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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this work is to offer a reflection on the significance of the role of emotions in 
theological ethics. There is growing concern in the area of philosophical and theological 
ethics over the role of emotions with serious consideration for the fact that human beings 
typically make ethical judgments combining both their rational and affective dimensions.1 
This resonates with psychological insights that human ethical decision-making is the fruit 
of two types of cognitive operations belonging to what we traditionally call ‘reason’ and 
‘intuition.’2 The so-called dual-process theories describe the first type of cognition as 
slower, more reflective and oftentimes, more calculative; in other words, a more 
sophisticated mode of assessing moral realities; the ‘intuitive’ system of judgment, on the 
other hand, is quicker, associative, and more primitive. The two systems are separate, but 
plastic and the judgments conducted by one can also be assessed by the other. The intuitive 
sphere has its foundations in emotions, beliefs, and response tendencies.3 While moral 
theologians traditionally focused on the rational side of the debate, our project’s objective 
is to make more transparent the affective dimension of ethical projects and the moral life.  
Even if one acknowledges that emotions might indeed play a role in human 
judgments, defining their adequate place in ethics is not easy. In order to achieve this we 
need to confront several fundamental questions. First of all, we need to determine what 
emotion actually is. Secondly, we need to inquire into the relationship between the 
emotions and the ethical realm and establish what it means to say that the emotions have a 
role in that realm.  
To approach these questions we decided to consult two key figures who offer 
accounts on the nature and ethical meaning of emotions, namely, Martha C. Nussbaum and 
Thomas Aquinas. In the field of philosophical ethics the question of emotions has become 
mainstream inquiry and Nussbaum represents one of the major voices in the discipline.4 
Nussbaum claims that emotions are essential factors shaping our mental and social lives 
and that they are undoubtedly a constitutive part of our ethical reasoning. She advocates a 
																																																						
1 In this instance we should note theologian Edward Collins Vacek, S.J. and his notable works in this area 
Love, Human and Divine. The Heart of Christian Ethics (Washington D.C: Georgetown University Press, 
1994) and “Orthodoxy Requires Orthopathy: Emotions in Theology,” Horizons Vol. 40, No. 2 (2013): 218-
241. We also note an earlier pioneer in this moral-theological field William C. Spohn, S.J. and his “The 
Reasoning Heart: An American Approach to Christian Discernment,” Theological Studies 44 (1983): 30-52. 
For now we indicate instances of advocating the importance of human affectivity in the area of Roman 
Catholic theology. We will discuss the sources of philosophical ethics in Chapter I, section 3. Thinking of 
Nussbaum’s Account of Emotions: Some Critical Reflections with all its subsections. 
2 Cf. Daniel Kahneman and Cass R. Sunstein, “Cognitive Psychology of Moral Intuitions,” Neurobiology of 
Human Values, eds. Jean-Pierre Changeux, Wolf Singer, Antonio R. Damasio, and Yves Christen 
(Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2005), 92. Kahneman and Sunstein describe intuitive judgments as automatic, 
effortless, associative, rapid, skilled, coming about through an opaque process and the rational deliberation as 
controlled, effortful, deductive, slow, self-aware, and rule-following. Kahneman and Sunstein, “Cognitive 
Psychology of Moral Intuitions,” 93.  
3 Cf. Ibid., 103. 
4 The current state and roots of philosophical inquiry into the nature of emotions is well presented in Ronald 
de Sousa’s article “Emotion,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), ed. Edward N. 
Zalta http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/emotion/. A comprehensive overview of the philosophy of emotion is 
offered in Peter Goldie, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009) and Robert C. Solomon, ed., Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
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cognitive theory of emotions in which she tries to articulate the complex intelligence of 
emotions as perceptions of value. More than that, Nussbaum provokes contemporary 
ethical discourse by suggesting that any ethical project that does not articulate an adequate 
account of the emotions is incomplete – a challenge that has to be considered seriously by 
the discipline of theological ethics. 
Our second key partner in this conversation comes from within the discipline of 
theological ethics and represents one of the main sources of ethical wisdom. In recent years 
one has witnessed a positive retrieval of Aquinas’s account on the passions found in the so-
called Treatise on the Passions (Questions 22-48 of the Prima secundae of the Summa 
theologiae). Despite the traditional lack of attention paid to this section of the Summa, 
authors like Servais Pinckaers, O.P., G. Simon Harak, S.J., Nicholas Lombardo, O.P, 
Diana Fritz Cates and Robert Miner (the latter within the discipline of philosophy) among 
others argue for an integral role of the passions in the overall picture of Thomistic ethics.5 
The passions understood as essential elements of human nature are seen as indispensible 
resources in the human pursuit of ultimate happiness. We will approach Aquinas’s views 
on the passions with the assistance of the latter three thinkers, Lombardo, Cates, and 
Miner, because their accounts incorporate a detailed investigation of the Treatise itself. 
Our own investigation will consist of careful reading of both authors on their own 
terms (in Aquinas’s case with the aid of contemporary interpretations). First, we will 
analyze Nussbaum’s thought on the emotions, examining her major work devoted to 
presentation of her moral psychology, namely, the Upheavals of Thought.6 We will also 
consult her other works as necessary. Nussbaum presents us with complex works written in 
a captivating literary manner. Owing to this fact, however, her arguments are not always 
easy to trace. Thus one of our own endeavors will be the construction of a systematic 
picture of Nussbaum’s perspective on the emotions. Nussbaum’s philosophy will also offer 
the point of departure to explore and discuss contemporary philosophical debates on the 
topic of emotion.7 In addition to this contemporary secular philosopher, we will present 
Aquinas’s account on the passions as a candidate for an insightful and distinctively 
Christian perspective of the nature and meaning of emotions in one’s life. Our method of 
presentation will consist of two major aspects: we will not only present a theoretical view 
of Nussbaum’s and Aquinas’s accounts on the emotion/passions8 in general, but we will 
																																																						
5 Servais Pinckaers, O.P., Passions and Virtue, transl. Benedict M. Guevin, O.S.B. (Washington: The 
Catholic of America University Press, 2015). Pinckaers’ book was translated into English at the end of July, 
2015. As a result, we did not get the chance to properly engage with it in the last phase of our work; G. 
Simon Harak, S.J., Virtuous Passions. The Formation of Christian Character (New York: Paulist Press, 
1993); Nicholas E. Lombardo, O.P., The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion (Washington, D.C.: The 
Catholic University of America Press, 2009); Diana Fritz Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions. A Religious-
Ethical Inquiry (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009); Robert Miner, Aquinas on the 
Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae Ia2ae 22-48 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
6 Martha C. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001). 
7 As indicated before, the question of emotions is by now a large topic in philosophical discussions and there 
are important approaches which attempt to describe the nature and meaning of emotions. We will situate 
Nussbaum in the context of those debates in the last part of Chapter I, section 3. Thinking of Nussbaum’s 
Account of Emotions: Some Critical Reflections. 
8 The distinction between the contemporary term ‘emotion’ and the term ‘passion’ is a historical and 
philosophical inquiry in its own right. We address the terminological issue in Chapter III, footnote 1. It is 
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offer case studies of two particular emotions. We have chosen two emotions that are 
traditionally understood as standing in tension with each other; compassion and anger.9 
Our synthetic account of Nussbaum’s perspective on compassion will lead us to the 
foundation of her moral psychology. Anger, which appears through Aquinas’s 
interpretative lenses in a thought-provoking way, will allow us to engage critically with 
Nussbaum’s emphasis on compassion and situate it in the contemporary discussions related 
to social justice.  
The structure of the work will be the following: Chapter I will inquire into the setting 
of Nussbaum’s general ethical thought and synthesize her theory of emotions. This will be 
confronted with the views of those contemporary philosophers of emotion particularly 
interested in intersections between philosophy and natural sciences. Chapter II will present 
a synthesis of Nussbaum’s multilayered account of the emotion of compassion, 
demonstrating its fundamental role in Nussbaum’s ethical project. The chapter will end 
with the theological critique by Cates suggesting that compassion is better conceived in 
terms of virtue, and philosopher Amia Srinivasan’s insight that compassion promoted on a 
political level might be a dangerous moral sentiment. The question is raised whether in 
certain cases anger would not serve as a more appropriate reaction. Chapter III will take us 
to Aquinas’s thought where we will present, as in Nussbaum’s case, the general setting of 
his ethics and attempt a positive retrieval of his views on the passions. This inquiry will 
lead us to Chapter IV which will start with the presentation of Aquinas’s views on anger. 
Introducing this specific case will not only help us to recapitulate Aquinas’s framework, it 
will also serve as the first bridge in bringing Aquinas and Nussbaum into conversation. 
The chapter will proceed by disclosing the similarities and distinctiveness of their general 
ethical frameworks and the elements we judge to be the most salient in their accounts of 
the emotions/passions. We will suggest that the accounts culminate into distinctive moral 
visions that include proposals for cultivating our affective dimension.  
Before we start our journey into the landscape of Nussbaum’s and Aquinas’s 
thought, we should note that the purpose of our inquiry is not to develop a third account of 
the nature and ethical meaning of emotions merging the views of both thinkers. Rather, we 
wish to present their thought on their own terms enabling us to have an in-depth 
understanding of their visions of human affectivity and their connection to ethics. The 
detailed analysis of Nussbaum’s and Aquinas’s thought facilitates a comparison between 
the two, bringing them into conversation through discussion on a particular emotion – 
anger.10 Our aim is to illustrate how both Nussbaum and Aquinas advance persuasive 
arguments for inclusion of the emotions in the general agenda of theological ethics. 
																																																																																																																																																																			
clear, however, that Aquinas, in his account of the passions, wanted to discuss the phenomena which we 
label ‘emotions’ today. 
9 We will start fleshing out the relationship between compassion as a morally praiseworthy emotion and 
anger as a morally ambiguous and possibly destructive emotion in Chapter II, sections 4.1.1.4 The Case of 
Anger, 4.1.1.5 Concluding Remarks and section 5.4 Is Compassion the Only Political Emotion We Owe to 
Others? with all its subsections. We continue in Chapter IV, sections 2. Continuing the Case of Anger with 
all its subsections, 2.2 Contemporary Thinkers on Anger: Anger as a Moral Response to an Imperfect World 
and sections 2.3 Nussbaum Against Anger and 2.4 Concluding Remarks. 
10 Theologian Carlo Leget offers an article on Nussbaum’s and Aquinas’s accounts on emotions which offers 
an introductory discussion on the topic, but not a detailed analysis. See Carlo Leget, “Martha Nussbaum and 
Thomas Aquinas on Emotions,” Theological Studies 64 (2003): 558-581. 
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CHAPTER I. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM’S CHALLENGE TO 
THEOLOGICAL ETHICS: THERE IS NO ADEQUATE THEORY OF 
ETHICS WITHOUT AN ADEQUATE THEORY OF THE EMOTIONS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION TO MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM’S ETHICAL PROJECT 
 
Martha C. Nussbaum,1 a renowned name in academic circles and beyond, provokes 
promising philosophical discourse with her ethical views. More than that, she challenges 
the theological agora. Claiming that there can be no adequate theory of ethics that does not 
incorporate an adequate theory of the emotions, Nussbaum demands that theologians, 
especially those working in theological ethics, closely examine her arguments.  
To inquire into Nussbaum’s challenge this chapter will pursue the following 
structure: first, we will establish the context of her ethical project. In the following pages 
we will lay down the most prominent features of her ethical theory. Furthermore, we will 
allow Nussbaum to speak for herself; her own self-descriptions will be instrumental to our 
construction of her ethical vision. In this way we do justice to our author and her thought, 
listening carefully to what she brings to the ethical discourse. This analysis will help us to 
grasp the reasons behind Nussbaum’s conviction that emotions are essential to ethics. As a 
second step, we will offer an analysis of Nussbaum’s theory of emotions. The first stop in 
this inquiry will be examination of the Stoic roots of her account and the presentation of its 
most prominent elements. We will then present Nussbaum’s analysis of the natural and 
cultural factors that shape human emotional lives. We will conclude our inquiry grounded 
in Nussbaum’s own terms by synthesizing her psychological account on the emotional 
development in human infants. This is critical to the adequate understanding of her theory 
of emotions. The chapter will culminate in a critical evaluation of Nussbaum’s theory of 
emotions by situating her views against accounts of her most prominent peers in 
philosophy, especially, those holding a keen interest in the intersections between 
philosophy and the natural sciences. 
 
1.1 THE GOAL OF ETHICS 
 
Under this broad heading we will discuss Nussbaum’s understanding of the meaning of 
ethics. As mentioned above, the most overarching feature of Nussbaum’s ethics is its 
Aristotelian character. But we should keep in mind that she also draws inspiration from the 
Greek poets of tragedy, specifically from the sense of life that one finds in their writings: 
“For I was finding in the Greek tragic poets a recognition of the ethical importance of 
                                                
1 Nussbaum is an American philosopher and professor at the University of Chicago, where she is the Ernst 
Freund Distinguished Professor of Law and Ethics. Her main research interests are in the fields of ancient 
philosophy, political philosophy, the philosophy of law, and ethics. Additionally, she specializes in questions 
of gender equality (she is especially interested in researching and writing on the situations of women in 
developing countries), developmental issues and animal rights. Speaking broadly, Nussbaum’s thought can 
be considered universalist, including within itself the female perspective, and is deeply Aristotelian. We 
could tell that there are two major pillars (or influences) holding up Nussbaum’s thinking. One is classical 
Greek thought, especially Aristotle and the poets of tragedy. The other is classical Roman thought, especially 
the Stoics. While her ethical thought is Aristotelian, Stoicism inspires the descriptive aspects of her theory of 
the emotions.  
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contingency, a deep sense of the problem of conflicting obligations, and a recognition of 
the ethical significance of the passions, that I found more rarely, if at all, in the thought of 
the admitted philosophers, whether ancient or modern.”2 In Greek tragedy Nussbaum finds 
a sense of vulnerability, not only of the moral agent (or rather the human being), but of life 
itself. Life, for Nussbaum, is something that one can never fully categorize, precisely due 
to the contingency and surprise perpetually born inside it. Nussbaum, it can be said, 
combines this sense of life with the version of Aristotelian ethics which she finds most 
convincing. For her, as for Aristotle, ethics begin with the very broad question of how a 
human being should live. Thus, it is not a cost-benefit analysis or a dilemma-solving 
device, but rather a way of living. Nussbaum eagerly reminds us that for Aristotle there 
was no real distinction between the ethical and other realms. Furthermore, ethical inquiry 
is both an empirical and a practical quest: “Empirical, in that it is concerned with, takes its 
‘evidence' from, the experience of life; practical, in that its aim is to find a conception by 
which human beings can live, and live together.”3 
For Nussbaum, as for Aristotle, ethics is both a personal and a communal endeavor. 
It begins with observation, with reflection concerning lived experience, and proceeds by 
comparing this experience with existing moral theories. Nussbaum’s starting point is the 
question of what we are actually doing when we deliberate regarding pressing ethical 
issues. She urges us to stop for a moment, imagining that we have forgotten everything that 
we previously knew about ethics: Kantianism, Utilitarianism, even Aristotle and Thomas 
Aquinas, and to look at our own lives: at what we actually value, how we come to make 
moral decisions, what is at the core of the things we cherish, our deepest decision-making 
processes in which we are engaged when no one is watching and what they show us to be, 
and also at who we are as communal beings, members of families, neighbors, colleagues, 
citizens, and members of a global community. The following seems to be Nussbaum’s 
methodology: to find not a perfect, but an adequate fit between one’s own sense of life and 
external sources of wisdom. In her own words:  
 
The participants look not for a view that is true by correspondence to some extra-human reality, 
but for the best overall fit between a view and what is deepest in human lives. They are asked to 
imagine, at each stage, what they can least live well without, what lies deepest in their lives; and, 
again, what seems more superficial, more dispensable. They seek for coherence and fit in the web 
of judgment, feeling, perception, and principle, taken as a whole.4  
 
Hence, her ethics seeks a proper fit between experience and available moral theories. 
This means that her ethical proposal, in accordance with Aristotle, can be described as 
inclusive, flexible and open-ended.5 
                                                
2 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Introduction: Form and Content, Philosophy and Literature,” in Love’s Knowledge. 
Essays on Philosophy and Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 14. 
3 Ibid., 25. 
4 Ibid., 26. 
5 This is manifest in various writings by Nussbaum spanning a long portion of her career time. It is illustrated 
in the following long quotation from Upheavals of Thought. This work will be discussed in detail when we 
present her theory of the emotions. For now, it is enough to mention that this work addresses three major 
themes. The first is her theory of the emotions. The second is compassion as the best personal and social-
political moral guide. The third one is the diverse ascents of love proposed within various philosophical and 
literary traditions (since love is thought to be at the root of all the other emotions, and if one can show that 
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Nussbaum’s ethical proposal is also faithful to another important aspect of 
Aristotelian ethics: the search for the middle ground. Here it should be borne in mind that 
she addresses many topics that are controversial or that quickly engender heated debate 
(examples include her accounts of social emotions like primitive shame and disgust and 
their import for gender issues and the morality of homosexuality). Furthermore, the label 
‘analytic feminist philosopher’ usually presupposes of its referent fairly radical ethical 
positions. Nussbaum, however, adheres to a moderate ethical position. In her own words: 
“I have no interest in dismissive assaults of systematic ethical theory, or on ‘Western 
rationality,’ or even on Kantianism or Utilitarianism.”6 
 
1.2 NUSSBAUM’S UNIVERSALISM 
 
As is proper for an Aristotelian, Nussbaum defends a full universalist ethical theory against 
all the objections of radical relativism. While universalism is present in all of her works, 
she is especially devoted to refuting objections to essentialism. Essentialism can be defined 
as follows: “The view that human life has certain defining features.”7 Its opponents link it 
with “an ignorance of history, with lack of sensitivity to the voices of women and 
minorities. It is taken, usually without extended argument, to be in league with racism and 
sexism, with ‘patriarchal’ thinking generally, whereas extreme relativism is taken to be a 
recipe for social progress.”8 Nussbaum is convinced that linking the view that human life 
does indeed have certain defining features with the aforementioned types of discrimination 
is all together wrong. Moreover, she argues that only a fully universalist ethical theory can 
provide us with an adequate account of the human being’s good, which then can serve the 
cause of its protection and promotion. For her, a moral philosophy must ultimately lead to 
political action. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary that it contains an account of the 
human good. Universalist theory, she thinks, advances the protection of human beings and 
the betterment of their life circumstances. It also enables one to judge particular situations 
in terms according to the standards of an overall human condition. 
Nussbaum strongly opposes the idea that a rejection of metaphysical realism leaves 
us without foundations for our evaluative choices. She argues that if we abandon hope in a 
                                                                                                                                              
this highly ambiguous concept can be healed by a proper therapy of desire, then a door is opened for the 
entrance of the emotions into philosophical-ethical discourse). After 713 pages Nussbaum offers the 
following conclusion: “It seems logical that a series of discussions of the ascent of love would end with a 
total text, one that includes all the elements that I think a view of love should include. If I am correct, 
however, such a complete ending is false to the complexity of the problem, and perhaps itself an aspect of the 
problem. The longing for totality breeds intolerance of the individual. We are left not with a total text, but 
with insights from several idealistic pictures that we may try to incorporate into the greater chaos of our 
lives: with Dante’s lucid love of the individual, piercing the fog of envy, anger, and sloth; with Mahler’s 
triumphant compassion, rising above envy, including the whole world of mortal striving in its embrace; with 
Whitman’s political call to a democratic equality grounded in the recognition of mortality, with ‘the most 
excellent sun so calm and haughty,...the gentle soft-born measureless light.’” See Nussbaum, Upheavals of 
Thought, 713. 
6 Martha C. Nussbaum, “The Discernment of Perception: An Aristotelian Conception of Private and Public 
Rationality,” in Love’s Knowledge. Essays on Philosophy and Literature (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1990), 27. 
7 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Social Justice and Universalism: In Defense of an Aristotelian Account of Human 
Functioning,” Modern Philology 90 (1993): 49.  
8 Ibid., 49. 
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transcendent metaphysical grounding, we are not then left with a radically free play. This is 
because “we have everything we always really had all along: the exchange of reasons and 
arguments by human beings within history, in which, for reasons that are historical and 
human (but not the worse for that), we hold some things to be more valuable than others, 
some more important than others, as constituents of the life we call our own.”9 Nussbaum’s 
conception of the good aims to be universalist in the proper sense. It aspires to bridge 
religious and cultural gulfs. It is not metaphysical realism. It is not ahistorical and it does 
not advocate a single faith tradition or set of metaphysical doctrines. Rather, it simply 
advances the following claim: we recognize others as human across and in spite of the 
barriers of time and space. There exists a broadly shared, general consensus about the 
features the absence of which means the end of a human form of life.10 
At this point the following question arises. Who gets the final say about the good? In 
other words, who judges regarding what should be included or excluded in our definition 
of it? The account’s author? Nussbaum claims that the best accounts emerge from (a) the 
self-understandings of persons in many times and places and (b) from the narratives that 
people tell about themselves.11 As her ethics is open-ended, so also is her understanding of 
the human good.  
We should at this point be aware that universal theories of the good usually originate 
in nations favored by history with track records of oppression toward other nations. Such 
accounts may thus be viewed as contributing to the ‘colonization’ and Westernization of 
other cultures. Critiques of universalist theories are usually constituted by a three-fold 
argument: 1) an argument from culture, 2) an argument from diversity, and 3) an argument 
from paternalism.12 Nussbaum urges theorists advocating universal ethical systems to be 
attentive to these. The first argument, she claims, gives space for critiques of unjust 
cultural practices, while also leaving room for individuals who choose traditional 
hierarchical ways of being in society. The second urges universalist theorists to recognize 
that they “ought to provide spaces in which valuably different forms of human activity can 
flourish.”13 The argument from paternalism “nudges us strongly in the direction of what 
might be called political rather than comprehensive liberalism, in the sense that it urges us 
to respect the many different conceptions of the good citizens may have and to foster a 
political climate in which they will each be able to pursue the good.”14 But Nussbaum is at 
the same time acutely aware that these critiques understand persons to be dignified 
choosers, asking us to respect them as such. Such respect, however, already presupposes 
the acknowledgment of certain universal values, like respect for each person’s dignity and 
basic political rights/liberties.15 Hence, in her eyes an adequate universalist theory is 
                                                
9 Nussbaum, “Social Justice and Universalism,” 53. 
10 Cf. Ibid., 54. 
11 We can identify as constancies within diverse narrative self-understandings of what it means to be human: 
(1) the teachings of the major world religions and (2) various historical and anthropological data. Also, the 
world’s major philosophical traditions all include attempts to answer the question of what it means to be 
human.  
12 Cf. Martha C. Nussbaum, “In Defense of Universal Values,” The Fifth Annual Hesburgh Lectures on 
Ethics and Public Policy (1999): 7. 
13 Ibid., 23. 
14 Ibid., 23. 
15 Cf. Ibid., 7. 
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facilitative, not imposing. It creates a space for action, rather than forcing distorted 
normative visions onto actual human functioning.16  
 
1.3 NUSSBAUM’S FEMINISM 
 
Another prominent feature of Nussbaum’s ethical proposal is its feminist character. Yet 
here also should one remember the middle position that she advocates. While she is clearly 
interested in articulating an ethics reflective of the situations of females worldwide, her 
feminism is not ‘radical’. In her own words: “I myself think (albeit controversially) that a 
good moral theory is fully universal, that there is no reason why we should expect women 
as such to have different roles or goals, and also no reason why we should expect them to 
have a distinctive set of positions.”17 However, Nussbaum does agree that women’s 
experiences are generally different from those of males; a fact owing itself to history’s 
having created a certain amount of inequality between the genders. We mean here that 
original contributions on the part of women to moral philosophy are not what they are by 
virtue of their author’s being a woman and thus having distinctive ways of knowing. 
Rather, history has exposed women more than men to certain situations. Women’s 
continuously having to face ethical conflicts within their lives has prevented them from 
saying “some of the silly things about moral conflicts that the tradition has sometimes 
said.”18 By ‘silly things’ she means the denial of moral conflict in general and/or the claim 
that when such conflicts are carefully examined, then it will be discovered that one of the 
conflicting obligations is not a real obligation after all. Women’s daily lives, Nussbaum 
considers, have led them to investigate what might be characterized as a more holistic 
approach to ethics. They have integrated reason within life’s moral totality, some troubling 
features of which are situations of real conflict occurring within the plurality of possibly 
realizable goods.19 This, however, should not cause female thinkers to diminish reason’s 
importance or to be more prone to impulse. Finally, it should surprise no one that the half 
of the human race previously deprived from contributing to philosophy now brings to it 
some fairly original reflections.20 
                                                
16 Cf. Ibid., 24. Nussbaum’s understanding of universalism is a framework where her capabilities approach is 
conceived. In these sections we discuss the main characteristics of her ethics generally speaking, we discuss 
the capability approach in particular in Chapter II, sections 4.1.1 The Central Human Capabilities; 4.1.1.1 
What Are the Capabilities?; 4.1.1.2 Functioning and Capability; 4.1.1.3 Capabilities Approach and the 
Relevance of Emotions. 
17 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Virtue Ethics: A Misleading Category?,” The Journal of Ethics Vol. 3, No. 3 
(1999): 176. 
18 Ibid., 177. 
19 Cf. Nussbaum, “Virtue Ethics,” 177. 
20 Women were at the forefront of the integration of moral psychology and the study of the emotions into 
moral philosophy. Yet Nussbaum claims that one reason for this is reactive: “Women have frequently been 
denigrated on account of their allegedly greater emotional nature, so one way of responding to that would be 
to understand these elements of the personality between and, for example, to argue that they are not brutish 
but highly discerning, not devoid of thought but infused with thought. Another reason for the emphasis is that 
on balance women have more often been encouraged by society to attend and label their emotions. This 
means that they are often better places to undertake such an inquiry. Finally, women have often spent more 
time than men caring for young children, an occupation that both confronts one every day with a tremendous 
range of emotions, both in the child and in oneself, and requires one to deal with these responsibly and 
perceptively.” See Nussbaum, “Virtue Ethics,” 176. As we will see later in our exploration of Nussbaum’s 
theory of the emotions, she does not ascribe different emotional responses to males and females per se, but 
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1.4 NUSSBAUM’S FOCUS ON THE MORAL AGENT AND THE SENSE OF LIFE 
 
Nussbaum is also rather outspoken about yet another prominent feature of her ethics: its 
focus on the moral agent. She claims that moral philosophy should be primarily concerned 
with agents, not just choices and actions. If we see the discipline in these terms, then we 
will analyze the agent’s inner moral life (patterns of motivation, emotions, reasoning, etc.), 
rather than just his or her isolated actions.21  
Nussbaum indicates that she bases her ethics upon five essential dimensions of 
Aristotelian thought. But we have to be cautious here, for she identifies these dimensions 
herself. These features are: 1) the non-commensurability of valuable things, 2) the priority 
of perceptions, 3) the ethical value of emotions, 4) the ethical relevance of uncontrolled 
happenings, and 5) possibility as constitutive of our lives.22 These features, in a more 
proximate or a more distant form can be found in the classical novels too, Nussbaum 
considers.23 They presuppose as does Aristotelian ethics, the same ‘sense of life’ that we 
indent to present in this section.  
Nussbaum is convinced that we cannot truly grasp ethical performance without 
adequately understanding the agent’s moral life. The latter phrase designates both the 
performance’s immediate context, which is constituted by the agent’s motives and 
intentions, the quality of deliberation, his or her reactive emotions, etc., and its remote 
context, central to which is an estimation of the choice’s compatibility with the patterns of 
choosing that person has (or has not) cultivated. The ‘sense of life’ present in Aristotelian 
ethics thus provides the best tools for answering these questions, intrinsic as they are to the 
endeavor of moral philosophy. As Nussbaum sees it, the moral agent has to make his or her 
ethical decisions within what she describes as the messiness of life.24 Inspired by Aristotle 
and the Greek poets of tragedy, she explores the ethical realms (remember that for her, as 
for Aristotle, there is no demarcation between ethical and non-ethical realms) with which 
we are confronted on a daily basis. Her moral agent lives in a world marked by 
contingency and a plurality of goods. This world inevitably provides for her agent moral 
conflicts and difficult choices between values that really do conflict with each other. Thus, 
he or she witnesses the non-commensurability of good things. Nussbaum claims that the 
choices made by moral agents in a world pervaded by conflicting attachments and 
obligations often carry with them a tragic character.25 In her words: “The choice between 
                                                                                                                                              
acknowledges that these may differ due to historical circumstances and learnt emotive behaviors. Moreover, 
the distinction between male and female emotive patterns is not central in Nussbaum’s works, as she seems 
not terribly intrigued by it. She rather speaks of human emotive patterns, not dividing them into male and 
female. See Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought. 
21 Cf. Nussbaum, “Virtue Ethics,” 170. 
22 Cf. Nussbaum, “The Discernment of Perception,” 36-46. 
23 Cf. Ibid., 36. 
24 ‘Messy’ is not a common word in philosophical ethics, which generally aims at categorizing and ordering 
our moral lives. Nussbaum does not dismiss the possibility of moral growth. In fact, promoting this is a goal 
of her work. But she does emphasize that the ethical choices that we make in our daily lives generally refuse 
to fit neatly into categories. Taking daily experience as a source of ethical reflection is very Aristotelian. Yet 
she goes a step further than Aristotle by presenting the emotions as essential to ethics, not only as regards 
habit-formation, but also as a genuine indicator of value. She admits that including the emotions in ethics 
may make this enterprise even messier. See Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, I. 
25 Cf. Nussbaum, “The Discernment of Perception,” 37. 
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two qualitatively different actions or commitments, when on account of circumstances one 
cannot pursue both, is or can be tragic – in part because the item forgone is not the same as 
an item attained.”26 Moreover, the moral agent confronted with difficult choices bares 
responsibility for his/her actions. Nussbaum calls this the priority of perception or the 
priority of the particular, meaning essentially “the ability to discern, acutely and 
responsively, the salient features of one’s particular situation”27 or one’s “becoming finely 
aware and richly responsible.”28 
Nussbaum’s moral agent lives within what is best described as the surprise of life. 
What do we mean by this? In short, that the ‘richly responsible’ agent wrestles with a 
world marked by particular perception and a certain generality of moral knowledge. Here 
we commence discussion of the relationship between concrete perception and general 
rules. Nussbaum claims that morality can be described by utilizing the metaphor of 
improvisation often employed by Aristotle himself.29 Concrete perception demands that we 
be attentive to phenomena not previously noticed and therefore not yet incorporated within 
already existing systems of rules. But make no mistake, rules and general categories still 
have major significance in the endeavor of morality. They are sources of accumulated 
wisdom usually worth consulting. Yet they are also essentially limited in their being fixed 
in advance of particular situations. They tend to omit the following: first, the new and 
unanticipated features of moral situations (if an agent is taught to see morality as merely 
the application of rules designed to cover a large range of situations to his/her particular 
circumstances, then he or she is poorly prepared to face life’s actual flow, lacking the 
resources to confront its unexpected occurrences); second, the context embeddedness of 
relevant features, meaning that all of the aspects of a concrete situation are complexly 
interrelated (one aspect cannot be judged fairly if we neglect this mutual connectedness); 
and third, the ethical relevance of particular persons and relationships. When these omitted 
aspects are incorporated together in ethical reflection, they force us to view life as it is. A 
single life has a single trajectory, containing within itself important relationships.30 To 
think life otherwise is to imagine it differently than it actually is. And here no qualitative 
replacements will do. For it is essential to the human situation that things do not repeat 
themselves. Certain relationships can never be replaced. For example, one has only one 
mother who lives once only. Nussbaum concludes, “so the universalizable does not, it 
would seem, determine every dimension of choice and there are silences of the heart within 
which its demands cannot, and should not, be heard.”31 
Nussbaum’s moral agent also makes ethical choices fully, i.e., through rational 
deliberation accompanied by appropriate emotions. Thus, “practical reasoning 
unaccompanied by emotion is not sufficient for practical wisdom.”32 Here she elaborates 
on the cognitive role of the emotions, viewing them as intelligent parts of our ethical 
agency. For her, they are involved in deliberation processes and are hence intrinsic to 
ethics. But these arguments will be presented in full in a moment. In addition, her moral 
                                                
26 Ibid., 37. 
27 Ibid., 37. 
28 Ibid., 37. 
29 Cf. Ibid., 43. 
30 Cf. Ibid., 38-39. 
31 Ibid., 40. 
32 Ibid., 40. 
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agent can appreciate the ethical relevance of uncontrolled happenings, because these 
enable him or her to grasp the novel and to master particular situations by improvising 
accordingly.33 Moreover, for Nussbaum’s agent possibility is a mark of life, defined here in 
terms of the becoming or pursuit of something better than that which already exists.34 
 
1.5 NUSSBAUM’S JUDAISM 
 
Nussbaum to be sure does not work in the field of religious ethics, but as we have seen 
attempts to construct a secular universalist ethics. Yet in accessing the account written 
from particular religious commitment, she does not hesitate ‘to put her cards on the table:’ 
 
To put my cards on the table, then, what I say henceforth is said from the point of view of 
someone who has converted from Christianity to Judaism, and whose understanding of 
Judaism gives the moral sphere considerable autonomy and centrality, seeing the concern of 
God for man as essentially moral and political, focused on this-worldly concerns and actions, 
and intelligible from the point of view of a this-worldly use of intelligence.35 
 
Nussbaum, then, generally speaking will find any religious ethics that does not 
provide the moral sphere with sufficient amount of autonomy and offers other-worldly 
solutions to the ethical problems of the here and now inadequate, if not dangerous. She 
especially finds Christian ethical accounts troublesome.36 In the third and final part of the 
Upheavals of Thought, Ascents of Love Nussbaum leads us to consider the accounts of 
erotic love and its purification. She is convinced that any account of the emotions must 
confront the ambivalence of erotic love – especially if we consider that love is at the root 
of every emotion.37 If we want to find a conceptual space for compassion in our ethical 
                                                
33 Cf. Ibid., 43. 
34 Cf. Ibid., 46. 
35 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 549. In this passage Nussbaum gives away her own conviction and 
states that it will color her judgment of Augustine’s account of love. 
36 Nussbaum in some of her works and the magazine interviews she gives, explains that she was raised 
Episcopalian in Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania by a southern racist father who did not attend her wedding to Alan 
Nussbaum, a Jew, and could not accept her following conversion to Judaism in 1969. Nussbaum explains that 
she, as a convert, already has concepts of “rationalist, chosen Judaism” (Martha C. Nussbaum, “Judaism and 
the Love of Reason,” in Philosophy, Feminism, and Faith, eds. Ruth E. Groenhout and Marya Bower 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press), 10), which she can contrast with a life in a wasp (White Anglo-
Saxon Protestant) family and gives her the knowledge of anti-Semitism that comes from personal experience. 
Journalist Giles Fraser after concluding an interview for The Guardian with Nussbaum cannot, but conclude: 
“The more she talks, the more I begin to think that a great deal of her work is a wrestling with the Christian 
religion of her father – not least with Christianity's nervousness about the body in general and sexuality in 
particular. A more this-worldly religion such as Judaism is perfectly suited to a philosopher who made her 
name in The Fragility of Goodness by defending the practical ethics of Aristotle over the metaphysical 
supernaturalism of Plato.” Giles Fraser, “Martha Nussbaum and new religious intolerance: ‘Is it right to 
allow nuns to teach in full habit but to ban Muslim teachers wearing headscarves?,’” The Guardian, Friday 
June 29, 2012 [accessed February 13, 2015]. 
37 Cf. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 459. Nussbaum construes erotic love as “an intense form of object-
love that underlies all the adult emotions and colors them.” Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 460. We will 
discuss the root of it in section 2.4 Roots of Emotional Experience in Infancy of this chapter. Erotic love, 
furthermore, “involves an opening of the self toward an object, a conception of the self that pictures the self 
as incomplete and reaching out for something valued. The object is seen as valuable and radiant, the self as 
extending itself toward that radiance.” Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 460-461. To put it in yet another 
form we could say that “love is a particular kind of awareness of an object, as tremendously wonderful and 
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projects, we will also have to investigate and find a proper place for the initial attachment – 
erotic love. Nussbaum inquires whether it is possible to say that erotic love can be part of a 
good ethical life and her method could be best summarized in the following way: 
 
What we find emerging, therefore, in consequence of this perceived tension between love’s 
energy for good and its subversive power, is a recurrent attempt to reform or educate erotic 
love, so as to keep its creative force while purifying it of ambivalences and excess, and making 
it more friendly to general social aims. This tradition centrally uses the metaphor of an 
‘ascent,’ in which the aspiring lover climbs a ladder from the quotidian love from which she 
began, with all its difficulties, to an allegedly higher and more truly fulfilling love. In each 
case, moving the lover up the ladder involves both addition and subtraction; and we must ask 
whether what is left at the end still contains what was originally valuable and wonderful in 
love, whether it is still erotic at all, still love at all.38 
 
We will not dwell upon all the suggested ascents, but we will look into Nussbaum’s 
suggested accounts of Christian love and the accounts associated with Judaism, since her 
own Jewish conviction is a center of our interest.39 To access the account of love 
normatively Nussbaum sets it against three normative criteria: compassion, reciprocity, and 
                                                                                                                                              
salient, and as deeply needed by the self.” Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 477. Erotic love, then, is a 
partial force, threatening by its intensity the equal concern. Erotic love also allows another person deep into 
oneself and, by this, passivity and lack of control becomes features of it. This, Nussbaum argues, opens our 
worlds for ‘unbearably deep need’ and “a need this deep is rarely free of retributive wishes.” Nussbaum, 
Upheavals of Thought, 462. She also urges that we should be aware of erotic love’s close connection to anger 
and aggression, shame and disgust.  
We should also keep in mind that love is a complex emotion to define and discuss, thus Nussbaum reminds 
us that the emotion love is also a relationship. And so she argues that: “there are types of love that do have 
requirements beyond the emotional, and these are among the most important types of love for the purposes of 
normative ethics…In other words, the term ‘love’ is used equivocally, to name both an emotion and a more 
complex form of life. Our object-relations account may be adequate to describe the emotions, without giving 
a complete account of the fuller form of life of which emotions of love are a central part.” Nussbaum, 
Upheavals of Thought, 474. Nussbaum thus urges that any investigation of the emotions should not forget to 
concern itself ‘with the whole fabric of love.’ 
Lastly, Nussbaum urges readers to be open in thinking about the sexual aspect of erotic love and the role of 
sexual elements in it. We will discover her views on the relationship between the emotions and physiological 
aspects in the upcoming sections 2.2.5 The Non-Cognitive Elements of Emotions; 2.2.6 Feeling and Kinetic 
Properties of the Emotion; and 2.2.7 Emotions as Upheavals of Thought. 
For now we should keep in mind that Nussbaum argues that it is indeed plausible to think of erotic love as 
intimately linked to some type of sexual desire, yet “‘upheavals of thought’ are often linked to other 
upheavals – but love itself is in the upheaval of mind” and so “the intercourse and its physical manifestations 
are not themselves the love.” Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 474. 
38 Ibid., 469. 
39 To put it concisely, Nussbaum focuses on three types of ascent found in a long Western philosophical and 
literature tradition: “Instead, I shall focus on three distinct types of ascent story that form their own 
continuous traditions within that larger tradition: an account of the ascent that focuses on contemplation of 
the good and beautiful; a Christian account of the ascent that investigates the role of humility, longing, and 
grace; and a Romantic account that rejects a static telos for ascent, holding that striving itself is love’s 
transcendence. Finally, I shall consider an account of a reverse ascent or ‘descent’ of love in which human 
desire sets itself the task of embracing the imperfect human world with love.” Nussbaum, Upheavals of 
Thought, 469. In the first group she puts Plato, Spinoza and Proust; the second group is represented by 
Augustine and Dante, the Romantic ascent is represented by Emily Brönte and Gustav Mahler (Nussbaum 
greatly values Mahler’s account, which according to her is formulated in universal terms and the following 
‘descent’ accounts offer a particular expression of its values), and the last and her preferred group of 
‘descent’ is represented by Walt Whitman and James Joyce. 
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individuality.40 The first criterion indicates that the view of love has to make space and 
support general social compassion; the reciprocity criterion stands for a claim that love 
should make space and support “reciprocal relationships of concern in which people treat 
one another not just as things, but as agents and ends;”41 the individuality criterion argues 
that an adequate account of love will recognize human beings as separate and qualitatively 
distinctive individuals (this criterion essentially refers to a one chance to live this life as a 
unique individual).  
Nussbaum takes Augustine’s and Dante’s accounts as representatives of Christian 
accounts of love and finds both of them insufficient to meet her criteria. She tries not to be 
entirely dismissive and in Augustine’s case we can find her claiming that she regards his 
account “as a major philosophical achievement and a decisive progress beyond the Platonic 
accounts: because it situates ascent within humanity and renounces the wish to depart from 
our human condition.”42 But Nussbaum is hesitant whether Augustine’s account of love 
respects the criterion of individuality – she acknowledges that “in loving God, Augustine 
emphasizes, one loves each and every human being – not only the good parts but also the 
flaws and faults, and not only as stepping stones to one’s own artwork but in 
themselves.”43 Yet she questions what role is left for loving real life particular people in 
The Confessions. For her, what one loves the most in them is the presence of God and thus 
she questions to what degree the lover loves the individual in its separate and qualitatively 
distinct life. When it comes to reciprocity Nussbaum argues that “Augustine portrays the 
ascending Christian as radically isolated in her confessional zeal, retreating from the world 
to be alone with God. There is some question as to how this confessing lover can be said to 
have a neighbor at all.”44 Furthermore, she argues that there is a recognition of equality in 
Augustine’s thought, yet it is based on our common sinfulness as foundation of the 
community. And Nussbaum conceives this as a mistake: “There is, I think, too much of 
abjectness in this, too much unwillingness to grant that a human being may in fact become 
                                                
40 Nussbaum argues that these positive criteria are needed because when we talk normatively about love “we 
are talking, clearly, about matters both personal and social.” Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 478. The 
account of love she is searching for should support the vision of the best political arrangement to her 
judgment: “[W]e want to know whether we can find an account of love that really does make it reasonable to 
expect that the emotional life of citizens will support pluralistic liberal-democratic institutions. Although the 
arguments that follow do not strenuously observe this distinction between political values and comprehensive 
values, and although it thus remains an open question how many of this part’s conclusions could be made 
part of a political ‘overlapping consensus,’ my tentative judgment is that the normative criteria set out here 
are reasonable ones for all citizens to share. Loves that do not have these features should certainly be 
tolerated, but we can see that they are less likely to be supportive of the goals of a liberal-democratic 
society.” Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 479. We will discover Nussbaum’s political vision and its 
connection with the emotions more in depth in Chapter II, section 4.1.1 The Central Human Capabilities and 
all the subsections. What we should bear in mind now is that Nussbaum is a universalist thinker who offers 
an account of good, thus, she takes a stance in defining good and bad things. Yet her approach attempts to be 
open and respectful, even in its self definition – persons are pointed to the direction of good, but never forced 
into functioning according to it. However, the issue remains open to discussion, as it is a sensitive topic in 
itself, the thinkers who do not adhere to universalist thought might accuse her of paternalism by defining the 
good and universalist thinkers starting from a different premise would see her as using coercive arguments 
and pushing everyone to agree with her conception of the good. 
41 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 480. 
42 Ibid., 547. 
43 Ibid., 549. 
44 Ibid., 550. 
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and be, good, and that there is all the world of difference between the evil and the good. 
This entails a related failure to acknowledge individuality: each is treated as sinful, even 
before each has had a chance to live.”45  
When it comes to the criterion of compassion, Nussbaum argues again that 
Augustinian conception of it is directed at our common sinfulness and the need for God’s 
grace.46 This for her means that all human suffering and virtues are made provisional. 
“This means,” Nussbaum argues, “that Augustinian love is committed to denying the 
importance of the worldly losses and injustices to which my neighbor may attach 
importance, in order to assert the primacy of the need for God and the potential for 
grace.”47 Then “[d]eath is irrelevant, real suffering in this world is irrelevant, all that is 
relevant is coming into God’s presence”48 and in addition “the aim of slipping off into 
beatitude distracts moral attention from the goal of making this world a good world, and 
encourages a focus on one’s own moral safety that does not bode well for earthly 
justice.”49 
Dante represents an Aristotelian-Thomistic version of Christian account of love for 
Nussbaum and he seems to do way better than Augustine in her eyes. And with some 
tensions, he still seems to pass the criteria of reciprocity and particularity.50 When it comes 
to Dante’s portrayal of compassion, Nussbaum merits him for making an advancement 
from Augustine and making compassion for human suffering a fundamental element of his 
ascent story. His picture of compassion is also both “more insistently worldly and 
social.”51 But Nussbaum still finds a tension between Dante’s compassion and his portrayal 
of redeemed souls as lacking in nothing and complete. And so she goes on to argue that 
“[o]ne cannot help feeling that this doctrine is in some tension with the desire to represent 
                                                
45 Ibid., 550-551. 
46 While Nussbaum is critical of Augustine’s conception of compassion (or her own interpretation of 
Augustine’s views), she is not dismissive of Christian accounts of compassion in general. We can find her 
stating that “I argued that the good social agent should care when people are hungry, when they mourn, when 
they are persecuted – and should, in her compassion, see the remediation of those bad states of affairs as an 
urgent task of earthly politics. This is of course exactly how compassion functions in many parts of the 
Christian tradition, not least in the social doctrine of the contemporary Roman Catholic Church, with its 
scathing attacks on inequality and its admirable concern for the eradication of hunger, persecution, and other 
ills of earthly life.” Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 552. Nussbaum’s argument is then simply that 
Augustine’s version of Christian compassion is not truly attentive to this-worldly ills. 
47 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 552. 
48 Ibid., 552. 
49 Ibid., 553. 
50 Nussbaum hence argues that: “In short, Dante’s Aristotelianism points in two directions. On the one hand, 
it points toward a view that was unknown in his day, but which has become familiar as a type of Catholic 
liberalism (instantiated in the views of thinkers such as Jacques Maritain, John Courtney Murray, and, more 
recently David Tracy). On this view, respect for agency takes a central position, preventing church authority 
from using coercive means to its goals, and enjoining public respect for divergent religions, even when one is 
convinced that they are in error. I have said that Dante’s conception of the person as both free and needy 
promises a particularly attractive version of such a position. On the other hand, his view points toward 
Augustinian abjectness and shame, seeing in church authority the only remedy for disobedience. In this view, 
citizens are children, and the church is the only parent. On such a view, reciprocity should never be the basis 
for politics in this world.” Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 583. When it comes to the individuality 
criterion, Nussbaum continues that “Dante’s achievement centers around individuality, both separateness and 
particularity. He stresses that the cured Christian lover can embrace many elements of the particular person 
that Platonic love could not, or could not fully, embrace: the idiosyncrasies, the flaws and faults, the history, 
the particular talents and affinities that chart our course of life.” Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 583. 
51 Ibid., 587-588. 
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the world as a place whose events matter greatly, even from the point of view of 
salvation”52 and that “[t]he image of Heaven as a place of self-sufficiency, and a place of 
beatitude in the sense of an end to mourning, cannot ultimately be reconciled with the idea 
of ongoing compassion for human life. Compassion is incomprehensible without 
mourning; if these things are important, they are important.”53 Thus for the dichotomy of 
choice between regarding the world and its struggles as provisional or regarding it as a 
history of important struggles seeking justice remains unresolved in Dante’s account. 
Thus Nussbaum’s judgment of the Christian accounts, she admits, comes from her 
views as a Reformation Jew – in which the moral has a significant amount of autonomy 
and religious and this-world discussions are guided by the same enlightened reason of the 
here and now. We can find her claiming further:  
 
I am an Enlightenment Jew. My Judaism is marked by a commitment to the primacy of the 
moral, to the authority of truth and reason, and to the equal worth of all human beings. That 
this Judaism is both feminist and cosmopolitan follows from its commitment to these great 
organizing values. Like the intellectual leaders who gave rise to Reform Judaism in Germany, I 
conceive of God’s kingdom as the kingdom of ends, a virtual polity, containing both true 
autonomy and true community, that organizes our moral hopes and efforts in this world of 
confusion, herdlike obedience, and unenlightened self-interest.54 
 
Nussbaum argues that the early German Reform Jews’ works could be seen as an 
extended conversation with Immanuel Kant, with whose argumentation about religion in 
terms of reason alone they agreed (but disagreed with his critical views about Judaism 
itself). The early Reformers regarded Judaism as a religion that more than other belief 
systems “put regard for humanity and imperatives of moral conduct at its very core.”55 
Furthermore, Nussbaum claims that Judaism’s stress on justice in the here and now made it 
an ideal mediator of Kant’s vision of ideal religion: “the this-worldly character of the 
religion, combined with the priority it attaches to practice in contrast to belief and 
metaphysics, makes it ideally suited to be the vehicle of a Kantian program of rational 
religious reform.”56 And this, Nussbaum argues, does not mean that the early reformers 
                                                
52 Ibid., 589. 
53 Ibid., 590. 
54 Nussbaum, “Judaism and the Love of Reason,” 9. According to Nussbaum the sources of the Jewish 
Enlightenment thinking are the following (she is also well aware that they are the subjects of interpretation 
and not a case of complete agreement): “I shall be referring to several distinct strands of Jewish 
Enlightenment thinking: the Haskalah, or Jewish Enlightenment, of which Moses Mendelssohn (1729-86) 
was the most famous and influential exemplar; the early German Jewish Reformers, especially Abraham 
Geiger (1810-74) and Samuel Holdheim (1806-60); the early leaders of Reform in the United States, most 
influential among whom were Isaac Mayer Wise (1819-1900) and David Einhorn (1809-79); and ‘Classical’ 
Reform Judaism, among whose many leaders two Chicago rabbis Kaufmann Kohler (1843-1926) and Emil 
Hirsch (1851-1923) are particularly important for my discussion. In addition, I shall refer to several official 
documents of American Reform Judaism: the Pittsburgh Platform (1885), the Columbus Platform (1937), 
and the San Francisco Platform, ‘Reform Judaism – a Centenary Perspective’ (1976). Obviously many of the 
ideas I derive from these sources are controversial; many Reform Jews do not accept all of them, and some 
may deny them all – especially at present, when, in the aftermath of the Holocaust, many Reform Jews have 
lost the rational optimism that once characterized the religion as a whole.” Nussbaum, “Judaism and the Love 
of Reason,” 17.  
55 Ibid., 18. 
56 Ibid., 18. 
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suggested the innovation of Judaism. Instead, it was a return to the Biblical and thus the 
prophetic core of their faith.57 But what is the content of this core? “Mendelssohn 
(following Hillel),” Nussbaum states, “understood the core of the core to be love of the 
neighbor; in this he was followed by all the great Reformers, who stressed the urgency of 
the fight for social justice in the here and now.”58 In addition, Nussbaum argues that 
Reform Judaism is a cosmopolitan and universal endeavor. “Thus Samson Hirsch,” she 
continues, “coined a term that well expressed the conception of the Reformers: the Jew 
should understand himself as a ‘Mensch-Jiss-roeïl,’ a human being pursuing the universal 
within a particular tradition.”59  
So far we have witnessed Nussbaum theorizing about the ethical core of Judaism, but 
we did not discern her views on existence of God as a part of what Jewish faith is. 
Nussbaum prepares her reader to encounter her views on God by stating that Reform 
Judaism by its nature houses many conceptions of the divine: “The moral core of Reform 
Judaism has coexisted with many different ideas of God, running the gamut from 
traditional belief in a personal anthropomorphic God to Deism and even agnosticism.”60 
She confirms that there are many disagreements and discussions in this area, but plurality 
of belief was always a hallmark of Reform Judaism, nonetheless.61 What is Nussbaum’s 
own position on the matter? We can find her again ‘putting the cards openly on the table’ 
and stating that her own views fall on the Kantian/Deist side of the spectrum: 
 
I don’t believe in a personal God, and the idea of an eternal infinite substance means nothing to 
me. Nor do I think that humanity is precious only if there is something more than human about 
it. My beliefs are thus closest to those of the religious humanists, who think that what is worthy 
of respect and awe is humanity itself, struggling with its problems within history. I also find 
attractive the conceptions of prayer articulated by Hirsch and the humanists: prayer is (for me) 
essentially emotional and moral, a sharpening and focusing of one’s moral energies, which are 
usually blunted by the distractions of daily life. But I am not taken with Hirsch’s Matthew 
Arnold view of divinity: I think that if we are ever to do right, the power to do it has to come 
from us. Otherwise our actions would be by rote, and would not be virtuous actions. Beyond 
this, I have great uncertainty. I do think that there is mystery and sublimity in our lives; but I 
think it would be a cop-out to say that we need to derive that sublimity from an external source. 
Nor do I agree with Kant about the need for a specific hope for life after death to sustain our 
moral efforts. But I do think that humanity is not just a machine pushed around by the natural 
                                                
57 In this regard Nussbaum refers us to Moses Mendelssohn’s work Jerusalem, or on Religious Power and 
Judaism (first published 1783). 
58 Nussbaum, “Judaism and the Love of Reason,” 21. 
59 Ibid., 24. Nussbaum continues that these views are also reaffirmed in the Reform Jewish documents: “As 
the Columbus Platform put it, ‘Judaism is the historical religious experience of the Jewish people. Though 
growing out of Jewish life, its message is universal, aiming at the union and perfection of mankind...We 
regard it as our historic task to cooperate with all men in the establishment of the kingdom of God, of 
universal brotherhood, justice, truth, and peace on earth. This is our Messianic goal.’ The San Francisco 
Platform keeps that part of the tradition intact, stating ‘that the ethics of universalism implicit in traditional 
Judaism must be an explicit part of our Jewish duty.’” Nussbaum, “Judaism and the Love of Reason,” 24. 
60 Ibid., 31-32. 
61 In this regard she quotes the San Francisco Platform that while committing itself to one God still states: 
“Reform Jews respond to change in various ways according to the Reform principle of the autonomy of the 
individual. However, Reform Judaism does more than tolerate diversity; it engenders it…We stand open to 
any position thoughtfully and conscientiously advocated in the spirit of Reform Jewish beliefs…[W]e accept 
such differences as precious and see in them Judaism’s best hope for confronting whatever the future holds 
for us.” Nussbaum, “Judaism and the Love of Reason,” 33. 
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world: that, as both Seneca and Kant said in their different ways, there is something in 
humanity that is deeply awe-inspiring, that goes beyond mechanical causality.62 
 
Thus we discern that Nussbaum’s Jewish affiliation is her rational decision and she 
seems to cherish its rational parts the most. The core of it is fostering her moral 
commitments that consist of equal respect for all humanity, passion for justice here and 
now, and lastly the recognition for mysterious and admirable elements in humanity, just 
because they are human. 
Nussbaum stated that her identity as a Reform Jew influenced her assessment of 
Augustine’s and Dante’s Christian ascent of love. And thus it should not surprise us that 
the accounts of love she prefers in one way or another have Jewish characteristics. We will 
focus on the last one, the one she chooses to conclude the Upheavals of Thought with. The 
closing pages of the book are dedicated to James Joyce’s Ulysses63 and the values it 
promotes – we should also keep in mind that its main character Leopold Bloom is a Jewish 
figure. Nussbaum is eager to embrace the account of love found in Ulysses because unlike 
the others (even with their noted admirable parts), Ulysses offers a full embrace of our 
daily lives, thus something that Nussbaum calls a ‘descent’ of love.64 All the previous 
stories on love, for her, leaves a gap between their constructed reader and the real life 
reader reading them. “This is a deliberate stratagem to drive attention upward,” Nussbaum 
argues, “but it runs the risk of compounding anger and disgust when we discover that we 
are still ourselves.”65 But we may ask how the descent changes love? Part of Nussbaum’s 
answer would be that our view on ourselves and our love is changed by relaxing our need 
for perfection and portraying our life as it is. “In these ways the text says,” Nussbaum 
argues, “here, here in this confusion is the really whole cosmos (or noncosmos), here and 
not in those ordered clarified probabilified well-plotted texts in which we are accustomed 
to look for our lives.”66 
Nussbaum further argues that a double movement of contrasting the grandeur of a 
                                                
62 Ibid., 33. 
63 Nussbaum utilizes and quotes the following edition of the book – James Joyce, Ulysses (New York: 
Modern Library, 1961). She offers an original philosophical assessment of the book, but additionally bases it 
on the insights of a prominent American literary critic and a biographer of Joyce, Richard Ellmann. See 
Richard Ellmann, James Joyce (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983). 
64 ‘Descent’ of love for Nussbaum means embracing and loving our daily lives with all its imperfections and 
by this, freeing love from hatred and anger from what is ‘merely human:’ “And this means that – despite a 
general agreement in Christian and post-Christian accounts that a truly adequate love will embrace the flaws 
and imperfections of a human being as well as the goodness – all of these ascents in a real sense repudiate us. 
Nobody has a menstrual period in Plato. Nobody excretes in Spinoza. Nobody masturbates in Proust (though 
in a certain sense also, nobody does anything else). Augustine and Dante records such moments, but leave 
them behind in Hell. Cathy and Heathcliff demonstrate their superiority to the Linton world by a demonic 
intensity that seems to lift them straight out of the daily world. In Mahler, the daily social round is dead and 
deadening; the ascending artist, bitten by his own cry of disgust against this world, ascends to a creative 
realm in which love exists purified of the lapses of attention that make up much of our daily lives. In 
Whitman, the body and erotic desire are rehabilitated, but also transfigured, made part of the great march of 
justice in the world, rather than just being by themselves. As Lawrence said of the poetry, even if you reach 
eternity, you can’t sit down there. In none of these texts, then, does love wear a real life body with its hungers 
and thirsts and fantasies, its all-too-human combination of generosity with forgetfulness.” Nussbaum, 
Upheavals of Thought, 681-682. 
65 Ibid., 682. 
66 Ibid., 688-689. 
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legend and the instances of daily urban lives is characteristic to the book. And we can find 
her arguing: 
 
But since the text draws the reader’s attention and heart to these elements of daily life, and 
does so with tenderness, the first ‘take,’ which laughs at the absurd juxtaposition, soon leads on 
to a second set of thoughts, in which one wonders whether Bloom’s simple kindness to 
Dignam’s family, his small speech against racial intolerance, his silly poem to Molly, his kiss 
on her bottom, are not the material of whatever is real in heroism, and of whatever is generous 
and genuine in the spiritual life.67 
 
Nussbaum continues that above all we should remember that Ulysses is a book about 
love and it makes several claims on the nature of it: 
 
It appears to argue that it is only through love, and bodily love at that, that human beings can 
find an exit from solipsism and loneliness to the reality of another life. It appears to argue that 
the creative imagination is itself erotic, a receptive form of forms, passive, masochistic, akin to 
the ‘surety of sense of touch in’ Bloom’s ‘firm full masculine feminine passive active hand’ 
(674). It appears to argue that love is the great hope for public life as well, the great opposite to 
the ‘insult and hatred’ that are themselves ‘the opposite of that that is really life.’68 
 
But what about the three criteria and the possibility to induce the political vision 
from Joyce’s account of love? Nussbaum answers readily that it would be too much to 
search for a political vision in the novel, yet it offers some views on a good community by 
its fundamental ‘yes’ to humanity: 
 
Here Joyce partly agrees with Whitman, but goes beyond him in the mercy of his attention to 
the flawed particular. Whitman is prepared to accept desiring so long as the relevant minds are 
filled with the Great Idea of Democracy. Joyce is prepared to allow people to be their whole 
selves, both idealistic and flawed, both committed and straying. And this yes to humanity, 
Joyce, suggests, is the essential basis for a sane political life, a life democratic, universalist, and 
also liberal[.]69 
 
Nussbaum using the example of Ulysses wants to convince her reader that the best 
account of love is the one that strives for ideal, but never abandons the real. And in fact, 
due to the gentle acceptance of what is real in love can get its full force and can be less 
threatened by anger and hatred when it fails, when it is ‘merely human.’ Nussbaum does 
not argue against searching and trying to suggest adequate accounts on the nature of love, 
she argues that while doing so we would not forget to look at our daily lives because those 
are the soil of our ideals: “What seems required, then, is an idealism that also shows mercy 
and love to the real, a dedication to justice that embraces the fact that the individuals we 
love do have a daily life, with potted meat and the chamber pot, and the same time grand 
romantic yearnings and a serious faith in the soul.”70 
Only after insisting that a tender spirit of gently mocking the grandiose projects of 
the ascent of love, Nussbaum suggests a final image of love’s ascent:  
                                                
67 Ibid., 691. 
68 Ibid., 692. 
69 Ibid., 709. 
70 Ibid., 712. 
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When, lo, there came about them all a great brightness and they beheld the chariot, wherein he 
stood ascend to heaven. And they beheld Him in the chariot, clothed upon the glory of the 
brightness, having raiment as of the sun…And there came a voice out of heaven, calling 
Elijah! Elijah! And he answered with a main cry: Abba! Adonai! And they beheld Him even 
Him, ben Bloom Elijah, amid clouds of angels ascend to the glory of the brightness at an angle 
of forty-five degrees over Donohoe’s in Little Green Street like a shot off a shovel.71 
 
We will come back to the question of the influence of Judaism on Nussbaum’s 
thought in Chapter II. Martha C. Nussbaum on Compassion, section 5.1.4 Compassion and 
Religion and section 5.3 Judaism in Nussbaum’s Ethics and all its subsections, where 
Diana Fritz Cates and professor of philosophy and Judaism Martin Kavka question 
Nussbaum’s religious affiliation to Judaism and its possible influences on her view on 
ethics, construction of the theory of emotions, and her views on compassion in particular. 
Our own conclusion in this regard sides much more with Kavka and sees Judaism as 
forming the landscape of Nussbaum’s ethics with its passion for this-world justice and 
carnality, and less with Cates who sees Nussbaum’s Judaism directly influencing her 
concepts. In theorizing about emotions in general and compassion in particular, Nussbaum 
never employs religious or metaphysical arguments to ground it, thus we would much 
more see Judaism as sculpting the imagination of her ethics in a way that literature works 
do, but not as a set of metaphysical beliefs – the rationality guiding religion and philosophy 
for her ultimately has to be the same, meaning, never utilizing the other-worldly 
arguments. Thus we could conclude that Nussbaum’s Judaism and the rationale of her 
ethics do not stand at odds with each other – it is rather that Reform Judaism matched her 
intellectual convictions and not that she induces her ethical concepts from it. 
 
1.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
We attempted to take a closer look at Nussbaum’s ethical vision. Nussbaum, as we 
mentioned in the first pages of the work, shows interest in many topics, but essentially it 
can be grouped into two major groups: political thought and questions on the nature of 
emotions. We have discovered that these questions are conceived in an Aristotelian, 
feminist, and universalist ethical framework. As a defender of Aristotelian ethics 
Nussbaum is a firm believer in the good. Here, we can say, the enterprise of theological 
ethics can find its ally72 – Nussbaum draws a positive anthropological picture of the human 
being - her moral agent is capable of seeking good, he/she has a complex emotional life, 
but emotions are, indeed, governable and educable. This moral agent also holds a rich 
responsibility for his/her inner moral life as much as for his/her political actions. 
Furthermore, Nussbaum with her philosophical endeavor seeks to contribute to the 
                                                
71 Ibid., 714. Nussbaum quoting Joyce, Ulysses, 345. Here she uses a quote that puts together a biblical image 
of the ascent of the prophet Elijah in the chariot of fire and Leopold Bloom (far from a saintly Jewish figure), 
to culminate in a paradox of love – that even the highest of ideals have not to lose the connection and 
appreciation of the real and tangible.  
72 Theological ethics constructed from the traditional Catholic perspective also rests on the positive 
understanding of human nature. From this perspective the goodness of human nature is injured by the reality 
of sin, but not entirely destroyed by it. 
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betterment of society by seeking a positive practical outcome. We can see a deep 
conviction throughout Nussbaum’s works that philosophy can serve this purpose and in 
fact serve the public good (to be more precise, the ethical and political part of philosophy). 
Nussbaum is convinced that the goal of philosophy is not to produce more philosophy. At 
the higher political level philosophical endeavor can sink into political agenda, as we will 
see from her capabilities approach.73 
Next to presenting the large and ambitious framework of her universalist political 
thought something we may call a high stakes morality, Nussbaum as we saw in the 
previous pages, tries to keep her eye on individuals that form the institutions and societies 
she wants to advance. Her ethical system tries to keep an actual human being in mind. 
Philosophy that truly attempts to speak about life to people has to capture the sense of it. 
Life is a messy enterprise, Nussbaum claims. Life is marked by contingency, the element 
of surprise, plurality of goods, difficult choices, and competing emotional attachments. 
Nussbaum seems to be convinced that if we speak of life in these terms we will do justice 
to its reality. Furthermore, if we will speak of an agent living in these circumstances we 
will not also lose the notion of the real-life person.  
Having in mind Nussbaum’s high aspirations to contribute to the betterment of 
society and her fierce belief in the good, but at the same time attention to the messiness of 
our daily life felt throughout her works, we could tell that the following quotation captures 
the core of her ethical vision: 
 
The upside-down ladder of Ulysses reminded us that imperfection is just what we 
ought to expect of our human ideals, and people. It asked us to climb the ladder and 
yet, at times, to turn it over, looking at a real person in bed or on the chamber pot. 
Only in that way do we get the best from our ideals; only in that way do we overcome 
the temptation, inherent in all ideals, to despise what is merely human and everyday.74 
 
Precisely in this tension between the ideal and real Nussbaum’s ethics is conceived. 
If we have that in mind, we can say that we have an adequate grasp of her ethical thought. 
The familiarity with her ethical vision enables us to move to the presentation of her theory 
of emotions. 
 
2. NUSSBAUM’S THEORY OF EMOTIONS 
 
The work Upheavals of Thought is a work presenting the moral psychology guiding 
Nussbaum’s political philosophy and offers an exposé of her account of the nature of 
emotions. Here we can encounter a conviction that emotional experience is essential to 
ethics and we will try to discern why Nussbaum holds this claim. We will try to 
accomplish our task by first of all representing the Stoic core of her views on the nature of 
emotions. We will move, then, to her appropriation of that core, something she calls a Neo-
Stoic theory of emotions. We will conclude our inquiry with the last two segments; the first 
one trying to situate emotions between the natural and socially constructed spectrum and 
the last presenting Nussbaum’s views on the roots of emotional experience in infancy. This 
                                                
73 See Chapter II, section 4.1.1 The Central Human Capabilities with all its subsections. 
74 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 713. 
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structure, we hope, will shed light on the question of why emotions should be considered a 
moral phenomenon. 
 
2.1 THE STOIC ROOTS 
 
Now let us take a look at Nussbaum’s conception of the Stoic views of emotions and in 
this way try to discern why she is attracted to it. Firstly, we should mention that the Stoics 
rather frequently used a medical analogy to present philosophy as a doctor of the soul.75 
The usage of this analogy seems to signal the practical goal of the Stoic philosophy, 
something that Nussbaum appreciates herself. But this practical goal of philosophy can be 
achieved focusing on what exactly the Stoics wanted to heal – and this leads Nussbaum to 
investigate their conception of the emotions.76 
Nussbaum turns to investigate a famous Stoic Chrysippus’77 thesis, that emotions are 
forms of false judgments or beliefs (that emotions are indeed forms of judgment/beliefs is a 
backbone of her theory of emotions, thus she uses a great deal of Chrysippus’ descriptive 
theory, but wishes to dismiss his normative conclusions). This thesis rests on the Stoic 
conception of the good which is understood as sufficiency of the life of virtue: 
 
According to Stoicism, only virtue is worth choosing for its own sake; and virtue all by itself 
suffices for a completely good human life, that is, for ευδαιµονία [eudaimonia]. Virtue is 
something unaffected by external contingency – both (apparently) as to its acquisition and as to 
its maintenance once acquired. Items that are not fully under the control of the agent – such as 
health, wealth, freedom from pain, the good functioning of the bodily faculties – have no 
                                                
75 Nussbaum presents us with three examples of this analogy, in the first instance Cicero claims “There is, I 
assure you, a medical art for the soul. It is philosophy, whose aid need not be sought, as in bodily diseases, 
from outside ourselves. We must endeavor with all our resources and all our strength to become capable of 
doctoring ourselves (Cic TD III.6);” Seneca adds: “There are certain healthful practical arguments that may 
be compared to the prescription of the useful drugs, these I am writing down, having found them effective in 
healing my own sores, which, even if not thoroughly cured have at least ceased to spread (Sen Ep 8.2);” and 
Chrysippus continues: “It is not true that there exists an art called medicine, concerned with the diseased 
body, but no corresponding art concerned with the diseased soul. Nor it is true that the latter is inferior to the 
former, in its theoretical grasp and therapeutic treatment of individual cases (PHP V.2.22, 298D = SVF 
III.471).” Martha C. Nussbaum, “The Stoics on the Extirpation of the Passions,” Apeiron: A Journal for 
Ancient Philosophy and Science Vol. 20, No. 2 (1987): 129. The article marks an early writing on the 
material which is the basis and in many regards very similar to her thoughts found in the later works and the 
focus of our attention – the Upheavals of Thought. This article offers a concise exegesis and analysis of the 
Stoic view of the emotions, also present in the work preceding the Upheavals, namely, The Therapy of 
Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). The 
Upheavals while presenting a theory that is inspired by the Stoic views on the emotions does not offer a 
lengthy presentation of the original views and focuses on Nussbaum’s appropriation of the theory. 
76 In the earlier works Nussbaum uses the terms passions and emotions interchangeably. We can find her 
stating: “In what follows, I shall use these two words more or less interchangeably, making no salient 
distinction between them. ‘Emotions’ is the more common modern generic term, while ‘passions’ is both 
etymologically closer to the most common Greek and Latin terms and more firmly entrenched in the Western 
philosophical tradition. In any case, what I mean to designate by these terms is a genus of which phenomena 
such as fear, love, grief, anger, envy, jealousy, and other relatives – but not bodily appetites such as hunger 
and thirst – are the species.” Nussbaum, “The Stoics on the Extirpation of the Passions,” 130; footnote 2. In 
her later works Nussbaum almost exclusively utilizes the term ‘emotions.’ 
77 Chrysippus of Soli (279-206 BC) is one of the most famous and prolific Stoic thinkers; he is attributed to 
have given Stoicism its definite form by taking the works of his predecessors Zeno and Cleanthes and 
crystalizing their main doctrines.  
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intrinsic worth, nor is their causal relationship to ευδαιµονία even that of an instrumental 
necessary condition. In short, if we take all these things away, if we imagine the wise man 
living in the worst possible natural circumstances, so long as he is good – and once good he 
cannot be corrupted – his ευδαιµονία will still be complete. He will be living as valuable and 
choice worthy and enviable a life as a human being possibly could.78 
 
This is in short the core of the Stoic conception of the good and Nussbaum argues 
that precisely due to it the Stoics hold that emotions are false judgments. Yet Nussbaum 
wishes to look deeper at this thesis. Usually, she claims, we experience emotions as “a 
condition of tumult, violent movement, and vulnerability,”79 thus how could we possibly 
conceive of emotions as equivalent to judgments? The answer is two-fold, firstly – this 
thesis helps the Stoics to establish philosophy as an art of the soul:  
 
For it helps them in no small measure to establish the necessity and efficacy of philosophy as 
the art of life. If passions are not sub-rational stirrings coming from our animal nature, but 
modifications of the rational faculty, then, to be moderated and eventually cured they must be 
approached by a therapeutic technique that uses arts of reason.80 
 
This claim at the same instance establishes the sovereign worth of philosophy and 
conceives of emotions as phenomena that can be not only moderated, but entirely cured – 
in the Stoic view that means extirpated. Yet Nussbaum is convinced that next to the 
pragmatic usefulness this thesis holds some truth and she thus argues it is not merely just a 
philosophical construct forced by the real experience of life. Here we encounter the second 
element of the argument of why emotions were conceived as judgments in the Stoic view – 
it also holds some intuitive truth. For her, in fact, the claim that emotions are value 
judgments is “one of the most powerful candidates for truth in this area; and it is also far 
less counterintuitive than we might at first think.”81 Moreover, Nussbaum argues that one 
can find a close link between intuitive acceptability and truth in the thought of 
Chrysippus.82  
If Chrysippus was attentive to common beliefs/experiences of the people that means 
that his theorizing about the emotions should have been close to it too. Why was 
Chrysippus convinced that emotions embody the ways of interpreting the world? Basing 
this on already existing Greek philosophical insights and common daily practices he 
understood them to be beliefs of a particular kind, namely, the ones that ascribe value to 
external goods. Thus, “they embody conception of the agent’s good according to which the 
good is not simply ‘at home’ inside of him, but consists, instead, in a complex web of 
connections between the agent and unstable worldly items such as loved friends, city, 
possessions, the conditions of action.”83  
The Stoic emotion is, then, a judgment about the good and bad concerning the things 
                                                
78 Nussbaum, “The Stoics on the Extirpation of the Passions,” 132. We will come back to the discussion of 
the Stoic conception of the good and their views on external goods in Chapter II, section 2.3 Does 
Compassion Contain False Thoughts? Classic Stoic Objections  and all its subsections. 
79 Nussbaum, “The Stoics on the Extirpation of the Passions,” 137. 
80 Ibid., 137. 
81 Ibid., 139. 
82 Cf. Ibid., 139. 
83 Ibid., 141. 
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outside of one’s control.84 How does Chrysippus explain the tumultuous element in it and 
the fact that we sometimes feel passive in the face of our emotional experiences? 
Nussbaum reminds us that the Stoics conceived the soul as consisting of one rational 
element (as opposed to the three-part Aristotelian conception of the soul). This, from first 
glance, makes their conception of the emotions even more troublesome. But what 
Nussbaum really wants to demonstrate is that the single faculty conception of the soul is 
conceived so precisely due to Chrysippus’ insights on the nature of moral psychology. She 
thus argues that “it was not an item of unargued dogma for the Stoics that the soul has just 
one part; it was a conclusion, and a conclusion of arguments in moral psychology, 
prominently including arguments about the passions.”85 Now we should look at the 
arguments of why Chrysippus judged that the passions and reason can be housed by one 
faculty. 
First of all, we should note that the Stoic judgment is assent to appearance, to put it 
simply.86 That means that the world around me looks to me in a particular way and I can 
accept or reject these appearances based on the previous beliefs I have. Appearance of an 
object presents itself to one’s cognitive faculties and ‘[e]mbracing or acknowledging an 
appearance, committing to it oneself as true, seems to be a task that requires the 
discriminating power of cognition.”87 The act of recognition of the truth of the appearance 
always goes together with a profound upheaval. The upheaval is caused by the nature of 
the preposition – it contains evaluative elements. These have three features, to be more 
precise: first of all, “they must make a claim about what, from the point of view of that 
agent, is valuable and fine, or the contrary.”88 Yet the ‘valuable and fine’ expresses not 
mere preferences and desires, but the values of the agent, his/her scheme of goals (thus, we 
are talking not about mere caprice in this instance). Secondly, “the propositions ascribe to 
the item in question not only some value, but a serious or very high value (or disvalue).”89 
And this is the source of the mistake and the passion, according to Chrysippus – we judge 
things to be way more important than they really are. And finally the belief has a certain 
content: “it must be concerned with vulnerable external things, things that can fail to be 
                                                
84 Nussbaum suggests a good example to help us to grasp the distinction between the emotion and a mere 
bodily movement: “Seneca adds a useful distinction. Sometimes, he says, the presence of an appearance 
might evoke a reaction even when the appearance itself is not accepted or taken in, but, so to speak, just 
strikes against you suffice. Sudden pallor, a leap of the heart, sexual excitation – all of these bodily 
movements may be caused by the appearance alone, without assent or judgment. (In saying this he is 
following a tradition that goes straight back to Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium, which uses the very same 
examples). But these are not passions: these are mere bodily movements. It is only when the appearance has 
been allowed in, that we get – in the very act of recognition – the tumult of the mind that is the passion (Ir 
II.3).” Nussbaum, “The Stoics on the Extirpation of the Passions,” 153. 
85 Ibid., 145. 
86 Cf. Ibid., 146. We will come back to the question about the Stoic conception of judgment in the upcoming 
section 2.2.1 Emotions Are Cognitive Judgments. 
87 Nussbaum, “The Stoics on the Extirpation of the Passions,” 146. Nussbaum also points out that this was a 
classical argument from Aristotle on distinguishing between humans and animals – the animals are said to 
move about the way things strike them, without commitment. Nussbaum claims that we can find this 
argument in Aristotle’s EN 1147b3-5 and Metaph 980b25-8. 
88 Nussbaum, “The Stoics on the Extirpation of the Passions,” 149. Here Nussbaum points to the writings of 
Chrysippus – SVF III. 385, 386, 387, 391, 393, 394. 
89 Ibid., 149. Here Nussbaum suggests that we would compare it with Chrysippus – PHP IV.5.20-22, 262D = 
SVF III.480. 
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present, that can arrive by surprise, that are not fully under our control.”90 
We can put this all in a concrete example to make it more tangible – in this instance 
Chrysippus uses a case study of grief:91 
 
A person I love very much has died. It strikes me, it appears to me, that an item of enormous 
and irreplaceable value that was there a short time ago is there in my life no longer. If we want 
to display the appearance pictorially – a conception of appearing that some Stoic texts 
occasionally suggest – we might think of a stretch of daily life with a big empty space in it, the 
space that a loved person used to fill by his presence. In fact, the representation of this 
evaluative proposition, properly done, might require a whole series of picturings, as I would 
notice the person’s absence in every corner of my existence, notice the breaking of a thousand 
delicate and barely perceptible threads. Another sort of picturing would also be possible: I 
could see that wonderful beloved face, and see it both as enormously beloved and as 
irretrievably cut off from me. What we must insist, however, is that the appearance is 
propositional: its content is that such and such is the case; and it is evaluative.92 
 
The emotion, then, is a judgment that embraces the appearance. But Nussbaum wants 
to enquire further and discover why Chrysippus made it a function of reason. Nussbaum 
asks – what do we think gets a terrible shock of grief? Where are we so shaken that our 
whole existence acknowledges that the beloved person is gone? If we conceive of emotions 
as “complex and evaluatively discriminating responses,”93 there is no purpose to create an 
irrational part of the soul, we already have a faculty that is busy with very similar functions 
– and due to this Chrysippus thought that reason was just a suitable faculty to house the 
emotions. 
Emotions apart from their discriminating power also have an affective side, but 
Chrysippus was convinced that reason can house these kinds of disorderly movements 
simply because of its own nature. Stoic reason is dynamic, not static: “It moves, embraces, 
refuses. It can move rapidly or slowly; it can move directly or with hesitation. We have 
imagined it entertaining the appearance of the loved person’s death and then, so to speak, 
rushing towards it opening itself to take it in.”94 
Thus what we have encountered so far in the Stoic thought is a dynamic conception 
of knowing. Here “an acknowledgment is not a cool inner act of intellect set over against 
the proposition, but an acknowledgment, with the core of my being, that such and such is 
the case. To acknowledge a proposition is to realize in one’s being its full significance, to 
take it in and be changed by it.”95 
                                                
90 Nussbaum, “The Stoics on the Extirpation of the Passions,” 150. The third element, contrary to the first 
and the second, is not explicit in the works of the Stoics and is thus Nussbaum’s reading of their works. On 
the same page we can find her stating: “The Stoics do not explicitly include this in their definitions, though 
they repeatedly underline the connection between passion and a concern with external goods, and emphasize 
that a person who ceases to be concerned with externals will be free of passion.”  
91 In the footsteps of Chrysippus, Nussbaum also utilizes grief as a central example. In the paper we are 
discussing and the later works (for example, The Therapy of Desire) it has no definite object, but in the 
Upheavals of Thought grief is defined as she tells her own story about grieving the death of her mother Betty 
Craven. 
92 Nussbaum, “The Stoics on the Extirpation of the Passions,” 147. Nussbaum suggests we compare her 
interpretation with Chrysippus’ given example of grief, see PHP IV.7. 
93 Nussbaum, “The Stoics on the Extirpation of the Passions,” 151. 
94 Ibid., 152. 
95 Ibid., 153. 
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This is the core of the Stoic conception of the passions and Nussbaum holds it to be 
one of the most truthful interpretations of the nature of the emotions. She thus highly 
appreciates the descriptive part of the Stoic theory, yet she altogether dismisses the 
normative part. After presenting the nature of emotions, the Stoics turn to their suggested 
therapy – and their answer is not the moderation of the passions (the answer that is 
suggested by Aristotle and the Peripatetic school), but a total extirpation of them. Passions 
should be extirpated because the judgment they rest upon is false, they are not stable 
motivations for virtuous action (the peaceful mind and duty is), they cause pain – all the 
claims Nussbaum wishes to repudiate in her Neo-Stoic theory of emotions. We now turn to 
the presentation of her appropriation and interpretation of the Stoic moral psychology. 
 
2.2 THE NEO-STOIC THEORY OF EMOTIONS 
 
The starting point of Nussbaum is the agreement with the Stoics that emotions are 
cognitive value judgments.96 Thus in the Upheavals of Thought she offers the following 
definition of emotions: “[t]his view holds that emotions are appraisals or value judgments, 
which ascribe to things and persons outside the person’s own control great importance for 
that person’s own flourishing. It thus contains three salient ideas: the idea of a cognitive 
appraisal or evaluation; the idea of one’s own flourishing or one’s important goals and 
projects; and the idea of the salience of external objects as elements in one’s own scheme 
of goals.”97 This statement prompts an explanation of each of these three concepts.  
 
2.2.1 Emotions Are Cognitive Judgments 
 
First, what does Nussbaum mean by the concept of cognition in the context of emotional 
experience? In her own words: “By the word ‘cognitive’ I mean nothing more than 
‘concerned with receiving and processing information.’ I do not mean to imply the 
presence of elaborate calculation, of computation, or even reflexive self-awareness.”98 So 
cognition within emotions might be seen as a certain awareness, a possibility of accessing 
and being able to process incoming signals from the surrounding world. In addition, as the 
aforementioned definition makes evident, Nussbaum does not require that emotions would 
contain elaborate, complex cognitive processes, but they are means of awareness of the 
world around us. 
At this point it is important to clarify the notion of judgment that Nussbaum is 
working with. If she accepts the Stoic view that emotions are judgments, then what did 
                                                
96 Note that when Nussbaum speaks of values she does not want to attach herself to a particular position. She 
wishes to merely point to the valuational character of emotional experiences. She argues that: “My approach 
does not take a stand one way or another on the nature of value, but tries to present the valuational nature of 
our appraisals from the internal viewpoint of the person having the emotional experience.” Nussbaum, 
Upheavals of Thought, 22-24, footnote 2. Thus though she appreciates the works of professor of philosophy 
Robert C. Solomon, a pioneer in connecting emotion and value, Nussbaum distances herself from his 
perspective influenced by existentialism. For the link between emotion and existential value see his The 
Passions (New York: Doubleday, 1976) and The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Life, 2nd ed. 
(Indianapolis: Hacket, 1993). 
97 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 4. 
98 Ibid., 23. 
  27 
these ancient thinkers really mean by this proposition? For the Stoics, judgment is assent to 
appearances, occurring in a two-stage process.99 The first stage is rather simple: I am 
struck that things are such and such. The second stage involves a choice between the three 
following possibilities:100  
I can accept or embrace the way things look, take it into me as the way things are: in 
this case the appearance has become my judgment, and that act of acceptance is what 
judging is. I can repudiate the appearance as not being the way things are: in that case I am 
judging the contradictory. Or I can let the appearance hang there without committing 
myself one way or another. In that case I have no belief or judgment about the matter one 
way or the other. 
Thus, judgment requires cognitive ability. Nussbaum claims that here reason seems 
to reach out and take the appearance into itself.101 She thinks that this is generally a useful 
way to consider reasoning itself. Reasoning can be seen as the capacity to commit oneself 
to views concerning the way things really are. 
Here we must ask an important question concerning not only the nature of emotions, 
but also the nature of judgment and belief. Are emotions acts of assenting to appearances 
or states resulting in such assent? Nussbaum answers that they are both: “[w]e initially 
assent to or acknowledge a proposition, and then there it is, part of our cognitive make 
up.”102 Hence, emotions assent to propositions continually. In this sense they have the 
same structure as any judgment: first, agreement that things are such and such; and later, 
the continuous acceptance of that agreement.103 But why is this important? Because of the 
aforementioned claim’s consequences. If we understand emotions in this way, then, they, 
like all the other beliefs, can be true or false, reasonable or unreasonable.104 In Nussbaum’s 
words: “The fact of having emotion depends on what the person’s beliefs are, not on 
whether they are true or false.”105 More precisely, it is the emotion’s propositional content 
that is true or false, not the affective experience itself. Emotions are in this sense 
appropriate or inappropriate. They are thus both judgments and beliefs about the way the 
                                                
99 Nussbaum finds this position intuitively appealing and a good basis on which to critique the Humean 
desire framework as an explanation of action. However, she also acknowledges that this Stoic view needs 
reformulation, since it strongly focuses on linguistic propositions and thus denies the possibility of emotional 
experience within human infants and non-human animals. Moreover, the Stoics developed an extremely 
voluntarist view of judgment: ascent or non-ascent to an appearance is thought to be always a voluntary act, a 
position supporting their emphasis on extreme self-monitoring. Nussbaum rejects this aspect of Stoic 
psychology, since it necessarily excludes the aforementioned groups from the having of emotions. She takes 
assent in a broader sense – for Nussbaum assent is less voluntaristic. Circumstances, such as habit, 
attachment or simply the weight of present events in one’s life, can influence whether we will ascent to 
certain appearances. This allows for emotionality in young children and non-human animals, both of which 
lack the ability to withhold assent to appearances confronting them. See Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 
37.  
100 Cf. Ibid., 37. 
101 Cf. Ibid., 38. 
102 Ibid., 46. 
103 Cf. Ibid., 46. 
104 Cf. Ibid., 46. Nussbaum argues that “[e]motions are part of my view of the world, and responsive to 
changes in belief in much the same way that other judgments are. But they are still beliefs about the world, 
not just about my conception of the world, and so they can be false.” Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 46, 
footnote 42. Nussbaum thus wants to conceive of emotions as judgments/evaluations that can be indeed 
evaluated themselves.  
105 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 46. 
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world is and responses on our part to how we perceive it to be. 
 
2.2.2 Emotions Are Eudaimonistic  
 
Also requiring further explanation is Nussbaum’s claim that emotions are judgments 
concerned with one’s own flourishing, i.e., that they are eudaimonistic judgments 
regarding one’s important goals and projects. Nussbaum warns readers not to buy into a 
common misconception concerning eudaimonistic theories, namely, that human happiness 
cashes itself out in egoistic terms, the end goal being pleasure or a sense of contentment.106 
Rather, their central concern, Nussbaum says, is the question “how should a human being 
live?”107 Its answer is that which in ethical discourse is called human flourishing, a 
complete human life. The actions, relations, and persons necessary for this complete life 
are not to be valued instrumentally and/or according to standards of satisfaction. Nussbaum 
further claims that “[n]ot only virtuous actions but also mutual relations of civic or 
personal love and friendship, in which the object is loved and benefited for his or her own 
sake, can qualify as constituent parts of a person’s eudaimonia.”108  
These things, we should not forget, are valued as constituents of my life: any 
virtuous action that I perform is mine, the people that I value stand in some relation to me. 
Emotions, Nussbaum claims, seem to have an identical structure: “They insist on the real 
importance of their object, but they also embody the person’s own commitment to the 
object as a part of her scheme of ends. This is why, in the negative cases, they are felt as 
tearing the self apart: because they have to do with me and my own, my plans and goals, 
what is important in my own conception (or more inchoate sense) of what it is for me to 
live well.”109 Hence, emotions always refer to the self.  
Now if one is using an ancient eudaimonistic framework within a contemporary 
context, then, one should be aware of certain inadequacies inherent in the former. In the 
Aristotelian conception the schema of goals is organized systematically. The agent creates 
a system of things that he/she values and seeks, and these goals can be commended to 
others. Real people, Nussbaum points out, are usually not that systematic. They value 
things that do not perfectly fit together. In some cases their goals even conflict. In this 
respect Nussbaum departs from ancient eudaimonistic thinking. Emotions, she says, “have 
to do with whatever I do value, however well or badly those things fit together.”110  
Regarding whether humans always have goals commendable to others, Nussbaum 
makes two important points. The first, which is possibly located within, but not fully 
developed by, the ancient theory, concerns the specification of general ends. Put simply, 
this is the issue of the general good becoming specific in a person’s concrete 
                                                
106 Cf. Ibid., 32. Nussbaum is convinced that happiness is a misleading term if it is understood in the 
aforementioned terms. She guides us to consult the correction of the view on the eudaimonistic theories by 
English philosopher Harold Arthur Prichard, “The Meaning of Agathon in the Ethics of Aristotle,” 
Philosophy 10 (1935): 27-39 and another British philosopher of language John Langshaw Austin, “Agathon 
and Eudaimonia in the Ethics of Aristotle,” in Philosophical Papers, 2nd ed. I-3I (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1970). 
107 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 32. 
108 Ibid., 32. 
109 Ibid., 33. 
110 Ibid., 49. 
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context/situation. Nussbaum gives the example of the general goal of artistic cultivation.111 
An agent who cultivates this goal by playing the clarinet does not necessarily commend 
this instrument to others, since achieving the former does not require this specific 
expression (one can achieve it through other art forms). This point, however, though not 
fully developed within the ancient system, nevertheless fits its general spirit.  
However, we must discuss a much more pressing difficulty facing the ancient 
project: that people do indeed cherish and value things that they do not think are good 
and/or would not commend to others.112 Ancient eudaimonism does not speak about this 
reality. Certain emotions, Nussbaum argues, do not engender systematic reflection 
regarding the goodness of the valued object. Human lives are more complex than the 
ancient system is comfortable with. Employing the examples of habit, attachment, and 
unconditional love, Nussbaum develops her argument.113 Take the example of one’s native 
country. One may deeply disapprove of some of its political actions, but generally one will 
in some way or another value and cherish it as one’s own. Moreover, Nussbaum reminds 
us that thoughts about the good may not be as powerful as habit and time in the forming of 
value concepts. And in many cases these thoughts are intertwined in complex and almost 
inseparable ways. Also worth mentioning here are experiences of unconditional love. In 
her use of the phrase ‘unconditional love’ Nussbaum has in mind the parent-child 
relation.114 Here the search for a person’s good aspects should take a back seat, for a parent 
should love their child despite the bad characteristics that he/she has. The failure to 
recognize this aspect of love is a notorious limitation on the part of ancient theory, and 
Nussbaum wants us to be aware of it. 
Only when we are cognizant of the aforementioned limitations of ancient 
eudaimonistic thinking will it seem appropriate to discuss emotional life therein. In other 
words, “only when we acknowledge that people’s sense of what is important and valuable 
is often messy, disorderly, and not in line with their reflective ethical beliefs”115 can we 
probably pursue a eudaimonistic ethics.116 This leads us to the third part of Nussbaum’s 
definition.  
 
2.2.3 Emotions Are Eudaimonistic Value Judgments 
 
Emotions contain judgments indicating the salience of external objects as elements in one’s 
own scheme of goals. This means that emotions have something to do with the value of 
external objects, these being parts of our eudaimonia. As we saw in Chrysippus’ account, 
emotions are beliefs regarding external value. Nussbaum’s position is that they are beliefs 
                                                
111 Cf. Ibid., 51. 
112 Cf. Ibid., 51. 
113 Cf. Ibid., 51 
114 Cf. Ibid., 51. 
115 Ibid., 52. 
116 Nussbaum discusses in detour the closely linked emotions of wonder, awe and reverence, all of which 
seem to lack a eudaimonistic nature. Wonder appears the response of a subject to the pull of an object of 
maximal value, where his or her awareness of his or her own plans is minimal. Wonder seems to culminate in 
contemplation rather than action. Moreover, the question of the all-surpassing value of the object of wonder 
here arises. This ‘beyond eudaimonism’ experience is well articulated by religious imagery. Indeed, 
Nussbaum claims that it is most greatly manifested in religious contexts. See Nussbaum, Upheavals of 
Thought, 54. 
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of a particular sort, namely, of eudaimonia. We have attempted to explain what 
eudaimonia means for Nussbaum. As previously mentioned, it is not egoistic satisfaction, 
but rather the entirety of one’s life. While not about egoism, it is certainly conceived of in 
personal terms. For the things that I value constitute my life and no one else’s. Emotions 
mark both the object’s importance and the person’s commitment to that object. Now, if 
emotions intend eudaimonistic value, then, they signal something very important to us, 
namely, that we need others for our well-being. They indicate a needy, not a self-sufficient, 
person, one whose happiness depends on things outside his/her control. 
All judgments associated with the emotions, Nussbaum says, have a common subject 
matter: vulnerable things, things that can be affected by happenings in the world.117 In this 
context ‘external goods’ do not necessarily mean things outside the human body, but rather 
things outside a person’s complete control. An emotion “records that sense of vulnerability 
and imperfect control.”118 This has important implications for how we think about moral 
agency. Nussbaum’s moral agent manifests a certain passivity before the world’s 
happenings. An emotion indicates that its object has significance in a person’s life. “I do 
not go about fearing any and every catastrophe anywhere in the world, nor (so it seems) do 
I fear any and every catastrophe that I know to be bad in important ways,”119 says 
Nussbaum. Emotions should thus be seen as localized. They stand for something in a 
particular person’s life, rather than for what we may call universal concern. They have a 
revelatory character, pointing to what is really important in my life. We can now see that 
Nussbaum’s definition of emotion has two further implications. The first is a specific 
outlook on the human person. The second is that emotions should be seen as intentional 
phenomena, as always about something. 
 
2.2.4 The Intentionality of Emotions 
 
As the aforementioned definition indicates, emotions are always about something or 
someone. Intentionality, Nussbaum says, is a key element of all emoting.120 While 
intentionality is certainly key to understanding Nussbaum’s theory of the emotions, it may 
also be a major obstacle to its acceptance. Both philosophy and common sense are still 
very much under the sway of what we shall call the mechanistic view of emotions “that 
emotions are ‘non-reasoning movements,’ unthinking energies that simply push the person 
around, without being hooked up to the ways in which she perceives or thinks about the 
world. Like gusts of wind or the currents of the sea, they move, and move the person, but 
obtusely, without vision of an object or beliefs about it.”121 Nussbaum disagrees entirely 
                                                
117 Cf. Ibid., 42. 
118 Ibid., 43. 
119 Ibid., 31. 
120 Cf. Ibid., 19. 
121 Ibid., 24-25. In this regard Nussbaum directs us to the works of professor of philosophy and law, who also 
extensively writes on the topic of emotion John Deigh. He argues that removing intentionality of emotions 
seems more characteristic to modern scientific approaches and that this was not the case in medieval 
philosophy; see his “Cognitivism in the Theory of Emotions,” Ethics Vol. 104, No. 4 (1994): 824-854. She 
also points out the work of English philosopher Anthony Kenny who stresses that there is a strong link 
between Humean philosophy and behaviorist psychology. See his Action, Emotion and Will (London: 
Rutledge, 1994). Nussbaum suggests looking at George Pitcher’s take on a ‘traditional view on the emotions’ 
  31 
with this view. For her, intentionality, specifically an appraisal of some external stimulus 
or situation, is key to understanding emotional experience. Emotions are not thoughtless 
natural energies. They are always about something. They always have an object. This 
‘aboutness,’ or her, is clearly a part of what emotions are.  
As mentioned before, an emotion is not merely about some object. The objects that 
emotions appraise are intentional objects. An intentional object, according to Nussbaum, 
appears in the emotion as it is perceived and interpreted by the person experiencing it. In 
her own words: “Emotions are not about their objects merely in the sense of being pointed 
at them and let go, the way an arrow is released toward its target. Their aboutness is more 
internal, and embodies a way of seeing.”122 It is a way of viewing an object through one’s 
own window, Nussbaum says. The following example illustrates this: “What distinguishes 
fear from hope, fear from grief, love from hate – has not to do much with the identity of 
the object, which might not change, but the way in which the object is seen.”123 The way of 
seeing the object is part of the emotion’s identity, according to Nussbaum. It implies 
beliefs, often very complex ones, about the object.124 From an experiential point of view, 
emotions do not appear as objectless feelings. What are emotions if they are not about 
anything, she asks. Using the examples of pleasure and pain, she points out that our very 
language indicates the intentionality of emotions: we take pleasure in, or are pained by, 
something.125  
 
2.2.5 The Non-Cognitive Elements of Emotions 
 
Here we shall discuss one of the more controversial parts of Nussbaum’s theory of the 
emotions. While one can question whether it is really correct to absolutely equate emotion 
and thought, the general connection between cognition and emotion has been well 
established within the field of cognitive psychology. The following sentences (or ones like 
them) are commonly found in the discipline’s handbooks: “As there are almost constant 
interactions between cognition and emotion in everyday life, any attempt to provide an 
adequate theory of cognition that ignores emotion is likely to prove inadequate.”126 
Researchers in cognitive psychology have conducted numerous studies showing that 
emotional experience is influenced by and influences cognitive appraisal.127  
In this regard, Nussbaum’s eagerness to conflate emotion and thought challenges her 
readers less than her claims about the relationship between feeling and emotion. 
                                                                                                                                              
in his “Emotion,” Mind 74 (1965): 326-346.; we can find a discussion about the ‘hydraulic’ and ‘feeling’ 
models in William Lyon’s, Emotion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).  
122, Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 27. 
123 Ibid., 28. 
124 Cf. Ibid., 28. 
125 Cf. Ibid., 35. 
126 See for instance, Michael W. Eysenck and Mark T. Keane, Cognitive Psychology: A Student’s Handbook, 
6th ed. (Hove and New York: Psychology Press, 2010), 572. 
127 As an example, we can point to studies by Richard Lazarus, a prominent researcher in psychology and 
pioneer in the study of emotion and its relation to cognition (Lazarus’ works are widely utilized by 
Nussbaum). Consider an early experiment conducted by Speisman, Lazarus, Mordkoff, and Davison (1964). 
Herein participants were shown various anxiety-evoking films. The aim of this experiment was to confirm 
the hypothesis that emotion does not take place without cognitive appraisal. See Eysenck and Keane, 
Cognitive Psychology: A Student’s Handbook, 572-577. 
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Nussbaum’s philosophical theory of the emotions, as we have seen, holds that they are 
evaluative beliefs indicating the importance of certain objects to our systems of goals. Here 
it seems appropriate to ask whether this is everything that an adequate definition of an 
emotion should contain. For from an experiential point of view an emotion also feels like 
something. Do emotions necessarily contain non-cognitive elements? 
Nussbaum states very clearly that it is not necessary to include non-cognitive 
elements in defining an emotion. In explaining this she uses the example of grief.128 While 
we know that grief is a complex emotion with multiple expressions and felt dimensions, 
our author inquires how we are to discern those things occurring during an experience of 
grief that are actually a part of it? She claims that it is characteristic of a waking sentient 
being to have feelings of some sort. Such feelings are necessary conditions of waking 
mental life. Hence, feeling of one sort or another is a necessary condition for the 
experience of emotions like grief. Yet Nussbaum refuses to see feeling as partially 
constitutive of emotion itself. 
Seeking a better grasp of the phenomena of emotions, Nussbaum continues her 
argument. If the bodily sensations and changes associated with grief take place very 
slowly, she asks, then can we conclude that a person undergoing grief isn’t really grieving? 
In other words, if elements allegedly central to the concrete experience of an emotion are 
not present in a given person, then can we still say that that person is experiencing that 
emotion? Nussbaum’s answers would be a firm no to the first question and yes to the 
second. As she sees it, even under these circumstances the emotion still happens. In her 
words: “If my hands and feet were cold or warm, sweaty or dry, again this would be of no 
necessary criterial value, given the great variability of the relevant physiological 
connections.”129 Nussbaum certainly agrees that all human experiences are embodied.130 
This means that they are realized in certain material processes. In this sense emotions are 
intrinsically bodily processes. For our author, this does not pose an extra challenge. She is 
already clearly challenged by the question of whether there are certain bodily experiences 
that we can correlate with certain kinds of emotional experience. 
Nussbaum repeatedly provides negative answers to these questions. Surprisingly, one 
of her motives in doing so is that emotions have often been ascribed by 
philosophical/religious traditions to God or the gods, these deities being commonly 
imagined as bodiless substances.131 For Nussbaum, accepting any theory wherein particular 
physiological processes are necessary conditions for the occurrence of certain emotions 
means dismissing these traditions as false. Whether or not one believes that these kinds of 
substances exist, “the reason it makes sense to imagine a bodiless substance having 
genuine emotions is that it makes sense to imagine that a thinking being, whether realized 
in matter or not, could care deeply about something in the world, and have the thoughts 
and intentions associated with such attachments.”132 Thus, Nussbaum, from a philosophical 
point of view, endeavors to keep her theory of the emotions open to, and logically 
applicable for, even divine beings. She claims that she employs a Jewish approach in 
                                                
128 Cf. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 57.  
129 Ibid., 58. 
130 Cf. Ibid., 58. 
131 Cf. Ibid., 59. 
132 Ibid., 60. 
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speaking of religious matters. For her, religious and secular discourses have to be based on 
the same logic. We cannot speak of religious matters in terms that do not make sense in 
philosophical/scientific discourse.133 Hence, she leaves open the possibility that divine 
substances have emotions in the same way that human beings do. 
 
2.2.6 Feeling and Kinetic Properties of the Emotion 
 
Let us return to the question of feeling within emotions. We know for a fact that certain 
feelings are characteristically associated with certain emotions. Here, Nussbaum insists, we 
should be careful about how we use the word ‘feeling’. We should, she advises, distinguish 
two types of feelings, those with rich intentional content and those lacking it.134 The latter 
sort, which includes experiences of fatigue, of boiling, of trembling, of extra energy, etc., 
may or may not accompany emotions of a given type. But they are not necessary for 
emotion in the strict sense. Feelings rich in intentional content, some examples of which 
are “feelings of the emptiness of one’s life without a certain person, feelings of unhappy 
love for that person, and so forth,”135 are entirely different. Here what we are calling a 
‘feeling’ is not something opposed to cognitive words like ‘perception’ and ‘judgment,’ as 
the latter are used by Nussbaum. Some feelings of this sort are identity conditions for some 
emotions.136 Here the word ‘feeling’ does not have a different meaning per se, but rather is 
used in a way illustrative of the nuances of its general meaning. 
Also important to discuss is the kinetic properties of emotions. These are what the 
word ‘feeling’ is generally used to capture when it is spoken/written in a discussion of the 
emotions. However, for Nussbaum the concept of judgment is sufficient to exhaust the 
kinetic content of some emotions. Here it can plausibly be asked: “Do we imagine the 
thought causing a fluttering in my hands, or a trembling in my stomach?”137 Moreover, 
taking up again the example of grief, can we think that this trembling is itself grief? 
Nussbaum is convinced that we cannot, due precisely to its lack of aboutness. For her, the 
emotion of grief, like any other, is the recognition of its object’s importance. And this 
capacity of recognition is necessarily part of the emotion’s identity.  
Even if we accept the existence of cognitive elements within emotions, can we still 
hold that these cognitive judgments are merely their beginnings, while the previously 
discussed kinetic movements are their essences? Nussbaum answers this question by 
restating her bold claim that judgment is a constituent part of emotion and a sufficient 
cause for its other elements. Yet she insists that those other elements (feelings, movements, 
etc.) are parts of the judgment itself.138 This statement is deeply connected with how she 
construes judgment. As we have already seen, Stoic reason is dynamic. Hence, judging is 
also a dynamic process. Nussbaum says: “Reason here moves, embraces, refuses; it can 
move rapidly or slowly, it can move directly or with hesitation.”139 Using once again the 
                                                
133 This is not necessarily an issue for the Christian tradition, where the language and ideas of analogy, 
mystery, and God’s logic surpassing that of human beings are often employed. 
134 Cf. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 60. 
135 Ibid., 60. 
136 Cf. Ibid., 60. 
137 Ibid., 44. 
138 Cf. Ibid., 44-45. 
139 Ibid., 45. 
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example of grief, she continues, “I have imagined it [reason] entertaining the appearance of 
my mother’s death and then, so to speak, rushing toward it, opening itself to take it in.”140 
It thus seems reasonable to claim that such a dynamic faculty can store the disorderly 
motions of grief. But by these motions, we must be clear. Nussbaum does not mean kinetic 
properties belonging to bodily processes. Rather, the movement within grief (for example, 
a movement toward the appropriating of the death of one’s mother) is the movement of 
thought toward something incredibly important.141 It will be helpful to keep the following 
lines in mind: “I think that if we say anything else we lose the close connection between 
the recognition and the being shaken that experience gives us. The recognizing and the 
upheaval, we want to say, belong to one and the same part of me, the part with which I 
make sense of the world.”142 
This idea of emotions as upheaval of thought is essential to Nussbaum’s theory of the 
emotions. Emotion, for her, is precisely a very acute way of knowing. This knowledge’s 
weight, as explained previously, comes from its reference to the self. In grief the griever 
does not coolly accept the proposition “someone dear to me is dead” and then commence 
their sorrow. Instead, “the real, full recognition of that terrible event (as many times as I 
recognize it) is the upheaval.”143 Upheaval is experience that tears open a person’s self-
sufficiency. “If I go up to embrace the death image, if I take it into myself as the way 
things are, it is at that very moment, in that cognitive act itself, that I am putting the 
world’s knife nail into my own insides.”144 We can see that for Nussbaum movements in 
emotions can be explained by the nature of reason itself. Reason is a dynamic, all- 
encompassing human capacity. And in this way one does not need the terminology of 
feelings to explain the kinetic movements associated with emotions. The processes of 
knowing are not static in her system. There are some things the coming to knowledge of 
which can shake a person’s whole essence. “Knowing can be violent, given the truths that 
there are to be known.”145  
 
2.2.7 Emotions as Upheavals of Thought  
 
Now let’s revisit Nussbaum’s definition of the emotion: “Emotions are appraisals or value 
judgments, which ascribe to things and persons outside the person’s own control great 
importance for that person’s own flourishing.”146 One could rightly point out that it does 
not contain the claim that emotions are upheavals of thought, but only that they are 
appraisals or value judgments. This observation would be correct, for Nussbaum does not 
include the concept of ‘upheaval’ into the definition of emotion that she offers. She indeed 
agrees that it feels like something to experience an emotion. “Much of the time, that 
feeling might be described as involving something that psychologists typically call 
‘arousal’ and that Proust calls ‘upheaval’ – experiences of being shaken up or in 
                                                
140 Ibid., 45. 
141 Cf. Ibid., 45. 
142 Ibid., 45. 
143 Ibid., 45. 
144 Cf. Ibid., 45. 
145 Ibid., 45. 
146 Ibid., 4. 
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ferment.”147 Yet she thinks that this is not universally the case. In many instances emotions 
simply do not feel that way. Think, for example, of calm joy or love. Even grief or anger 
may not manifest themselves as upheavals. Nussbaum uses the term ‘upheaval’ to explain 
our experiences of emotions, but this rather loose concept should not enter our definition 
itself. “There is just too much variation among persons, and across times in the same 
person, for that to be right[.]”148 Emotions, in Nussbaum’s theory, can be defined as 
evaluative judgments solely; upheaval and other feelings characteristic of them being just 
very general stipulations of this definition. 
 
2.2.8 Emotions and Imagination 
 
We have established that for Nussbaum emotions are value recognitions only. She has 
assured us that her definition is exhaustive. However, she admits that the human 
experience of emotions usually contains more than just cognitive content. It seems that 
emotions are closely connected with imagination. “It [emotion] contains rich and dense 
perceptions of the object, which are highly concrete and replete with detail[.]”149 Emotions, 
then, are generally not just abstract forms of judgment. They also involve dense 
perceptions. This imaging element of emotion is highly particular. “The experience of 
emotion is, then, cognitively laden, or dense, in a way that a propositional-attitude view 
would not capture; and it is probably correct to think that this denseness is usually, if not 
always, a necessary feature of the experience of an emotion such as grief.”150 
The above statement implies that emotions are different from more abstract judgment 
states. Nussbaum claims that human emotions are shaped by our perceiving natures getting 
their rich texture from our sophisticated sensory abilities.151 However, she does not want to 
easily admit imagination into her definition. For imaginative acts are more characteristic of 
some emotions than others. And even in these they are not universally present. When 
elaborating on the connection between emotions and imagination, again taking grief as an 
example, which generally has a strong connection to particular perception, Nussbaum 
argues “that grief is the acceptance of a certain content, accompanied (usually) by relevant 
acts of the imagination.”152 Drawing our attention to imaginative acts, Nussbaum 
emphasizes that these focus on their object very intensively, much more than mere 
propositional content does. Imaginative acts seem to make very general apprehensions of 
the object mine. They seem to give their objects concrete faces, so to speak. It seems to be 
a bridge whereby numerous distant appearances become concrete objects of our emotions. 
However, Nussbaum decidedly does not add imagination into her definition per se. 
Here we will not go much further with this discussion of the relation between 
imagination and the emotions. Rather, we will resume it in this work’s later pages, where 
we will address specifically the emotion of compassion.153 It is sufficient to now mention 
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151 Cf. Ibid., 65. 
152 Ibid., 66. 
153 See Chapter II, especially, subsections 4.3 Education of the Eudaimonistic Judgment; 4.3.1 Humanities at 
the Aid of the Eudaimonistic Judgment: Tragedy and Comedy as Didactical Tools; 4.3.2 Tragedy; 4.3.2.1 
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that imagination contributes significantly to morality through its opening to persons of 
ways to include distant individuals in their schemes of goals, and through its creating for 
them of chances to broaden their circle of concern and form meaningful attachments. This 
statement also highlights certain problems regarding the relation of emotions to morality; 
for they are morally ambiguous. They can be both positive forces, broadening our circles 
of concern, and negative ones, tending toward the creation of closed spaces of attachment, 
inclusive of only very proximate individuals and entities (take, for example, uneducated, 
strongly biased emotions). But we will continue this discussion later on. 
 
2.2.9 Types of Emotions: Background and Situational, General and Concrete 
 
Nussbaum takes these two categories as independent distinctions. We will explain them by 
utilizing once again the example of grief. Let us first address the distinction between 
general and concrete emotions. The distinction, which Nussbaum does not discuss in great 
length, refers to evaluative judgments of the following sorts. Grief’s concrete judgment 
concerns a very particular person and his/her importance to my own flourishing. Here it is 
all about a concrete person with concrete characteristics whose story was intertwined with 
mine in so many ways.154 The general aspect of this judgment is the grieving for a lost 
mother (Nussbaum throughout her book speaks not about grief in the general sense, but 
rather tells of her own grief when she lost her mother), the fact that now one does not have 
a parent.155 
Nussbaum then discusses the distinction between background and situational 
emotional judgments.156 As one might guess, this distinction is between those evaluative 
judgments that are continuous through different situations and those that arise with new 
situations. But we should not see these as radically dichotomous. Yes, background 
emotions persist through various situations, but situational emotions can also be enduring, 
because situations themselves often are.157 Hence, they can be seen as continuous with 
                                                                                                                                              
Tragedy and Education of the Eudaimonistic Judgment; 4.3.2.2 Tragedy and Education of the Judgment of 
Seriousness; 4.3.2.3 Tragedy and Value Conflict; 4.3.3 Comedy; 4.3.4 Concluding Remarks. 
154 Cf. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 68. 
155 Cf. Ibid., 68. 
156 Nussbaum’s ideas on background and situational emotions are inspired to some extent by English 
philosopher Richard Wollheim, who is noted for original work on the topics of mind and emotion and his 
views on distinction between states and dispositions. See his On the Emotions (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1999). Nussbaum agrees with him that “it is important to recognize the existence of enduring 
structures in the personality that have psychological reality whether or not they are conscious; emotions are 
among such structures.” Yet, Nussbaum claims that she utilizes less dichotomous distinctions between 
background and situational emotions: “It really suggests a continuum, since ‘situations’ may be more or less 
enduring, and thus an emotion might be situational and yet relatively enduring; a background emotion is one 
that persists through situations of different types, and thus is more enduring than that. Another difference is 
that on my account, the background situational distinction does not perfectly map on to the 
conscious/nonconscious distinction. One may, I believe, have a situational emotion of which one is not 
aware: as when someone has grief at a particular death without being aware of it (or not yet), or when one is 
angry at someone for some specific reason without being aware of it. (This nonconscious operation of a 
situational emotion is analogous to the noncounscious operation of a whole host of concrete beliefs in one’s 
ordinary movements. Thus, when I move across my office, I have and use various concrete situation-focused 
beliefs about the locations of objects, of which I have no conscious awareness.)” Nussbaum, Upheavals of 
Thought, 69-70, footnote 69. 
157 Cf. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought , 69. 
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each other. Background emotions remain unnoticed until circumstances shed light on 
them.158 One’s judgments about the badness of death, the importance of health, the 
vulnerability of the human body, etc. may persist over one’s adult life, but it takes 
something like the concrete loss of one’s beloved to bring them to the fore.159 Another 
example of a background emotion is the persistence of one’s love for one’s children, one’s 
parents, one’s partner, etc. even without any concrete situation bringing to mind an 
awareness of it. “They [background emotions] are not simply dispositional; they have 
psychological reality, and often explain patterns of action[.]”160 These emotions are 
entangled with the fabric of life and are essential in understanding and explaining one’s 
actions. Once one has formed attachments to things that one cannot control, once these 
things have become part of one’s own eudaimonia, one has also formed background 
emotions toward them, emotions that now are deeply rooted in the soil of one’s daily 
life.161 These are sometimes more salient and sometimes less, yet always motivating of 
one’s actions in numerous ways. The phenomena of background emotion can be illustrated 
by the calm joy experienced when the important pillars of one’s life are strong, i.e., when 
one’s work is going well and one’s important relationships are flourishing, and that calm 
joy lingers in everything that one does.162 These emotions might be called to awareness by 
specific happenings, or they might not.163 “Background emotions need not be 
nonconscious, just as episodic or situational emotions need not to be conscious; but 
frequently they will be, since they are persisting conditions that are often unnoticed partly 
on the account of their pervasiveness[.]”164  
Situational emotions, however, are judgments elicited by concrete situations. They 
should be viewed as existing in a certain continuum with background emotions. For one to 
become aware of one’s background judgments, at least in most cases, their objects must be 
made present in concrete situations (for example, one’s background fear of death comes to 
mind only in a concrete situation where one is confronted with his/her vulnerability).165 
The distinction between background and situational emotions shows the complex 
geography of emotional life. It indicates how our general conceptions of value enable us to 
be responsive to concrete situations. In Nussbaum’s words: “To use a very Stoic image, the 
background emotion is the wound, the situational emotion the world’s knife entering the 
                                                
158 Cf. Ibid., 70. 
159 Cf. Ibid., 70. 
160 Ibid., 70. 
161 Cf. Ibid., 71. 
162 Cf. Ibid., 70. 
163 Talking about the phenomenon of nonconscious emotions might be rather difficult, because of the lack of 
phenomenological and imaginative elements within them. But when Nussbaum speaks of nonconscious 
emotions she uses the term in a very ordinary sense, one in accordance with common beliefs. “They are 
nonconscious, although they guide our actions in many ways: beliefs about cause and effect, beliefs about 
where things are, beliefs about what is healthy and harmful, and so forth. We don’t focus on such familiar 
and general beliefs every time we use them or are motivated by them. And yet, if we were asked, ‘Do you 
believe that one dollar is worth more than fifty cents?’ we would of course say yes. We are repositories of an 
indefinite number of such beliefs, and rely on them in our actions. Indeed, if we weren’t like this, if we used 
only those beliefs on which we were consciously focusing, we couldn’t possibly survive.” This, we believe, 
sheds light on the distinction between conscious and nonconscious as it is used by Nussbaum. See 
Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 71-72. 
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wound.”166 
 
2.2.10 Emotional Conflict 
 
We have presented the argumentative pillars supporting the core of Nussbaum’s theory. It 
remains for us to explain Nussbaum’s conception of emotional conflict, understood here in 
terms of both clashes between the emotions and other judgments, and between the former 
themselves. In the first case, the force of reason battles an unthinking, rebellious energy. In 
the second, the emotions assault each other.167 Nussbaum is convinced that the Stoics had a 
good grasp on emotional conflict. We have already seen that in their thinking emotions are 
cognitive. Hence, we can dismiss the unthinking force image. Regarding the image of 
reason restricting the emotions, Nussbaum questions how this scenario could possibly 
occur. How could reason restrict a force with which it hypothetically does not 
communicate?168 But if we see emotions as cognitive, then we can rather easily account for 
these conflicts as debate about what is really the case in the world. “In this rhythm of 
embrace and denial, this uneven intermittence of visions, we have a story of reason’s 
urgent struggles with itself concerning nothing less than how to imagine life[.]”169  
Regarding conflicts between the emotions themselves, these are usually issued on the 
exact same basis, that of judgments. For instance, a conflict between different emotions 
directed toward the same person (for example, between anger and gratitude) usually 
involves the assessment of the harms and benefits for which that person is responsible, 
their impact, etc.170  
Here we may be able to get a better idea of why all the various emotions are typically 
grouped together as one class. It is not just that they have common characteristics (which 
we have attempted to explicate), but also that they are in dynamic relationship with each 
other.171 The following sentence by Nussbaum will help us understand this better: “Given a 
deep attachment to something outside one’s own control, the very accidents of life, 
combined with that attachment now into intense joy, when the beloved object is at hand, 
now into fear, when it is threatened, now into grief, when catastrophe befalls it.”172 The 
relationship between the emotions stems precisely from their aboutness, their 
intentionality. And the passage from one emotion to another has everything to do with our 
relation to the object that we are emoting about. Our emotional life indicates that we have 
hostages to our fortune. It points to the vulnerable aspects of our good. Emotions, while 
ultimately referring to the self (it is I who undergoes experiences having to do with what I 
deem most important), also remind us that this self is always in the world, exposed to 
uncontrolled happenings. This exposer is both enriching and depriving. “So far as the 
passage from one emotion to the other goes, one is in the hands of the world[.]”173 
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2.3 ON ORIGINS OF THE EMOTIONS: BETWEEN NATURE AND NURTURE 
 
Nussbaum has presented us with a cognitive/evaluative view of the emotions, yet we are 
still to discern her views concerning the origins of them – thus we have to look into a 
discussion on how much our emotional experiences and reactions are part of our biological 
nature and how far (and if) they are formed by culture.174 Nussbaum acknowledges the fact 
that frequently the theorists of emotions adhere to the extreme views: on one side we have 
an argument, especially common to evolutionary psychologists and psychoanalytical 
thinkers, that society plays no role in our emotional life; and on the other hand some 
anthropologists argue that emotional repertory of societies were solely constructed 
socially.175 
Nussbaum wishes to position herself somewhere in the middle between the extreme 
positions and she argues that she has stressed the universality of certain emotions in a way 
that she conceives them as attachments to the things of limited control that human beings 
can hardly fail to have.176 They are additionally the elements of our common animal 
heritage and so have adaptive significance, thus biological basis for emotions is likely to be 
common to all. But this stipulation does not discard another – that emotions can be shaped 
                                                
174 While the previous sections mark Nussbaum’s attempt to provide us with the original theory of emotions 
that is inspired and built upon some core insight found in the Stoic moral psychology, the upcoming sections 
mark her attempt to put that theory in dialogue with the status questions and thus tensions concerning the 
questions on how one should interpret the phenomenon of emotions. Here she wrestles with different 
interpretations of emotion given by evolutionary psychologists – emotions in this discipline are conceived as 
absolutely universal, natural species; on the other side of the spectrum we have anthropologists who see 
emotions as socially constructed and practically unable to escape the chains of a particular culture. 
Nussbaum, we will see, finds both of these perspectives reductionist and attempts to argue for the ideas of 
freedom even in our conceptions of emotions. 
175 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 143. When it comes to evolutionary psychology Nussbaum points to 
the works of Paul Ekman. This American psychologist working with Darwinian approach is one of the most 
renowned scholars in emotion research and a pioneer in the research connecting emotions to facial 
expressions (the research is conducted by showing the photographs of a subject expressing a particular 
emotion). This thus attempts to prove universality of emotional experiences and expressions. While 
acknowledging that his work suggests that some of the facial expressions can be cross-culturally recognized 
as signs of certain emotions, Nussbaum seems less convinced about the other conclusion of the research – 
that it also shows a cross-cultural tendency to display such reaction at particular circumstances. And so we 
can find her saying: “I have to admit to a brain deficiency here, because I don’t always find it easy to 
recognize the emotions of the subjects in these photographs; insofar as I do recognize some of them, they 
tend to look like the contortions of children making faces, not like expressions that a real person would have. 
And I have a tendency to wonder whether what I’m seeing is the habitual pattern of frown lines in the face of 
an older person who might be perfectly happy at that moment, or an expression of an actual 
sadness…Moreover, as Paul Griffiths points out, Ekman’s research claims something far out of line with the 
data when it claims to show that emotions are universally experienced. For the research deals exclusively 
with the behavioral manifestations of (some) emotions (what Griffiths calls the ‘output’ side), and with only 
a part of that behavioral manifestation. It does not deal at all with the emotions’ content, or with the ways 
people interpret situations as calling for particular emotion. It thus has nothing to say about universality in 
the occasions for anger, or grief, or fear. Those are matters of interpretation and belief, and the studies 
confine themselves to behavior and recognition behavior.” Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 158-159. For 
Griffiths’ argument see Paul E. Griffiths, What Emotions Really Are (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1997). Ekman has published numerous scientific articles on emotions and their connection to facial 
expressions, but you can consult Paul Ekman and Richard J. Davidson, eds., The Nature of Emotions. 
Fundamental Questions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) as a representative work. 
176 Cf. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 141. 
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differently by different societies and these differences can affect the experience of emotion 
itself. 
 
2.3.1 The Logic of the Emotions: Human-Animal Differences 
 
Nussbaum argues for including animals in her theory of emotions,177 yet she also wants to 
highlight certain features in which human beings and non-human animals are dissimilar. 
She presents a cognitive/evaluative theory of emotions and includes animals in it as 
capable of certain cognitive operations, some being way more complex in nature than we 
sometimes see at a first sight.178 
                                                
177 Nussbaum builds a strong case for including animals (and human infants) in a cognitive/evaluative view 
of emotions. Animals, rather evidently, have emotions, but the original Stoic view claims that ‘appearances’ 
that evoke emotions have propositional content that must be formable linguistically. For Nussbaum this 
analysis seems too narrow and she wants to argue that animals are capable of intentionality, selective 
attention, and appraisal. She attempts to illustrate her case by attending to the current experimental work in 
cognitive psychology. She highlights the question of intentionality by using the works of an influential 
American psychologist Martin Seligman, see, for example, his Helplessness: On Depression, Development, 
and Death (New York: W.H. Freeman, 1975); a prominent American psychologist Richard Lazarus see, for 
example, Richard L. Lazarus and Bernice N. Lazarus, Passions and Reason Making Sense of Our Emotions 
(New York, Oxford University Press, 1994); a professor emeritus of cognitive psychology and a novelist 
Keith Oatley, see, for instance, his Best Laid Schemes: The Psychology of Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992); a professor emeritus of cognitive psychology Anthony Ortony, see his Anthony 
Ortony et al., The Cognitive Structure of Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
Additionally, she also utilizes account of professor of neuroscience Joseph E. LeDoux, see, for instance, his 
The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1996); and neuroscientist/neurobiologist Antonio R. Damasio, see, for instance, his Descartes’ Error: 
Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Putnam, 1994). In addition, Nussbaum in constructing 
her views on animal emotions is trying to be attentive to the narratives of experience. This is a bit more 
troublesome due to the lack of the first person story, but Nussbaum utilizes the biography of emeritus 
professor of philosophy George Pitcher where a close relationship with his dogs Lupa and Remus is depicted, 
see his The Dogs Who Came to Stay (New York: Dutton, 1995).  
By basing her views on the interpretation of the aforementioned literature, Nussbaum wants to stipulate that 
1) the animal evidence, indeed, confirms that emotions are evaluative appraisals of the world; 2) the 
cognitive appraisal does not have to be a matter of reflexive self-consciousness: “Many if not most animals 
have something that we may call conscious awareness: that is, there is something the world is like to them, 
and that intentional viewing of the world is significant in explaining their actions, but this need not imply that 
they study their own awareness…We have self-consciousness, but do not always exercise it; and we can 
ourselves discriminate threat from nonthreat, the loved from the nonloved, without explicitly formulating this 
to ourselves in every case, or reflexively scrutinizing our own ascriptions.” Nussbaum, Upheavals of 
Thought, 126; 3) The role of language in the Stoic theory of emotions should be re-thought: in the cases of 
animals, human infants, and even adult humans the subjects’ emotional content will not always be able to be 
translated into a good (if any) verbal translation. “There are many kinds of cognitive activity or seeing-as,” 
Nussbaum argues, “in which ideas of salience and importance figure: there are pictorial imaginings, musical 
imaginings, the kinetic forms of imagining involved in the dance, and others. These are not all reducible to or 
straightforwardly translatable into linguistic symbolism, nor should we suppose that linguistic representing 
has pride of place as either the most sophisticated or the most basic mode…[E]ven in the human case 
language is far from being the only medium in which an emotion’s content can register.” Nussbaum, 
Upheavals of Thought, 127-128. 
178 In the Political Emotions, for instance, Nussbaum utilizes the example of elephants to illustrate that non-
human animals are capable of some form of grief and altruism. She is giving an example that occurred in 
West Bengal, India, in 2010 September – two baby elephants became trapped on the train track while the 
herd was attempting to cross the railroad. As a train was approaching the infants, five adult females tried to 
protect them by surrounding them. All seven animals died, the remaining members of the herd did not leave; 
they stayed to watch the perished ones. Thus Nussbaum claims that “[n]onhuman animals care and grieve; 
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But at this point Nussbaum attempts to illustrate how the distinctiveness of human 
beings can alter the way they conceive of the world and thus emote. She introduces 
categories of time, language, and social norms to show how these alter human existence. 
 
2.3.2 The Ways Temporal Thinking Affects Our Emotions  
 
One of the pillars of the existence of a human being is temporal thinking, meaning, that we 
do understand our lives “as a temporal process with a beginning, a development, and an 
end.”179 Humans normally orient their lives around this structure and it gives the self a 
grasp of continuity of the self.180 Temporal category also enables something so essential to 
ethics – a sense of habit and routine, which has a great consequence to the sense of the self 
and our emotional lives. The sense of time gives human beings a grasp of history and this 
allows them to generalize in more sophisticated ways than other non-human animals. 
Furthermore, the ability to conceive itself in time and thus history, allows one to make 
complex causal concepts. 
Due to the lack of this line of thinking animals seem to lack certain emotions: “hope, 
for example, with its robust sense of the future possibility; guilt, with its keen identification 
of a past wrongdoer with the agent’s own present self, romantic love, to the extent that it 
involves a temporal sense of aim and aspiration, and a fine sense of particularity; 
compassion, to the extent that it calls upon a sense of general possibility and fellow 
feeling; types of shame that involve thought of a norm against which one has measured 
oneself and found oneself wanting; and even some forms of anger, fear, and grief, to the 
extent to which they require causal and temporal judgments.”181 
Furthermore, only humans seem to develop explicit theories of the world, thus we 
have such objects of thought as religion, metaphysics, philosophy, science. “But this, too,” 
Nussbaum argues, “makes a great difference to the emotional life, not only by giving the 
human being new emotional objects (Nature, God), but also by providing a framework of 
understanding with which causal and temporal thinking will operate.”182 Nussbaum wants 
to show to her reader that human beings distinctively develop a sophisticated sense of the 
self and the context in which the self operates (presence with a complex history where one 
construes his/her values based on distinct conscious or pre-conscious philosophical 
concepts) gives them unique objects of emotions. Some human emotions can be conceived 
as universal in a sense that they have same biological roots and are attachments to the 
things of a great matter, but Nussbaum seems to argue that we cannot conceive this 
universality in similar ways as we would conceive it in non-human animals, precisely due 
to the complex self-consciousness human beings develop and by consequence distinct 
objects of emotions. Human beings and their emotions, thus, are unique phenomena that 
should not be approached in a reductionist way. 
                                                                                                                                              
they experience compassion and loss. They perform acts of altruism that appear to be motivated by powerful 
emotions.” Martha C. Nussbaum, Political Emotions. Why Love Matters for Justice? (Cambridge, London: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2013), 138. Nussbaum uses the example she found in the 
newspaper The Telegraph (2010). 
179 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 144. 
180 Cf. Ibid., 144. 
181 Ibid., 146-146. 
182 Ibid., 147. 
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We should also remember that Nussbaum conceives of emotions as eudaimonistic; 
that means that they really rest on the sense of the self – on its goals and projects.183 
Human beings are much more likely to perceive their goals as having some kind of 
network and their goals also manifest a great amount of flexibility. And so Nussbaum 
argues: 
 
From this follow a number of implications for the logic of the emotions. First, that in the 
human case there is logic in them, to an extent unknown in the rest of the animal world. 
Humans may form inconsistent goals and have emotions accordingly; but the awareness of an 
inconsistency is likely to be a reason for deliberation, self-criticism or at least anxiety in a way 
that it will not be in the other species.184 
 
From this argument we can see that Nussbaum argues that emotions, together with 
the rest of the person’s goals and projects, are subject to deliberation and scrutiny. The 
deliberative activity normally appears in a context of social interactions – and this feature 
for Nussbaum also alters the content of distinctively human emotions. It allows the object 
of emotions to be a group: “the city or the country or nation itself, and possibly even the 
whole of humanity – abstractions of which no other animal is capable.”185 In a sense that 
human beings are more fully social they are also more able to be alone, Nussbaum argues. 
And this ability to be alone for her is an essential aspect of emotional development as we 
will see further on.186 The ability to be alone enables humans to imagine and so to wonder 
and consequently makes them capable “of the exhilaration of solitary contemplation, of 
awe before the silence of nature, of peaceful solitary joy at the air and light that surround 
them, also of loneliness, of the gloomy horror that can seize one in the middle of a forest, 
in whose shadows one finds images of one’s own death.”187 And we could conclude that in 
a nutshell Nussbaum argues that “in an ethical and social/political creature, emotions 
themselves are ethical and social/political, parts of an answer to the question, ‘What is 
worth caring about’? ‘How should I live’?”188  
 
2.3.3 Language and Its Influence on Human Emotions  
 
By including human infants and non-human animals in her theory of emotions – thus 
arguing that they are capable of genuine emotions, Nussbaum also proclaims that language 
is not a prime actor in the emotions and that they can be based on other forms of symbolic 
representation. Yet the fact that language exists – changes emotions.189 Nussbaum argues 
that the fact that we label our emotions can affect the experience of the emotion itself: 
 
                                                
183 Cf. Ibid., 147. 
184 Ibid., 148. 
185 Ibid., 148. 
186 The ability to be alone in the presence of others takes up a prominent role in a successful emotional 
development of the human infant. This ability can aid in conquering the narcissistic tendency to employ 
others for our needs. This will be discussed in the upcoming section 2.4 Roots of Emotional Experience in 
Infancy all of its subsections. 
187 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 149. 
188 Ibid., 149. 
189 Cf. Ibid., 149. 
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In the process of labeling, we are also frequently organizing, bounding some things off from 
others, sharpening distinctions that may have been experienced in an inchoate way. From then 
on, we experience our emotions in ways guided by these descriptions. A person who does not 
know emotional ‘grammar’ of his or her society cannot be assumed to have the same emotional 
life as one who does know this ‘grammar.’ To be able to articulate one’s emotions is eo ipso to 
have a different emotional life.190 
 
2.3.4 Social Norms and Human Emotions  
 
If we take in Nussbaum’s view that emotions are evaluative appraisals, then, we will see 
that social norms concerning the value of certain phenomena can affect emotions rather 
directly. Nussbaum argues that criteria for social manifestation of behaviors appropriate to 
certain emotions are socially taught.191 In many cases, we may expect that the experience 
of emotions within different societies is the same and only the external manifestation is 
different, but Nussbaum argues that in some instances behavior rules can alter the 
experience itself. 
Nussbaum wants to show that due to different physical conditions, metaphysical, 
religious, and cosmological beliefs and various practices and routines different cultures 
approach and construe emotions differently. Cultures also judge differently the entire 
emotion category, the appropriate object of emotions, and they develop a different 
taxonomy of emotions. 
One of the examples she utilizes is the example of anthropologist Jean L. Briggs’ 
study of Canadian Inuit. This culture judges that anger is always inappropriate. Though, 
they experience anger, they find it to be a sign of immaturity, infantilizing the person who 
experiences this emotion. Thus anger in Inuit culture is highly linked with the experience 
of shame. On the contrary, Ancient Greco-Roman culture saw anger as a pleasant emotion, 
directed at the future and taking pleasure in contemplating revenge. Thus anger was seen 
there as a delightful experience “dripping ‘sweeter than honey before the heart.’”192 
Nussbaum claims that contemporary Americans have rather ambivalent views on anger as 
her experience in classroom discussions has proven. 
                                                
190 Ibid., 149. At this point Nussbaum also briefly discusses the differences between genders. Research seems 
to show that in American society males are less able to label emotions. Males tend to be able to name 
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Nussbaum also points out that appropriate objects for an emotion that are also fixated 
in the Anglo-American legal system move according to cultural shifts.193 The doctrine of 
‘reasonable provocation,’ for example, used to permit that one could get violently angry at 
a wife’s adultery. Nowadays, the doctrine is still there, yet the objects are different – a wife 
is no longer conceived of as a man’s property, thus the adultery clause is gone. But new 
objects that resemble changes in social norms have been added to a norm of proper anger – 
for example the anger of a battered woman against her abuser.  
Also emotion taxonomies are not the same across various cultures and so Nussbaum 
claims: “I have said that all known societies have some variety of the major emotion-types: 
love, fear, anger, jealousy, envy, compassion, and some other. But even at the level of the 
big generic categories we do not find a perfect one-to-one correspondence across the 
cultures, since cultures organize in different ways the elements that individuate emotions 
from one another.”194Here she comes back to the example of the anthropological study of 
Jean L. Briggs and the Ifaluk people – this culture has an emotion called fago which 
contains elements of both personal love and compassion – a juxtaposition which is not 
available for cultures that have a high focus on erotic love. Ifaluk is a tight bond 
community focused on survival and mutual aid, thus their fago highlights the vulnerability 
of the object and not its particularity/specialness as the emotion of love in many Western 
cultures does. 
For Nussbaum, then, culture is an adequate key to access emotions, but she does not 
want this key to become an all-encompassing narrative. “But social constructionists,” 
Nussbaum argues, “frequently suggest several more ambitious theses: that cultural forces 
leave no room for individual variety and freedom; that they make the details of a personal 
history aetiologically unimportant; that they create mutually inaccessible worlds.”195 
Nussbaum is not willing to accept a concept of social construction conceived in this way. 
And so she argues “that culture only exists in the histories of individuals, that individuals 
vary greatly, and that the existence of diverse personal patterns creates spaces for diversity 
in the culture itself. People usually see this where their own culture is concerned.”196 We 
should remember that Nussbaum is greatly concerned with moral education – thus a 
conceptual space, a well argued acknowledgment that culture can alter our emotions 
without being the sole shaping power is rather essential to her theory of emotions. 
Nussbaum wishes that the concept of social construction would lead to recognition of 
space and freedom. And, indeed, on a daily basis people manifest behavior and beliefs that 
emotions are not only irrational impulses, but they have a cognitive content – they speak of 
shaping their own emotional content, this is especially evident when adults attempt to 
shape the emerging emotions of their children.197 Thus Nussbaum continues: “Indeed, a 
great advantage of a cognitive/evaluative view of emotion is that it shows us where 
societies and individuals have freedom to make improvements. If we recognize the element 
of evaluation in the emotions, we also see that they can themselves be evaluated – and in 
                                                
193 Cf. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 163. 
194 Ibid., 163-164. 
195 Ibid., 169. 
196 Ibid., 171. 
197 Cf. Ibid., 172. 
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some ways altered, if they fail to survive criticism.”198 Thus if emotions are shaped in 
some ways by intelligent human activity (as social construction theory implies in itself), it 
can also be further altered by it. 
Thus a plausible constructionist theory should make space for human freedom. 
Nussbaum argues further that it should respect the narrative history of an individual. And 
so she claims that “a fundamental aspect of treating a person as a person is the recognition 
that an infant has a separate history of great depth and intensity. Only from such a history 
does an infant come to be a member of a larger social group.”199 We now turn to the 
presentation of that developmental history as Nussbaum construes it. 
 
 2.4. ROOTS OF EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE IN INFANCY 
 
In this section we intend to present yet another characteristic of emotions, namely, its 
embeddedness in personal history.200 Nussbaum perceives emotions not as momentary 
occurrences (this was also evident from her account on the background emotions), which 
have no connection with a person’s past experiences, but as experiences that have, indeed, 
a complex relationship with one’s history. Emotions, then, can best be understood in light 
of that history. We can understand our grief most adequately, Nussbaum says, if we look at 
it as one strand in a history of the love relationship with the person we grieve for.201 To put 
it in her own words: “For new objects of love and anger and fear bear the traces of earlier 
objects; one’s emotions toward them are frequently therefore also, in both intensity and 
configuration, emotions towards one’s own past.”202 
By introducing the past temporal category into the account of emotions Nussbaum 
alters the original Stoic view on emotions. The Stoic taxonomy omits emotions that are 
directed to the past events, furthermore, it does not allow us to see how past events 
influence present emotions.203 The original Stoic theory of emotions does not admit 
emotional experience for young human children partially due to the lack of capacity to 
formulate linguistic propositions. Nussbaum, however, does not agree with this claim of 
the Stoic theory. First of all, she advocates broader concepts of ascending to the 
appearance and forming of a proposition that does not have to be that dependent on 
linguistic formulations. Rather than strictly linguistically formulable propositions, 
emotions in this account are conceived in terms of “urgent transactions with a changing 
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environment.”204 Seen in this light emotional experience, then, is legitimate in human 
infants and non-human animals. Emotions in infancy do not constitute a trivial part of 
Nussbaum’s theory of emotions. On the contrary, this is a rather essential correction of the 
Stoic views of emotions. Nussbaum is convinced that if we see emotions from the temporal 
perspective we can understand them most adequately, as we have mentioned above. Only 
in light of the past event can we make proper sense of present emotions. Nussbaum thus 
argues “that in a deep sense all human emotions are in part about the past, and bear the 
traces of a history that is at once commonly human, socially constructed, and 
idiosyncratic.”205 
Understanding emotions developmentally, Nussbaum says, helps her to complete the 
descriptive part of her neo-Stoic theory.206 To present a narrative structure of emotions (or 
the cognitive content of emotions being rooted in the narrative history of the person) 
Nussbaum provides her reader with a story of the development of human emotional life. 
We have to mention several important aspects of that story. First of all, it is a philosophical 
story. Hence, it is a philosophical take on describing the development of emotions. Our 
author is neither a developmental psychologist nor empirical scientist, thus, here we will be 
presented with a philosophical account on emotional development. And though emotional 
development was treated limitedly in philosophical tradition, Nussbaum utilizes insightful 
passages from Lucretius and Spinoza, in addition to the works of prominent 
psychoanalysts (such as Daniel Stern, Donald Wininnicot, Melanie Klein, John Bowlby, 
and Christopher Bollas among others)207 to construct her story of emotional development. 
We will now introduce Nussbaum’s interpretation of the main stages of a human infant’s 
emotional development. 
 
2.4.1 Emotional Development of the Human Infant 
 
Nussbaum entitles the first stage of infants’ emotional development The Golden Age: 
Helplessness, Omnipotence, Basic Needs and in this segment of her work she wants to 
illustrate the ambivalent relationship between the infant and the world he/she is born into 
as a main incentive of his/her emotional life. 
The image guiding her developmental story is taken from Lucretius’ writings: 
 
like a sailor cast forth from the fierce waves, lies naked on the ground, without speech, in need 
of every sort of life-sustaining help, when first nature casts it forth with birth contractions from 
its mother’s womb into the shores of light. And it fills the whole place with mournful weeping, 
as is right for someone to whom such troubles remain in life.208    
 
 
                                                
204 Ibid., 178.  
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206 Cf. Ibid., 178. 
207 Nussbaum is well aware that the method of psychoanalysis is greatly questioned. Thus she treats the 
authors that employ psychoanalysis “as humanistic interpretative thinkers, very closely related to Proust and 
Plato, whose work gains texture and depth through having a clinical dimension – and in the case of Daniel 
Stern and Bowlby, also an experimental dimensions.” Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 181. 
208 Ibid., 182. Here Nussbaum uses the quotation from Lucretius 5.222-7 
  47 
“A ‘gentle nurse,’” Nussbaum continues, “now calms the child with calm talk and 
caresses – as well as nourishment.”209 Nussbaum is aware that Lucretius presents an image, 
not an account – but her aim is to extrapolate it to an account.210 Nussbaum attempts to 
portray an account of early childhood emotional development where the ambivalence of 
infants’ existence has little to do with sexuality and pleasure per se. She wants to convince 
her reader that the ambivalence is rooted in the infants’ relationship with external goods, or 
in other words, with objects of high importance. The account of the Lucretian infant will 
have three distinct aspects stemming from the above quoted picture.211 The first external 
item of great importance is the need of ‘every sort of life-sustaining help.’ Nussbaum treats 
this facet as a self-evident need confirmed by Lucretius and the modern psychologists – 
this need, to put it simply, consists of basic bodily needs that are channeled through 
sensations of hunger and thirst. In this context the infant will start to recognize the definite 
objects around him/her and start to perceive his/her own boundaries. In this regard 
Nussbaum uses the works of psychoanalyst Nicholas Bollas and his concept 
‘transformational object’ – which refers to a caregiver as an agent who restores the infant’s 
world.212 This means that infants will perceive caregiver not as a particular object, but as 
an agent restoring his/her own states (thus, inducing a transformational process). This 
process puts an imprint on the subsequent life of the infant where he/she continues to long 
for the object that might bring him/her to a state of bliss.213 The fact that infants cannot 
control the subject’s presence already gives a character of unpredictability to his/her world. 
This intuition is very prominent in Nussbaum’s writings.214 It can be called an essential 
characteristic of life in itself and is registered by our emotions. 
Nussbaum asserts that the infant’s needs cannot be reduced just to physical-bodily 
needs and thus she points to the second element she deduces from Lucretius’ picture of the 
infant – a nurse offering not only nourishment, but also gentle caresses.215 At this point she 
turns to the works of Winnicott in order to argue that infants’ needs cannot be reduced to 
bodily gratification only.216 She draws our attention to his concept of ‘holding’ that 
includes feeding, sensitive care and creation of a ‘facilitating environment.’ Facilitating 
environment is a space where the omnipotence (which actually stems from a complete 
helplessness) of the infant is acknowledged and aided (and this aid included nutrition and 
comfort). Nussbaum thus argues that the basic need to be held and comforted is a part of 
our common primate heritage – which seen from evolutionary perspective is an adaptive 
trait that helps one to be protected from danger.217 The need for comfort is a very powerful 
                                                
209 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 182. 
210 Cf. Ibid., 183. 
211 Cf. Ibid., 183-184. 
212 In this regard Nussbaum utilizes Christopher Bollas, The Shadow of the Object: Psychoanalysis of the 
Unthought Known (London: Free Association Books, 1987). 
213 Cf. Nussbaum uses the argument found in Bollas, The Shadow of the Object, 13-29. 
214 As a telling instance of this, see section 1.4 Nussbaum’s Focus on the Moral Agent and the Sense of Life 
of this chapter. 
215 Cf. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 185-187. 
216 Cf. Donald W. Winnicott, The Maturational Process and the Facilitating Environment (New York: 
International Universities Press, 1965).  
217 In this instance Nussbaum turns to the study of psychologist, psychiatrist and psychoanalyst John Bowlby 
who claimed that the need for nourishment and security are two distinct features of an infant’s attachment to 
caregivers. His experiments with the primates suggest that animals that are fed with a hard mechanical device 
  
 
48 
need, Nussbaum argues. In this instance she quotes biologist Sarah Hrdy asserting that 
“human infants have a nearly insatiable desire to be held and to bask in the sense that they 
are loved.”218 
Nussbaum brings us to the third characteristic of Lucretian infant’s experience 
described as casting a newborn into ‘the shores of light.’219 Nussbaum is convinced that 
this description about the world in which a newborn arrives is essential – it indicates that 
the world around the infant is full of wonder and is an object of interest and pleasure in 
itself. This element distances Nussbaum’s analysis of child development from the classical 
psychoanalytic interpretations of basic needs that usually is concerned with tendencies to 
remove pain and disturbance. “But Aristotle got it right,” Nussbaum argues, “the interest in 
cognitive mastery is a part of human infants from the start of life.”220 She turns to the 
works of psychiatrist and psychoanalyst Daniel Stern and his research on infants’ 
fascination with light and the brightest objects as an expression of their interest in 
cognitive stimulation.221 
Thus we can see that in the three tendencies Nussbaum distils from the Lucretius 
picture of the infants’ experience, she wants to emphasize that from the very beginning 
human beings have three sorts of needs – nutrition, comfort, and a sensitivity for wonder as 
a starting point of our imaginative activity. These needs are interrelated and quite essential 
to who we are as human beings. Nussbaum, thus, seems to argue that not only are our 
obvious needs for bodily gratification there from the moment we are born, but also that our 
need to be comforted and feel loved and the world which presents itself as interesting and 
full of mysterious wonder, are all elements that can be traced to the very beginning of our 
life. 
 
2.4.2 Love, Anger, and Primitive Shame 
 
Nussbaum has set the context of early child development – but where do we explicitly find 
emotions in it? Nussbaum explains: 
 
We have roots of emotions already, in the inchoate sense that some processes of profound 
importance to one’s being are arriving and departing in a way that eludes control. Emotions are 
recognitions of that importance coupled with that lack of full control. This means that they 
develop gradually, as the infant becomes more and more cognizant of the importance of the 
transformations to its being, and of the fact that they arrive, so to speak, from outside. When 
                                                                                                                                              
still need the comfort of a soft object. When provided an alternative between the sources of nourishment and 
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they are traced to a definite agency, and when that agency is to some extent distinguished from 
the self, the emotions will be provided with an object.222 
 
Nussbaum argues, then, that in the ambivalent context of the infant’s situation – 
his/her omnipotence and helplessness appear at the same time the rudimentary set of 
emotions get their start. At the very early stage of his/her life the infant is not able to grasp 
a caregiver as a distinct person, but it is aware of the changes in its states. Thus Nussbaum 
claims: “But a kind of rudimentary love and gratitude are involved in the awareness that 
others aid it and its attempts to live (Spinoza’s definition of love).”223  
If gratitude and love is present in a rudimentary form, then, logically some negative 
emotions should be rudimentarily present too. The child’s state is helpless after all, and 
he/she can do very little to alter its states of discomfort. Furthermore, a caregiver will not 
always be able to elevate the negative stimuli immediately or in a form desired by an 
infant. In this case, Nussbaum claims that anger is also present in a rudimentary form as an 
expression that “others sometimes fail in its [infant’s] efforts to live.”224 Thus the infant 
will experience both, love and anger, towards the agency he/she is depending on. Anger for 
Nussbaum is an outcome of the ambivalent situation of an infant’s existence.  
At this point Nussbaum wants to introduce us to Winnicott’s concept of ‘holding.’225 
This concept refers to the caregivers’ ability or inability to meet the infant’s omnipotence 
and helplessness. If parents provide stable care in this manner a context of trust and 
interdependence is set up and can develop further and if not, the child will cling on to 
his/her omnipotence. Nussbaum believes that this delicate stage of human life sets up the 
framework for our future as adult people and can explain further adult crises. And thus she 
argues: 
 
On the other hand, to the extent that a child does not receive sufficiently stable holding, or 
receives holding that is excessively controlling or intrusive, without space for it to relax into 
a relationship of trust, it will cling, in later life, to its own omnipotence, demanding 
perfection in the self and refusing to tolerate imperfection either in object relations or in the 
inner world.226 
 
The character of parental care, thus, influences how an infant starts to conceive 
his/her neediness – it can be experienced as a normal trait of being human or it can be 
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rejected in the name of a perfect omnipotent state and as the only tolerable state of human 
condition. 
At the early stage of human life, yet another complex emotion gets its start – 
primitive shame. For Nussbaum primitive shame, one of the species of shame, is 
“connected to the very fact of [our] own humanness.”227 Nussbaum argues that all infants 
enjoy the sense of omnipotence, and they feel a rudimentary shame due to the fact of their 
helplessness which makes them depend on the caregiver. Shame in its more developed 
form is an outcome of the recognition that one is not adequate in some ways he or she 
hoped – it can appear only if one already expects himself/herself to have worth or 
perfection.228 Adequate parental care which provides a chance for healthy development is 
once again a key to relaxing our claims of perfection in favor of trust in a relationship 
where imperfect things might happen because any relationship is a delicate interchange 
between two imperfect beings. Once an adult person is able to acknowledge this, he/she 
can take delight and joy in his/her imperfection and imperfect relationships.  
Nussbaum’s aim is to suggest an analysis of emotions which starts as rudimentary 
cognitive appraisals from the infant’s arising awareness of uncertainty of the good and 
his/her own inability to control it. Thus, Nussbaum concludes: “Now I shall argue that 
emotions, so construed, are essential to the development of practical reason and the sense 
of self; that they bring problems to the moral life, but also substantial resources without 
which that life would be drastically incomplete.”229 
 
2.4.3 The Body and Disgust 
 
Nussbaum chooses to introduce another difficult emotion into the story of infant 
development, namely, disgust. Disgust, Nussbaum points out, arrives later than primitive 
shame and is connected with the time of toilet training (Nussbaum tries to introduce an 
infant’s development story of the first two years). Thus disgust does not fit an early 
account, yet it is extremely important for later development of our moral outlook. Disgust 
seems to also emerge from our own relation with the vulnerability of our body and can be 
relaxed or severed by the parental care and so Nussbaum chooses to discuss it in the 
context of the infant’s emotional development. 
Nussbaum construes her views based on the work of a professor of psychology Paul 
Rozin, the world’s leading expert in research on disgust. The interpretation of disgust and 
its role in how we construct the picture of ourselves and also our relationship with others in 
a social and legal sense is of great importance to Nussbaum.230 Here we will present the 
mechanism of disgust, its place in child development and the possible dangers it can cast to 
morality. 
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Based on Rozin’s research, Nussbaum claims that disgust has a complex cognitive 
content which has the idea of incorporation of a contaminant at the center of its focus.231 
She thus utilizes Rozin’s definition of disgust: “Revulsion at the prospect (oral) 
contamination of and offensive object. The offensive objects are contaminants; that is, if 
they even briefly contact an acceptable food, they tend to render that food 
unacceptable.”232 Rozin claims further that “it is the subject’s conception of the object, 
rather than the sensory properties of the object, that primarily determines the hedonic 
value.”233 Disgust, thus, seems to be different in important ways from distaste and 
danger.234 Distaste refers to a negative reaction due to sensory factors of the object and 
danger is rejection motivated by perceived harmful consequences. 
Disgust is very strongly linked to borders of the human body and in this sense the 
human mouth seems to be a heavily-laden border. Once again building on Rozin, 
Nussbaum claims that a disgusting object has to be perceived as alien – the bodily products 
are not seen as disgusting as far as they are in our bodies.235 And the fact that most people 
are disgusted to drink from the glass in which they have spit, but they are not disgusted 
with saliva in their mouths, can well illustrate her claim. 
As a rule humans are more disgusted by the objects that are animals or animal 
products (unlike plants).236 Bodily fluids and feces are found to be the prime objects of 
disgust in many societies (with exception of tears, the only bodily secretion that is uniquely 
human). Thus Nussbaum argues “Rozin tentatively concludes that the core idea in disgust 
is a belief that if we take in the animalness of animal secretion we will ourselves be 
reduced to the status of animals.”237 Nussbaum, however, wants to extend this argument 
(but along the lines of Rozin’s research) that we also have reactions of disgust to spoiled or 
decaying objects and this indicates that if digested they would make us decaying and 
mortal. Thus in Nussbaum’s thought disgust gets a connection with loathing our animality 
and mortality. This addition allows her to explain why we loathe some elements of our 
animal heritage (like secretions), but we admire others like (strength, agility). Humans, 
hence, find the objects that they can connect with their vulnerability and possibility of 
decay disgusting. 
The other two prominent features of disgust are ‘psychological contamination’ and 
similarity.238 The former means that once an unharmful substance is in contact with a 
contaminated substance they will continue to act upon each other. Rozin claims that this 
conviction is mediated by the laws of ‘sympathetic magic.’ He suggests an example from 
his study that shows that once a cockroach was dropped into a particular kind of juice, 
people would refuse to drink that kind of juice later on. When it comes to similarity is 
seems that when two things look alike, it is perceived that actions that contaminate one will 
have an effect also on the other. Thus, albeit knowing the origin, people who participated 
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in the experiment refused to eat chocolate fudge when it was shaped as dog-feces; they 
also refused to eat soup that was served in a sterile bedpan. 
Nussbaum attempts to convince us that some beliefs that make up disgust are 
irrational. However, that does not disqualify a possibility for disgust to have an 
evolutionary origin or benefit – generalization can be quite functional in avoiding objects 
that might be dangerous. But disgust does not appear in infants before they are three years 
old and thus it seems that it is largely taught by parents and society – or to put it differently 
– even if disgust is a part of our natural equipment, it seems that disgust, like the ability of 
language, is largely shaped by social teaching. In fact Nussbaum asserts that Rozin’s 
research shows that disgust is a very powerful vehicle of social teaching.239 Yes, there are 
primary objects of disgust, as we have indicated; feces and other bodily fluids. Yet 
societies show a great deal of latitude in the way they extend their disgust reactions from 
primary to other objects. A great number of objects become objects of our disgust 
depending on our cultural teaching and traditions. Thus when a child is introduced to toilet 
training, he/she also gets to know the social teaching related to his/her bodily wastes and 
the related substances, which is a beneficial thing because in this way a child learns to 
avoid some truly harmful objects. Yet it also learns to see his/her own body as problematic. 
And so Nussbaum argues: 
 
In this way, another root of conflict arises in the child’s life: for her own body now seems to 
her problematic, the source of vile substances. She learns to some extent, in some way, to 
cordon herself off against the decaying and the sticky in herself, and she comes to see herself 
in a new way as a result. A ubiquitous reaction to this sense of one’s own disgustingness is to 
project the disgust reaction outward, so that it is not really oneself, but some other group of 
people, who are seen as vile and vicious, sources of a contamination that we might possibly 
keep at bay.240 
 
This mechanism that starts in an early developmental stage if not tamed in later years 
can pervert itself into societal processes of misogyny – and, indeed, Nussbaum attributes 
disgust to anti-Semitism and homophobia. Disgust always spreads outwards: “These 
vehicles of the disgusting are rarely if ever the child’s own parents or her closest circle: for 
that would not accomplish the desired cordoning off. If your cootie-catcher finds cooties 
on your mother, they are probably already on you too.”241 Thus people who are ‘the other’ 
are usually conceived as disgusting, and this is precisely why Nussbaum finds disgust 
dangerous. Disgust threatens the idea of equal dignity and worth which are intrinsic parts 
of a favorable moral system.242 And so Nussbaum argues: 
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[I]f a moral view encourages children to project their disgust reactions onto vulnerable 
people and groups, we may wonder about that system from a psychological viewpoint: for, as 
Thelweleit’s study shows, people who cannot abide their own animality and learn to fantasize 
their bodies as pure machines are telling lies to themselves, and sustain a brittle and difficult 
existence. If, on the other hand, we discover that a moral view insists on equal respect for all 
persons and therefore teaches the children that it is wrong to single out a group as the 
disgusting ones, because we are all equally moral and animal, we will suspect that this view 
is psychologically promising, because it tells no lies and does not require children (and 
adults) to live lives of brittle self-deception.243 
 
2.4.4 The Ambivalence Crisis and the Rise of Morality 
 
Nussbaum returns to the early emotional development of the child and the ambivalence 
crisis that has its roots in high cognitive abilities and the bodily weakness of the infant. We 
might remember that starting from the moment of birth to around the age of two the infant 
experiences a wide range of emotions varying from love and gratitude to anger and shame. 
In most of these cases these emotions are directed to the same person who provided 
primary care for the child. Nussbaum is convinced that emotions are needed to provide the 
child with the map of the world: 
 
The child’s emotions are recognitions of where important good and bad things are to be found 
– and also of the externality of these good and bad things, therefore also of the boundaries of 
its own secure control. Fear and joy and love and even anger demarcate the world, and at the 
same time map the self in the world, as the child’s initial appraisals, prompted by its own inner 
needs for security and well-being, become more refined in connection with its own active 
attempts at control and manipulation, through which it learns what good and bad things are 
parts of its self, or under its control, and what are not.244 
 
Even in a context of a certain lack of control over his/her surroundings, it is essential 
for the infant to learn to experience itself as a relatively stable creature in a world that is 
not too hostile. Nussbaum suggests that Winnicott introduces a very insightful concept of 
the child ‘being alone in the presence of mother.’245 This means that the child becomes 
able to be preoccupied with his/her own activities rather than seeking constant comfort 
from the caregiver. This is essential for the development of the self and such capacities as 
exploring the self’s inner life and creativity. The ‘good holding’ of the caregiver sets the 
context of trusting one’s own environment – thus the ability ‘to be alone’ entails not only a 
physical being alone, but also the ability of the infant to relax and explore its inner life. 
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“The personal kind of aloneness is always inherently relational,” Nussbaum states, 
“someone else is always there, and it is from the shadow of the early holding object that 
creative aloneness derives its richness.”246 And she furthers “[i]n order for this sense of 
safety to emerge, the child must be able to feel held even when not being physically held: 
she must come to feel that the environment itself holds her.”247 
Thus if a child is provided with adequate parenting, his/her emotions evolve in a 
relatively stable environment. But a characteristic of life as not being under our full control 
always remains – caregivers must come and go – and “before long a time comes when the 
child, further cultivating her imagination of absent possibilities, recognizes that the very 
same objects who love and care for her also go away at times and attend to other projects, 
heedless of her demands.”248 And precisely at this stage Nussbaum situates a pivotal stage 
of the development of the child’s emotions – the emotional conflict stemming from a grasp 
that love and anger are directed to one and the same person. And so Nussbaum claims “she 
now really has love for the first time – if we think of a recognition of the separateness and 
independence of the objects as a requirement of real love. But this love is colored in its 
very genesis by a profound ambivalence.”249 The child’s anger also gets a definite object 
(compared to previous rudimentary emotions that were directed to the alleviating and 
disturbing processes). “This anger,” Nussbaum argues, “as Bowlby correctly emphasizes, 
is itself ambivalent, for it is mixed up with the wish of love to incorporate and possess the 
needed object, and the anger itself may be used as a device of control.”250 This anger gives 
rise to jealousy – a wish to possess the object and get rid of competing forces.251  
Nussbaum suggests looking at how the crisis of ambivalence would appear in a child 
of a more fortunate development.252 The crisis even in a more fortunate context is a painful 
one. As the child becomes increasingly aware of the fact that the object of his love and 
anger is the same person – he/she starts to experience his/her own angry wishes. The child 
thus, for the first time is confronted with the co-presence of goodness and badness in 
himself/herself. At this stage Nussbaum introduces another important emotion, namely, the 
emotion of guilt.253 Guilt is a judgment that there exist pieces of oneself that are bad, desire 
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bad things, and have made bad things. And Nussbaum argues: “For the child has in a very 
real sense experienced a profound loss – of the totality of its world of bliss, of the pure 
goodness of the object of its love, of the full attention and love of that object, and finally, 
of its own full goodness and purity.”254 Thus a child experiences that some sort of threat 
does not come solely from the outside world, but is present in himself/herself. 
The moment of this crisis is serious and painful, yet Nussbaum argues that if a child 
had fortunate parenting he/she by this stage would acquire some resources to deal with it. 
First of all, the child has a nascent sense of love and gratitude directed at the caregiver. The 
child also has developed a subtle interplay with the caregiver that entails openness and 
trust; the child also has an ability to wonder at the world around him/her and this wonder 
entails a loving gaze at his surroundings. Finally, through the ability ‘to be alone in the 
presence of mother’ a child by now can exercise his imagination and by this stage acquires 
the ability to imagine the suffering of the good object.255 Nussbaum thus suggests that the 
emotional resources the child has acquired will provide some strategies in dealing with the 
ambivalence crisis: 
 
These capacities suggest a strategy she will increasingly follow: to wipe out bad things with 
good things, damage with loving deeds. A crucial part of this strategy of ‘reparation’ is the 
acceptance of proper boundaries to one’s demands, as the child understands, and shows 
increasingly in her acts, the fact that she lives in a world in which people other than herself 
have legitimate demands, in which her own needs are not the center of the universe.256 
 
What we can extract from Nussbaum’s line of thinking is the idea that even the bad 
tendencies in human love can be the source of goodness. And so she continues: 
 
What is remarkably suggestive about this line of thought is that it shows that the ambivalence 
of human love – which might at first be thought to be a bad feature of our difference from the 
animals – may also be an important source of the intensity and creativity of human love, the 
terrifying moment of discovering one’s own impurity the source of a genuine turning outward 
toward the recognition of another person’s needs.257 
 
Furthermore, in this dynamic of locating the boundaries of one’s own demands and 
attempting to repair one’s own bad deeds, Nussbaum locates the starting point of morality 
and, indeed, its positive function for a human life. Morality demarcates the world by 
creating a space with borders – where your needs and mine can co-exist. Nussbaum argues 
that the comprehension and acceptance of the legitimate needs of the other and of a penalty 
once you transgress the boundary of the needs of the other stimulates creative and 
benevolent efforts of the child. And thus she sees moral guilt as a positive emotion: 
 
Moral guilt is much better than shame, because it can be atoned for, it does not sully the 
entirety of one’s being. It is a dignified emotion compatible with optimism about one’s own 
prospects. The structure of morality thus performs a ‘holding’ function for the child, giving her 
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a feeling of safety. In this sheltering structure she can play and exert herself.258 
 
Nussbaum, thus, paints human morality as having not only a policing structure to 
safeguard the possibility for mutual co-existing, but as a phenomenon creating a trusting, 
creative, and even playful space. Even if a child recognizes the existence of the bad wishes 
in himself/herself, he/she does not have to shy away from it – there is always a way to 
repair his/her moral badness. The emotion of moral guilt here serves as a vehicle of 
creativity to look into one’s own resources and construct benevolent action to repair one’s 
bad deeds. Thus, one is fundamentally not helpless in the face of one’s badness, even 
amidst crisis – one always has resources to make it better. The child, then, is able to 
recognize the goodness in itself and at the same time he/she is able to recognize the worth 
of the people around him/her (hence, the focus of this kind of morality is outward, it is 
always directed at recognizing the existence of the other). Morality thus holds an imperfect 
child in its loving embrace to say that the world is filled with forgiveness: 
 
Morality protects the intrinsic worth of persons and their dignity, at risk from the damaging 
effects of the child’s internal aggression. It is nonegoistic and focused on the intrinsic worth of 
the objects outside the self; it sets limits to self-interest and enjoins respect for the legitimate 
activities of others. But is also infused by love and wonder, and thus it is not a gloomy 
authoritarian morality. Indeed, morality performs the holding function of a loving mother (if 
we may use Winnicott’s proviso, that this ‘mother’ may also be the father playing a ‘maternal’ 
role). Rather than making a forbidding and stifling demand for perfection, it holds the child in 
her imperfection, telling her that the world contains possibilities of forgiveness and mercy, and 
that she is loved as a person of interest and worth in her own right. She therefore need not fear 
that her human imperfection will cause the world’s destruction. And because she is not stricken 
by annihilating shame at her imperfection, she will have less need for envy and jealousy, 
emotions that express her desire for omnipotent control of the sources of good: in this way, too, 
a benign cycle is established.259 
 
Nussbaum thus suggests an interpretation of morality where instead of emphasis on 
human badness (which encourages stifling primitive shame), one promotes a loving and 
forgiving ‘holding’ that provides inner resources to wrestle the self’s aggressive tendencies 
by creative and reparative actions. Nussbaum seems to suggest a parenting and moral 
education style that encourages a delight in our own humanness.260  
By appealing to the emotional resources of the infant, Nussbaum also attempts to 
illustrate the pivotal role they play in the forming of our moral landscape (for worse or 
better). Therefore she praises moral systems that appeal to love, gratitude, wonder and is 
critical of moral systems that encourage primitive shame and disgust.261 The former type of 
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moral systems produces people who are able to turn creatively to their reparative abilities, 
she argues. Most importantly, it nourishes and supports the vulnerable parts of the self. The 
latter not only produces people who are morally stiff – it actually harms the elements of the 
human being that need support and nourishment.  
 
2.4.5 Facilitating Environment and ‘Mature Interdependence:’ From Families to 
Political Institutions 
 
Winnicott and Fairbairn describe a norm of health – the condition which is reached after 
the ambivalence crisis is solved. Fairbairn uses the term of ‘mature dependence’ to 
describe a healthy psychological condition. Nussbaum changes the term into ‘mature 
interdependence’ for the purposes of her argument, yet essentially her alteration entails the 
same content as the original concept – it defines a child-caregiver relationship where the 
child is able to accept that those whom she cares deeply about and needs are separate 
beings that have projects of their own. She also points out that analysts tend to describe 
health as an easy-to-achieve phenomenon, yet it is always a lifelong task. Mature love is 
achieved not only through the recognition of separateness, but also by a wish to protect this 
separateness. And even when one has realized the principles of the processes of maturity, 
the struggle against perfection and totality is always present: 
 
Behind the increasing competence and maturity – and, indeed, the mature and generous love – 
of a ‘normal’ human adult lurks much that the Stoics and Proust correctly describe, in an 
inchoate and often preverbal form that is therefore, while cognitive, especially impervious to 
reasoning and argument – a seething jealousy, a demand to be the center of the world, a 
longing for bliss and comfort, a desire to wipe the competing object off the face of the earth – 
any of which may be very ill-suited to some of the adult’s chosen plans and projects. The 
ambivalence crisis is never completely resolved, and reparation remains a lifelong task.262 
 
Apart from stressing that creating a psychologically healthy and thus facilitating 
environment is a continuous task, Nussbaum points out that this happens not only in an 
environment of the immediate family context, but also at the level of political institutions 
(and this argument marks that she moves well beyond classical objects relations analysts in 
her emotional development account). She argues that “people cultivate emotions in larger 
social and political groupings, and they need to learn the types of imagination and empathy 
suitable to those interactions.”263 Thus, she adds political institutions and systems of law as 
elements of a facilitating environment where our emotions as citizens can evolve. Political 
institutions that support capacities for love and reparation are preferred because these are 
primary goods that any just political regime should support.264 That is the very core of 
Nussbaum’s concept of an adequate political regime – a regime that supports psychological 
health. This kind of regime will have a particular vision of its citizens: 
 
All are allowed to be children, in the sense that all are permitted to be imperfect and needy, and 
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an essential of regard for the humanity in them is to attend to the ‘holding’ of those needs and 
the creation of a political ‘facilitating environment.’ Thus a norm of psychological maturity 
also suggests a norm for public life, a commitment to the meeting of basic needs, or, to put it 
differently, to support for a group of basic human capabilities…It is also well suited to 
replicate itself stably over time, since its leading ideas support the formation of personalities 
that are likely to be intensely concerned with the needs of others, and thus to support for its 
leading ideas.265 
 
2.4.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
Nussbaum alters the Stoic theory of emotions by including the childhood developmental 
history. This step adds temporal and narrative structure characteristics to the nature of 
emotions. It also has some consequences for how we conceive of emotions and thus their 
possible education. 
For Nussbaum the idea that emotions have history and so the idea that their adult 
form has roots in our childhood sheds light on how we can understand our emotional lives 
more deeply. She is convinced that this can explain why on a daily basis an adult reflecting 
on his/her emotions can feel that they indeed do not resemble his/her values. But if our 
emotions have a past they are also connected to some distant objects and even value-
conflicts we might not be conscious about in the present. “The past wells up in us,” 
Nussbaum claims, “in ways that surprise the deliberately intending self.”266 
Once we can get a grasp of that, and understand that there is no non-intentional force 
moving us around, we can identify the true object of our emotions. In this way, Nussbaum 
opens a conceptual space for ‘mysterious’ and ‘ungoverned’ facets of our emotional lives 
and this influences her view on the education of emotions. She thus argues: “This means 
that for such views virtue need not to be construed (as Kant construes it) as a matter of 
strength, the will simply holding down the brutish impulsive elements of the personality. 
Instead, we can imagine reason extending all the way down into the personality, 
enlightening it through and through.”267 
Emotions, Nussbaum argues, also have a narrative structure and this opens a door for 
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her to ascribe to arts a very prominent role in human self-understanding. Narrative artwork 
has an ability to enter our emotional lives.268 And so storytelling and narrative play become 
important aspects of cultivating a child’s imagination – and in this sense, some serious 
matters happen when a child plays – through this activity he/she learns to imagine the 
experiences of others. In addition, play can aid a child in the ambivalence crisis in multiple 
ways: it helps to imagine the pain of others, it nourishes curiosity, aids the reparative 
powers, and finally it strengthens the child’s ability “to see other people in non-
instrumental and even non-eudaimonistic ways, as objects of wonder in their own right.”269 
We have now completed our description of Nussbaum’s cognitive theory of 
emotions. We have learned that our author conceives of emotions as visions capturing the 
geography of life. Much of Nussbaum’s imagery comes from Marcel Proust’s 
Remembrance of Things Past. Not only do various interlocking stories and characters from 
this work surface here and there in Nussbaum’s book, sometimes in unexpected ways, but 
also the very term upheaval has its roots in Proust. The term that does not make it into 
Nussbaum’s definition of emotion itself is nevertheless so characteristic of the 
phenomenon that she considers it worthy of her title – Upheavals of Thought: The 
Intelligence of Emotions. The term upheaval seems to capture something very essential 
about emotions. This is true even when they are thought of as intelligent forces, dynamic 
parts of a dynamic reason. It captures the heights and depths of the movements of emotions 
in their embracing and rejecting facts about the world. Just think, Nussbaum writes: 
 
The world of Charlus in love is compared to a landscape full of mountains and valleys, 
produced as if by ‘geological upheavals of thought;’ and this differentiated landscape is 
contrasted with the ‘uniform plain’ of his previous unattached life, where no idea stood out as 
urgent or salient, no evaluation jutted up above any other. His self-sufficient world was, we 
might say, very much like the world seen from the point of view of a far-distant sun, a word 
not yet humanized by the earthquakes of human love and limitation, which are at one comic 
and tragic. His new world of twisted jealousy and towering love is a more agitated world, alive 
as it is at every moment to small movements of thought and action in a person whom he in no 
way controls (and who is, besides, especially inscrutable and unreliable). And yet the narrator 
tells us that this world is a world ‘enriched’ – and enriched by the agitation itself (‘par là 
même’).270 
 
This excerpt from Nussbaum’s work expresses suitably the core of her vision of the 
emotional life. We have presented her main arguments in support of that vision in the hope 
of shedding some light on what it means to see emotions as value-laden cognitive 
processes attempting to make sense of the world. 
 
3. THINKING OF NUSSBAUM’S ACCOUNT OF EMOTIONS: SOME CRITICAL REFLECTIONS 
 
We would like to confront Nussbaum’s theory of emotions with the views of some of her 
most prominent peers working in the field of philosophy of emotion. Our prime interest is 
the ethical dimension of emotions and Nussbaum’s cognitivist theory suggests insightful 
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comments on the meaning of emotions in our everyday lives. Because emotions are also 
observable phenomena, it seems helpful to counterbalance Nussbaum’s account with other 
accounts that show particular interest in intersections of scientific and philosophical 
reflections. Together with Aaron Ben-Ze’ev, a philosopher of psychology, we are 
reminded that there are two ways to think about emotions:  
 
I merely want to cite Aristotle’s claim that anger can be described on two major levels. A 
scientist may describe anger as a boiling of the blood and the presence of heat around the heart, 
and a philosopher may describe anger as the desire to retaliate by returning evil for evil 
(Aristotle 412b19). The desire to retaliate cannot be found in the boiling blood – which is, 
however, a necessary supporting basis for that desire. To explain that desire, we have to refer 
to the evil that was inflicted and not to the boiling blood.271  
 
From Nussbaum’s thought we could have seen that she clearly chooses a 
philosopher’s path in describing emotions, but let us for a moment examine those elements 
that also take into consideration ‘the boiling of the blood’ in the works of other thinkers. 
This section will thus proceed in the following structure: first of all, we will introduce the 
state of contemporary philosophical discussions on the emotions which are stemming from 
the debate on the distinction of emotions as basic and complex (we will soon attend to the 
explanation of this distinction, for now we indicate that basic emotions can be described as 
short-lived emotional responses that have concrete homologous physiological expressions 
attached to them while complex emotions can be described as responses to relatively 
sophisticated situations involving a great amount of cognitive activity). Here we will 
encounter a concise explanation of the distinction from the perspective of psychology and 
from the perspective of neuroscience. When it comes to the latter, we will present the 
approaches of Antonio R. Damasio and Joseph E. LeDoux, two very prominent researchers 
in the area of neuroscience whose ideas are widely utilized (by Nussbaum as well), in the 
philosophy of emotion.272 In this part we will encounter Nussbaum’s appropriation of 
Damasio’s and LeDoux’s research which will be confronted with the thought of Paul E. 
Griffiths, a philosopher of science, who argues that a distinction between basic and 
complex emotions is real and one should consider it seriously in one’s reflections on the 
nature of the emotions. He, in fact, claims that the phenomena we normally label as 
‘emotions’ can be so distinct that we can hardly think of emotions as constituting a single 
category. This will lead us to examine more carefully the question of the connection 
between the emotions, the body, and the brain. Here we will encounter arguments of Jesse 
J. Prinz, a philosopher of psychology, who argues that emotions appear without cognitive 
appraisal judgment and suggests his ‘embodied appraisal approach’ where our body is 
perceptive to our surroundings and makes judgments concerning how we are relating to it. 
                                                
271 Aaron Ben-Ze’ev, “Emotion as a Subtle Mental Mode,” in Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary 
Philosophers on Emotions, ed. Robert C. Solomon (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 253. 
272 Damasio’s research focuses on the relationship between the brain and consciousness, see Antonio R. 
Damasio, Descartes’ Error; also The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of 
Consciousness (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1999). LeDoux explores the relationship between the brain, 
emotions and memory with a particular interest in the mechanisms behind fear and anxiety. See Joseph E. 
LeDoux, The Emotional Brain; also Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are (New York: 
Viking, 2002). 
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Prinz’s perspective presents important considerations for an argument not to abandon the 
bodily dimension in our reflections on emotions, even when we consider their ethical 
character, as the body seems to be an intrinsic part of our experience of emotions.  
After suggesting that the body does matter, we will move to the dimension of 
feelings – the experiential sphere of the emotions. Here we will encounter late philosopher 
Peter Goldie who had a keen interest in emotions. Goldie urges that feelings are a 
constitutive part of the emotions, because without feelings emotions would not be what 
they are. Goldie’s ideas are supported by late philosopher, Robert C. Solomon, a famous 
forefather of the cognitivist theory of emotions in philosophy, who in the course of his 
thought moved from the dismissive position regarding the dimension of feelings in 
emotional experience to appreciating feelings as expressions of judgments of the body. We 
will conclude this section by suggesting that Nussbaum’s robust theory of the ethical 
significance of emotions would benefit from making more explicit the distinction between 
basic and complex emotions (and admitting that she is mostly concerned with the latter 
type). We believe that Nussbaum’s theory would also benefit by taking the body, in 
general, and the feelings aspect more seriously as they appear to be intrinsic to emotional 
experience.  
 
3.1 A DISTINCTION BETWEEN BASIC AND COMPLEX EMOTIONS 
 
The distinction between basic and complex emotions marks a very important discussion in 
in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy which stems from the discussion in 
psychology and neuroscience. Today in the field of psychology one can find two most 
prominent paths to discus the nature of emotions, namely, the basic emotions approach and 
the ‘appraisal’ or ‘cognitive’ approach.273 The former approach considers emotions to be 
part of our evolutionary heritage, that is, they are relatively simple, automatic entities 
which typically are manifested in bodily feelings and are expressed through universal, non-
plastic facial expressions. This approach identifies six basic emotions of anger, disgust, 
fear, joy, sadness, and surprise (though this definite list is also a matter of debate) and the 
rest of the emotions are seen as a mixture of the basic ones. The appraisal or cognitive 
theories are interested in accounting for the emotions that appear to have a more complex 
structure and explore intentionality of emotions, their connection to associated cognitions 
and their capacity to situate us in the world not only as reactions to certain stimuli, but as 
responses to human personal narrative and viewpoint.  
To contextualize the two approaches we can briefly attend their historical overview. 
There are three major thinkers cited as proponents of the basic emotions approach. Firstly, 
Charles Darwin and his The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872)274 
which is, in fact, considered as a source of inspiration which instigated the modern basic 
emotions approach. To put his main thesis simply: “Darwin reasoned that if humans share 
a common ancestral heritage with other mammalian species, then humans should give 
evidence of homologous behaviors, and he described emotional expression in these 
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274 Charles Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 1965); (Original work published 1872).  
  
 
62 
terms.”275 Secondly, William James is often cited as a member of this group, with his 
influential article “What is an Emotion?” (1884).276 There he advanced the thesis that 
emotions are mental events that trigger physical changes in the body.277 This view 
otherwise known as the James-Lange theory278 can be cited as siding with a basic emotions 
approach because it argues “that stimuli in the environment are prepared to elicit a specific 
reaction which is perceived as a specific emotion.”279 This theory is also commonly known 
as the ‘feelings’ theory due to its consideration that all conscious emotions are experienced 
through bodily feelings. The third very prominent proponent of the basic emotions view is 
Paul Ekman with his seminal Emotions in the Human Face (1972)280 where he, “inspired 
by Darwin's approach, takes emotional expressions to be important parts of ‘affect 
programs’ – complex responses found in all human populations, which are controlled by 
mechanisms operating below the level of consciousness.”281 Ekman’s theory prescribes 
“very specific configurations of facial muscle movements that are proposed to correspond 
to different emotion categories in a one-to-one manner.”282 
The shift in psychology in attempting to explain emotions of a complex character 
took place with the research of Magda B. Arnold who is often cited as the first appraisal 
theorist. With her seminal Emotion and Personality (1960),283 Arnold moved from feeling 
and behaviorist understandings of emotions and developed the idea that emotions typically 
have a formal object and involve evaluation at the fore. She described the appraisal as the 
process through which an individual determines the significance of the situation. This, in 
turn, “gives rise to attraction or aversion, and emotion is equated with this ‘felt tendency 
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279 Ibid., 324.  
280 Paul Ekman, Wallace V. Friesen, and Phoebe Ellsworth, Emotion in the Human Face (New York: 
Pergamon Press, 1972). 
281 De Souza, “Emotion”.  
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283 Magda B. Arnold, Emotion and Personality: Vol. 1. Psychological Aspects (New York Columbia 
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toward anything intuitively appraised as good (beneficial), or away from anything 
intuitively appraised as bad (harmful).’”284 The subsequent appraisal theories in 
psychology mainly accept the broad features of Arnold’s framework and differ mostly in 
the varying degrees of emphasis on those elements. The two other prominent and widely 
cited authors in the literature on emotion are Nico H. Frijda and his The Emotions (1986)285 
and Richard S. Lazarus’ Emotion and Adaptation (1991).286  
When it comes to the research in neuroscience, the works of Damasio and LeDoux 
make conceptual space for the existence of both, basic and complex, types of emotions. 
From the start of our discussion, we should introduce the distinction Damasio and LeDoux 
make between an emotion and a feeling. From a neuroscience point of view, emotions are 
reactions of the body to certain stimuli, thus, emotions are understood as purely physical 
signals appearing automatically and unconsciously while feelings appear when our brain 
interprets emotions. Both of the authors are aware that in common language, the terms 
emotions and feelings are used interchangeably, thus it is difficult to avoid confusion in 
this regard. LeDoux notes that in the beginning of his research on the emotions in animals: 
“I treated emotions in terms of essentially non-conscious brain states that connect 
significant stimuli with response mechanisms, and feelings as conscious experiences 
arising from these non-conscious brain states…By separating processes that non-
consciously detect and respond to significant stimuli from those that create feelings, 
emotional mechanisms could be studied in animals without having to solve the problem of 
whether animals feel emotion, while at the same time honoring the importance of feelings 
in the human mind and brain.”287 Yet, LeDoux changed his perspective and in his current 
writings he prefers to stick to an everyday meaning of emotions (which in ‘folk 
psychology’ includes the dimension of feelings) and thus he claims: “Instead of 
differentiating between emotion and feeling, I stick with the everyday meaning of the 
terms, using them interchangeably to refer to the mental states that people experience when 
they face situations in which survival is challenged or enhanced.”288 LeDoux’s proposal is 
that all organisms can detect and respond to threats, but organisms that can be conscious of 
their own brain activity can feel fear (his research focuses on fear reactions in rats). Both 
Damasio and LeDoux also allow the traditional nomenclature of the category of emotion to 
stay (we will see later in the discussion that it is also challenged), and so they allow 
broader mental states to fit into this category; thus we can categorize emotions as basic 
(affects) and complex (awareness of our own feelings that can be caused by cognitive 
stimuli). LeDoux furthers:  
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Emotions resulting from non-conscious motive states emerge in consciousness in a bottom-up 
fashion, but emotions can also be built from cognitive processes in a top-down fashion without 
the involvement of motive state ingredients. So-called social emotions are like this (for 
example, feelings of compassion, pride, and shame). These arise from our assessment of our 
circumstances. While fear is a prototypical bottom-up emotion, it can also arise from top-down 
influences. We can think our way into fear and activate a defensive motive state this way. 
Additionally, we can have intellectual fears, such as the fear of failing in life, of our eventual 
death, or of alien abduction, that depend on top-down processes rather than simply emerging 
bottom-up from a motive state as a result of external stimuli.289 
 
Damasio adds to LeDoux’s argument and further explains that the emotions are:  
 
part and parcel of the machinery with which they regulate survival…sandwiched between the 
basic survival kit (regulation of metabolism; simple reflexes; motivations; biology of pain and 
pleasure) and the devices of high reason, but are still very much a part of the hierarchy of life 
regulation devices…And as a result of powerful learning mechanisms such as conditioning, 
emotions of all shades eventually help connect homeostatic regulation and survival ‘values’ to 
numerous events and objects in our autobiographical experience. Emotions are inseparable 
from the idea of reward or punishment, of pleasure or pain, of approach and withdrawal, of 
personal advantage and disadvantage. Inevitably, emotions are inseparable from the idea of 
good and evil.290  
 
Damasio also distinguishes three types of emotions: primary, secondary, and 
background. Primary emotions correspond to the oldest group of basic emotions and they 
are independent from consciousness. The members of this group are “[f]ear, anger, 
sadness, disgust, surprise, and happiness have been found to be universal emotions in terms 
of a facial expression and recognizability.”291 Secondary or social emotions correspond to 
more complex stimuli (natural as well as learned) and they include “sympathy, 
embarrassment, shame, guilt, pride, jealousy, envy, gratitude, admiration, indignation, and 
contempt”292 as members of this group. They also involve substantial areas of the 
neocortex.293 Background emotions refer to the always present awareness of our own body 
condition and the examples of these are: fatigue, energy, excitement, wellness, sickness, 
tension, relaxation, surging, dragging, stability, instability, balance, imbalance, harmony, 
discord.294  
We should note that Nussbaum in her discussion seems to be interested in secondary 
emotions, but without making a clear distinction between them and basic emotions. We 
should also press here that an acceptance of the distinction between basic and complex 
emotions is no dogma in philosophy, Ben-Ze’ev, for example, construes emotions as a 
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‘subtle mental mode’ which included cognition, evaluation, motivation, and unintentional 
feeling. He claims:  
 
A heated dispute in the philosophy and psychology of emotions is whether there are certain 
emotions that can be regarded as basic. Above all, ‘basic’ means simple, as opposed to 
complex. Accordingly, any emotion is a simple irreducible emotion, or it can be analyzed into 
a simple emotion plus x, where x is either another emotion or some nonemotional element. 
When emotions are considered as a mode of the mental system, they become more complex 
and a simple reduction of them to a few basic forms is less plausible. Indeed, criteria for simple 
or basic emotions vary from one theory to another, and such differences cast doubt on the 
existence of basic emotions.295 
 
Nonetheless, we consider that the works of LeDoux, Damasio and Ekman conducted 
on facial expressions of emotions, give a sufficient amount of scientific evidence to hold 
that the distinction between the basic and the complex emotions is real. Nussbaum takes 
into consideration the works of all three authors and while she is critical of Ekman’s 
approach,296 she is generally appreciative of the works of LeDoux and Damasio and 
considers that their scientific findings do not contradict her cognitive theory of 
emotions.297 When it comes to the works of LeDoux, Nussbaum claims that his views are 
already cognitive in a sense because the transmission of information is central to it.298 
Moreover, for her LeDoux essentially does not study the emotion of fear per se, but 
“Ledoux claims only to have uncovered some phenomena involved in fright behavior, not 
to have illuminated the subjective experience of emotion of fear, in either rats or 
humans.”299 Thus, Nussbaum seems to not regard the fright behavior as fear and she claims 
to do so basing it on the claims of LeDoux himself. What about the physiology of the fright 
reaction? Nussbaum claims that it does not affect the cognitive view of emotions: “We 
should certainly not eliminate the intentional account in favor of a physiological account, 
and we should not at this time include a particular physiological process as a necessary 
element in a definition of a given emotion type – although we should not rule out the 
possibility that such a move will in the future be supported by adequate evidence, at least 
for some simpler emotions, such as fear and surprise.”300 
Damasio in his turn is also regarded as an ally of a cognitive theory of emotions. For 
Nussbaum: “Damasio’s primary concern, in Descartes’ Error, is to convince his reader 
that the emotion/reason distinction is inaccurate and misleading: emotions are forms of 
intelligent awareness. They are ‘just as cognitive as other percepts,’ and they supply the 
organism with essential aspects of practical reason.”301 And we can find her continuing: 
“His secondary aim is to show that emotional functioning is connected with particular 
centers in the brain. (A further claim, that the object of all emotions is the agent’s own 
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body, is unconvincingly argued, as I shall mention later.)”302 Why then is Nussbaum not 
convinced that an object of emotions is one’s own body? For her that is essentially a 
revival of a James-Lange theory of emotions, but in a less reductionist way (the James-
Lange theory claims that bodily activity produces emotions and not the other way around). 
The body, for Nussbaum, participates in emotion in a sense that the subject is aware that it 
is he/she who has an emotional experience. “So in that sense,” she claims, “an awareness 
of self (and therefore, often, one’s body) is a part of the experience of any emotion. It does 
not follow from this that the emotion’s object is the body: the object is the goal or person 
or thing, whatever it is, to which the subject is attending.”303 
Nussbaum, then, continues to argue that emotions are bodily in the sense that they 
happen to a waking sentient being, but emotion in itself is not merely a physiological 
event. Physiological reactions can accompany emotions, but she is hesitant to ascribe a 
particular set of physiological reactions to particular emotions, at least until neuroscience 
can provide us with univocal evidence in the human case. The core of emotion for her still 
remains a eudaimonistic (involving me and my goals) judgment of value which can be so 
strong that it can activate all of our sentient system, but bodily reactions can be 
accompanying parts of emotion without constituting it. She, moreover, does not consider 
or make explicit the difference between basic and complex emotions as possibly distinct 
phenomena. 
The achievements of neuroscience are interpreted in a different way by Paul E. 
Griffiths. Griffiths, contrary to Nussbaum, regards the difference between more simple or 
basic and complex emotions as a real difference. Moreover, he argues that the phenomena 
that usually fall under the generic term of ‘emotion’ are so different that it is difficult to see 
how they can constitute a single category. Griffiths points out that Nussbaum’s theory is a 
classical example of arguing that emotions are all one kind as she claims that all the 
emotions are ‘intelligent responses to the perception of value.’304 He acknowledges that 
Nussbaum is willing to recognize a relatively low level of appraisal triggering the emotions 
– as she allows for young children and animals to experience true emotions. Griffiths cites 
Nussbaum claiming that “[w]hat we need, in short, is a multifaceted notion of cognitive 
interpretation or seeing-as, accompanied by a flexible notion of intentionality that allows 
us to ascribe to a creature more or less precise, vaguer or more demarcated, ways of 
intending an object and marking it as salient”305 and credits her for a compelling 
description of what is required from an adequate account of emotional cognition. Yet he 
wants to point out that Nussbaum misses the point that levels of emotional appraisal do not 
differ only among organisms – they differ within a single organism. 
 From this perspective emotions seem to not be a natural kind and in philosophical 
reflections on them we should attempt to be equally true to biological facts and our 
conceptual philosophical requirements.306 Griffiths suggests then that to analyze emotion 
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as a single category cannot serve the purpose of a scientific enquiry and suggests a useful 
comparison with the term ‘vitamin:’ 
 
Vitamins are not, as was once thought, ‘vital amines’ but a diverse group of chemicals with 
diverse roles in physiology sharing the feature that humans cannot synthesize them, or can 
synthesize them, as with Vitamin D, only under advantageous environmental conditions. Their 
absence leads to ‘deficiency diseases’ with diverse etiologies and diverse prognoses. So the 
concept of a vitamin can be analyzed, and individual vitamins and even some groups of 
vitamins are natural kinds, but ‘vitamin’ itself is a superficial descriptive category. It is not a 
sensible scientific project to investigate the nature of vitamins in general. The question ‘What 
is a vitamin?’ is best answered by describing the main kinds of vitamin and how different they 
are from one another.307 
 
Thus emotion as a generic term is a superficial descriptive category for him because 
all the phenomena and experiences that are used in vernacular language, psychology, 
neuroscience, and philosophy do not constitute a natural kind of category. A natural kind, 
to explain it briefly, is a relatively fixed category about which we can make scientific 
claims. “Scientific classifications of particulars into categories,” Griffiths argues, “embody 
our current understanding of where such projectable clusters of properties are to be found. 
The species category, for instance, classifies particular organisms into sets that represent 
reliable clusters of morphological, physiological, and behavioral properties.”308 Thus 
Griffiths claims that taking into consideration the current state of research on emotions, 
emotions cannot claim the status of a natural kind category and a thinker does not do 
justice to the complexity of emotions if he/she attempts to produce a general theory of 
emotion (as we have seen Nussbaum doing). Why cannot emotions be categorized as a 
natural kind in line with classical examples, such as biological species and chemical 
elements? Griffiths suggests an illuminating example: 
 
Suppose, for example, that you are waiting in line outside a nightclub. After twenty minutes, 
someone unexpectedly pokes you sharply in the small of the back. You spin around, making a 
threat expression, probably the ‘square-mouthed’ variety, your body adjusts physiologically for 
violent action, and your attention is entirely on your assailant. If the situation is rapidly defused 
(you are male and an attractive young woman has tripped against you and is smiling 
apologetically) then this will be a pure case of affect program anger. On other occasions, 
however, a person ‘having an emotion’ is responding in a more cognitively complex way to 
more highly analyzed information. The episode may or may not involve the occurrence of one 
or more affect program responses. Suppose, for example, that you are locked into a 
dysfunctional pattern of interaction with your spouse involving continual fault finding and put-
downs, this pattern emerging without any intention from the particular patterns of relationship 
management you both bring to the marriage. The pattern has resisted your occasional attempts 
to consciously improve your behavior and, as you reflect one day on what appears to be the 
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inevitable degeneration of the relationship, you experience a deep sense of guilt and self-
loathing. 309 
 
Both of these rather different instances, a sudden anger reaction, falling beautifully 
into a reaction of an affect program,310 and a sense of guilt and self-loathing stemming 
from coming to terms with the status of your marriage, a helpful example, of a more 
complex cognitively-laden emotion, are nonetheless regarded as emotions in vernacular 
language and in various scientific disciplines. Griffiths’ argument that emotions are not a 
natural kind, a unified category, rests precisely on these two examples of an affect program 
emotions or basic emotions and complex cognitively-laden emotions. Both of these cannot 
be reduced to each other. He rejects the view that basic emotions are not emotions in a 
proper sense or they are proto-emotions.311 Griffiths also concludes that the complex 
emotions cannot be seen as a species of basic emotions or blends or elaborations of them. 
Yet he agrees that there is a link between the two and the complex emotions which “may 
involve basic emotions as parts, depend on basic emotions for their development in the 
child, and interact with basic emotions in typical ways in real-life situations.”312 
Essentially, thus, Griffiths argues that there are at least two types of known emotions and 
we should investigate them on these terms without putting them into one generic category 
as basically the same phenomenon.313 Emotions are, indeed, forms of awareness of our 
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emotion – background, primary and secondary. This is revolutionary enough, given that background 
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environment, but some involve low-level and some high-level appraisal. To describe low-
level appraisal as evaluative judgment is simply misleading for Griffiths. From a 
neuroscience point of view, he argues, the low-level appraisal processes seem not to have 
access to other information which is represented elsewhere in the brain, but most 
importantly their goal is “not truth-preserving, but heuristically survival-enhancing.”314 
Thus, “[i]t does not follow by any reasonable deduction that if I have been poked hard and 
unexpectedly in the small of my back then I have suffered ‘a demeaning offence to me and 
mine’ but the automatic appraisal mechanism for anger will reliably draw that 
conclusion.”315 
Do Griffiths’ views pose a challenge to Nussbaum’s thought on emotions? It appears 
that her cognitive theory of emotions does not stand at odds with research outcomes of 
such neuroscientists as LeDoux and Damasio, thus it is not groundless from a natural 
sciences point of view. But it lacks some more sophisticated distinctions in approaching 
the variety of emotions – especially if we acknowledge that a distinction between basic and 
complex emotions is real. Nussbaum’s theory in essence is preoccupied with complex, 
cognitively-rich emotions, but she wishes to extend the definition of emotions as cognitive 
value judgments to all species of emotions, which keeps her theory conceptually bound, 
but not entirely faithful to a possible nature of basic emotions as more primitive states of 
awareness. 
John Deigh, a professor of philosophy, argues in a similar fashion that each cognitive 
theory of emotions needs to account for basic emotions, and each affect theory needs to 
account for a cognitive element in emotions. Thus, if we start to think of emotions there 
will be two elements we have to include – their intentionality and the fact that humans and 
animals share them.316 Nussbaum in our assessment, is committed to making it clear that 
emotions are something that we share with non-human animals and there are certain 
strengths and weaknesses coming from this common heritage. Yet, her works also seem to 
suggest strongly that human emotions are rather distinct from animals due to the more 
complex cognitive capacities we posses, due to existence of language, due to the ability to 
grasp the concept of time and, subsequently, our personal histories and history of our 
cultures in a broad sense – all of this offers extra dimensions influencing the way human 
beings emote.317 Thus, as mentioned before, she does not make a sharp distinction between 
primitive/basic emotions and more complex emotions. We would like to press once more 
that this kind of distinction would be useful in discussing emotions as they seem to appear 
in human experience. 
 
3.2 EMOTIONS, THE BODY, AND THE BRAIN 
 
This leads us to another aspect of the discussion, namely, the role of the body in an 
                                                                                                                                              
emotions are not part of the usual roster of emotions (1999, 341).” Griffiths, “Is Emotion a Natural Kind?,” 
241. Griffiths here quotes Damasio’s, The Feeling of What Happens, 341. 
314 Griffiths, “Is Emotion a Natural Kind?,” 247. 
315 Ibid., 247. 
316 Cf. John Deigh, “Primitive Emotions,” in Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on 
Emotions, ed. Robert C. Solomon (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 9. 
317 See section 2.3 On Origins of the Emotions: Between Nature and Nurture with all its subsections of this 
chapter and Chapter II, section 3.1 Radical Evil with all its subsections.  
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experience of emotion since basic emotions seem to be accompanied by fixed facial 
expressions, as well as by certain other physiological elements. Cognitivist accounts, then, 
must face the question of whether there is a place for the body in the experience of 
emotion. If, together with Nussbaum, we want to assert that the core, the very essence, of 
any emotion is value judgment, does this mean that emotions are disembodied in some 
sense? We have seen Nussbaum arguing that emotions always occur to an embodied 
person, but for her the concrete physiological expression is not necessary to say that a 
particular emotion took place or that this expression enters the nature of emotion. 
We would like to think of emotions and their possible relation to the body together 
with Jesse J. Prinz. In his thought Prinz is influenced by British Empiricism and so, not 
surprisingly, he turns to the James-Lange theory of emotions to construct his own. He does 
not take the James-Lange approach straightforwardly, but adds some significant 
alterations:  
 
I believe that emotion is quite literally a form of perception. This is consistent with the view of 
James, Lange, Damasio, and others who relate emotions to the body. Like them, I defend a 
somatic theory. At the same time, I think existing somatic theories tend to leave too many 
questions unanswered. In particular, somatic theories do not explain why emotions seem so 
meaningful, intelligible, and rational. To rectify this deficit, it is important to show that 
emotions are not merely perceptions of the body but also perceptions of our relations to the 
world.318 
 
Emotions, then, for him are relatively simple entities, not collections of multiple 
elements, complex state of mind. Prinz, however, argues that while being simple entities, 
emotions have complex effects and information-processing tasks – and so he sees his own 
approach as an attempt to bring the body, mind, and world together.319 We could say, then, 
that Prinz argues that emotions are somatic as well as semantic. We have seen that 
Nussbaum firmly endorses the position that emotions are semantic. We are particularly 
interested in the somatic role Prinz ascribes to emotions and in the possibility of finding a 
semantic meaning even in the knowledge of our bodies.320 
                                                
318 Jesse J. Prinz, Gut Reactions. A Perceptual Theory of Emotions (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2004), 20. 
319 Cf. Ibid., 20. 
320 Prinz turns to neuroscience to argue that there is anatomical evidence that “emotions can be elicited via 
pathways from early visual structures, such as the pulvinar and superior colliculous, to the amygdala, which 
instructs other structures to perturb the body (LeDoux 1996; Morris, Öhman, and Dolan 1999). These 
pathways trigger an emotional bodily response without the mediation of any kind of judgment.” In this 
instance he refers us once again to the widely used book of Ledoux, The Emotional Brain and an article of J. 
S. Morris, A. Öhman, and R. J. Dolan, “A Subcortical Pathway to the Right Amygdala Mediating ‘Unseen’ 
Fear, ” Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 96 (1999): 1680-1685. A professor of philosophy 
Jenefer Robinson suggests an additional perspective of the two pathways in the brain via which the emotional 
stimulus is processed. She summarizes the core of LeDoux’s findings in the following way: “LeDoux 
concludes that he has discovered two different pathways for processing the same sound. On the one hand, 
there is a ‘quick and dirty processing system,’ which responds very fast, warns the organism that something 
dangerous may be around without identifying it very carefully, and gets the organism to respond 
appropriately to whatever it is. And on the other hand, there is a slower, more discriminating processing 
system, which operates through the cortex and figures out whether the thalamo-amygdala’s ‘affective 
appraisal’ is appropriate or not (LeDoux 1989, 1996).” Jenefer Robinson, “Emotion. Biological Fact or 
Social Construction?,” in Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions, ed. Robert C. 
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What Prinz argues in particular is that emotions can appear without an appraisal 
judgment. And he, in fact, is particularly critical of strict cognitivist theories like 
Nussbaum’s. Prinz notes Nussbaum’s suggestion that emotions can appear without any 
somatic component and thus “[t]he cognitive components bound to our emotions are 
something above and beyond the bodily changes or inner states that register bodily 
changes.”321 The problem with this kind of approach is that it holds that the cognitive 
appraisals bound to our emotions are disembodied. Furthermore, he considers Nussbaum’s 
theory to be too demanding as it defines emotions as overly sophisticated cognitions.322 
Unlike Griffiths, Prinz does not credit Nussbaum for a sound multilevel appraisal account 
and considers her theory to center on metacognition – “[s]he says that emotions are 
judgments that our evaluative judgments are justified”323 (thus emotions, as Nussbaum 
construes them, are judgments about our judgments, Prinz thinks). He furthers that there is 
scientific evidence324 that young children up to the age of three or four and animals do not 
have a capacity for metacognition; thus Nussbaum’s theory should be amended. We should 
take Prinz’s interpretation that Nussbaum’s theory of emotions is metacognitive cautiously 
– Nussbaum considers cognition in terms of awareness of our environment and not in 
terms of complex computing, moreover, she allows non-linguistic forms of emotional 
prepositions. Nonetheless, Prinz’s insistence that cognitive appraisal theories, Nussbaum’s 
including, seem to separate bodily and cognitive dimensions in a too sharp way seems a 
rightful critique. 
Prinz turns to the research in evolutionary psychology and argues that “[m]ere 
change in facial musculature seems sufficient for an emotional response, even when we do 
not realize we are making emotional expressions.”325 In this instance, we may remember 
Nussbaum’s question inquiring into the essence of the emotion of grief – and asking 
                                                                                                                                              
Solomon (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 35-36. LeDoux himself proposes thinking of emotions 
and cognition as “separate but interacting mental functions mediated by separate but interacting brain 
functions.” LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 69. In many aspects Robinson and Prinz have a very similar 
approach to emotions – they are primarily affective responses. Robinson’s own proposal is the following: 
“My suggestion is that there is a set of inbuilt affective appraisal mechanisms, which in more primitive 
species and in neonates are automatically attuned to particular stimuli, but which, as human beings learn and 
develop, can also take as input more complex stimuli, including complex ‘judgments’ or thoughts.” 
Robinson, “Emotion. Biological Fact or Social Construction?,” 41. Thus in her conceptions emotions are 
automatically induced physiological changes, which give rise to action tendencies and then are guided by 
cognitive monitoring – she treats emotion essentially as a process. See Jenefer Robinson, Deeper than 
Reason: Emotion and its Role in Literature, Music, and Art (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005). In 
Prinz’s conception, an emotion is a rather simple entity that does not entail a plurality of parts. In any case, 
even though both, Prinz and Robinson, do not wish to include phenomena that seem to elicit emotions in the 
content of it, both accounts are useful in demonstrating that the link between emotions and bodily responses 
is no accident. 
321 Prinz, Gut Reactions, 25. 
322 Cf. Ibid., 36. 
323 Ibid., 36. 
324 Here Prinz alludes to an article by Heinz Wimmer and Josef Perner, “Beliefs about Beliefs: 
Representation and Constraining Function of Wrong Beliefs in Young Children's Understanding of 
Deception,” Cognition Vol. 13, No. 1 (1983): 103-128. 
325 Jesse J. Prinz, “Embodied Emotions,” in Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on 
Emotions, ed. Robert C. Solomon (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 46. He bases his claim on his 
interpretation of the psychology research by Robert B. Zajonc, Sheila T. Murphy, and Marita Inglehart, 
“Feeling and Facial Efference: Implications of the Vascular Theory of Emotion,” Psychological Review Vol. 
96, No. 3 (1989): 395-416.  
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whether grief is trembling of hands of the person or the sharp acknowledgment of the fact 
that a beloved person is irreversibly gone.326 Prinz turns the question around and wonders 
what is left of an emotion without a bodily reaction. Together with William James he asks: 
“What kind of an emotion of fear would be left, if the feelings neither of quickened 
heartbeats nor of shallow breathing, neither of trembling lips nor of weakened limbs, 
neither of gooseflesh nor of visceral stirrings, were present, it is quite impossible to 
think.”327 And if one mentally abstracts the bodily features of emotions – what is really left 
of them?  
A question that deserves real attention and a delicate analysis is answered by Prinz in 
a manner inspired by empiricist philosophy which makes Deigh doubt whether these kinds 
of theories can truly account for intentionality of emotion. Thus, he claims “I think the 
somatic approach can subsume anything that deserves to be called an emotion.”328 This 
means that he firmly rejects the idea that some emotions do not involve a bodily change. 
Among these examples some thinkers suggest guilt which seems to not have a universal 
and strictly ascribed physiological state or emotions that endure for a long time, as in the 
case of thinking of a life-long love.329 Something that is ought to be classified as an 
emotion has to always involve a bodily change. In this sense Prinz asserts that the category 
of emotion is a more unified category than some thinkers would want to admit (for 
example, Griffiths). And so Prinz argues that “[l]ong-standing emotions deserve to be 
called emotions only because they dispose us to enter into patterned bodily responses”330 
and he furthers, “I would defy the critic of James and Lange to identify a single emotion 
that lacks a bodily mark, at least dispositionally.”331 Emotions should not be 
intellectualized, they are, indeed, a bodily event (though, one does not have to claim 
rigorously that each emotion has a distinctive physiology). 
To be precise on exactly what kind of perceptions of bodily changes qualify as 
emotion (some bodily changes such as shivers from cold and fatigue would not be regarded 
as emotions), Prinz has to sharpen his perspective. Thus, he argues that particular kinds of 
mental states can classify as vehicles of emotions – specifically, the bodily states that are 
perceived as emotions are elicited by certain circumstances. Prinz inspired by Lazarus 
argues that emotions arise when an organism faces core relational themes, precisely, 
“organism/environment relations that bear on well-being.”332 His redefined James-Lange 
theory, then, looks like this: 
 
Core relational themes include dangers, losses, threats, achievements, status, demotions, and 
transgressions. In each case, there is an object, situation, or event that bears some relation to 
                                                
326 We can recall the quotation we already met in section 2.2.5 The Non-Cognitive Elements of Emotions, of 
this chapter: “If my hands and feet were cold or warm, sweaty or dry, again this would be of no necessary 
criterial value, given the great variability of the relevant physiological connections.” Nussbaum, Upheavals 
of Thought, 58.  
327 Prinz, “Embodied Emotions,” 46. Here he quotes William James, What Is an Emotion? (1884). Reprinted 
in What Is an Emotion? Classical Readings in Philosophical Psychology, eds. Cheshire Calhoun and Robert 
C. Solomon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 193.  
328 Prinz, “Embodied Emotions,” 49. 
329 Robert C. Solomon in The Passions discusses the long-standing emotions in these terms. 
330 Prinz, “Embodied Emotions,” 50. 
331 Ibid., 50. 
332 Ibid., 53. 
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the organism. As a first stab, we can invite James and Lange to say that emotions are 
perceptions of those bodily states that are characteristically caused when an organism enters a 
relation that falls under a core relational theme.333 
 
Thus emotions in cognitivist theories are similarly seen as bodily events which occur 
when triggered by a specific situation – that is – emotions have objects. Dissimilarly to 
cognitivist theories, Prinz does not argue that this object is apprehended cognitively; it is 
understood in terms of a classical affect theory as a trigger that elicits an affect file (to put 
it in other words, emotions in affect theory are pre-programmed reactions to certain 
triggers, but to apprehend that kind of object-trigger we do not need any explicit cognitive 
appraisal). How then does Prinz suggest we regard the intentionality of emotions? We have 
just seen Prinz claiming that emotions, indeed, have objects; that means, they are 
intentional. According to him emotions are intentional in two senses – they have general 
and particular objects. Thus, “[a]ll fears concern dangers (the formal object), and each 
particular episode of fear concerns a particular danger, such as an assailant, a great height, 
a loud noise, a dental visit, an upcoming exam, and so on (particular objects).”334 
Intentionality conceived in cognitive terms, an ability to conceive an object of an emotion 
as concrete representation makes emotions something we can evaluate rationally and so 
ethically. But if we perceive them as intentional awareness of our own bodies (and 
cognitivist theories would find this superfluous) – this kind of intentionality just indicates 
that a body is in that concrete state. Thus, from this perspective a James-Lange theory is 
seen as inadequate to house the intentionality of emotions as awareness, not only of our 
own bodies, but as an assessment of an object outside us. Prinz claims that even Damasio 
agrees with this objection and he furthers:  
 
Even Damasio gives in on this point. He says the James-Lange theory places inadequate 
emphasis on the role that evaluation plays in the induction of emotions (1999, 130). To make 
up for this shortcoming, he recommends that we identify emotions with sensations of bodily 
changes coupled with a mental evaluative process (139). This process can involve innate 
perceptual triggers in the case of the primitive (or ‘primary’) emotions exhibited by animals 
and children, but it will involve more complex cognitive processes mediated by the frontal 
cortex in the more advanced (or ‘secondary’) emotions of human adults.335 
 
As we have seen from Griffiths’ argumentation both he and Damasio, suggest 
acknowledging existence and making distinctions between basic and secondary and 
complex emotions. Moreover, both types of emotions should be regarded as truly being 
emotions – and Prinz seems to focus on the first group of basic emotions wishing to fit the 
more complex emotions into characteristics of phenomena that are close, yet distinct from 
them. Prinz sees his theory as ‘embodied appraisal theory.’ Appraisal here should be 
understood “not as an evaluative judgment, but as any representation of an organism-
environment relation that bears on well-being.”336 An evaluative judgment can be an 
                                                
333 Ibid., 53. 
334 Ibid., 54. 
335 Ibid., 55. Here Prinz refers us to arguments found in Antonio R. Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens, 
130, 139. 
336 Prinz, “Embodied Emotions,” 57. Prinz argues that emotions can be defined by their expressions and by 
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appraisal, but Prinz argues that it is not the sole phenomenon that can be classified in this 
category: 
 
If a nonjudgmental state represents an organism-environment relation that bears on well-being, 
it too will count as an appraisal on this definition. My suggestion is that certain bodily 
perceptions have exactly this property. They represent roughly the same thing that explicit 
evaluative judgments represent, but they do it by figuring into the right causal relations, not by 
deploying concepts or providing descriptions. Our perceptions of the body tell us about our 
organs and limbs, but they also carry information about how we are faring.337 
 
Thus, Prinz essentially argues for giving the body an essential role in theories of 
emotions. This move, he argues, will not make emotions less valuable appraisals – they 
will inform us about our relation to the world, but their vehicle will be not a thought, not a 
cognitive judgment, but the judgment of our bodies. And so he concludes that “[i]n 
developing a theory of emotion, we should not feel compelled to supplement embodied 
states with meaningful thoughts; we should instead put meaning into our bodies and let 
perceptions of the heart reveal our situation in the world.”338  
Prinz suggests an interesting and illuminating analysis of our emotions, especially in 
the way he regards the knowledge of the body as valuable. His account may have problems 
accommodating complex emotions, yet we think that he raises a very important objection 
to Nussbaum’s views – that in the experience of emotions, the body is more important than 
she wants to admit. As Jenefer Robinson plausibly argues: “In other words, a judgment or 
cognitive state all by itself can never produce an emotional state; it is physiological change 
                                                                                                                                              
straightforward classical ways. Prinz argues that building on prevailing theories of mental representation, we 
can claim that “a mental state gets its intentional content in virtue of being reliably caused (or having the 
function of being reliably caused) by something (Dretske 1981, 1988; Fodor 1990).” Prinz, “Embodied 
Emotions,” 55. Here he uses the work of an American philosopher noted for work in epistemology and 
philosophy of mind, Fred Dretske, Knowledge and the Flow of Information (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981), 
and the work of an American philosopher and cognitivist scientist Jerry Alan Fodor, “A Theory of Content, I 
and II,” in A Theory of Content and Other Essays (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990). Prinz argues for 
considering his suggestion in light of the fact that there, indeed, might be causal relations that grant content 
without entering it. Emotions as perceptions of bodily changes, then, would be reliably caused by core 
relational themes. Prinz suggests an elicitation files model: “We can think of all of these body-change 
elicitors as belonging to a mental file – an elicitation file. That file may start out with a handful of triggers 
and expand over a life span. As we learn of new dangers, we may add new entries to the elicitation file. 
Elicitation files can even come to include evaluative judgments of the kind emphasized by defenders of 
appraisal theories. Each addition to an elicitation file will be sufficient for triggering the relevant bodily 
response, though getting admitted to the elicitation file in the first place will depend on similarity to or 
association with triggers that have already been attained. Consequently, all the representations that trigger the 
bodily response will do so in virtue of being recognized as dangerous, either explicitly or implicitly by 
similarity to previously established elicitors.” Prinz, “Embodied Emotions,” 55. This means, that if bodily 
perceptions, which according to him are emotions, are caused by reliable causation they have formal objects 
and so they are intentional in a broad sense. When it comes to particular objects of emotions, Prinz suggests 
looking at them from this perspective – all emotion theories can agree that bodily changes occur in virtue of a 
particular perception or a thought. What he attempts to prove, trying to illuminate the mechanism through an 
example of fear, is that “[t]he idea would be that a representation of heights gets coactivated with a somatic 
perception and linked to it in such a way that the former causes the latter to occur, and the latter wanes when 
the former becomes inactive.” Prinz, “Embodied Emotions,” 55. That means that Prinz argues that a 
cognitive appraisal can cause emotions as bodily perceptions without entering into their content. 
337 Prinz, “Embodied Emotions,” 55. 
338 Ibid., 58. 
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that puts the emotionality into emotion.”339  
 
3.3 EMOTIONS AND FEELINGS 
 
So far we have encountered accounts that may interpret the content of emotion, its eliciting 
factors in different ways and so ascribe different roles to physiology and cognition, but 
they all seem to argue that emotions are a form of awareness around us. Now we would 
like to turn to the question of how we in fact become aware of emotion and thus become 
disposed to the knowledge it offers. We thus would like to discuss the feeling dimension of 
emotional experience. Peter Goldie argues for something we have encountered in the 
aforementioned accounts (be it an argument that emotions are appraisals of the significance 
of the environment to an organism, a kind of thinking we found in Griffiths and Prinz or 
theories that want to ascribe an explicit ethical dimension to them, as we found in 
Nussbaum), namely, that emotions are a ‘good thing.’340  
While recognizing that philosophers may praise emotions, he also adds that 
cognitivist theories have systematically neglected the dimension of feelings in the 
emotions. Goldie points to Nussbaum’s work as a paradigmatic example of this. He argues: 
“So far as concerns bodily feelings, these, she says, are ‘without rich intentionality or 
cognitive content,’ or even ‘nonintentional;’ and as there is variability in feelings across 
people and cultures, and as we should admit the possibility of nonconscious emotions, 
bodily feelings cannot be part of an emotion’s identity conditions.”341 Goldie disagrees 
with this assessment and starts his defense of the feeling dimension in emotion by defining 
them as an experience “of the condition of one’s body, such as the feeling of the hairs 
going up on the back of one’s neck; and feelings directed towards the object of one’s 
emotion, such as feelings of fear directed towards the strange man approaching one in the 
dark alley.”342 He further argues that cognitivist theories may neglect feelings on the 
common misconception of the nature of them: “The misconception is that feelings are 
brute: they can tell us nothing about the world and how to act in the world, and this is 
because feelings are not about anything (or if they are about anything, they are only about 
the condition of one’s body). Moreover, feelings are inessential and peripheral to an 
account of what emotions are, although, of course, one might admit that they do sometimes 
occur.”343 
Now before we turn to explore the feelings dimension of emotions we should see 
what Goldie holds emotions to be. Emotions are our engagement in the world.344 He, like 
Nussbaum, constructs emotions as intentional – “the thoughts and feelings in an emotional 
experience are (at least typically) directed towards objects in the world, beyond the bounds 
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of our bodies.”345 In addition, emotions “can be made intelligible by reference to the 
thoughts which are involved in it.”346 They are also involved in shaping and determining 
what we value. And stemming from this point, Goldie further argues, similarly to 
Nussbaum, that emotions can also reveal to us what we value “and what we value might 
not be epistemically accessible to us if we did not have such responses (cf. Stocker 
1996).”347 Emotions, as is the case in Nussbaum’s thought, are seen as intentional 
phenomena situating us in the world and helping us to access the things we value 
ourselves.  
Where does Goldie situate the dimension of feeling in the intentional and 
discriminating phenomenon of emotions? Goldie claims that “[f]eelings are an intimate 
and familiar part of emotional experience; without feelings, emotions would not be what 
they are.”348 Yet, he is well aware that feelings are a difficult topic to discuss – it is hard to 
describe them and, moreover, to capture the right place for them in an emotional 
experience. He recognizes a certain type of dynamics in cognitive theories, namely, to 
leave feelings out when defining the nature of emotions and, then, to hope to describe them 
as a separate dimension of emotional experience. He calls this an ‘add on’ strategy and 
argues that in this way we cannot capture what emotion truly is:  
 
[T]o put feelings to one side for as long as possible, in the hope of giving as full an account of 
emotion as can be given without feelings, and in the hope of adequately explaining, or making 
sense of, action out of emotion just in terms of feelingless beliefs and desires, perhaps 
characterized impersonally. Then, according to this view, feelings should emerge as a separate 
component to round off the account – an add-on – comprising perhaps just awareness of the 
physiological changes involved in emotion, and quite distinct from any intentional elements.349 
 
This displaces the role and importance of feelings in emotional experience. What 
Goldie attempts to do, then, is to take notions, familiar with cognitivist theories of 
emotions – a personal point of view and intentionality – and seat them at the center of 
emotional experience; and for him, seriously considering feelings in emotions seems an 
adequate way to do it. Goldie, in his account, separates feelings into two kinds – bodily 
feelings (perceptions of our own bodies, the feeling of one’s own heart racing, for 
example) and feelings towards (or we would say intentional feelings such as fear towards a 
barking dog). But where he departs from Nussbaum is in the claim that both are part of 
what emotion is. Further to this, Goldie warns us not to look at feelings atomistically. 
Emotional experience is always a holistic experience. While dissecting and discussing 
parts is something that is unavoidable and necessary in philosophy, one should not lose 
sight of the holistic aspect in the overall approach to emotion and “seeing feelings as 
embedded in an emotion's narrative, as part of the person's life.”350  
When it comes to bodily feelings, Goldie claims that they supply us with 
                                                
345 Ibid., 48. 
346 Ibid., 48. 
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Elizabeth Hegeman, Valuing Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
348 Goldie, The Emotions, 50. 
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introspective knowledge of our bodily condition. Within this he situates facial expressions, 
hormonal changes, changes in the autonomic nervous system. We should note that Goldie 
is concerned with feelings of bodily change, the phenomenological aspect of it, not with 
the bodily change in itself as a fact that can be scientifically and impartially observed and 
measured.351 Goldie agrees with the spirit of William James’ approach and argues that 
emotion should not be understood as bodily change (a separation we encountered in claims 
of Damasio, LeDoux, and Prinz), but as a feeling of that change.352 The changes must be 
felt (or experienced), after all. It is difficult to imagine someone being angry without 
feeling angry – “[w]ithout the ‘emotional flush and thrill’ (203), all you have is pure 
cognition.”353  
Yet Goldie also wishes to alter James’ approach to feeling – by arguing that a feeling 
does not always have to be conscious and that a feeling does not always have to be directed 
to our own bodies. He thus wants to keep true to James’s argumentation, but to make 
conceptual space for a feeling towards and so he introduces a term of ‘borrowed 
intentionality.’ Goldie wishes to explain this, not so self-evident term, by starting with 
James’ position:  
 
An object falls on a sense-organ and is apperceived by the appropriate cortical centre; or else 
the latter, excited in some other way, gives rise to an idea of the same object. Quick as a flash, 
the reflex currents pass down through their pre-ordained channels, alter the condition of 
muscle, skin and viscus; and these alterations, apperceived like the original object, in as many 
specific portions of the cortex, combine with it in consciousness and transform it from an 
object-simply- apprehended into an object-emotionally-felt.354 
 
                                                
351 We can find Goldie explicating this choice of argumentation as being embedded in the daily experience of 
emotions and wanting to explain and contribute to an understanding of those: “Scientific investigation of the 
emotions, from a purely impersonal perspective, deploying purely impersonal theoretical concepts, inevitably 
– and quite appropriately from this perspective – makes no use of phenomenal concepts, which are available 
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the World,” 95-96. 
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the insult and deem it right to strike, but we could not actually feel afraid or angry.” Goldie, The Emotions, 
53 quoting James, “What is an Emotion,” 190. And “What kind of emotion of fear would be left, if the 
feelings neither of quickened heart-beats nor of shallow breathing, neither of trembling lips nor of weakened 
limbs, neither of goose-flesh nor of visceral stirrings, were present, it is quite impossible to think. Can one 
fancy the state of rage and picture no ebullition of it in the chest, no flushing of the face, no dilation of the 
nostrils, no clenching of the teeth, no impulse to vigorous action, but in their stead limp muscles, calm 
breathing, and a placid face? The present writer, for one, certainly cannot. The rage is as completely 
evaporated as the sensations of its so-called manifestations, and the only thing that can possibly be supposed 
to take its place is some cold-blooded and dispassionate judicial sentence, confined entirely to the intellectual 
realm, to the effect that a certain person or persons merit chastisement for their sins. In like manner of grief: 
what would it be without its tears, its suffocation of the heart, its pang in the breast-bone? A feelingless 
cognition that certain circumstances are deplorable, and nothing more. Every passion in turn tells the same 
story. A purely disembodied human emotion is a nonentity.” Goldie, The Emotions, 53 quoting James, “What 
is an Emotion,” 194.. 
353 Goldie, The Emotions, 53. Here he quotes James, “What is an Emotion,” 203. 
354 Goldie, The Emotions, 54-55. Here he quotes James, “What is an Emotion,” 203. 
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What Goldie infers from this is an idea that while the feeling of emotion is a bodily 
experience, what makes it that particular feeling (and not just a feeling in general) is its 
combining with an object in the consciousness. James, for instance, describes grief in, we 
could say poetic images, of ‘suffocation of the heart’ and its ‘pang in the breast-bone.’355 
What Goldie attempts to demonstrate is a conviction that “when we talk, taking James’s 
own example, of a grieving person feeling a pang in the breastbone, we want to say that the 
pang is a pang for the one who is being grieved over; although it is undoubtedly a feeling 
of something bodily, and can be pointed to as being in the chestbone, what makes it a pang 
of grief, rather than any old pang in the breastbone, is surely that it has been, as James 
says, ‘combined in consciousness’ with the object of the emotion.”356 Thus, at this point he 
comes back to the conception of emotion as a holistic experience: “[O]ur entire mind and 
body is engaged in the emotional experience, and all the feelings are ‘united in 
consciousness’ in being directed towards its object: united ‘body and soul,’ ‘heart and 
mind.’ For example, sexual desire is felt with the whole being – body and soul – for the 
one we desire. And, likewise, our whole being aches in grief for the one we have lost.”357 
Furthermore, Goldie wants to show that the idea of borrowed intentionality should not be 
easily conceived only as a matter of phenomenology. It may be only a matter of 
philosophical dogma to insist that feelings are one or the other – either they lack 
intentionality altogether or they are intentional without a necessity for bodily change – they 
seem to be capable of accommodating both. 
A feeling towards for Goldie is an intentional content of emotion which is directed 
towards the world. While bodily feelings can have, as we have seen, borrowed 
intentionality, a feeling towards has a direct intentional character: “No degree of bodily 
feeling can alone reveal to you what your emotion is about; the association of ideas is, 
initially, from the feeling towards to the bodily feeling, and thus, if you do not know what 
your thoughts and feelings are directed towards, you cannot find out merely through 
introspection of your bodily feelings.”358 Goldie’s concept of feeling towards in its essence 
is similar to what Nussbaum calls an emotion, but it is defined not as a form of thought 
only, but as a form of thinking with a feeling. Feelings towards are part of one’s 
consciousness of the world that surrounds him/her, but similar to Nussbaum’s thought, 
they do not need to exhibit reflective self-consciousness.359 Feelings, however, cannot be 
identified with beliefs and desires. Goldie further argues that: “In feeling towards, the 
imagination tends to be much more intractable than in thinking of; that is to say, the 
imagination tends to be less subject to the will – it tends actively to ‘run away with you.’ 
And it is, in part, because of this feature that the emotions are passions: your thoughts and 
feelings are not always as much under your control as you would want them to be.”360 
What he essentially wants to argue, then, is that a feeling towards (which is an intentional 
thinking with feeling) is an experience which is a qualitatively new experience from just 
thinking of. We may be passive in the process of feeling towards, we may see that it is not 
                                                
355 Cf. Goldie, The Emotions, 54. 
356 Ibid., 55. 
357 Ibid., 55. 
358 Ibid., 58. 
359 Cf. Ibid., 64. 
360 Ibid., 58. 
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as easily and cognitively penetrable as belief (for Goldie this is also something we can 
infer from our daily emotional experiences), but feeling towards alters the content of 
knowing something, it is distinct from just thinking of that object: 
 
Coming to think of it in this new way is not to be understood as consisting of thinking of it in 
the old way, plus some added-on phenomenal ingredient – feeling, perhaps; rather, the whole 
way of experiencing, or being conscious of, the world is new (cf. Budd 1995: 153, who makes 
this point in another context). The difference between thinking of X as Y without feeling and 
thinking of X as Y with feeling will not just comprise a different attitude towards the same 
content – a thinking which earlier was without feeling and now is with feeling. The difference 
also lies in the content, although it might be that this difference cannot be captured in 
words.361 
 
Goldie thus wants to argue that feelings are part of emotional experience and we 
cannot attempt to try to describe emotions only basing it on some aspect of their nature (be 
it intentionality, cognition, bodily change) and then adding feeling. For him, saying that 
feeling is a part of emotions is a way to capture a personal point of view in them. We have 
seen that when talking about emotional feelings Goldie divides them into bodily feelings 
and feelings towards, something we may say is faithful to the distinction of basic-complex 
emotions. While discussing the bodily feelings he allows them to lack intentionality in 
some cases, but they can also have a borrowed intentionality – a pang of grief in my chest 
is, nonetheless, a pang for a person I lost. The intentional feelings towards are in many 
regards similar to Nussbaum’s concept of emotions. Goldie in similar fashion argues that 
feelings towards do not necessarily have to have distinct physiological expression or 
phenomenology, but they are, nonetheless, essential parts of emotional experience because 
feeling is something that makes emotion be emotion, after all. We find Goldie’s insights 
about the place of feelings in emotional experience yet another valuable, critical point to 
Nussbaum’s conception of emotions. Feeling, from a phenomenological point of view, 
seems to be part of the phenomenon of emotion, something that, indeed, is essential to its 
nature and not only a by-product of it. 
Robert C. Solomon who was at the genesis of cognitivist theory of emotions in 
philosophy and whose thought is a focal point of many of the authors we have discussed 
here – either as being inspired by his thought or arguing vigorously against it – also 
considers feelings as important to emotional experience. Owing to his interest in existential 
philosophy, Solomon during his academic career was driven to challenge the primitivist 
conceptions of emotions (as he indicates himself, at the beginning of his career, emotions 
were seen as physiological, then as neurological syndromes conjoined with feelings).362 
According to Solomon emotions “are a kind of judgment – or rather, a complex of 
interlocking judgments, desires, and intentions.”363 Emotions, for him, are thus intelligent 
engagements with the world. They are intentional and so they are always about the world 
but in a keen and intense way. To sum his position up: “Emotions are not just about (or 
                                                
361 Ibid., 59-60. 
362 Cf. Robert C. Solomon, “Emotions, Thought, and Feelings. Emotions as Engagement in the World,” in 
Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions, ed. Robert C. Solomon (New York: 
Oxford University Press), 76. 
363 Ibid., 76.   
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‘directed to’) the world but actively entangled in it. So I now want to improve my analysis 
by making this point central, that emotions are subjective engagements in the world. I still 
favor the use of ‘judgment’ to make this point, but I now want to stress even more than I 
have before the idea that a judgment is not a detached intellectual act but a way of 
cognitively grappling with the world.”364 
 Solomon admits that in his earlier work Passions (1993) he was dismissive about the 
‘feeling theory.’365 Thus, near to the end of his life Solomon came to understand that 
feelings might not be secondary to a cognitivist theory of emotions. Bodily experiences 
and manifestations, he claims “are not mere incidentals, and understanding them will 
provide a concrete and phenomenologically rich account of emotional feelings in place of 
the fuzzy and ultimately content-free notion of ‘affect.’”366 A point is similar to the one 
made by Goldie and not accidentally so – Solomon came to appreciate a fundamental, as 
opposed to, an accidental role of feelings in emotions also by acknowledging Goldie’s 
insightful critique of the cognitivist theories of emotions.367 What Solomon wants to argue 
then is that cognitivist theories do have a tendency to leave out the feeling dimension, but 
he also asserts that cognition, if properly construed can include this dimension. What does 
Solomon consider feelings to be? This dimension of emotions’ experience, for him, 
includes the movements of the autonomous nervous system (quickened pulse, galvanic 
skin response, bodily fluids release, etc.), facial expressions and bodily postures, arousal, 
action readiness – all of these seem to have phenomenological manifestations.368 And these 
things that make up for feeling can and should be included as part of the experience of 
emotion, and so Solomon suggests seeing them as judgments of the body. Thus, body, as in 
Goldie’s account, adds to our knowledge of the world.  
In addition, Solomon, then, similarly to Nussbaum, construes judgment of emotion as 
both capable of processing propositional (linguistic) and non-propositional information. 
The latter for Nussbaum is used to include non-human animals and human infants into her 
account as beings capable of genuine emotions. It also enables her to make aesthetic 
experiences, such as dance and music, able to give non-propositional attitudes that can be 
received by our emotions. What Solomon does with the feeling dimension of emotional 
experience is something similar, but he allows our body to make the judgments that are 
also engagements in the world and by this enable the body to reveal a kind of knowledge to 
us: 
 
Thus the judgments that I claim are constitutive of emotion may be nonpropositional and 
bodily as well as propositional and articulate. They manifest themselves as feelings. They may 
become reflective and self-conscious. What is cognition? I would still insist that it is basically 
judgment, both reflective and prereflective, both knowing how (as skills and practices) and 
knowing that (as propositional knowledge). A cognitive theory of emotion thus embodies what 
is often referred to as ‘affect’ and ‘feeling’ without rendering these unanalyzable. They may 
not be analyzable in the mode of propositional analysis, but neither are they simply 
manifestations of the biological substratum, as James and Griffiths suggest. There are feelings, 
                                                
364 Ibid., 77. 
365 Cf. Ibid., 84. 
366 Ibid., 85. 
367 Cf. Ibid., 84. 
368 Cf. Ibid., 86. 
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‘affects’ if you like, critical to emotion, but they are not distinct from cognition or judgment 
and they are not mere ‘read-outs’ of processes going on in the body. They are judgments of the 
body, and this is the ‘missing’ element in the cognitive theory of emotions. They are profound 
manifestations of our many ways of emotionally engaging with the world.369  
 
It seems that trying to reconcile a cognitive judgment and a feeling judgment in 
emotional experience might be a fruitful way to think about emotions. Feelings as 
judgments of the body are not conceived as brute and non-discriminating, but as adding to 
our knowledge about the world around us (and not only of our own bodies). This might be 
a good way to think of emotions in accounts that reflect on the human meaning of emotion 
as opposed to those accounts that focus only on something that can be defined as short- 
term neurological arousal. Emotion from a natural sciences point of view is also that, but 
when this ‘short term neurological arousal’ happens to us in our daily lives, it may also 
result in rather serious consequences and it is this aspect of emotional experiences that we 
are interested in.  
 
3.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
We have encountered some critical comments that can apply to Nussbaum’s views given 
by her fellow philosophers. If we think of their comments in light of Nussbaum’s work we 
can conclude that her cognitive theory of emotions lacks a clear distinction and accounting 
for the existence and differences between basic and complex emotions. Nussbaum also 
seems to disregard a clear link between our emotions and our bodies. She is also rather 
dismissive of the element of feeling in emotional experience. Nussbaum’s own thesis 
would benefit from acknowledging that she focuses on complex emotions and especially 
on their cognitive element. However, that would still leave the area of feelings neglected. 
We should also note that bodily expression of emotion seems not to be secondary to 
emotion, as Nussbaum would like to portray it. Many authors would agree that in the case 
of complex emotion it would be difficult to speak of concrete physiological and 
phenomenological expressions of emotion, that may vary, but, nonetheless, the bodily 
change and the experience of it is what seems to make an emotion what it is. 
We have attempted to present suggestions of what emotions might be and have 
considered how these suggestions propose a deeper understanding of the nature of emotion 
and their possible influences on our moral lives. Emotions, broadly speaking, seem to be a 
form of engagement with the world – they are important for our survival, social relations, 
and self-image. Complex emotions, furthermore, seem to involve a considerable amount of 
cognitive activity and, thus, they seem to be intelligent responses to the happenings around 
us. If emotions can be considered as having a kind of evaluative intelligence they should be 
considered seriously by ethical disciplines. Furthermore, if emotions are capable of 
processing information and present a deep personal grasp of the situation or as Goldie puts 
it – thinking with feeling as a new qualitatively distinct way of knowing an object, 
emotions should be taken into account in a moral education that wants to be effective.370 
                                                
369 Ibid., 88. 
370 In Chapter III, we will encounter a resonating idea in Aquinas’s thought – through the passion of love we 
add an extra qualitative dimension of knowing a particular object. See sections 3.1.1.2 Is Sense Love a 
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Distinct Passion? and 4.1 The Influence of the Passions on Reason and the Will and a Possibility of Affective 
Knowledge in Aquinas’s Thought of that chapter. 
 
 
CHAPTER II. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM ON COMPASSION 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
After inquiring into Nussbaum’s theory of emotions we can turn to the presentation of a 
case study of compassion. This endeavor will enable us to grasp how, according to 
Nussbaum, the emotions can function concretely in the ethical realm. Moreover, 
compassion for Nussbaum is the most basic moral emotion and the basis of her own moral 
psychology and ethical vision.1 Our endeavor in the upcoming pages will be similar to the 
one encountered in Chapter I – we will offer a synthesized picture of Nussbaum’s thought 
on compassion as a praiseworthy ethical guide and will allow the author to argue on her 
own terms. By pursuing this approach we hope to do justice to her complex account of 
compassion which is especially relevant in the face of moral and political realities today. 
This chapter will proceed in the following manner: first, we will analyze the philosophical 
roots of Nussbaum’s concept of compassion. This will be achieved by situating 
Nussbaum’s vision of compassion vis-à-vis the Stoic vision which promotes human dignity 
as a main concept respecting the fundamental nature of human beings. After fleshing out 
Nussbaum’s concept of compassion, we will proceed to her analysis of compassion’s place 
in the general picture of human psychology. This will lead us to the major part of this 
chapter – an analysis of Nussbaum’s views on educating compassion, enabling it to 
function as a reliable element in our ethical undertakings. This section will illuminate the 
importance of compassion to Nussbaum’s ethical-political vision. Here we will encounter 
Nussbaum’s conviction that the basic insights inherent to this emotion provide a deeper 
understanding of what we owe each other. In turn, if these insights are embodied in our 
ethical thought and political institutions they can further promote and sustain human 
compassion. This section will make evident Nussbaum’s view that politics is inseparable 
from love. Having journeyed into Nussbaum’s philosophy of compassion we will turn to 
the reception of her thought – Nussbaum’s views will be challenged by Cates, Martin 
Kavka, and Amia Srinivasan. Cates will question Nussbaum’s approach from a Christian 
perspective situating Nussbaum’s concept of compassion vis-à-vis compassion understood 
as a Christian virtue. Kavka will approach Nussbaum from a Judaic point of view and will 
dispute her views that one cannot incorporate external transcendence claims into ethics. He 
will advance the possibility for such claims through the human emotions of compassion 
and love. Srinivasan will draw attention to the fact that the compassion promoted by 
political regimes might be oppressive to victims of injustice as a silencing mechanism. 
 
1.1 A BRIEF NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY 
 
Compassion, in Nussbaum’s view, “is a painful emotion occasioned by the awareness of 
another person’s underserved misfortune.”2 There are numerous synonyms to name this 
experience in English such as pity, sympathy, empathy, and they all appear to be used in a 																																																								
1 Cf. Martha C. Nussbaum, “Compassion: The Basic Social Emotion,” Social Philosophy and Policy Vol. 13, 
No. 1 (1996): 27-58. 
2 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 301. 
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similar context and without clear distinctions.3 Why then does Nussbaum choose to utilize 
the term compassion? Nussbaum is aware that the terms were translated in philosophical 
tradition in different ways and invites us to take a look at her brief analysis of them. 
The word pity was widely used to translate Rousseau’s pitié4 and the Greek tragic 
terms eleos and oiktos. This term was associated with the undeserved nature of a 
misfortune and so also with potential questions of justice.5 In contemporary usage pity 
came to have “nuances of condescension and superiority to the sufferer”6 and because of 
the new connotation, Nussbaum chooses to avoid the term. 
Empathy is another term used in a synonymous way as compassion. For Nussbaum, 
however, empathy represents “an imaginative reconstruction of another person’s 
experience, without any particular evaluation of that experience; so used, obviously, it is 
quite different from and insufficient for compassion; it may not even be necessary for it.”7 
This imaginative reconstruction of another person’s experience whether that experience is 
“happy or sad, pleasant painful or neutral,”8 lacks the character of suffering for the other 
person’s misfortune and so the empathic imaginer can judge the situation “good, bad, or 
indifferent,”9 but cannot judge a grave predicament as compassion does. 
When it comes to the term sympathy, Nussbaum claims that it “is frequently used in 
British eighteenth-century texts to denote an emotion equivalent to what I call 
‘compassion.’”10 Sympathy as compassion also alludes to the judgment that the situation of 
the other person is bad. “If there is any difference between ‘sympathy’ and ‘compassion’ in 
contemporary usage,” Nussbaum states, “it is perhaps that ‘compassion’ seems more 
intense and suggests a greater degree of suffering, both on the part of the afflicted person 
and on the part of the person having the emotion.”11 
After having a more clear view on the terminology we can proceed to our 
presentation of the emotion of compassion.  
 
1.2 DEFINITION OF COMPASSION AND ITS PHILOSOPHICAL ROOTS 
 
After getting acquainted with her theory of emotions, we should not be surprised that 
Nussbaum presents us with the account of something we could call a “rational 
compassion.” To put it in her own words: “More than a warm feeling in the gut, 
compassion involves a set of thoughts, often quite complex.”12  
																																																								
3 Cf. Ibid., 301. 
4 This term is widely used in his analysis of the emotion Nussbaum chooses to call compassion. See Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, Émile, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Book, 1979). 
5 Cf. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 301. 
6 Ibid., 301. 
7 Ibid., 302. Nussbaum bases her usage of the term on the interpretation of its history suggested by Lauren 
Wispé. See Lauren Wispé, “History of the Concept of Empathy,” in Empathy and Its Development, eds. 
Nancy Eisenberg and Janet Strayer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 17-37. 
8 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 302. 
9 Ibid., 302. 
10 Ibid., 302. 
11 Ibid., 302. 
12 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Compassion &Terror,” Daedalus Vol. 132, No. 10 (2003): 12. 
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Nussbaum claims that she utilizes the structure of compassion found in Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric.13 She continues that the Aristotelian compassion is in continuity with the 
previous conception found in Homer, the tragic poets, and Plato. The traces of the 
Aristotelian concept of compassion subsequently can be found in the works of Rousseau, 
Schopenhauer and Smith.14 Aristotle proposes that compassion has three value judgments 
inherent in this emotion: the judgment of seriousness of the suffering, the judgment that the 
person who undergoes misfortune does not deserve it, and the judgment that the one 
experiencing compassion and the sufferer have a certain similarity; thus, the observer 
experiences that he/she has similar possibilities that appear in the situation of the suffering 
person.15 Nussbaum agrees with the judgments of Aristotle and takes in the three thoughts 
compassion has, stipulating only that the third element is not entirely necessary and 
altering it by adding her fourth judgment. At this point we encounter Nussbaum’s concept 
of compassion, which we will introduce in the proceeding section and then continue 
fleshing out other influences on Nussbaum’s thought on this emotion. 
 
2. COMPASSION AND ITS COGNITIVE CONTENT 
 
Thus, here we take a closer look at the meaning of the thoughts which form the emotion of 
compassion. This section will present the thoughts Aristotelian compassion entails and will 
present the link Nussbaum makes between them and contemporary research. Nussbaum is 
convinced that the value judgments of compassion are rather universal and one can witness 
a “remarkable unanimity about core instances across time and place.”16 The tragic 
elements of life endorsed by Aristotle are reaffirmed by Candace Clark’s sociological 
study.17 The core instances to experience compassion remain the same with added specific 
elements, which are inherent to contemporary life. At this stage of Nussbaum’s argument 
we encounter her attempt to build a bridge between the ancient and contemporary world 
and by this, seal the universality of her argument. 
As mentioned above, the first thought compassion entails is the one of size. This 
cognitive element essentially signals that we judge that something serious happened to the 
person we have compassion for. This means that the onlooker judges that the event 
threatens the flourishing of the person in question. 
What are these universal misfortunes people judge to have size across centuries? 
Nussbaum argues that Aristotle rightfully so indicated the following: “Death, bodily 
assault or ill-treatment, old age, illness, lack of food, lack of friends, separation from 
friends, physical weakness, disfigurement, immobility, reversals of expectations, absence 
of good prospects.”18 This list is remarkably similar to the plight for which contemporary 
Americans feel compassionate.19 Nussbaum concludes that, naturally, what is to be taken 																																																								
13 The definition can be found in Aristotle’s Rhetoric I385bI3 ff. 
14 Cf. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 306. 
15 Cf. Ibid., 306.  
16 Ibid., 307. 
17 The study examines the cases of sympathy among contemporary Americans. See Candace Clark, Misery 
and Company: Sympathy in Everyday Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997). 
18 Nussbaum, Upheavals of thought, 307. 
19 Clark’s list of tragic predicaments in America could be illustrated by the following passage: “When I 
looked at what had triggered sympathy, I discovered dozens of plights. The inventory encompasses all those 
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as an instance worthy of compassion may vary across societies and individuals. Yet, “the 
central disasters to which human life is prone are remarkably constant; constant as well is 
the fact that people take these disasters to be central.”20 
The second judgment is the judgment of non-desert. This judgment considers that the 
misfortune happened to the person without his/her own fault and thus this person does not 
deserve the suffering. To put it in other words: “Compassion […] addresses itself to the 
nonblameworthy increment.”21 This element, Nussbaum states, is very prominent in 
Aristotle.22 Compassion, then, appeals to the sense of justice we have. The thought of non-
desert is also particularly closely connected to the view or intuition that the things that 
matter to us ‘can be held hostage to fortune.’ The value judgment of not deserving the 
misfortune appeals to the disaster that happened from outside, the one that was not caused 
by the person, but by the unpredictable flow of life. 
Once again Nussbaum guides us to the research of Clark to draw upon similar, 
contemporary experiences. Clark claims that contemporary Americans experience 
compassion only for the cases caused by “victimization by forces beyond a person’s 
control.”23 This points out that even nowadays compassion is directed to events one might 
call ‘bad luck,’ something that happened to the suffering person without his/her active 
action or decision.24 This judgment of compassion presents a rather controversial picture of 
the world. It speaks about an agent who is capable not only of active agency, but also is 
vulnerable to the world surrounding him/her and the unforeseen, painful happenings that 
can befall him or her. Thus, ultimately it speaks of an agent who ascribes existential value 
to the external goods. At this point we just want to highlight the consequences of the 
second judgment of compassion. In the upcoming sections we will elaborate on the 
worldview Nussbaum’s compassion suggests in greater length. 
The last judgment of an adequate compassion is the judgment of similar possibilities. 
The cognitive content of this judgment signals that one will feel compassion over 
misfortunes that are likely to happen to himself/herself or the ones one loves. This 																																																																																																																																																																							
enumerated in blues lyrics (e.g., poverty, a partner’s infidelity, death of loved ones). It includes illness 
(including ‘functional’ or behavioral illnesses such as alcoholism and drug use), physical or mental 
disabilities or deformities, injury, and pain. The respondents also mentioned war trauma, sexual abuse, 
physical abuse, crime, victimization, disaster victimization, (e.g., by earthquakes, hurricanes, or airplane 
crashes), homelessness, infertility, divorce (or loss of ‘partner’), discrimination (e.g., in jobs or housing), 
political victimization (e.g., liberties abridged by tyrannical government), role strain (e.g., single parenthood), 
unwanted pregnancy, physical unattractiveness, car accidents, car trouble, house trouble (e.g., leaky roof), 
insensitive parents, ungrateful children, social ostracism, loss in competition (e.g., sports or job), depression, 
fear, public humiliation, accidental embarrassment, fatigue, bad judgment, ruined vacations, boredom, and 
discomfort (e.g., enduring heat, cold, or traffic jams).” Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 307-308. Here 
Nussbaum quotes Clark, Misery and Company, 83. Though the list clearly contains ‘milder’ elements, in 
essence, the instances worthy of compassion are close to the ones depicted by Aristotle.  
20 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 308. 
21 Ibid., 312. 
22 Ibid., 312. Nussbaum bases her claim on Rhet. I385bI4, b34-86aI, I386b7, bI0, bI2, bI3; Poetics I453a4, 5. 
23 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 313. Here Nussbaum quotes Clark, Misery and Company, 84. 
24 These tragic plights for American people do not involve ambiguity, as they separate rather sharply between 
realms of action and choice and fate and chance. Thus, Americans, generally speaking, would not include 
poverty as an unfortunate plight. Similarly, sexual crimes, as sexual assault would not get an immediate 
compassionate response. But alcoholism or abuse of drug substances are rather surprisingly perceived as ‘bad 
luck.’ See Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 314. Here Nussbaum is basing her argument on Clark, Misery 
and Company, chapter 3. 
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judgment speaks not only of the awareness of the fragility of the other person (as in the 
judgment of non-desert), it recognizes the fragility of oneself. For Aristotle, this judgment 
essentially means that compassion can be experienced by those who are acquainted with 
suffering, and people who experience themselves as omnipotent (they do not experience a 
lack in anything) will not have compassion.25 Thus for Aristotle compassion has an 
intimate link with fear.26 What is more, the judgment of similar possibilities, as its title 
already indicates, requires certain demarcation: who can I judge to be similar to me? This 
means that the emotion is dependent on the ability to see similarity between you and me. 
This perception of similarity is clearly formed and, thus, predisposed by the culture and 
upbringing one is born into. Hence, the emotion can be impeded by “all kinds of social 
barriers - of class, religion, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation.”27 
 
2.1 ALTERING THE JUDGMENT OF SIMILARITY: EUDAIMONISTIC JUDGMENT 
 
After stating the Aristotelian case, Nussbaum, however, hesitates to embrace the third 
judgment of compassion fully. She sees the first two judgments of seriousness and fault as 
necessary elements of emotion, while similarity is described as “only a helpful 
epistemological device.”28 The similarity element in compassion, for Nussbaum, uncovers 
the significance of suffering, but its demarcating character and the requirement to have a 
certain prior community bond with the sufferer seems to be consequences that Nussbaum 
is not willing to accept. This would essentially mean that without the sense of commonness 
and perceived possible prospects undergoing the same pain, the emotion of compassion 
would fail to occur in the observer. Or to put it in other words – without the perspective to 
experience the same pain – one would not react to the pain of the person whose life does 
not manifest any similarities with his/her own; the only reaction to it would be 
indifference. 
This perspective not only creates an impossibility for a human being on a 
significantly higher social, economical rank to experience genuine compassion if he/she 
fails to recognize his/her own vulnerability and similarity with the other, for Nussbaum this 
perspective also disqualifies the possibility of genuine emotion in a divine being. 
Nussbaum argues that we can imagine a divine (thus perfect being) feeling a genuine 
compassion for human beings without an understanding of shared similarity (and so similar 
possibilities to encounter the suffering) and vulnerability. Yet, in religious traditions we 
can encounter gods and godlike humans who feel compassion: “Zeus weeps for the death 
of Sarpedon; the Christian god feels ceaseless compassion for the errors and sufferings of 
mortals; the Buddhist who has successfully escaped from personal vulnerability and pain 
experiences compassion for the sufferings of those still fettered.”29 																																																								
25 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 315. Quoting Aristotle I385b24 ff and I385b21-22, b31. Nussbaum 
claims that one can find a similar point in Rousseau’s Émile. In this work one can find Rousseau’s agreement 
with Aristotle that a necessary element, condition for pitié is knowledge of one’s own weakness and 
vulnerability. Nussbaum refers us to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Émile, 224. 
26 Nussbaum directs us to read more on the link between compassion and fear in Aristotle’s Rhetoric 
I386a22-8, 82b26-7 and Poetics I453a5-6. 
27 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 317. 
28 Ibid., 317. 
29 Ibid., 318. 
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So far we have highlighted several elements of the third judgment of Aristotelian 
compassion. Though Nussbaum sees it as a helpful tool to understand the impact of 
suffering, she reveals that this judgment is composed of a close link with fear, a strong 
demarcation element which attributes compassion only to ‘my own’ and deprives not only 
humans that perceive themselves as invulnerable, but also divine beings from genuine 
compassion. Thus Nussbaum chooses not to embrace this judgment fully, but to alter it. At 
this moment she turns to the eudaimonistic character of emotions we have presented in the 
previous sections.30 Nussbaum claims that precisely this element is necessary for 
compassion, not similarity. This extension, curiously enough, is intended to safeguard the 
possibility of true emotion in a deity. To put it in her own words: “A truly omniscient deity 
ought to know the significance of human suffering without thinking of its own risks or bad 
prospects, and a truly loving deity will be intensely concerned for the ills befalling mortals 
without having to think of more personal loss or risk.”31 At this segment of her argument 
Nussbaum tries to convince her reader that her alteration is necessary. Nussbaum attempts 
to construct a theory, which from her perspective, is well thought through and includes 
genuine emotion not only in humans, but it also extends to the deities of various religious 
traditions. 
Nussbaum is convinced that the eudaimonistic judgment represents a deeper meaning 
of the Aristotelian judgment of similar possibilities, and as mentioned above, sees the latter 
as a certain tool to help to comprehend the former. “Imagining one’s own similar 
possibilities aids the extension of one’s own eudaimonistic judgment.”32 Thus, Nussbaum 
sees her alteration as a necessary element of compassion and similarity as a heuristic tool. 
Eudaimonistic judgment means that the predicament of the other (even a distant other) falls 
into my circle of concern and that my own happiness depends on yours. Nussbaum affirms 
that this is a rather abstract judgment and so she leaves the connection with the Aristotelian 
judgment of similar possibilities – if we see the other somehow similar to us, we can 
imagine that his/her predicament can happen to us too. Nussbaum sees the link between the 
two judgments as useful for the work of imagination that is necessary for compassion to 
appear, yet the judgment of similar possibilities has an ancillary role and, strictly speaking, 
is not necessary for compassion to appear. The idea that what happens to others is of 
importance to me is necessary for compassion to appear and not the idea that I feel 
compassion for you because you are similar to me and your suffering is something that is 
likely to befall me. The main motive in this kind of reasoning is demarcation and fear and 
Nussbaum is after an inclusive and universal notion of compassion. 
What we have encountered in this section is Nussbaum’s attempt to define the 
content of compassion. These cognitive elements “are both sufficient for compassion and 
constituent parts of it.”33 That would essentially mean that once one judges a particular 
situation to meet the three criteria he/she will experience compassion. 
 
2.2 COMPASSION AND REASON  
 																																																								
30 See section 2.2.3 Emotions Are Eudaimonistic Value Judgments at the beginning of Chapter I. 
31 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 319. 
32 Ibid., 319. 
33 Ibid., 325. 
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We have touched upon the definition and the cognitive structure of Nussbaum’s concept of 
compassion. Clearly enough, her suggestion speaks of emotion, which cannot be labeled as 
an irrational feeling, but on the contrary – a thought-laden perception of the world and 
events around us. In Nussbaum’s discussion on compassion, the link between reason and 
emotions is already clearly established in the nature of emotion itself, thus, we should not 
be surprised by the perspective from which she attempts to discuss the relationship 
between the two.  
Nussbaum tries to convince her reader that the core discussion on the relationship 
between emotion and reason lies in the question: what do we mean by saying that emotions 
are irrational? Do we mean that emotions are irrational impulses of the human body or do 
we mean that emotions contain irrational thoughts within their cognitive structure? The 
first allegation belongs to a Freudian line of thinking, the second one clearly corresponds 
to the Stoic mistrust in the emotions. Nussbaum holds that the first allegation cannot hold 
any serious scrutiny and she attempts to discuss objections to compassion as an adequate 
ethical guide answering the latter concern. 
 
2.3 DOES COMPASSION CONTAIN FALSE THOUGHTS? CLASSIC STOIC OBJECTIONS 
 
2.3.1 The Radical Defense of Human Dignity  
 
The first objection stemming from the Socratic teaching and encapsulated strongly in the 
works of the Greek and Roman Stoics, warns against the thoughts of which compassion is 
made of. Socrates was convinced that a good person cannot be harmed.34 This position 
crowned by the teaching on virtue and self-sufficiency got its most influential form in the 
teachings of the Greek and Roman Stoics. The moral purpose or reason and will were 
depicted as the most important things in life. Furthermore, “this faculty of moral choice is 
the possession of all humans, and its virtuous use is always within our power, no matter 
what the world does.”35 The moral purpose is the source of human equality – “its dignity 
outshines all circumstantial differences and renders them trivial.”36 
In this line of thinking, the intuition encompassed in compassion seems to be far from 
appropriate. The Stoics spoke of a dignified agent who is fully responsible for his or her 
life. The damages of life come not through unpredictable happenings, but through 
deliberate bad choices. Rather self evidently, the response to the evil events in life is 
blame, not compassion. Blame in the Stoic thought, Nussbaum states, “unlike compassion 
respects the primacy of moral purpose in each person, treating people not as victims and 
subordinates but as dignified agents.”37 
Compassion from this perspective suggests a controversial approach to a person by not 
respecting his/her full dignity as a free moral agent. Nussbaum summarizes this position in 
the following way: “If one respects the faculty of moral purpose in a human being, one will 
																																																								
34 Cf. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 356. Here Nussbaum refers to Plato’s, Apology, 41D, cf. 30DC.  
35 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 357. 
36 Ibid., 357. 
37 Ibid., 357. 
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not feel compassion, for one will see that faculty as a source of equal human worth, 
undiminished by any catastrophe.”38 
Nussbaum asserts that this position is Plato’s basis to criticize the genre of tragedy 
(the only one highly endorsed by Nussbaum herself as useful for moral learning), 
furthermore, this position was taken by Spinoza, and heavily influenced works of 
Descartes, Smith, and Kant.39 At the core, we could describe this position as a radical 
defense of human dignity. Nussbaum furthers that this defense of human dignity manifests 
strong qualities of egalitarian cosmopolitanism, which chooses to ignore any kin 
attachments. 
We are well familiar with the discussion on human dignity from the field of 
theology. The inherent human dignity, a teaching, which is at the heart of Christian morals, 
provides an impartial, ethical motive to guide human ethical behavior. Nussbaum, on her 
behalf, presents herself as an advocate of the collaboration between moral principles and 
emotions. She fleshes out the importance of emotion in her works more, because this topic 
is less self-evident than the importance of good moral principles for ethical guidance. In 
her discussion on human dignity as a guiding principle, however, Nussbaum expresses 
some reservations about it, if we treat it separately from the guiding light of compassion.  
The idea of dignity, which was cemented very strongly by the Stoics, put through by 
Cicero, Kant and beyond can promote some questionable points if we take it uncritically.40 
The concept of human dignity clearly presents itself as a fair motive to respect equal 
humanity in each and every person disregarding his/her social/material circumstances, 
race, sex, and so forth. The very fact that you are a human being who is reasonable and 
free, prompts respect and equal treatment. 
Nussbaum, however, is convinced that human dignity is a notion which is far less 
clear than we might think from first sight. If we look at the Stoic conception of it we 
discover that human dignity essentially represents human capacity to be above the beasts. 
We have reason, freedom, language, moral capacity and this makes us different from all 
the rest.41 This kind of dignity is an unconditional property because “you either have it, or, 
bestially, you don’t.”42 For Nussbaum, this poses the problem of denying animal dignity 
and any human moral obligation towards them.43 
Another problem Nussbaum ascribes to the concept of human dignity is a poor 
treatment of the value of basic human goods. This topic we shall discuss further in a few 
sections.44 At this point it is important to mention that Nussbaum disagrees with the idea 
that dignity without a proper respect for other human goods is sufficient for eudaimonia. 
“Dignity,” Nussbaum asserts, “is just one part of her [a person’s] happiness – a piece of it 
that can itself be victimized and held hostage to fortune; her human dignity is being 																																																								
38 Ibid., 357. 
39 Ibid., 358. 
40 See Martha C. Nussbaum, “Duties of Justice, Duties of Material Aid: Cicero’s Problematic Legacy,” 
Journal of Political Philosophy Vol. 8, No. 2 (2000): 176-206, to consult her views on the problematic of the 
Stoic understanding of human dignity. 
41 Nussbaum, “Compassion &Terror,” 18. We move to discuss the argument found in this article as it 
presents Nussbaum’s critique of Stoic dignity in a nutshell. 
42 Ibid., 18. 
43 To look into this matter more deeply Nussbaum refers us to Richard Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human 
Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993). 
44 See the upcoming section 2.3.3 The Value of External Goods. 
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weighed in the balance with other goods and it no longer looks like the thing of surpassing, 
even infinite worth, that we took it to be.”45 Human dignity in Nussbaum’s thought, then, 
is an element of eudaimonia, which needs proper protection as other elements of it. It can 
be affected by negative events and circumstances and so we should never look light-
heartedly at human suffering because it touches one existentially. In this regard, we should 
think of communities suffering from constant deprivation of such basic goods as clean 
water, sufficient nutrition, lack of shelter, constant threats to security, situations of abuse 
and slavery, just to name a few instances. These events do not pose a threat to external 
goods only; they threaten the very core of humanity in the person. Nussbaum goes as far as 
saying that if we look at human dignity superficially we see in it an unbiased motivation to 
respect equal humanity in all. Yet if we try to deconstruct this concept and take a more 
critical look at it “it seems to license quietism and indifference to things in the world, on 
the grounds that nothing that merely happens to people is really bad.”46  
Nussbaum suggests yet another argument as to why we should look at the concept of 
human dignity understood as an absolute, invulnerable property cautiously. Nussbaum 
drawing on ideas of Marcus Aurelius, a Roman Stoic of the second century, tries to show 
that the Stoic understanding of human dignity implies something she calls death within 
life.47 Marcus Aurelius advocated something we may call a non-reactive imagination. This 
imagination has to unlearn all the strong childhood attachments, thus, be cleansed from 
“intense partiality and localism.”48 Ultimately as a crown of extirpation of all vivid 
attachments Marcus Aurelius urges one to stop being a lover.49 For Nussbaum this leads to 
a picture of the world which seems to lack everything that we know as human: “But getting 
rid of our erotic investments, not just in bodies, but in families, nations, sport teams – all 
this leads us into a strange world, a world that is gentle and unaggressive, but also 
strangely lonely and hollow.”50 For Nussbaum, the advocacy for this kind of world 
suggests a death within life. She asserts that the moral righteousness promoted by Marcus 
Aurelius could be real only in circumstances where human life does not exist. Human life 
as such is marked by imperfection, quirkiness, and uneven attachments.  
Marcus Aurelius claimed that life as we know will, without a doubt, fade into 
oblivion, so we should not invest in a series of meaningless happenings. The only thing 
that truly matters and that will remain is moral order with its principles of truth and 
justice.51 Nussbaum is left restless with this answer and poses the question whether justice 
should not serve the living? The vision of justice which is detached from life and concrete 
circumstances of real communities seems like a vision we should not follow. For 
Nussbaum this vision seems to also be an easy theoretical escape from a complexity of 
practical ethical matters. Our moral choices are made when we engage in an honest 																																																								
45 Nussbaum, “Compassion &Terror,” 19. 
46 Ibid., 20. 
47 Cf. Ibid., 20. 
48 Ibid., 21. 
49 Nussbaum points out that erotic love and desire are also taught to be seen in detached ways and the sexual 
act described as nothing more than “the rubbing together of membranes.” She refers us to Pierre Hadot’s, The 
Inner Citadel: The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, transl. Michael Chase (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1998), VI.13. 
50 Nussbaum, “Compassion &Terror,” 22. 
51 Cf. Nussbaum using an argument found in Hadot, The Inner Citadel, VI.47. 
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dialogue with ourselves. To put it in Nussbaum’s own words: “But in so far as we retain, 
as well, our local erotic attachments, our relation to that motive must always remain 
complex and dialectical, a difficult conversation within ourselves as we ask how much 
humanity requires of us, and how much we are entitled to give to our own.”52 This 
approach leads not to extirpation of the emotions and compassion as a social motive, but 
the extension and education of it; a topic we will further discuss in subsequent sections of 
this chapter. At this part of Nussbaum’s argument we have discovered her proposal to keep 
respect for human dignity, but not to treat it as an exceptionless moral principle, an idea we 
might be familiar with from the writings of revisionist moral theologians.53 Nussbaum 
suggests that this respect for moral principles and not only acknowledgment of our 
attachments, but also appreciation of the values they disclose mean that “we need to 
negotiate our lives with a complex combination of moral reverence and erotic attachment, 
we need to have a keen imaginative and emotional understanding of what our choices 
mean for people in many different conditions, and the ability to move resourcefully back 
and forth from the perspective of our personal loves and cares to the perspective of the 
distant.”54 Hence, Nussbaum suggests that we should trust our imaginations and at the 
same time criticize them.55 She is a staunch believer that in this dialectic of trust-criticism-
and, then, trust again something similar to truth or at least understanding of moral 
situations may occur. 
 
2.3.2 Mercy Rather than Compassion 
 
Nussbaum further develops that the Stoic tradition should not be perceived as a cold-
hearted perspective. Due to its conception of the human being and value it simply cannot 
accept compassion as a worthy moral sentiment. Yet the Stoics had an answer to the moral 
situations concerning guilt and their answer was mercy. Nussbaum continues that 
“believing that the only serious harms that befall others are the harms that they have 
caused themselves through their folly and wrongdoing, the Stoic nonetheless believes that 
it is extremely difficult to be good.”56 
Thus the attitude of a true Stoic towards wrongdoings of the other should be free of 
harshness and in a lot of instances merciful. Nussbaum introduces Seneca’s main 
arguments in favor of mercy: 
 
First, it is expressive of his strength and dignity: it shows that he does not need to inflict pain in 
order to be a whole person. Second, it displays understanding of the difficulties of human life, 
which make it almost impossible to err in some respect; it displays, too, the awareness that the 
punisher is himself an imperfect person, liable to error. Third, it is socially useful, since it 
awakens trust and mutual goodwill, rather than fear and antagonism.57 
 																																																								
52 Nussbaum, “Compassion &Terror,” 23-24. 
53 In this regard we could think of the works by James Keenan, S.J., Lisa Sowle Cahill, Margaret A. Farley, 
R.S.M.  
54 Nussbaum, “Compassion &Terror,” 24. 
55 Cf. Ibid., 26. 
56 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 365. 
57 Ibid., 365-366. 
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Nussbaum points out that we should not be surprised if we find ourselves wondering 
what then is the actual difference between mercy and compassion. What we encounter in 
Seneca’s teachings is the cognitive content of compassion translated into terms adequate 
for the teaching on virtue.58 If we would take a closer look at the mercy Seneca talks about, 
it also recognizes burdens inherent to human life. The main accent in mercy, however, lies 
in the recognition that the life of virtue is difficult to attain, thus, its emphasis is put on the 
things which one can control. We recall that compassion also recognizes the human 
struggle, yet its main accent lies in things that even virtuous behavior cannot control. 
Mercy states that there are no such cases, we are always responsible for our actions and 
their consequences and we should focus on perfecting our moral purpose; things outside it 
simply do not matter. Compassion is full of false ideas, to say the least. Mercy respects the 
full dignity of the human person and hence focuses on guilt (the only grave matters are 
always dependent on your own actions). “Mercy,” Nussbaum states, “is mitigation in 
sentencing, not a verdict of not guilty.”59 Mercy, a Stoic thinker would say, can hold 
society far better than quirky compassion because it inspires “mutual gentleness not tinged 
with fearfulness or a gnawing sense of personal need.”60 
 
2.3.3 The Value of External Goods 
 
Nussbaum attempts to prove that the debate on the best ethical guide in social matters 
might have something deeper at stake. She is convinced that the anti-compassion tradition 
opposes the emotions and reason in the way not always evident for a contemporary reader. 
As indicated above the Stoic tradition with all its followers, indeed, holds that compassion 
and all other emotions are irrational. Yet irrational in this sense means not the absence of 
cognitive content, but a complete falseness of it. Compassion and other emotions are faulty 
because they are “not discerning and aimed at truth.”61 Hence, Nussbaum tries to point out 
that the core of this debate in the very essence is ethical value.62 																																																								
58 Cf. Ibid., 366. 
59 Ibid., 366. 
60Ibid., 366. 
61 Ibid., 369. 
62 Nussbaum’s argument in a nutshell attempts to convince us that the compassion and the anti-compassion 
traditions offer two visions of the well-functioning societies. Both visions in essence deal with the questions 
of ethical value and the good in attempt to provide an answer to a question: How should we live a good 
community life? We believe that the following quotation captures the core of the two visions: “The debate 
over compassion constructs, in effect, two visions of political community and of the good citizen and judge 
within it. One vision is based upon emotions, the other urges their removal. One sees the human being as 
both aspiring and vulnerable, both worthy and insecure; the other focuses on dignity alone, seeing in reason a 
boundless and indestructible worth. One sees the central task of community as the provision of support for 
basic needs; bringing human beings together through the thought of their common weakness and risk, it 
constructs a moral emotion that is suited to supporting efforts to aid the worst off. The other sees a 
community, a kingdom of free responsible beings, held together by the awe that they feel for the worth of 
reason in one another; the function of their association will be to assist the moral development of each by 
judgments purified of passion. Each vision, in its own way, pursues both equality and freedom. The former 
aims at equal support for basic needs and hopes through this to promote equal opportunities for free choice 
and self-realization; the other starts from the fact of internal freedom – a fact that no misfortune can remove – 
and finds in this fact a source of political equality. One sees freedom of choice as something that needs to be 
built up for people through worldly arrangements that make them capable of functioning in a fully human 
way; the other takes freedom to be an inalienable given, independent of all material arrangements. One aims 
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We have seen above that compassion clearly deals with value, ascribing existential 
importance to external goods. Compassion speaks of a vulnerable moral agent who can be 
not only touched by misfortunes of life, but can be “cut to the very core of the 
personality.”63 This claim in essence means that a person is vulnerable in his/her 
attachments and rightly so because they do matter for a good life. 
The anti-compassion position speaks of a world where the status of human being 
should evoke respect and this status can never be touched by anything that happens to a 
person, because the dignity of the person cannot be harmed. 
Both positions meet at a point of equality – the anti-compassion perspective on the 
evident defense of fundamental human equality based on human dignity, the compassion 
tradition on the less evident (from the first glance) claim of similar possibilities inherent in 
its cognitive structure and being evoked by the recognition of a common human weakness 
and fragility. 
We can clearly grasp the teaching of value in the compassion tradition, but what 
about the Stoic position? The Stoics teach about the value of virtue and fundamental 
human equality; that is evident. But if we look at particular virtues we will see that they are 
always aimed at a prudent arrangement of external goods. “Courage, justice, moderation,” 
Nussbaum points out, “all these virtues deal with our need for externals.”64 The Stoic will 
deal with the arrangement of external goods through the teaching of preferred and 
dispreferred indifferents (basically, a term for preferred and dispreferred external goods, as 
in the Stoic thought those are not ‘goods’ at all. The Stoic points out their ethical value by 
the term ‘indifferents’), but will never ascribe real value to it.65 
Human dignity, hence, is entirely independent of fortune. For Nussbaum this poses a 
political-philosophical question of reconciling the defense of everyone’s right to the basic 
human goods and at the same time recognizing that humanity at its core does not need 
them.66 How can our political regimes promote equal distribution of these, how can they 
advocate political rights and liberties, if we continue to claim that human dignity will not 
be touched by a deprivation of these?67 
The compassion tradition, we should note, does not advocate a needy, weak, ‘soft,’ 
so to speak, society. But it wants to urge us to see that even despite our fundamental 
similarity, “differences in class, race, gender, wealth, and power do affect the extent to 
which the sense of helplessness governs the daily course of one’s life.”68 Recognizing this, 
																																																																																																																																																																							
to defeat the selfish and grasping passions through the imagination of suffering, and through a gradual 
broadening of concern; the other aims to remove these passions completely, overcoming retaliation with self-
command and mercy. One attempts to achieve benevolence through softheartedness; the other holds, with 
Kant, that this softheartedness ‘should not be at all among human beings.’ One holds that: it is the weakness 
of the human being that makes it sociable.’ The other holds that weakness is an impediment to community, 
that only the truly self-sufficient person can be a true friend.” See Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 368. 
63 Ibid., 371. 
64 Ibid., 373. 
65 Cf. Ibid., 373. 
66 Cf. Nussbaum, “Compassion & Terror,” 18. 
67 Cf. Martha C. Nussbaum, “The World of Human Dignity: Two Tensions in Stoic Cosmopolitanism,” in 
Philosophy and Power in the Graeco-Roman World: Essays in Honor of Miriam Griffin, eds. Gillian Clark 
and Tessa Rajak (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 31-49. 
68 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 375. 
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the advocates of compassion try to promote an ethical viewpoint and a course of action that 
would promote a meaningful functioning of societies. 
Nussbaum argues that the Stoic denial of the value of external goods is in a lot of 
cases romanticized. We choose to present her example of the philosophy of Nietzsche as 
most telling. Nietzsche whose ideas are influenced by Stoicism and who himself invokes 
Epictetus, Spinoza, and Kant as his masters advocated a view on the human being as an 
animal living entirely in the world of nature.69 Nussbaum criticizes the mixture of his 
naturalism and romanticism, which is especially manifest in Nietzsche’s glorification of all 
kinds of suffering.70 “To those human beings who are of any concern to me I wish 
suffering, desolation, sickness, ill-treatment, indignities…,”71 Nietzsche claims. Nussbaum, 
however, employs these claims as an example of absurdity of his position. In the romantic 
glorification of the renouncement of external goods “we find no sign of the simple truth 
that a hungry person cannot think well, that a person who lacks shelter, basic health care, 
and the other necessities of life is not likely to become a self-expressing philosopher or 
artist, no matter what her innate equipment.”72 Maybe Nietzsche was imagining the higher 
men and their prophet Zarathustra, but we can be sure he did not ponder from where 
Zarathustra gets his basic welfare and the higher men their food or what they do all day 
long.73  
The compassionate tradition, on the other hand, also imagines societies and persons 
aspiring to high functioning. Yet compassionate imagination recognizes that in order to 
flourish we need external goods in the first place and the task of morally educated 
compassion is to arrange the priorities among them wisely. The high moral aspirations are 
ideals, which can grow out of the soil of basic human needs. Compassion sees that those 
needs are often threatened by events that are independent of our moral virtue and cautious 
actions – it recognizes this common threat to all human beings. Yet precisely because of 
this compassion, offers itself as a trustworthy clay of societies as it recognizes the fragility 
of the human condition and offers a course of action to treat human life accordingly. 
 
2.3.4 The Limits of Compassion: The Problem of Bias 
 
Nussbaum is convinced that the objection against compassion concerning the partiality of 
concern in this emotion is one of the most important ones. This doubt of compassion is 
expressed not only by the Stoic-Kantian line of thinking, but also by Utilitarian tradition, 
moreover, by some members of the pro-compassion tradition such as Adam Smith.74 The 
thoughts that make up compassion need education because they primarily are aimed at 
people who are proximate to us. Yet Nussbaum is convinced that there is something very 
essential to a good moral life in the emotion of compassion and this ethical achievement, 
																																																								
69 Cf. Ibid., 383. 
70 Nussbaum refers us to Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil, 270; The Will to Power, 910; and a chapter of 
Ecce Homo “Why I am so Wise?” for some telling examples of the praise of the value of suffering. 
71 Nussbaum quoting Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. W. Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New 
York: Vintage Press, 1968), 910. 
72 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 384. 
73 Cf. Ibid., 385. 
74 Cf. Ibid., 386. 
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presented even in a ‘raw,’ not educated compassion, if broadened can promote well-being 
of our societies. 
“Compassion,” states Nussbaum, “is our species’ way of hooking the good of others 
to the fundamentally eudaimonistic (though not egoistic) structure of our imaginations and 
our most intense cares.”75 Compassion, in other words, is the first experience of care for 
the good of others, even if at first it is limited to the circle of our close ones. The thought of 
the good of others in abstract terms speaks very little to us, but “when it is brought into 
relation with that which we already understand – with our intense love of our parents, our 
passionate need for comfort and security – [that] such things start to matter deeply.”76 
Compassion does an important work by making the plight of the other vivid to our 
imagination. 
Nussbaum tries to convince her reader that the human mind can work with abstracts, 
but in moral matters they do not have the force of urgency and importance. Compassion is 
the first experience of the urgent care for loved ones, for his/her goods and ills. Hence, we 
can say that Nussbaum suggests that morality and the moral growth starts with the 
psychological equipment we have and this should not scare or discourage us. Compassion 
is limited, but the point of moral growth is precisely to start from this limited good and 
expand it to the broader community. Nussbaum employs the metaphor of circle used by 
Hierocles to explain how she sees compassion: 
 
Imagine, he says, that each of us lives in a set of concentric circles – the nearest being one’s 
own body, the furthest being the entire universe of human beings. The task of moral 
development is to move the circles progressively closer to the center, so that one’s parents 
become like oneself, one’s other relatives likes one’s parents, strangers like relatives, and so 
forth.77 
 
We can claim that this metaphor resembles the core of Nussbaum’s proposed 
perspective of moral growth. Here one starts with particular and limited concerns one can 
grasp and make sense of and gradually moves to a more well-informed and more universal 
concern. We can say that essentially Nussbaum attempts to advocate a theory with a ‘rich 
human meaning.’ This kind of theory will be structured around a chosen well-based 
argument, but it will allow morally relevant emotions to have a part in it. For Nussbaum 
emotions like compassion which already grow up from a good seed can break through even 
very complex moral situations and point one to the direction of some genuinely moral 
connections.78 Good moral theories are inhabited by imagination and moral attachments 
glued by emotions; precisely from this they take their life and their force. Simultaneously, 
well-ordered emotions are informed and educated by moral principles. We could say that 
this is the core of Nussbaum’s ethics. Due to this conviction Nussbaum is a ‘friend’ of 
compassion. She trusts that the cognitive content of compassion if educated and added to a 																																																								
75 Ibid., 388. 
76 Ibid., 388 
77 Ibid., 388. 
78 To support this statement Nussbaum often employs the example of Nazi morals. She utilizes the work of 
Jonathan Glover to argue that strong moral meanings learned in childhood and encapsulated in emotions at 
times can cut through strong layers of ideology and rationalization. See Jonathan Glover, Humanity: A Moral 
History of the Twentieth Century (London: Jonathan Cape, 1999). 
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good moral theory is normative to ethics. More than that, without compassion any kind of 
ethics is not complete because it does not have a true, immediate, forceful care for the 
other. Nussbaum asserts very strongly that ethics without emotions can offer only a 
“‘watery’ concern all around.”79 
Seen in this perspective compassion is close to the heart of ethics because it enables 
one to see a real person behind moral principles. It offers fundamental resources for 
morality in order to animate it and make moral principles ‘alive.’ To be sure, imagination 
and emotions without moral principles lack fundamental guidance and are prone to go 
astray. However, Nussbaum adds “but it is also true that compassion guides us truly toward 
something that lies at the core of morality, and without which any moral judgment is a 
ghastly simulacrum.”80 
The task of compassion to draw the circles of care towards the center, is a lifelong 
mission, to be sure. But in the co-working of a principle and emotion Nussbaum sees an 
ethical enterprise being fruitful. Moreover, Nussbaum asserts that emotions can and, 
indeed, make our rational moral judgments complete. To put it in her own words: 
“judgments characteristic of compassion are essential for the health of a complete adult 
rationality.”81 Nussbaum is convinced that without compassion our “abstract sight of the 
calculating intellect is value-blind”82 and that “compassion itself is the eye through which 
people see the good and ill of others, and its full meaning.”83 
We could conclude that Nussbaum attempts to point out that ethics definitely should 
not rely solely on the insights of the heart alone. Yet complete ethical observation will take 
those insights into account because they suggest a value-laden observation. In its first, not 
educated forms, the judgments offered by the emotion of compassion are limited to the 
ones close to the primary care center. This, however, already points to some genuine 
human attachments in the first place and is a first school experience of the world outside of 
me, the world that truly matters for my own well-being. Nussbaum is convinced that this is 
not the final stop of compassion and it can offer something far broader than this. 
Compassionate imagination can grow and with an adequate teaching it can expand to our 
fellow human communities, disregarding the background that separates them and us. 
Compassion needs moral theories to grow and moral theories need compassion to become 
alive. 
 
3. SITUATING COMPASSION IN THE PICTURE OF HUMAN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 
 
Nussbaum’s story of human compassion consists of attempting to show what compassion 
is, from where it appears in human emotional and behavioral make-up, and the possible 
ways to teach and sustain this emotion (the last element we will address in the upcoming 
sections on education of compassion).  																																																								
79 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 389. Here she refers to Aristotle’s, Politics II.4. 
80 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 390. 
81 Ibid., 391. This idea is very much inspired by Nussbaum’s collaboration with Amartya Sen and their 
critique of the theories of rationality which neglect the genuine, non-economic human concern for the good 
of the other. See Amartya Sen, Choice, Welfare, and Measurement (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982). 
82 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 392. 
83 Ibid., 392. 
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We have presented a definition of compassion in the previous sections and now we 
will attempt to present the place of compassion in human moral development, or in other 
words, we will attempt to show how compassion comes to life after all. In Nussbaum’s 
works we have discovered that she is a firm advocate of the positive human anthropology. 
The following quotation can illustrate her views rather well: “So for my account the 
problem is not how to plug the other things and persons into a fundamentally egoistic 
system; it is, instead, how to broaden, educate, and stabilize elements of concern that are 
already present – and in particular how to build a stable and truly ethical concern for 
persons, who are also objects of need and resentment and anger.”84 Thus, even the unstable 
proto-ethical elements in compassion are already the results of the generally positive 
psychological constitution of the human infant.  
Yet we are well aware of the negative human behavior, we are also aware of the 
negative human propensities that become clear in human development. How can we grasp 
and explain it? Any account of moral psychology and ethics has to attempt to explain the 
problem of evil to develop adequate thoughts on human morality. In upcoming sections we 
will present Nussbaum’s account of evil human behavior and in this way situate 
compassion in a fuller picture of moral human psychology. 
 
3.1 RADICAL EVIL 
 
Nussbaum is convinced that if we are to promote a good ethical life and extension of 
compassion we must know against what we stand. If we deliberate about the good, we also 
must deliberate about the evil and have a plausible account of it. There are many religious 
and secular attempts to find the roots of bad human behavior. In Christian accounts we 
ascribe this, for instance, to original sin and try to flesh out what the term actually means. 
In a secular context we can find accounts varying from ascribing moral corruption to social 
formation to more universal origins of moral corruption ascribing them to deep 
developmental emotional mechanisms.85 Nussbaum’s own approach to the account of evil 
is the following: 
 
I shall suggest, however, that by following the lead of empirical work on disgust, compassion, 
peer pressure, authority, and other human tendencies – as well as clinical work on child 
development and the capacities for empathy and concern – we can extract the core of a 
‘reasonable political psychology’ that people of many different overall views may endorse as a 
basis for political thought, considering it to be one element in their more comprehensive and, 
to that extent, different understandings of human nature.86 
 
																																																								
84 Ibid., 337. 
85 Cf. Nussbaum, Political Emotions, 163. We shift to this source because the account of radical evil is an 
evolution of Nussbaum’s thought present in the Political Emotions, but absent in the Upheavals of Thought. 
In this account Nussbaum wants to address the problem of evil human behavior seriously and look into 
propensities to it prior to any human socialization. The elements of animality as a problem for compassion (in 
a sense of compassion being narrow, thus directed to the ones close to us), the concept of denying our own 
animal nature (anthropodenial) and disgust, shame, and envy negatively influencing our compassionate 
responses are present also in the Upheavals. 
86 Nussbaum, Political Emotions, 163. 
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This essentially means that Nussbaum hopes that her account can function in a 
pluralistic society without establishing any, be it secular or religious, comprehensive 
doctrine. In the very presentation of compassion we saw that it is limited in its scope, but 
Nussbaum wants to take one step further and not stop at the narrowness of our sympathy as 
an answer to the question of evil. She wants to answer the question from where the darker 
human propensities appear and develop. Nussbaum is convinced that human cultures 
throughout history suffer from the reality of stigma – group exclusion – be it mirrored in 
the Indian caste system, prejudice against other nations, religions, race, sexual orientation. 
Thus in her account she does not want to avoid the question of real evil – “deliberately 
cruel and ugly behavior towards others that is not simply a matter of inadvertence or 
neglect, or even fear-tinged suspicion, but which involves some active desire to denigrate 
or humiliate.”87 Nussbaum thus in her understanding of the problem agrees with Immanuel 
Kant and finds in all human beings ‘radical evil’ – “a set of presocial tendencies to bad 
behavior, tendencies that go beyond those rooted in our shared animal heritage and which 
lie beneath cultural variation.”88 
Kant asserted that the roots of bad human behavior lie deep in human beings – “evil 
is radical, according to Kant – that is to say, it goes to the root of our humanity – because 
human beings, prior to concrete social experience, have a propensity to both good and evil, 
in the form of tendencies that are deeply rooted in our natures.”89 Kant was convinced that 
under certain circumstances human beings will inevitably act viciously. When do these 
tendencies come to the surface and flourish the most? Kant’s answer is that the evil is 
always present – “the tempter, the invisible enemy inside, is something peculiarly human, a 
propensity to competitive self-love, which manifests itself whenever human beings are in a 
group.”90 Thus, something dark that is already present in human constitution lets itself out 
whenever we are in the presence of others: 
 
Envy, addiction to power, avarice, and the malignant inclinations associated with these, assail 
his [human being’s] nature, which on its own is undemanding, as soon as he is among human 
beings. Nor is it necessary to assume that these are sunk into evil and are examples that lead 
him astray; it suffices that they are there, that they surround him, and that they are human 
beings, and they will mutually corrupt each other’s moral disposition and make one another 
evil.91  
 
Humans experience anxiety due to the mere presence of other humans. The bad 
tendencies are not freed by the mere need of something – and precisely in this part 
Nussbaum sees the strength of Kant’s account. “Even when,” she furthers, “people are well 
fed and housed, and even when they are reasonably secure with respect to other 
																																																								
87 Ibid., 164. 
88 Ibid., 164-165. 
89 Ibid., 166. Nussbaum using Kant’s argument found in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason 
(1793), transl. Allen Wood and George Di Giovanni (Reprint, New York and Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 6:28. 
90 Nussbaum, Political Emotions, 166. 
91 Ibid., 166. Here Nussbaum is quoting Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, 
6.94. 
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prerequisites of well-being, they still behave badly to one another and violate one another’s 
rights.”92 
We have to note that Nussbaum understands radical evil as an outcome of the 
structure of human developmental processes, in the dynamics of helplessness of the young 
infant’s body and his/her cognitive sophistication, the egoistic need of omnipotence is 
born. This primitive narcissism leads human infants and later adults (if it is not overcome) 
to subordinate and enslave others to our needs. This is essentially the key to understand 
Nussbaum’s views on the roots of evil. She, however, adds two elements to this account to 
complete it, namely, the tendency to yield to peer pressure and the tendency to obey 
authority, even if one needs to compromise a moral concern. Nussbaum sees these two 
tendencies as deeply rooted in human nature and they pose a threat for sustaining our 
democratic institutions. We will shortly introduce these two characteristics and the sources 
Nussbaum uses to construct her argument about them.  
Nussbaum bases her views on peer pressure on the famous works on conformity by 
psychologist Solomon Asch. His experiment found in Opinions and Social Pressure shows 
that an average subject shows a high degree of submission, even when the truth of a fact is 
evident when peer pressure is present.93 This tendency seems very troublesome to 
Nussbaum because it is “an impediment to truth telling.”94 Moreover, “it is all the more 
pernicious when brought to bear in situations already characterized by stigmatization and 
hierarchy.”95 Thus, Nussbaum sees the tendency to yield to peer pressure as very 
dangerous in combination with societal prejudices against such long stigmatized groups as 
gay people, people of color, Jewish people, people of middle East descent, etc.  
When it comes to human tendency to obey authority, Nussbaum utilizes the famous 
study of Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority.96 The study which had its setting in 
Yale’s laboratory famously found out that subjects would follow instructions of the 
scientist and give a dangerously high voltage of electroshock to their ‘learners,’ who 
actually worked for Milgram. In the basic version of the experiment Milgram discovered 
that if a ‘silvered glass’ appeared between the subject of the experiment and his ‘student’ 
and they could not touch – 60 percent of subjects would continue to press the voltage plate 
till maximum voltage level; when the two would be in the same room this rate would drop 
to 40 percent; when the subject was forced to touch his ‘learner’ and force his hand to the 
shock plate – the rate would drop to 30 percent.97 For Milgram this proved that “ordinary 
people, simply doing their jobs, and without any particular hostility on their part, can 
become agents in a terrible destructive process.”98 Milgram compared his own findings 
with Hannah Arendt’s study of Eichmann and “agreed with her that evil in not found in a 
‘sadistic fringe,’ but in normal people under circumstances in which they surrender 
personal accountability and simply go along with someone else’s directives – a personality 
state that he called the ‘agentic state.’”99 Nussbaum is convinced that Milgram’s studies are 																																																								
92 Nussbaum, Political Emotions, 166-167. 
93 Cf. Solomon E. Asch, “Opinions and Social Pressure,” Scientific American Vol. 193, No. 5 (1955): 2-8. 
94 Nussbaum, Political Emotions, 192. 
95 Ibid., 192. 
96 Cf. Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority (Reprint, New York: Harper Perennial, (1975) 2009). 
97 Nussbaum, Political Emotions, 194. 
98 Ibid., 194. Here Nussbaum is quoting Milgram, Obedience to Authority, 6. 
99 Nussbaum, Political Emotions, 195. 
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important and we can learn from them, but she does not agree with its pessimistic 
judgment for humanity. Moreover, she asserts that: “Nothing in Milgram’s work, however, 
shows that a robust training in independent thought, personal accountability, and critical 
dialogue cannot control and even surmount these tendencies.”100 She also suggests that in 
Milgram’s works we can find a solution to the part of this problem, namely, proximity of 
people which allows one to see others as individuals.  
Nussbaum perceives these two tendencies interacting in many ways with what she 
called radical evil (basically, an effort to cope with human weakness and helplessness) as 
they release the anxiety that comes from it. Yet, Nussbaum remains a staunch defender of 
moral education and the possibility of moral growth also in this area as she concludes:  
 
These tendencies are just tendencies, however deeply rooted. They can be modified by 
upbringing and education, and they can also be shaped by situations. Nations can foster 
cultures of dissent, encourage personal accountability, and discourage bureaucratic anonymity. 
Perhaps most important, they can build cultures of empathy, encouraging the ability to see the 
world through the eyes of others and to recognize their individuality.101  
 
Nussbaum considers Kant’s account of radical evil102 very insightful, but she does 
not want to stop with an answer that evil propensities are elicited by the presence of others 
and this gives birth to anxiety and competitively aggressive behavior. She wants to go a 
step further and look into the nature of these propensities and not stop at competitive 
human behavior, but explore the whole range of corrupted human actions. 
 
3.2 RADICAL EVIL: WHAT LIES BEHIND IT?  
 
Nussbaum, unlike Kant, thinks that a shared animal heritage is a part of the problem of 
evil. Our narrow sympathy is rooted in “a structure of imagination and affection that is a 
part of our likely evolutionary heritage, what enabled humans to survive as species.”103 
Nussbaum reminds us that typically mature human societies reject parts of this heritage as 
abandonment of elderly and disabled, for example, and seeks to transcend it with one of 
the biggest goals of ethics – impartiality.104 
In her account Nussbaum tries to draw our attention to both sides of our common 
animal heritage – the good, the proto-ethical achievements that are present in our 
constitution and the more troublesome parts of it. She tries to dissect how the propensities 
manifest themselves in human development trying to find out what emotions become 
strongly apparent at a certain age of human infancy and how they later on affect moral life 
and growth. Now we will try to present both negative and positive aspects of our emotional 
constitution. 																																																								
100 Ibid., 195. 
101 Ibid., 196-197. 
102 We should also note that Nussbaum stresses that anything we call innate propensity is a phenomenon 
difficult to demonstrate. In her appropriation of radical evil she accentuates that “innate tendencies are 
activated by general structural features of human life (mortality, scarcity, interdependence of various kinds), 
and that the tendencies to bad behavior are likely outgrowths of these interactions.” Nussbaum, Political 
Emotions, 167. 
103 Ibid., 167. 
104 Cf. Ibid., 167. 
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3.2.1 Animal Heritage: Problems for Morality  
 
Despite propensities to good, ethically relevant emotions in human infants lack resources 
crucial for mature morality, namely, impartiality. Human infants, like infants of other 
species are keen to choose their own kind: “They prefer the faces of the racial type that are 
most familiar to those of unfamiliar races; they prefer speakers of their own language to 
speakers of a foreign language.”105 This for Nussbaum shows that the good propensities are 
very limited in their scope and allows her to conclude together with Paul Bloom, a 
professor of psychology and cognitive science, that “the aspect of morality that we truly 
marvel at – its generality and universality – is the product of culture, not biology.”106 
Our animal heritage makes our compassionate concern inconsistent, it is bound to 
lose its immediacy over time, thus it fails in dealing with the permanent or reoccurring 
problems.107 “More troubling still,” Nussbaum states, “people often act immorally, by their 
own lights, as a result of empathy-induced compassion.”108 We will learn in the upcoming 
sections that compassion can be touched and educated by the vivid plight of other people’s 
misfortunes; a story can touch our imagination and give rise to the emotion. A vivid story 
of another person’s suffering tends to move one from ethical principles in favor of 
following up the lead of emotion. But the same mechanism can work in the direction we do 
not desire. 
 Furthermore, Nussbaum attempts to find the roots of group hatred, stigmatization, 
and exclusion in structures that are peculiar to human life. Human beings are born helpless 
and needy, in a state, which is unknown to other mammalian life.109 Human infants have 
cognitive powers that do not rely on speech or motion. Nussbaum points us out to Bloom’s 
research, which shows that babies are able to smell and identify their own mother’s milk 
from the milk of another mother within the first two weeks of their life; they also learn 
rapidly to separate themselves from others and are good ‘mind readers.’ The shape of 
human infancy is unique – “human infants are both highly intelligent and helpless, a 
combination that shapes emotional development, not always for the good.”110 
To describe the possible challenges to the infant’s development Nussbaum turns once 
again to the works of Daniel Stern. The infant experiences itself as a concentrated center of 
experiences coming from the outside world, be it positive or negative.111 “We are 
reminded,” Nussbaum states, “of how completely solipsistic the infant’s world originally 
is. All experiences radiate from its own internal states, and although the infant is not yet 
able to demarcate itself from the surrounding environment in a secure way, its awareness is 
entirely of itself, and of external agencies only insofar as they lock, magnetlike, onto itself 
																																																								
105 Ibid., 156. 
106 Ibid., 156. Here Nussbaum is quoting Paul Bloom, “The Moral Life of Babies,” New York Times 
Magazine, 2010, May 5. 
107 Cf. Nussbaum, Political Emotions, 156. Here Nussbaum is utilizing C. Daniel Batson’s, Altruism in 
Humans (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 195. 
108 Nussbaum, Political Emotions, 156. 
109 Cf. Ibid., 169. 
110 Ibid., 169. 
111 Cf. Ibid., 169.  
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and cause an alteration in its own states.”112 Gradually, the infant learns that his/her 
experiences of hunger and distress are elevated by external agencies, and for quite some 
time these agencies are seen as separated parts (breasts, arms) not belonging to whole 
people. “So, the solipsism of infancy colors its first relations to objects: other people figure 
in the infant’s perceptions and emotions as pieces of the world that help (by feeding and 
holding) or hinder (by not being there immediately or for long enough.”113 Nussbaum is 
convinced that these first experiences shape our emotional life and relation to the world in 
ways we rarely think of. The infant’s experience, Nussbaum considers, can be very 
beautifully described in Sigmund Freud’s image – “His Majesty the Baby.”114 Babies 
expect to be the center of the world, but they are in a helpless situation, where there is no 
way to promote their wishes: “From this situation develops a host of intense emotions: fear 
of abandonment and hunger; joy at the restoration of the world; anger when the needed 
food and comfort do not arrive when wished; and, gradually, shame at the dissonance 
between expectation and reality. I am the monarch, and yet here I am alone, hungry, and 
wet.”115 
Here in this intersection of narcissism and helplessness Nussbaum sees the start of 
radical evil. This tendency does not appear out of nothing, but is hosted by the context of 
human development. It gets its start in a form of a need to subordinate others to one’s own 
needs.116 At this point Nussbaum can meaningfully plug in to yet another concept in the 
account of problems of emotional and ethical development, namely, anthropodenial. 
Anthropodenial could be described as “the tendency of humans to refuse to acknowledge 
their animality and their kinship with other animals.”117 This tendency for Nussbaum 
causes the split between the life of rationality and soul and the life of the body (with all its 
realities such as sweat, urine, feces, sexual fluids), the latter is proclaimed to be non-
existent in a lot of our philosophical thought. This is uniquely human. Nussbaum adds, “no 
nonhuman animal denies that it is an animal, hates being an animal, shrinks from others of 
its kind because they are animals. None aspires to be an angel, above its body and its 
smells and fluids.”118 At this point Nussbaum situates anthropodenial in her story of early 
human development. She points out that “what is really resented and denied is not 
humanity tout court, it is the helplessness that we feel, on account of bodies that are 
vulnerable and often powerless.”119 
This primitive narcissism not only causes a lot of problems, it is also hard to 
overcome. “It is obvious,” Nussbaum states, “that narcissism of this type goes on 
exercising a pernicious influence in most human lives, as people focus greedily on their 
own security and satisfaction, neglecting the claims of others, or even seeking to convert 
them into a slave class who can be relied on to promote security.”120  
 																																																								
112 Ibid., 171. 
113 Ibid., 171. 
114 Ibid., 171. 
115 Ibid., 172. 
116 Cf. Ibid., 172. 
117 Ibid., 159. 
118 Ibid., 159. 
119 Ibid., 172. 
120 Ibid., 172. 
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3.2.2 Animal Heritage: Positive Contributions to Morality 
 
We have seen the possible shortcomings of human emotional equipment. It is remarkably 
similar to other non-human animals and animal emotions. Human compassion, just as 
animal, Nussbaum states, “is narrow in extent, relatively rigid, typically hostile to 
strangers, incapable of connecting to the distant through the imagination.”121 Human 
infants, however “from a very early age, prior to social learning, are well equipped to go 
further in these respects.”122 Nussbaum bases her argument once again on the research of 
Bloom, who suggests that babies experience the emotion of compassion.123 By the age of 
two, toddlers show the signs of guilt after harming someone and in experiment with 
puppets, babies overwhelmingly chose the ones that display helpful and not egoistic 
behavior.124 The traces of empathy, compassion, the grasping of guilt are all aspects of 
“human equipment prior to social shaping”125 and this gives the moral theorist resources to 
work on and try to build on what is already there. 
Looking back at the infant’s developmental story told by Stern we can encounter the 
seeds of this positive make-up that can grow into good ethical conduct if we build on it. 
We remember that Stern had described the infant’s world as solipsistic, sure only of his/her 
own existence and experiences. Stern, however, shows the infant’s appreciation of light, 
which prepares a way to positive and ethical value-laden emotions such as love: 
 
Infants love light, and in calm moods they stare at whatever most attracts their attention. From 
the beginning, the world is somehow lovable and interesting, not simply an agent of pain relief. 
There is a self-directed tendency toward relief – security and freedom from distress – but there 
is also an outward-pulling tendency to investigate, a kind of incipient wonder, which prepares 
the way for love.126 
 
This love of light can be one of the triggers in helping to overcome the fantasy of 
completeness caused by early experiences of helplessness, in other words, it can help one 
to overcome primitive narcissism. The perception of the world as lovable is crucial: “It is 
this outward erotic movement toward the world and its alluring objects – which we can 
already call wonder, and which we can call love in at least a nascent sense – that proves 
crucial in propelling infants beyond the frozen state of narcissism.”127 
 																																																								
121 Ibid., 155. Nussbaum extensively utilizes works of F. B. M. De Waal to discuss morality of animals. For 
this question see F. B. M. De Waal Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other 
Animals (Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press, 1996) and Primates and Philosophers: How Morality 
Evolved (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
122 Nussbaum, Political Emotions, 155. In this respect Nussbaum utilizes Paul Bloom’s Descartes’ Baby: 
How the Science of Child Development Explains What Makes Us Human (New York: Basic Books, 2004). 
123 Cf. Human infants at an early age show emotional contagion, connected to their ability for mimicry. They 
also learn to distinguish their own pain and the pain of the other very quickly – they cry more in response to 
recordings of other babies’ cries than other noises and the recordings of their own cries. Here Nussbaum 
utilizes the argument found in Bloom’s Descartes’ Baby. 
124 Cf. Nussbaum, Political Emotions, 156. Here Nussbaum utilizes the study exhibited in the first chapter of 
Bloom’s Descartes’ Baby. 
125 Nussbaum, Political Emotions, 156. 
126 Ibid., 171. 
127 Ibid.,173-174. 
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3.2.3 Concluding Remarks 
 
So far we have touched upon very important aspects of Nussbaum’s moral psychology and 
the role it should play in ethics. We have discovered her definition of compassion, which is 
taken from Aristotle and is highly influenced by the values found in the tragic Greek 
dramas. Later in the discussion we situated compassion in the context of human 
psychological equipment. In this regard Nussbaum utilizes contemporary research on 
children development and tries to show that compassion does not appear out of nothing, 
but has its roots in our developmental history and the channeling of this emotion is highly 
influenced by our early experiences. Nussbaum, moreover, analyzes the negative and 
positive human propensities and how they can shape our moral lives. She has suggested 
her proposition of the roots of evil human behavior – which she understands similar to 
Kant, as existing before any particular social shaping, but being elicited by the human 
condition itself. Nussbaum situates evil in the early stages of human development and sees 
it as narcissism, which is born out of the negative dynamics between human bodily 
weakness and high cognitive abilities and which, if not outgrown, can become the will to 
subordinate others to one’s own will. Nussbaum is convinced that we have to address the 
reality of evil seriously to be able to talk about the good effectively. She, however, also 
takes good human propensities seriously and basing her thoughts upon the research on the 
behavior and development of young infants concludes that we can discover a 
predisposition to embrace the world as lovable. This love of light we will see later on holds 
something very important for our moral development. Now as we have established the 
basic understanding of compassion and situated it in human developmental history we can 
address the question of moral education. 
 
4. EDUCATION OF COMPASSION 
 
Even if we are convinced that compassion offers truthful insights on the nature of 
personhood and sheds some light on what adequate ethical behavior should look like, we 
are still to address a very fundamental question of moral education. We have seen that 
Nussbaum treats compassion as a natural proclivity of human psychology, which then is 
formed and is influenced by the particular context and culture of the person. Nussbaum is 
convinced that compassion reveals something essential about us and about how things 
should be. Yet this is not sufficient for good and sustainable ethical behavior. The thoughts 
that make up compassion need a proper education in order to grow and direct us at a moral 
good. Compassion is a complex moral emotion, which needs sustainable ethical guidance 
to contribute meaningfully to our moral growth. Nussbaum states that: “The problem is 
that each of its [compassion’s] judgments need to be equipped with a correct ethical 
theory. The judgment of seriousness needs a correct account of the value of external goods; 
the judgment of nondesert needs a correct theory of social responsibility; the eudaimonistic 
judgment needs a correct theory of proper concern.”128  
Yet before we address education of the three judgments of compassion, we consider 
that it is important to note that Nussbaum does not consider moral education only a private 																																																								
128 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 386. 
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matter. We will be right to say that family is a first school of moral values, yet Nussbaum, 
being a political philosopher, advocates that moral emotions would be promoted at the 
governmental level in the context of liberal democracy.129 Thus the moral growth of 
compassion is not left aside as only a private matter, but, according to Nussbaum, the 
promotion of compassionate imagination should be institutionalized. That means that this 
kind of compassionate imagination ideally should inhabit our institutions and by this form 
morally responsible citizens. 
Nussbaum is well aware that emotions are a messy material to deal with, but she is 
convinced that a good political regime needs a ‘reasonable political psychology,’ which 
could address deepest human motivation.130 This reasonable political psychology should 
stand on two pillars: compassionate individuals and institutions which would embody 
compassionate insights. Nussbaum asserts that we could describe this dynamic as a two-
way street: compassionate individuals craft institutions which embody their imagination, 
institutions in their turn can influence the development of compassion in individuals.131 
The compassionate imagination can live in institutions in concrete ways such as: “In the 
creation of a tax code and a welfare system, in the creation of levels of offense and 
punishment in the criminal law, in democratic deliberation about human inequality at many 
different levels – and, finally, in reflection about the duties of rich nations toward poorer 
nations, in promoting both political and economic well-being.”132 
Having the understanding of the political scope of her thoughts on moral education 
we can proceed to the presentation of the education of the cognitive content of compassion. 
 
4.1 EDUCATION OF THE JUDGMENT OF SERIOUSNESS: WHAT THINGS WE SHOULD REALLY 
VALUE? 
 
Nussbaum claims that the judgment of seriousness is informed and educated by a good 
theory of external goods. In the general introduction of her theory of emotions we have 
encountered her account of the basic goods she worked out together with Amartya Sen 
(their working paths separated later on and Nussbaum highlights that she started to think of 																																																								
129 Throughout her works Nussbaum advocates liberal democracy as the most adequate form of societal 
arrangement. In Upheavals of Thought she defines it as “a political conception that attempts to win an 
overlapping consensus among citizens of many different kinds, respecting the spaces within which they each 
elaborate and pursue their different reasonable conceptions of good,” 401. In her formulation of liberal 
democracy she is highly influenced and builds up on the ideas of John Rawls. For comparison see John 
Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Colombia University Press, 1996). Nussbaum’s own conception of 
political liberalism is laid-out in detail in Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The 
Capabilities Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) and Creating Capabilities: The 
Human Developmental Approach (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2011). Both books are very similar in its content and structure, the first one 
representing an earlier version written in a context of universal feminism. These books contain arguments 
presenting and defending the capabilities approach, while Upheavals of Thought and Political Emotions are 
works presenting the moral psychology behind the capabilities perspective.  
130 This idea is inspired by Rawls’ writings: “The principles of moral psychology have a place for a 
conception of justice…Thus some view of justice enters into the explanation of the corresponding sentiment; 
hypotheses about this psychological process incorporate moral notions even if these are understood only as 
part of the psychological theory.” See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1971), 491. 
131 Cf. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 405. 
132 Ibid., 403. 
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the capability approach independently of Sen and prior to their encounter, inspired by 
Aristotle’s ideas of functioning and Karl Marx’s later appropriation of them).133 The 
capabilities approach, we believe, might be called not only an alternative paradigm of 
understanding of the good in economics, but also an attempt to create an alternative 
narration of reality and by this way prompt a change not only in our understanding of a 
good emotional, social, economic, political functioning, but also promote an action to 
achieve it.134  
The capability approach, then, is a philosophical attempt to reflect upon and 
systematize prevailing intuitions of the meaning of human life. “The core idea is,” 
Nussbaum states, “that of the human being as a dignified free being who shapes his or her 
own life in cooperation and reciprocity with others, rather than being passively shaped or 
pushed around by the world in the manner of a ‘flock’ or ‘herd’ animal. A life that is really 
human is one that is shaped throughout by these human powers of practical reason and 
sociability.”135 That is the underlying intuition behind the capabilities approach – in this 
way the citizens and the question of the good are approached. The question that is guiding 
this approach to well-being is very striking; it actually inquires what a particular person is 
able to do and to be.136 Furthermore, Nussbaum is convinced that the intuition about the 
worth of the human being crosses the boundaries of cultures and we can find it 
encapsulated in various religious and some secular traditions. “We see the person as having 
activity, goals, and projects,” Nussbaum opines, “as somehow awe-inspiringly above the 
mechanical workings of nature, and yet in need of support for the fulfillment of many 
central projects.”137 This approach makes a person “a bearer of value, and an end.”138 
 
4.1.1 The Central Human Capabilities 
 
The basic capabilities list we should note slightly differs according to the particular context 
in which it is presented. That means it is adjusted to the needs and specific problems of the 
particular nation. In the Upheavals of Thought we are provided with the following list: 1) 
Life; 2) Bodily health; 3) Bodily integrity; 4) Senses, Imagination, and Thought; 5) 
Emotions; 6) Practical Reason; 7) Affiliation; 8) Other Species; 9) Play; 10) Control over 
One’s Environment.139 Now we should emphasize that numerical order of this list is 																																																								
133 Cf. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, 70. 
134 Nussbaum asserts that she conceives the capability approach slightly differently from Sen. Sen primarily 
sees capability as a space of comparison of the quality of life; Nussbaum agrees with this approach, but sees 
it as a weaker use of the approach, primarily being a philosophical foundation of the constitutional principles 
establishing a social minimum or threshold. To put it in her own words: “I agree wholeheartedly with Sen’s 
claims about the capability space, and with the arguments he has used to support them, many of which will 
be replicated here. But my goal in this book is to go beyond the merely comparative use of the capability 
space to articulate an account of how capabilities, together with the idea of a threshold level of capabilities, 
can provide a basis for central constitutional principles that citizens have a right to demand from their 
governments.” Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, 12. 
135 Ibid., 70. 
136 Cf. Ibid., 71. 
137 Ibid., 73. 
138 Ibid., 73.  
139 Cf. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 416-418. It is important to highlight that this list is proposed in a 
political-liberal spirit and is “a list that can be endorsed for political purposes, as the moral basis of central 
constitutional guarantees, by people who otherwise have very different views of what a complete good life 
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relative and is necessary just to arrange the argument systematically; all the elements are of 
equal importance for a good human functioning.  
The list of capabilities very closely resembles the Sophoclean and Aristotelian lists 
of tragic predicaments,140 which should not surprise us because tragic authors and Aristotle 
play a fundamental role in Nussbaum’s thought. She sees this list not as a tool of complete 
education of compassion’s judgment of seriousness, but as a good way to inform it. This 
list, if embedded in public institutions, can speak to people in two ways. Firstly, “the list 
shapes the judgment in a particular way: for what it tells citizens is not only that certain 
calamities are particularly grave, but also that they are unjust, wrong.”141 On the other 
hand, if we see that a certain item is not on the list, we are informed that it might not be 
central. 
Nussbaum holds that the capability approach can form our moral judgments and 
compassion in a serious way because it is an outcome of the compassionate imagination. 
We believe that in this particular aspect of her ethics we can encounter the meeting of the 
two-way street Nussbaum mentions – a compassionate imagination forming concepts and 
institutions, and these in turn forming rational compassion.  
Each component of the list is separate (so having one, will not compensate for losing 
the other), yet they are related to each other in multiple complex ways.142 We have seen 
already that the capability approach starts with an intuition that human being is valuable 
and certain abilities of his/hers bring out a moral claim. This moral claim, however, “must 
be understood as a freestanding moral idea, not one that relies on a particular meta-
physical or teleological view.”143 Nussbaum is convinced that the human abilities that were 
put to the capabilities list are evaluated from the ethical viewpoint solely and “thus the 
argument begins from ethical premises and derives ethical conclusions from these alone, 
not from any further metaphysical premises.”144 
 
4.1.1.1 What Are the Capabilities? 
 
Nussbaum tries to convince her reader that capabilities are the spaces of a possible basic 
human functioning, which stem from the intuitive recognitions of human value and which 
can be found across cultures. The basic capabilities are not tied to any metaphysical 
viewpoint and they can be discerned based only on ethical evaluation. 
There are three types of capabilities at stake in Nussbaum’s analysis. First of all basic 
capabilities, those simply could be named as an innate human equipment necessary for the 																																																																																																																																																																							
for a human being would be.” Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, 74. Yet the list “of the central 
capabilities is not a complete theory of justice. Such a list gives us the basis for determining a decent social 
minimum in a variety of areas.” Nussbaum Women and Human Development, 75. 
140 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 418. 
141 Ibid., 418. 
142 Cf. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, 81. Nussbaum asserts that “one of the most effective 
ways of promoting women’s control over their environment, and their effective right of political 
participation, is to promote women’s literacy. Women who can seek employment outside the home have exit 
options that help them protect their bodily integrity from assaults within it. Reproductive health is related in 
many complex ways to practical reason and bodily integrity. This gives us still more reason to avoid 
promoting one at the expense of the others.” Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, 81. 
143 Ibid., 83. 
144 Ibid., 83. 
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more sophisticated capabilities. Nussbaum gives the following example to explain it: “A 
newborn child has, in this sense, the capability for speech and language, the capability for 
love and gratitude, the capability for practical reason, the capacity for work.”145 
Secondly, there are internal capabilities and those could be described as “mature 
states of readiness.”146 Sometimes this readiness is reached simply by time and bodily 
maturity (think of sexual functioning), but in most cases “internal capabilities develop only 
with support from the surrounding environment, as when one learns to play with others, to 
love, to exercise political choice. But at a certain point they are there, and the person can 
use them.”147 
Finally there are combined capabilities, “which may be defined as internal 
capabilities combined with suitable external conditions for the exercise of the function.”148 
Nussbaum explains this type of capabilities with the following example: “A woman who is 
not mutilated but who has been widowed as a child and is forbidden to have another 
marriage has the internal but not the combined capability for sexual expression (and, in 
most such cases, for employment, and political participation).”149 The list of basic 
capabilities, then, speaks of combined capabilities. 
 
4.1.1.2 Functioning and Capability 
 
An important aspect to discuss is the relation between functioning and capability. 
Nussbaum speaks of both, but ultimately chooses capability language. Why does she 
choose this path?  
Nussbaum is convinced that “where adult citizens are concerned, capability, not 
functioning, is the appropriate political goal.”150 For a fully human life we need 
functioning, yet to keep faithful to the liberal democracy ideals, Nussbaum chooses to 
speak of capabilities as a political framework. We believe that the core idea is captured in 
the following quotation:  
 
The reason for proceeding in this way is, quite simply, the respect we have for people and their 
choices. Even when we feel confident that we know what a flourishing life is, and that a 
particular function plays an important role in it, we do not respect people when we dragoon 
them into this functioning. We set the stage and, as fellow citizens, present whatever arguments 
we have in favor of a given choice; then the choice is up to them.151 
 
Nussbaum is thus speaking of deliberating on the good which leads to a flourishing 
human life, demarcating the areas where it lies, creating the space for that flourishing, but 
never pressuring people to engage into action to achieve it. Nussbaum asserts that in this 
way we can guarantee a fundamental respect for freedom and human choices (and she 
makes it clear that one can choose a workaholic lifestyle and not respect play, but this is 
entirely different from someone forced to undermine play due to a lack of working day 																																																								
145 Ibid., 84. 
146 Ibid., 84. 
147 Ibid., 84. 
148 Ibid., 84-85. 
149 Ibid., 85. 
150 Ibid., 87. 
151 Ibid., 88. 
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hour regulations).152  
This should not confuse us – good functioning is always an ultimate goal and hope 
for societies, yet for political reasons Nussbaum chooses the capabilities language as an 
adequate way to proceed. In this regard Nussbaum additionally offers a subsidiary 
argument pointing out that if people are pressured into making certain choices and do not 
have freedom of choice anymore, their actions lose their worth and they even may 
represent different functioning (in this case she adds: “functioning of the type this person 
wants will not arrive at all, if it is made the direct political goal in a way that does not 
allow latitude for choice”153). “Play is not play,” Nussbaum stresses, “if it is enforced, love 
is not love if it is commanded.”154 
We think that her choice to utilize capability language represents the guiding light of 
the capabilities approach and her entire ethical project – Nussbaum suggests a universal 
ethical system, taking a stand on what the good is, yet she takes respect for freedom of 
choice seriously (and in this case internal sensitivities and personal differences), and 
attempts to avoid a paternalistic approach. 
 
4.1.1.3 Capabilities Approach and the Relevance of Emotions 
 
We believe that our short introduction to the capabilities approach can help to set a larger 
framework of Nussbaum’s thought on compassion. The capability approach informs 
compassion and other emotions but is also conceived according to the emotive knowledge 
and values they disclose. A closer look at her conception of the capabilities approach can 
help us to grasp the strong link Nussbaum makes between moral psychology and political 
philosophy and her constant emphasis of the importance of institutional embeddedness of 
morally relevant emotions.  
As we have seen Nussbaum conceives of the capabilities approach as a philosophical 
systematization of the cross-cultural intuitions of what it means to be human and what 
human life is worth. She asserts that her method resembles Rawlsian reflective equilibrium 
– where “we lay out the arguments for a given theoretical position, holding it up against 
the ‘fixed points’ in our moral intuitions, and seeing how those intuitions both test and are 
tested by the conceptions we examine, hoping, over time, to achieve consistency and fit in 
our judgments taken as a whole.”155 We also have seen that Nussbaum chose to talk about 
the human good in capability, not the actual functioning language – this is disclosing of her 
anthropological picture with strong accents put on human freedom and choice. And yet 
even though the capability approach tries to create spaces where humans could live a good 
life without pushing other citizens into any particular action, it still defines what human 
good might be. In this way Nussbaum is convinced that she suggests a middle ground 
between subjective welfarism and Platonism – two positions on how preference can figure 
in social choice.156 The first position holds that “that all existing preferences are on a par 																																																								
152 Cf. Ibid., 87. 
153 Ibid., 88. 
154 Ibid., 88. 
155 Ibid., 175. Nussbaum uses the notion of reflective equilibrium taken from Rawls, Political Liberalism, 
384 n.16. 
156 Cf. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, 116-117. 
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for political purposes, and that social choice should be based on some sort of aggregation 
of all of them.”157 Platonism meanwhile states, “that people desire or prefer something is 
basically not relevant, given our knowledge of how unreliable desires and preferences are 
as a guide to what is really just and good.”158 This position is preoccupied with providing 
arguments for the objective value of a certain agenda and holds that actual desire and 
choice of particular individuals do not play any role in justifying what is good in political 
terms. Both positions hold real concerns,159 but both are found insufficient by Nussbaum. 
Nussbaum’s own ambition is to maintain respect for human desire and choice, but at the 
same time take a stance at defining where good might lie. Her approach to capabilities, 
moreover, wants to avoid paternalism, but without suggesting a relativist point of view. To 
put it in her own words: “I shall argue that desire continues to play both a heuristic role in 
arriving at the list of the central capabilities and a limited ancillary role in their 
justification; nonetheless, it is fruitful to begin from a substantive account of central goods 
rather than to attempt to derive them from a strictly procedural approach.”160 This means 
that Nussbaum holds that the capability language is able to define the areas of possible 
good human functioning. This is done with attention to people’s preferences, but ultimately 
those preferences are shaped by the material conditions people are in. Thus one needs to 
take a critical and careful look not only at what people desire, but also at how people come 
to want what they want. Nussbaum hence has an intuition that where the basic human 
capabilities are respected and promoted to functioning, people are able to have better-
informed desires and eventually make better choices. 
It should not surprise us that Nussbaum holds practical reason and affiliation 
capabilities central to the capability approach. To put it in her own words: “I have said that 
practical reason and affiliation are central to the entire project: they suffuse all the other 
capabilities, making them fully human.”161 Let us take a closer look at the content of these 
two capabilities. We will also add the capability of emotional functioning which has a 
direct link to the two others: 
 
5. Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves; to love 
those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to grieve, to 
experience longing, gratitude, and justified anger. Not having one’s emotional development 
blighted by overwhelming fear and anxiety, or by traumatic events of abuse or neglect. 
(Supporting this capability means supporting forms of human association that can be shown to 
be crucial in their development.)  
6. Practical Reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical 
reflection about the planning of one’s life. (This entails protection for the liberty of 
conscience.)  																																																								
157 Ibid., 117. 
158 Ibid., 117. 
159 Nussbaum describes the legitimate concerns of both positions in the following way: “Both positions are 
motivated by genuinely important concerns. Welfarism springs from respect for people and their actual 
choices, from a reluctance to impose something alien upon them, or even to treat the desires of different 
people unequally. In effect, it starts from respect for persons, interpreting that as equivalent to respect for 
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that in the real world these values are frequently subordinated to power, greed, and selfish indulgence.” 
Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, 117. 
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7. Affiliation. A. Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show concern for 
other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be able to imagine the 
situation of another and to have compassion for that situation; to have the capability for both 
justice and friendship. (Protecting this capability means protecting institutions that constitute 
and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting the freedom of assembly and political 
speech.) 
B. Having the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation; being able to be treated as a 
dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others. This entails, at a minimum, protections 
against discrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, caste, ethnicity, or 
national origin. In work, being able to work as a human being, exercising practical reason and 
entering into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with other workers.162  
 
Practical reasoning, a very Aristotelian notion, in pursuing ethical life stems from her 
views on the nature of humanity – Nussbaum believes in human agency and she speaks of 
a self-defining agent who can give meaning and goal to his/her life. We should note that 
she tries to pursue this optimistic goal in a realistic way – in her project Nussbaum 
attempts to show interest and sensitivity for human evolutionary origins and its influence 
of human psychology (we have encountered this point earlier). She is also taking very 
seriously the particular cultural and material circumstances of a person – those are essential 
to be able to exercise human agency and freedom of choice and self-definition. Nussbaum 
sees these notions as real characteristics of a human being, but she does not perceive them 
as indestructible. Earlier we have encountered her views on dignity and human agency – 
her fierce conviction that human tragedies can strike to the core of agency, impeding this 
capacity in humans or even destroying it. In her capabilities approach justification, we can 
encounter further arguments defending this view. This approach was coined to reflect on 
the political situations of nations and suggest some constitutional guidelines in order to 
create spaces where individuals could practice their ability to define meaning in their lives 
and use practical reasoning to achieve this. Thus, we could say that Nussbaum’s ethical 
project can be conceived as an exercise in practical wisdom and is aimed at advocating a 
society where it could be exercised.  
A second capability central to the whole project is the capability for affiliation. A 
part of Nussbaum’s layout of the content of this capability speaks of creating a space 
where one could live ‘with and toward others.’ This goal for Nussbaum is achievable 
through being able to imagine the situation of the other and be compassionate towards that 
person. This capability, Nussbaum furthers, is being protected by protecting the institutions 
which promote it. Our reflection on Nussbaum’s conception of compassion and the need to 
institutionalize and sustain it thus, can help us to grasp the content of the affiliation 
capability better. In this way we also learn why compassion can be considered central to 
her political philosophy. 
The B part of this capability speaks of equal dignity of all individuals disregarding 
any social barriers. This capability speaks of a dignified agent who can practice practical 
reason (define his/her course of life) and be able to enter a workspace as a worthy peer. 
Another capability central to our own project is the capability for emotional 
functioning. This capability has a direct link to the capability for practical reasoning – we 
have discovered earlier that for Nussbaum, adequate ethical deliberation always takes into 																																																								
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account the knowledge that is disclosed by emotions. We can also see that the capability 
for emotions is supported by supporting the forms of human affiliation which are essential 
for human development. In this way it has a connection to the capacity for affiliation – the 
capacity which is strongly supported by protecting the emotion of compassion. Nussbaum, 
generally speaking, prefers and utilizes the capability language – but in the case of 
capability for emotions we can encounter her stating that the lack of actual functioning 
might be indicative of the fact that the capability was surrendered. “Emotional health is an 
area,” Nussbaum declares, “in which we can usually make such inferences from absence of 
functioning to absence of capability: if a person always shows suspicion and fear of other 
people, we usually infer damage to the capacity for love, rather than saying that this 
person, though able to love, has made a choice not to.”163 The absence of emotional 
experience and responses then might be indicative of a lack of the capability itself. 
Furthermore, the capability itself speaks of being able to develop attachments where we 
can experience love, care, grief, and justified anger. We will also discover later on that 
love for Nussbaum is fundamentally an animating emotion, making trusting other people 
and life itself possible. This loving-trusting attitude liberates one from dangerous self-love 
and enables one to have meaningful relationships with others where one does not feel the 
need to control the other, but enjoys the dynamics of ‘subtle interplay.’ We will discuss 
this topic later on in this chapter. 
 
4.1.1.4 The Case of Anger 
 
The other element of this capability is a chance to experience ‘justified anger.’ We will 
take a closer look at this emotion together with Thomas Aquinas – anger, especially in a 
form of indignation, might be an interesting emotion to think of in a context of ethics. Let 
us nevertheless use the occasion to introduce in a small excursus what Nussbaum has to 
say about this emotion. Women and Human Development does not offer an elaborate 
account of Nussbaum’s views on anger.  
If we turn to the Upheavals of Thought we can discover that here also Nussbaum 
does not engage in an elaborated discussion about the nature of anger. In several instances, 
however, Nussbaum addresses this emotion and we can interpret her views on it. In section 
VI, Revenge and Mercy of chapter 7 Compassion: The Philosophical Debate she briefly 
addresses the question of the relationship between compassion and retributive justice in the 
context of the Stoic thought. The worry of a friend of compassion in this regard is the 
acknowledgment “that the very view of the world that makes a conceptual space for 
compassion includes, by definition, strong attachments to external objects and therefore 
leaves a conceptual space for revenge.”164 Revenge has a close link with retributive justice 
as an action inspired by this emotion. A Stoic in the face of anger and revenge would 
recommend the answer we know already, the extirpation of the passions. Anger is too 
ambivalent and dangerous, and once we adjust our concerns we will see that nothing is 
really worthy of our intense anger. Nussbaum’s own answer to this kind of Stoic is the 
following: 																																																								
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In short, we should simply deny that the excess of anger gives us reason to remove it. We 
should boldly tell the Stoics that anger is sometimes justified and right. It is an appropriate 
response to injustice and serious wrongdoing. Indeed, extirpating anger would extirpate a 
major force for social justice and the defense of the oppressed. If we are worried that anger 
may spill over onto inappropriate objects, we should focus on that problem, not try to remove 
anger completely. And if we are worried that angry individuals may inappropriately turn to 
personal revenge, rather than accepting legal solutions, once again, we should focus on that 
problem, rather than trying to extirpate anger altogether.165 
 
Nussbaum seems to justify anger as a motive for social justice and in that sense it can 
be seen as a legitimate emotion (though anger is always ambivalent and dangerous). In the 
contexts of situations where we experience injustice that is willingly inflicted upon us the 
emotion of anger is justifiable. This seems to be a context of the capability for emotions 
and the notion of ‘justified anger’ encountered there. 
In the context of the law, the energy of anger does not need to be connected with 
desire for personal revenge; the interest of punishing the offender can be channeled 
through the legal system. Nussbaum reminds us of an image of the Furies from the 
Aeschylus’ Oresteia.166 The Furies are not banished from the city; they are civilized and 
made a part of Athena’s legal system. “[T]hey cease to snarl, to crouch life dogs, to sniff 
for blood[,]” Nussbaum writes, “[b]ut they do not cease to demand punishments for crime: 
and that sense to place them at the heart of the judicial institutions of the city is to 
announce that these dark forces cannot be cut off from the rest of human life without 
impoverishing it.”167For Nussbaum these dark and ambivalent forces are also forms of 
acknowledgment of the importance of the goods that crime is threatening to damage. And 
in that sense Nussbaum sees a connection between anger and compassion – compassion 
also understands the size of the goods we greatly value and thus subsequently it grasps the 
size of victims’ suffering. Thus anger and compassion both demand “of the legal system 
some appropriate acknowledgment of the meaning of that suffering, and of the fact that it 
was unjustly inflicted.”168 
Compassion is, not surprisingly, the best guide in these situations for Nussbaum. If in 
our ethical reasoning we create a conceptual space for deep attachments and thus for 
emotions as anger and revengefulness that are not that welcomed as love and compassion, 
we should focus on the growth of the latter. “What we should focus on, instead,” 
Nussbaum argues, “is how to channel emotional development in the direction of a more 
mature and inclusive and less ambivalent type of love. Compassion itself, by extending the 
agent’s concern to people with whom she is not in a relation of painful dependence, makes 
a powerful contribution toward that development.”169 Compassion thus deals with 
questions of justice in a more constructive way by acknowledging the worth and meaning 
of the goods we value and the significance of suffering, but without the dangerous 																																																								
165 Ibid, 394. 
166 Oresteia dates to the 5th BC and refers to a trilogy of the Greek tragedies. The main theme of it is the shift 
from taking personal revenge to the legal system. Furies in Greek mythology are chthonic deities of 
vengeance. 
167 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 396. 
168 Ibid., 397. 
169 Ibid., 395. 
		 115	
ambivalence that anger holds. Nussbaum believes that compassion is a good teacher and 
she claims “when we move the outer circles closer to the self, as an education in proper 
compassion urges, our inclination to favor projects of revenge toward these distant people, 
should we even have such projects, will be likely to diminish.”170 And so she concludes: 
“Thus if we are justifiably angry with them [the wrongdoers], as we frequently will be, we 
will have reasons to handle the dispute without destruction.”171 
In Political Emotions Nussbaum utilizes examples of great political leaders in her 
judgment, namely, Abraham Lincoln, Martin Luther King Jr., Mahatma Gandhi, and 
Jawaharlai Nehru because of their capacity to touch the hearts of citizens by cultivating 
strong emotions aimed at the common work of building societies aspiring for justice. The 
question of anger comes to the fore in her example of Martin Luther King, Jr. She claims 
that the famous “I have a Dream” speech172 is a formative document of American 
education.173 The speech is built on the ideas of freedom, dignity, inclusion and 
nonviolence. The range of emotions cultivated in this speech is very telling: King inspired 
in his listeners a justified anger caused by racism, but at the same time pleaded that 
violence is never an answer.174 What Nussbaum wants to show is that King “by cultivating 
hope and trust, along with legitimate anger and insistent criticism…defuses the urge to 
violence.”175 Nussbaum’s concept of legitimate anger, thus, seems to be an emotion 
instigated by a serious form of injustice. Yet anger is acceptable when it has a link with 
positive emotions, as in this case with hope and trust, which soothe a violent urge and 
inspire to build rather than to destroy. The acknowledgment that ‘we cannot walk alone’ in 
the speech for Nussbaum is also very central in breaking through the situations of injustice. 
Anger is discerning in Nussbaum’s thought, as we can find her claiming: “In general, 
for a subordinated group, recognizing reasons for anger and blame can be an important part 
of asserting one’s equal dignity.”176 Thus while getting angry while experiencing injustice 
and oppression we can discover who we are and what we are truly worthy of. Yet, anger in 
itself is always an ambiguous emotion that needs to be shaped by love. Anger in 
Nussbaum’s thought also has a strong connection with radical evil and its outcome 																																																								
170 Ibid., 395. 
171 Ibid., 395. 
172 One can listen to the speech and find it transcribed at 
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/mlkihaveadream.htm  
173 Cf. Nussbaum, Political Emotions, 235. 
174 A very telling part of the speech in this instance is the following: “It would be fatal for the nation to 
overlook the urgency of the moment. This sweltering summer of the Negro's legitimate discontent will not 
pass until there is an invigorating autumn of freedom and equality. Nineteen sixty-three is not an end, but a 
beginning. And those who hope that the Negro needed to blow off steam and will now be content will have a 
rude awakening if the nation returns to business as usual. And there will be neither rest nor tranquility in 
America until the Negro is granted his citizenship rights. The whirlwinds of revolt will continue to shake the 
foundations of our nation until the bright day of justice emerges. But there is something that I must say to my 
people, who stand on the warm threshold which leads into the palace of justice: In the process of gaining our 
rightful place, we must not be guilty of wrongful deeds. Let us not seek to satisfy our thirst for freedom by 
drinking from the cup of bitterness and hatred. We must forever conduct our struggle on the high plane of 
dignity and discipline. We must not allow our creative protest to degenerate into physical violence. Again 
and again, we must rise to the majestic heights of meeting physical force with soul force.” The transcription 
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primitive narcissism.177 Anger at our own helplessness stemming from the condition of our 
infant stage of development is not removed by time. It persists and Nussbaum argues that 
love and the spirit of play are the key components in taming and educating it.178  
Nussbaum has been thinking further about the question of anger and in May-June, 
2014 she gave the series of lectures entitled Anger and Forgiveness in the prestigious John 
Locke Lectures series at Oxford University. The manuscript of these lectures is going to be 
published as the same entitled book in Autumn, 2015. A speech entitled What is Anger, 
and Why Should We Care? was given as a preparation for the John Locke Lectures and is 
posted on the University of Chicago webpage. From some comments also made available 
on the webpage we can concur that Nussbaum developed rather critical views on anger as 
an emotion often associated with justice and it seems she would now allow only a 
transitional form of anger.179 
Nussbaum acknowledges that anger becomes an increasingly popular theme in 
philosophy and that many people see the struggle against injustice as impossible without 
anger. This idea, however, for her is “fatally flawed” together with the “nonsensical” idea 
of retributive justice. Nussbaum’s concern is pragmatic and her perspective is looking 
forward, thus “a responsible leader has to be a pragmatist, and anger is incompatible with 
forward-looking pragmatism. It just gets in the way.”180 Nussbaum argues that we ought to 
separate deed from the doer (a thought familiar to theologians from Catholic moral 
teaching181). The idea of the payback is useless because the pain inflicted on the wrongdoer 
does not bring what was lost back. Furthermore, while in the presence of wrongful acts we 
should focus not exclusively on punishment, but on the question of how to better the social 
welfare and the system of justice and education because those areas are critical in creating 
just societies. Nussbaum once again refers to the lives and work of Mahatma Gandhi, 
Nelson Mandela, and Martin Luther King, Jr. Here Nussbaum once more points us to 
King’s I have a Dream speech that manifests transformed anger for revolutionary or 
transitional justice. We have seen from the small, yet telling part of the speech that King 
wowed emotions as anger, hope, and benevolence into a message of equality and better 
future together. And so he “takes anger and shapes it into hope and a call for constructive 
social action.”182 
 
4.1.1.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
We took a brief look at anger as a part of capability for good emotional functioning. 
Nussbaum’s views on this emotion evolved into a sharper form of allowing only 
transitional anger and being critical of a strong link between anger and the fight against 
injustice. Anger for Nussbaum is an ugly and morally dubious emotion that has more 																																																								
177 The discussion on radical evil you can find in section 3.1 Radical Evil in this chapter. 
178 Cf. Nussbaum, Political Emotions, 190. We will come back to this topic further in the chapter in section 
4.4.1 The Spirit of Love and Ethics, Compassion and Play. 
179 Cf. Meredith Heagney, “Martha Nussbaum on the Ineffectiveness of Anger (January 16, 2014),” 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/martha-nussbaum-ineffectiveness-anger [accessed 15 December, 2014]. 
180 Heagney, “Martha Nussbaum on the Ineffectiveness of Anger.”  
181 See, for instance, the Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation Reconciliation and Penance of John Paul II to 
the Bishops Clergy and Faithful and Reconciliation and Penance In the Mission of The Church Today. 
182 Heagney, “Martha Nussbaum on the Ineffectiveness of Anger.” 
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negative consequences on our personal lives and the lives of our political communities. 
Nussbaum’s final answer even in the face of injustice is compassion and love. She is 
convinced that people, even wrongdoers, should be separated from their evil actions and, 
furthermore, they always deserve sympathy and respect. She argues that this perspective is 
a way to truly get closer to justice.183  
There is a pragmatic force in Nussbaum’s argument as it seems a more sustainable 
and better way to look at the future together without blaming each other (she does not 
exclude punishment for the crime, to be sure, Nussbaum argues that the focus should be a 
building action) and constructing the future together. This view is challenged, however, as 
it is accused of not being sensitive enough to the position and emotions of the one that was 
wronged, the victim.184 Amia Srinivasan, a philosopher we will come back to at the end of 
the discussion of this chapter, argues that Americans accepted King’s loving dream 
because the alternative was Malcolm X’s politics of angry defiance.185 Srinivasan also 
argues that to ask from victims politically endorsed compassion is a dangerous move 
because it might encourage the silencing of the voice of the suffering and so perpetuate the 
unjust political systems, (for Srinivasan, unlike for Nussbaum, our political regimes do not 
embody almost-just institutions that need further formation, for her they commit injustice 
and perpetuate unjust treatment of its citizens). We will come back to this topic and discuss 
it in greater length in section 5.4 Is Compassion the Only Political Emotion We Owe to 
Others? at the end of this chapter.186 
Now looking back for a moment at the capabilities approach, we should highlight 
that Nussbaum believes that it is a fruitful and adequate way to talk about the good of 
human being and human development. It attempts to be attentive to transcultural intuitions 
on the worth of human life, it attempts to respect human desire and choice in defining what 
that good is and the way one approaches it. At the same time it takes a moral stance 
pointing out the areas of the possible good and claiming that when those areas are not 
created, sustained and protected people are deprived from real choice and flourishing. Thus 
Nussbaum states: “It seems to me that the capabilities account deals well with the 
problems that plagued the preference-based approach. It does not waste time trying to 
smuggle a substantive account of central capabilities into a procedure for winnowing 
desire: it goes directly and forthrightly to the good (and the right), taking an 
unambiguously clear stand on the need for these items, as an enabling core of whatever 
else human beings choose.”187 Ultimately and fundamentally the capability approach is 
guided by the belief that “human beings are creatures such that, provided with the right 
educational and material support, they can become fully capable of all these human 																																																								
183 Cf. Meredith Heagney, “Martha Nussbaum on the Ineffectiveness of Anger.”  
184 See our discussion in the section 5.4 Is Compassion the Only Political Emotion We Owe to Others? in this 
chapter. 
185 Cf. Amia Srinivasan’s speech on BBC Radio 4, Four Thought, “In defense of Anger (August 27, 2014),” 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b04fc70p. The text can be found at 
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~corp1468/Welcome_files/Srinivasan_In%20Defence%20of%20Anger.pdf [accessed 25 
November, 2014]. 
186 We will also continue to discuss anger in Chapter IV, section 2. Continuing the Case of Anger with all its 
subsections, section 2.2 Contemporary Thinkers on Anger: Anger as a Moral Response to an Imperfect 
World where we will again encounter Srinivasan and 2.3 Nussbaum Against Anger where we will further 
explore Nussbaum’s views on anger. 
187 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, 149. 
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functions.”188  
 
4.2 EDUCATION OF THE JUDGMENT OF NONDESERT  
 
The list of basic capabilities if embodied in political institutions can also shape them and 
the legal system of the country. The civil and criminal law should embody good standards 
for personal responsibility. Furthermore, public policies which address difficult situations 
of particular groups all help to form the judgment of nondesert.189 The very complex 
discussions about the welfare and the basic minimum citizens should or should not be 
entitled to is a difficult topic in most nations. Nussbaum’s works suggest that the outlook 
on the person, which is encapsulated in the capabilities approach, can inform our thoughts 
on blameworthiness and justice.  
Political discussions on the basic welfare, gender, and crime accountability can 
significantly inform the judgment of nondesert and evoke our compassion. “The society,” 
Nussbaum argues, “that incorporates the perspective of tragic compassion into its basic 
design thus begins with a general insight: people are dignified agents, but they are also, 
frequently victims. Agency and victimhood are not incompatible: indeed, only the capacity 
for agency makes victimhood tragic.”190 This is not a binary choice for Nussbaum – 
ultimately both characteristics are true to being human. In the aforementioned range of 
discussions, if aid is renounced to people, it is done for the sake of respect of human 
agency (thus, choosing to see people as capable and not infantilize them with help). Yet 
Nussbaum holds that precisely the respect for human dignity requires safeguarding the 
basic minimum of welfare (as we have seen from her capabilities account; without it the 
basic capabilities cannot flourish into a true functioning). Nussbaum draws our attention to 
the fact that in a number of areas, governments create the safe spaces for citizens. Think of 
protection of the freedom of speech and press and protecting property rights. Even if we 
hold that people are capable of resourcefulness in a situation of adversity, we do not hold 
that we victimize the authors when we protect legal action assuring free press.191 Or we do 
not hold that owners of a property are defenseless when “laws protect citizens from theft 
and fraud; these laws are backed up by state power, in the form of a police force supported 
by tax money.”192  
In fact there are countless ways in which citizens receive material support from their 
governments which are perfectly acceptable for most of them. Yet why do we in our 
discussions single out poor people, racial minorities, and women? Thus Nussbaum asks: 
“what is there about the situation of being poor, or female, or black that means that help is 
condescending, and compassion insulting?”193 Nussbaum is convinced that “legal 
guarantees, we think, do not erode agency: they create a framework within which people 
																																																								
188 Ibid., 83. 
189 Cf. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 418. We move to this source as we close down the discussion on 
the capabilities approach and move to the question of education of compassion. Upheavals present a large 
work on Nussbaum’s views on education of emotions. 
190 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 406. 
191 Cf. Ibid., 407. 
192 Ibid., 407. 
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can develop and exercise agency.”194 This view is stemming from her conception of 
personhood and the convictions embodied in the capabilities approach we discussed above 
– from the very beginning we need to create spaces where people could be enabled to 
flourish and material aid is a practical way to achieve it. Nussbaum claims that most of the 
middle class parents are aware that their kids need financial assistance to provide the basic 
food, shelter, and other components which lead to a meaningful human life so they could 
develop their full agency. “It is strange,” Nussbaum continues, “that we so often speak 
differently about the poor, suggesting that cutting off basic social support is a way of 
encouraging agency in poor mothers and children, and of improving their character, rather 
than a way of stifling agency, or of stunting it before it gets a chance to develop. If we do 
respect human dignity and the capacity for action, we owe them a chance to develop and 
flourish.”195  
In the thin line between blameworthiness and nondesert we can discover justice – the 
course of discussion and political action concerning these crucial areas of social life can 
teach the judgment of nondesert on how one could think of the plights of fellow citizens. 
The political discussion about what we owe to each other as citizens of particular and then 
global community, for Nussbaum, has a direct link to education of our thought of 
nondesert in compassion. Here we can discover the two way dynamics once again – the 
policies and laws inspired by compassionate imagination will suggest a course of action 
which will promote and protect a picture of the human being where he/she will be seen as a 
dignified agent who is at the same time vulnerable. This picture will show that to grow into 
full agency the human being needs recognition and nurturing of some basic entitlements. 
As the outlook of this compassionate imagination inhabits the governmental laws and 
policies it can form the compassionate imagination’s sense of justice in citizens. The laws 
and policies signal how we ought to see each other in matters where social justice is 
involved and by this educate the thought of nondesert of compassion. 
 
4.2.1 Education of the Judgment of Nondesert: Compassionate Judges  
 
Nussbaum also addresses the issue of legal rationality and its ability to approach questions 
of equality and criminal sentencing and by this way to form our compassionate judgments. 
Nussbaum, as a professor of law philosophy, is convinced that teaching compassion to the 
future servants of the legal system is crucial for that system in return to teach and inform 
societies. Thus she claims: 
 
This means, I think, that it is especially important for judges and future judges to acquire the 
kind of information my imaginary curriculum for citizenship will offer – not just collecting 
many facts about the diverse ways of life with which he or she is likely to come in contact, but 																																																								
194 Ibid., 407. 
195 Ibid., 413. In this instance Nussbaum also quotes William J. Brennan Jr., an associate Justice of the United 
States Supreme Court known for being a leader of the Court’s liberal wing. Brennan has stated that: “From 
its founding the Nation’s basic commitments has been to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons 
within its borders. We have come to recognize that forces not within the control of the poor contribute to 
their poverty…Welfare, by meeting the basic demands of subsistence, can help bring within the reach of the 
poor the same opportunities that are available to others to participate meaningfully in the life of 
community…Public assistance, then, is not mere charity, but a means to ‘promote’ the general Welfare, and 
secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.” Goldberg v. Kelly (397 U.S. 264 [1970]) 
		 120	
entering into these lives with empathy and seeing the human meaning of the issues at stake in 
them. Through that curriculum – which can and should be reinforced through instructions in 
law schools – the future judge will be especially likely to discern various kinds of unequal 
treatment that certain people and groups have experienced.196 
 
To illustrate the case of understanding the question of equality correctly Nussbaum 
invites us to think of the famous Supreme Court case Loving v. Virginia.197 In 1958 
Mildred Jeter, a black female, and Richard Loving, a white male, were married in the 
District of Columbia, according to its laws. The same year their marriage was ruled out as 
illegal by their native state of Virginia (there they returned to reside) due to violation of 
Virginia’s ban on interracial marriage. The Lovings went to defend their case in Virginia’s 
supreme court and challenged the constitutionality of Virginia’s antimiscegenation laws. 
The court, however, decided that the laws are constitutional because both races suffer 
equal and symmetrical disadvantages from the prohibition of interracial marriages. Finally, 
in 1967 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled these laws out as unconstitutional because they 
clearly uphold white supremacy. This case helps Nussbaum infer that: 
 
[A] democracy could try to construct equality out of laws and institutions alone, without an 
education of the heart and the imagination. It could simply command citizens to respect the 
equal rights of those different from themselves, and not to interfere with their legitimate 
activities. But such a regime of formal equal protection is fragile, as the Loving case shows us. 
When people approach an issue of equal protection externally and formally, without using their 
imagination to try to understand the human meaning and impact of the laws in question, they 
are apt to be obtuse about equality, taking formal neutrality to be sufficient for equal protection 
and missing the role played by hierarchies of race and gender in denying citizens the truly 
equal worth of the protection of the laws.198  
 
Nussbaum is convinced that we need judges capable of full rationality and that 
means that we need judges “who are properly emotional.”199 True neutrality for Nussbaum 
requires examination of people’s realities “with imaginative participation, looking in 
particular for evidence that certain groups have suffered unequal treatment and therefore 
need more attention if they are to be shown a truly equal concern.”200 Rational compassion 
in this case represents the ability of judges and jurors to master the human facts in front of 
them. The role of compassion in criminal sentencing is a complex issue, to be sure. But 
Nussbaum is convinced that “the good judge or juror understands that all human beings are 
fallible, and that the difference between criminal and juror or even judge is frequently 
made by personal and social circumstances.”201 Being able to access people’s situations 
more adequately creates a certain community between the judge and the criminal: “the 
judge’s willingness to accord significance to the circumstances of an individual human life 
shows that he is not treating the offender as subhuman or irretrievably alien.”202 Nussbaum 
discourages consulting disgust in the assessment of the situation of the criminal. This 																																																								
196 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 441-442. 
197 Cf. Ibid., 442-443. 
198 Ibid., 443. 
199 Ibid., 446. 
200 Ibid., 445. 
201 Ibid., 446. 
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dangerous moral emotion perceives others as completely alien to our world and for 
Nussbaum it is one of the inadequate ways to respond to evil. Disgust suggests that  
 
evil is outside, alien, has nothing to do with us. Our disgust creates the boundary: it says, this 
contamination is and must remain far from our bodies. We might even say, in this case again, 
that we call disgust to our aid: by allowing ourselves to see evil people as disgusting, we 
conveniently distance them from ourselves.203  
 
Nussbaum hence holds if that juridical system is inhabited by compassionate judges, 
their judgments inform society and form their rational compassion in return. 
 
4.3 EDUCATION OF THE EUDAIMONISTIC JUDGMENT 
 
Nussbaum opens this discussion by stating that the public and philosophical debates have 
no agreement on how much we owe to different groups of people, starting from the ones 
close to us and going as far as human community, yet we can find a rather general 
agreement that we are too narrow in our sympathies.204 
Nussbaum is again convinced that legal systems and public policies can inform this 
judgment “by situating people close to one another, it makes it easier to see one’s plight in 
the plight of another.”205 She suggests several concrete strategies that may aid citizens to 
hear and see each other. Nussbaum argues that the abstract argumentation about human 
equality cannot break through the social barriers we have built. She suggests that 
affirmative action which would intend to empower the oppressed groups might be an 
important step in a practical change. 
Another very prominent idea in Nussbaum’s works is a proper treatment of the 
mentally handicapped which can expand the bounds of compassion in enormous ways.206 
Nussbaum uses the example of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act,207 an act of 
legislation, which in fact aids to alter the judgment of proper bounds of concern. The act 
ensures that every child can receive adequate education in the ‘least restrictive 
environment.’ Allowing mentally healthy children to be with mentally differently-abled 
children redefines the landscape of both lives. Furthermore, “when children see a wider 
range of behavioral and cognitive functioning in their classrooms, they are less likely to 
demonize these children as disgusting outcasts.”208  
Our political communities and values they promote influence and define our 
judgments in essential ways, which are not always evident from the first glance. Nussbaum 																																																								
203 Ibid., 451. 
204 Cf. Ibid., 420. 
205 Ibid., 421. 
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effectively changing the name to IDEA. In 1997 and again in 2004, additional amendments were passed to 
ensure equal access to education.” http://www.washington.edu/doit/Stem/articles?48 [accessed 30 June, 
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through her major works defends the idea that societies can be judged by their treatment of 
the ‘weak.’ If less abled people are integrated well in a society, or at least the legal action 
and policies attempt to do so, it indicates that this kind of society is not hiding from human 
weakness and fragility, characteristics, which next to capability and agency are a part of 
the human condition. Nussbaum defends and promotes an early encounter with ‘different’ 
people because, she is convinced, the proximity of the other, the chance to see the other 
person makes his/her plight real to us. At this moment of common experience, Nussbaum 
claims, the abstract theorizing about disability or whatever difficult situation of the other, 
becomes a concrete experience of the person, which is, rather self-evidently, more vivid 
and can touch us immediately. These experiences are very important at the young age to 
form not only our perceptions about different bodies and various kinds of cognitive 
abilities, but consequentially the way we treat weaker members of our societies. For 
Nussbaum, as mentioned above, our way of approaching the disabled people is disclosing 
of who we are. First, it shows the level of primitive shame in the particular community. “A 
society,” Nussbaum asserts, “will be most likely to decrease the influence of primitive 
shame on its public life if it conveys the idea that there is nothing shameful about having a 
human body subject to all vicissitudes of time, age, weakness, and illness.”209 This society 
no longer tells a story that all its members are independent rational adults and 
acknowledges and embraces the stages of weakness, neediness and dependency, which, in 
fact, mark beginning and ending of human life.210 
 
4.3.1 Humanities at the Aid of the Eudaimonistic Judgment: Tragedy and Comedy as 
Didactical Tools  
 
The education of the eudaimonistic judgment and its aid – the similar possibilities 
judgment – takes up an important part in Nussbaum’s project. Nussbaum seems to suggest 
that this judgment of proper concern and compassion is heavily influenced by our access to 
the humanistic education. She is a vocal advocate for the need and protection of human 
sciences in education systems as a way for good citizenship.211 We shall not engage in that 																																																								
209 Ibid., 424-425. 
210 Cf. Ibid., 425. Here Nussbaum is inspired by the argument found in Eva F. Kittay, Love’s Labor: Essays 
on Women, Equality, and Dependency (New York and London: Routledge, 1999). 
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for Profit. Why Democracy Needs the Humanities (New Jersey/ Oxfordshire: Princeton University Press, 
2010). We will address this topic further in Chapter IV, section 3.3.1 Nussbaum on Cultivation of Emotions 
where we will present our interpretation of Nussbaum’s vision of education of human emotions in a nutshell.  
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discussion largely because this is a large topic in itself, but we will touch upon two didactic 
tools, which Nussbaum holds as essential to formation of compassion. Nussbaum suggests 
that we should take a closer look at the Greek model of education and proposes that genres 
of tragedy and comedy can be good didactic tools, which can activate, inform, and educate 
our psychological mechanisms. 
 
4.3.2 Tragedy 
 
In her views on education of compassion through tragedy Nussbaum comes back to her 
ancient philosophy roots and holds that the Greek model of education can, indeed, be 
useful today. Utilizing primarily examples of the classical Greek tragic dramas Nussbaum 
argues that they serve not only aesthetical function, but they play an important role in 
moral education. Tragedy in Nussbaum’s account has a revealing character because it 
discloses something very important about life itself. The elements of life’s fragility, 
unpredictability and the force of human suffering that can cut deeply into human agency 
are very salient in Nussbaum’s thought; they are greatly inspired by the Greek tragedies. 
Nussbaum is convinced that those elements are the core characteristics of life and one 
should go back to the tragic dramas to rediscover them. 
 
4.3.2.1 Tragedy and Education of the Eudaimonistic Judgment  
 
How do tragic dramas teach us? The same mechanism used to inform the eudaimonistic 
judgment by situating people close to each other is at work here. Tragic drama also enables 
us to see the plights of other people. Nussbaum, hence, discovers two salient elements in 
tragic dramas that might be helpful for moral education – the values they convey and the 
context of proximity they create. In the process of tragic drama spectatorship (in ancient 
Greece it was this genre, nowadays the elements of genre can be transferred through its 
modern equivalents) one learns to feel compassion. “By inviting the spectator to become 
intensely concerned for the fate of the tragic hero,” Nussbaum states, “and at the same time 
portraying the hero as a worthy person, whose distress does not stem from his own 
deliberate wickedness, the drama sets up compassion; an attentive spectator will, in 
apprehending it, have that emotion.”212 Tragic drama in its nature requires extension of 
sympathy. Nussbaum asserts that tragedy requires the spectator to shift through very wide 
scopes of landscapes and undermine the barriers of national belonging and gender. The 
tragic Greek dramas went from Greece to Troy, from male citizens to females who both 
were the victims of wars, just to recognize the common humanity in all.213 
Nussbaum is convinced that “argument cannot function well without imagination.”214 
Tragic dramas serve the purpose of civic reflection and do it in a way that raises our 
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emotional awareness. It aids at deliberating about the lives of others, but it does it in a way 
that their reality becomes also real to us.215  
 
4.3.2.2 Tragedy and Education of the Judgment of Seriousness 
 
Tragic drama, Nussbaum argues, also speaks to our judgment of seriousness. First of all, it 
encapsulates something she calls ‘a democratic experience,’ the “one that acknowledges 
the equal frailty of all human beings and their fully equal need for the goods of life that 
Philoctetes [the tragic hero] so conspicuously lacks: food, shelter, relief of pain, 
conversation, nondeceptive friendship, political voice.”216 In viewing tragic drama, the 
audience recognizes the need for these goods and feels compassion for the heroes deprived 
of them. Tragic drama exposes the thoughts that constitute compassion and gives 
spectators “a map of compassion,”217 enabling them to see what happens when one has no 
access to basic goods. 
Sophocles’ Philoctetes218 portrays the drastic consequences of human suffering and 
physical pain. This clearly “affects the mental life itself, poisoning speech and thought.”219 
Moreover, “pain infantilizes.”220 Nussbaum’s aim is to show repeatedly that human 
suffering should not be romanticized, but it should be addressed seriously. Tragedy, 
Nussbaum discloses, points out that human suffering and pain matter, and moreover, it 
should matter to all of us.221 
Nussbaum furthers that the play Philoctetes portrays a life of an outcast, who has 
been stigmatized abandoned, and considered not fully human anymore.222 Yet the play 
takes up the role to convince the spectators by convincing the other characters within it of 
the full and equal humanity of Philoctetes. Nussbaum is convinced that tragedy works in a 
unique way: it juxtaposes very sensitive social questions and aesthetic tools to convey its 
message. This helps the audience to step into the lives of the characters they might fear, 
might find disgusting but without initial fear of real-life situations. Tragedy opens a veil of 
broken lives, but allows the spectator to access them securely through mediums of poetry 
and melody. To put it in Nussbaum’s words: “By addressing such a scenario, but without 
the sensory qualities that elicit disgust and without the real-life involvement that could 
arouse fear, tragedy undermines exclusion.”223 
Nussbaum is also convinced that tragedy conveys universal values – ultimately they 
always address common human plights. Nussbaum asserts that tragedy has “an outward or 
universalizing movement that tends to correct the narrowing focus […] all too prevalent in 
compassion.”224 This is a particularly important point, as the goal of Nussbaum’s project is 																																																								
215 Cf. Nussbaum, Political Emotions, 260. 
216 Ibid., 262. 
217 Ibid., 263. 
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with them to Troy. 
219 Nussbaum, Political Emotions, 263. 
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to suggest an approach to ethics where emotion and principle can meet to sustain and 
inspire each other – tragedy seems to show that emotion can already have “a bridge 
towards [the] universal.”225  
 
4.3.2.3 Tragedy and Value Conflict  
 
Tragedies, moreover, speak of value conflict. This aspect is essential to ethics and the 
ongoing discussions we have. Tragedy refuses the simplification of our moral lives, it 
speaks about a plural society, about its different members and their aspirations. Most 
importantly they open the mindset of living the questions. In this regard Nussbaum guides 
us to the setting of Indian epic Mahabharata.226 Nussbaum presents us with the moral 
dilemma of Arjuna who has to choose between his family members fighting for the throne: 
one party led by his brother, the rightful heirs, and another led by his cousin and friends 
who have wrongfully usurped the throne.227 Nussbaum suggests taking a closer look at this 
story: in fact, it confronts us with two kinds of questions. The first question is the obvious 
question, Nussbaum states, and it asks what ought to be done?228 The answer to this 
question, however, is not obvious. One will always have to deliberate, to choose the most 
appropriate methods to arrive at an answer. “What is not difficult, however,” states 
Nussbaum, “is to see that it is a question that has to be answered, since some action must 
be taken, and even inaction is, in such a situation, a kind of action.”229 This is why 
Nussbaum calls the question of what ought to be done obvious. But there is something 
more at stake in moral dilemmas of any kind and Nussbaum calls it the tragic question. To 
put it simply, this question can be avoided, if we just look to the several alternatives and 
see the conflict between duty and other moral sentiments. But the tragic question asks 
whether any answers to the first question are morally acceptable after all. “The tragic 
question registers,” Nussbaum continues, “not the difficulty of solving the obvious 
question, but a distinct difficulty: the fact that all the possible answers to the obvious 
question, including the best one, are bad, involving serious moral wrongdoing. In that 
sense, there is no ‘right answer.’”230 
Nussbaum directs her reader to see that the tragic clash of values poses the tragic 
question.231 These situations occur not that often in life and usually indicate extreme 
moments in societies (war time for example), and making one choice or the other, even 																																																								
225 Ibid., 265. 
226 It dates to the 3rd century BCE and is one of the two major Sanskrit epics. Traditionally, the authorship is 
attributed to Vyasa. The story centers around the Kurukshetra War and the fates of the Kaurava and the 
Pandava princes. 
227 “Arjuna saw his closest kinsmen, related to him as father or grandfather, uncle or brother, son or 
grandson, preceptor as well as companion and friend, on both sides. Overcome by this site, he said in sorrow 
and compassion, ‘O Krishna, when I see my own people ready to fight and eager to battle, my limbs shudder, 
my mouth is dry, my body shivers, and my hair stands on end. Furthermore, I see evil portents, and I can see 
no good in killing my own kinsmen. It is not right and proper that we should kill our own kith and kin, the 
Kauravas. How can we be happy if we slay our own people?’” Nussbaum, Political Emotions, 266 quoting 
Mahabharata trans. Chakravarthi V. Narasimhan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), Book 6, ch. 
23. 
228 Cf. Nussbaum, Political Emotions, 267. 
229 Ibid., 267. 
230 Ibid., 267-268. 
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avoiding it has very painful consequences. Yet the tragic question, if we do not omit it, 
reminds us that ‘we have dirty hands’ no matter what decision we will make. Nussbaum is 
convinced that asking whether any alternatives in extreme clashes of values is moral helps 
the participants of the situation and the viewers of it to be reminded of the moral 
commitments that ought not to be abandoned and should be reinforced. 
To sum up, for Nussbaum tragic dramas have political implications for a good civic 
life. Firstly, they disclose the basic entitlements of persons and the tragic consequences 
when people are deprived of them. Tragedies convey their values through the mediums of 
music and poetry, by this reaching out to our emotional attentiveness and directing it to 
common human plights. In this process they are able to shape human compassion. 
Secondly, “through the emotionally difficult experience of tragic dilemmas, citizens learn 
that some costs, some losses, have a distinctive nature: they are bad in a distinctive way. 
No citizen should have to bear them.”232 Nussbaum is convinced that tragic spectatorship 
can trigger citizens to imagine the world without tragic conflicts, or at least the world 
where they would appear as least as possible and “[s]uch a cast of mind is itself 
progress.”233 
 
4.3.3 Comedy 
 
While the didactic worth of tragedy is rather prominent throughout Nussbaum’s works,234 
in her latest writings the element of the spirit of laughter appears. Comedy appears as a 
second important element of moral education next to the tragic drama. These two poles 
now seem to balance each other out and offer a fuller perspective on our moral lives. 
Furthermore, in the later thought of Nussbaum the tragic and comic spectatorship is 
connected to the human body. The tragic spectatorship seems to evoke the awareness of 
shared human possibilities through our common bodily vulnerability.235 While comedy 
looks at the other side of the same coin and finds the human body worthy of celebration. 
Tragic drama focuses on development of compassion, while comic drama addresses 
disgust (a dangerous societal emotion for Nussbaum, which tends to narrate others as 
worthy of exclusion) and seeds the spirit of fellowship.236 
																																																								
232 Ibid., 271. 
233 Ibid., 272. 
234 The tragic sense, the idea that we cannot control life fully is present in Nussbaum’s writings despite the 
varying discussions she tackles, be it compassion (its cognitive content, remember, is inspired by Aristotle 
who in his own right is influenced by Greek tragedy) in the Upheavals of Thought Chapter 6 Compassion: 
Tragic Predicaments, 297-236; the discussion about education of compassion in Political Emotions chapter 9 
Tragic and Comic Festivals: Shaping Compassion, Transcending Disgust; or, speaking broadly, any 
discussion on the ethical value of emotions and the unpredictability of life they register, for instance, 
discussion on disgust and shame in law in Hiding From Humanity. Disgust, Shame and the Law (Princeton 
University Press: Princeton and Oxford, 2004) or the compilation of her essays found in Love’s Knowledge, 
essays Introduction: Form and Content, Philosophy and Literature, 3-53 and Transcending Humanity 365-
392 among others. Finally, Nussbaum addresses tragedy directly in one of her early works The Fragility of 
Goodness. Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 
1986). The intuitions of this book are also observed in all the aforementioned works. 
235 Cf. Nussbaum, Political Emotions, 258.,  
236 Cf. Ibid., 261. 
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Nussbaum directs our look to the classical piece of Aristophanes The Acharnians237 
and its two characters – Lamachus the tragic hero and Dikaiopolis the comic hero. 
Lamachus is the heroic general, who comes from the battle severely injured and weeping 
from pain. Dikaiopolis is a rural obscene farmer, who has opposed the war. Both of them 
represent different sets of values. Lamachus represents the intuitions we have presented in 
the above section, describing the didactical worth of tragic drama. In him we recognize our 
common human vulnerability which can raise our emotional awareness. While Dikaiopolis, 
with his obscene lifestyle, represents the simple joys of life. In the dialogues between the 
two we can discover something very essential about life itself – the human life ultimately 
consists of both – the tragic events that hurt us deeply and simple everyday joys that keep 
us going. Nussbaum brilliantly describes this dynamics in the following quote: “As each 
tragic utterance is comically answered, the very excess and shamefulness of the comic hero 
look like a kind of healing: normal life, and the pleasures that all human beings love, rather 
than the cruel depredations of war, such as bed for pleasure, rather than bed for 
wounds.”238 The tragic hero represents human dignity, the comic hero violating all the 
norms of dignified conduct239 “stands for the messy, smelly, uncomfortable body, and the 
delights it can bring.”240  
We could say that Nussbaum highlights two elements in comedy which she finds 
important for moral and civic deliberation. Comedies, among other things, promote the 
already mentioned joy of body and peace. When it comes to reflection on the human body 
comedy takes the fragility of human body, the same element, which was highlighted by 
tragedy and sees it differently. Comedy takes the bodily fragility, common human 
activities which are usually veiled as not existing, and invites people to celebrate it, to 
revel in their bodies. Nussbaum explains this in the following way: 
 
Excretion, sex, and sweat are shown as signs of great vulnerability – many of the jokes in 
Aristophanes turn on the way and an ambitious plan is derailed by the need to take a shit, or by 
the embarrassment of having farted at the wrong time, or by an unwelcome erection. But the 
vulnerability is embraced as common to all, as just a part of being alive, connected to life’s joy. 
And the comedies celebrate that fragile joy – while repudiating the all-too-common pretense 
that one is invulnerable.241 
 
Nussbaum draws our attention to the fact that the bodily joys that comedy presents 
can be enjoyed only during the period of peace and here we encounter the second 
important element of comedies. In the Acharnians Dikaiopolis, a rural farmer and 
representative of bodily joys, comes to the assembly to argue for peace. He loves 
“democratic politics, tragic poetry, peace, the countryside.”242 The spirit of the comedy 																																																								
237 The play is dated 425 BCE and it tells a story of Dikaiopolis who obtains a private peace treaty with 
Spartans during the Peloponnesian War (the work illustrates the benefits of peace and appeals to end the 
war). 
238 Nussbaum, Political Emotions, 259. 
239 Everything about the comic hero indicated this: starting from the shapeless costume, public eating, 
defecation, farting, perpetual erection that ought to embarrass the spectator. See Nussbaum, Political 
Emotions, 271.  
240 Ibid., 272. 
241 Ibid., 272. 
242 Ibid., 272. 
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promotes these goods through political arguments rooted in bodily functions. Those kinds 
of arguments are attentive to bodily needs, peace and welfare. It serves a good public life 
by always keeping an eye on the ordinary citizens and their basic needs. “Peace […] is 
imagined, as always in Aristophanes, as a time of sensory delight: food, drink, sex, 
religious and poetic celebration.”243 It seems, Nussbaum furthers, that this spirit of play 
with its focus on the bodily delight promotes stability of our societies and peace.244 
Nussbaum argues that the underlying experience of the comedy, which is the 
experience of the love of the human body “can carry us forward.”245 This is a message of 
inclusion – we tend to label the aspects of our bodily life “as forbidden territory, telling 
ourselves that what makes us uncomfortable is outside and ‘other.’”246 But, Nussbaum 
asserts, “if we learn to love and celebrate what is noisy, messy, tumultuous – including, 
prominently, our own messy sexuality – then we will be less likely to hate and oppress the 
others.”247 This is the core of the comic spirit according to Nussbaum – to take a light, 
loving look at ourselves and our bodies, to see it as a commonality with others, and to 
actually enjoy it. Good ethical principles infused by the insights of the comic spirit will not 
cease “to bind citizens to what they love”248 and “laughter, while remaining lighthearted 
and earthy – indeed, precisely because it is […] – can surmount disgust and promote 
common good.”249 
 
4.3.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
Nussbaum presents us with some valuable insights about the tragic and comic dramas. But 
the times of the ancient Greek festivals are long gone. How ought we to utilize the 
achievements found in these literature pieces? Should classical Greek literature be a 
compulsory read in high schools? Even in that case we would need experts in the genre to 
deliver the message powerfully to his/her pupils. Or does Nussbaum ask us to become 
experts in literature? This might strike us as an idealistically elitist aim. Nussbaum, 
however, claims that her goal is not to suggest artistic erudition, but to point out the role of 
artistic endeavors.250 Tragedy and comedy (and the other forms of arts, not only literary) 
give us not only aesthetic experience, they are powerful didactical tools which are able to 
influence our moral growth. Moreover, ultimately they have political consequences for a 
good citizenship. Nussbaum is aware that contemporary societies cannot replicate the 
Greek model of civic and moral education, yet “they can try to understand their political 
role and find their own analogues – using political rhetoric, publicly sponsored visual art, 
the design of public parks and monuments, public book discussions, and the choice and 
content of public holidays and celebrations.”251 
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Furthermore, Nussbaum points out at a very prominent element of her thought – 
childhood development. Most of our education starts there, the tragic spectatorship not 
being an exception. Children go through a wide range of emotional experiences through 
stories they hear – Nussbaum reminds us of such recognizable characters as Bambi or 
Hayao Miyazaki’s film My Neighbor Totoro.252 These stories confront children with such 
grief-filled experiences as a loss of a mother or children in difficult social settings. Well-
composed children stories are also good didactical tools – they are the first window (if the 
family situation is not a proximate first experience of suffering) to see human fragility and 
the consequences of human suffering, and in this regard they are also one of the first things 
to inform children’s compassion. Nussbaum’s argument moves further to promotion of 
good artistry from elementary schools to freedom for talented artists to create and inspire 
societies. The analysis of these elements fall short of the scope of our research – as our 
goal is to collect the main insights that tragedy and comedy can offer to our moral 
education and growth. 
In her argumentation Nussbaum suggests looking at worthy artistic pieces and let 
them inspire us. Tragedy gives birth to compassion and at the same time corrects some 
judgments inherent to the emotion. Comedy, a younger element in Nussbaum’s thought, 
suggests that human vulnerability is also a locus of celebration. The simple everyday joys 
have a healing power over our fragile, weak bodies, and minds taunted by worries and 
anxieties. The tragic spectatorship, without a doubt, evokes and teaches our compassion. It 
teaches us to care beyond our own and to reach out to the far ‘others.’ Comic spectatorship 
twists the coin for a moment, takes a look at the fragile human body susceptible with all 
the ills, and smiles at it. The common human bodily experiences are the sources of fun and 
are worthy of revel. Nussbaum seems to suggest that we should feel compassion for the 
suffering other, but we should also, indeed, take pleasure in bodily joys, because those are 
truly celebrated in periods of peace, periods that are a dream of all aspiring people and 
societies. 
Yet we can still ask ourselves, are the values promoted by the tragic and comic 
dramas and the deliberation they inspire only accessible through artistic mediums? Any 
meaningful and adequate discussion has to be fortified by data, Nussbaum answers.253 But 
a story, more than a detached way of describing a situation, has a sense of immediacy. 
Stories can forcefully bring the reader or the listener to the life of a portrayed person, 
he/she understands the power of the actor’s plight and in this process makes the hero part 
of his/her eudaimonistic circle of concern. Furthermore, “the compassion such a work 
inspires is in principle highly pertinent to helping behavior.”254 
 
4.3.5 Education of Compassion: Realist Novel, the Role of Media, and Political Leaders 
 
With regards to the education of compassion we would like to draw attention to some less 
salient, but important aspects of it. Nussbaum notes that the realist social novel might be a 
helpful tool in educating compassion and helping its judgments go beyond specific social 
barriers. This, as well as the tragic drama, shows concrete circumstances of various social 																																																								
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groups and enables one to encounter them. “In this way,” Nussbaum claims, “it exercises 
the muscles of the imagination, making people capable of inhabiting, for a time, the world 
of a different person, and seeing the meaning of events in that world from the outsider’s 
viewpoint.”255 At the same time Nussbaum urges that education of compassionate 
citizenship should also be multicultural.256 In this way people can learn about the diversity 
of circumstances in which others are trying to flourish. 
Nussbaum also reminds us of the role of media in education of compassion as it is a 
great source conveying information to a large amount of people. The media has power to 
influence the judgment of similar possibilities – “its choices of images and roles, in news 
stories, advertising, and drama, will have important consequences for citizens’ moral 
abilities, for better or worse.”257 Nussbaum is aware that citizens can be confronted with 
these issues in the educational environment – yet the media is pressured to convey their 
contents in accordance with market pressures (not to say that schools and universities are 
free from it, yet the pressure is less in terms of choosing the teaching material). Nussbaum 
asserts that in this regard “a number of solutions suggest themselves, ranging from the 
corporate grants that already underwrite some risky public programming, to informal 
guidelines and standards for the industry, mandatory public interest programming, and 
subsidies for national broadcasting.”258  
Nussbaum takes up yet another point that can inform our compassion, namely, the 
role of political leaders. In this regard we could say that Nussbaum draws our attention to 
the visionaries of the society, broadly speaking, and the power of their compassionate 
outlook to inspire other citizens. “If Candace Clark’s study is valid,” Nussbaum opines, 
“Americans are highly responsive to ‘sympathy entrepreneurs’ who define for the general 
public norms of appropriateness in the areas of seriousness, responsibility, and extent of 
concern. Although such entrepreneurs come in many forms – journalists, civic awareness 
groups, artists and musicians – political leaders are such entrepreneurs inevitably.”259 To 
build her case more convincingly, Nussbaum utilizes the image of the ideal leader 
developed by Walt Whitman. In his poems Whitman promoted democratic values and 
articulated that the imagination of poets can hold democracy together (in this case one can 
look at his By Blue Ontario’s Shore, one of his central works). The poetic imagination of 
the leader can pierce through the lives of the people and finally he/she becomes the barrier 
of those lives showing compassion “for all the nation’s classes, ages, and races.”260 Thus 
Nussbaum concludes that “we should demand political leaders who display the abilities 
involved in a reasonable and appropriate compassion – who show not just mastery of 
pertinent facts about their society and its history, but also the ability to take on in 
imagination the lives of the various diverse groups whom they propose to lead.”261  
 
4.4 THE SPIRIT OF LOVE 																																																								
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We encountered the didactical tools Nussbaum considers to be very important in education 
of compassion. Next to it, Nussbaum points out that it is very important to connect our 
ethical endeavors, even the moral emotion of compassion to a spirit of love. That is coming 
back to the very root of it (as we remember, for Nussbaum love is at the root of every 
emotion).262 To look at this issue more in depth we will have once again to come back to 
the story of child’s development.263 Nussbaum is convinced that the spirit of love makes 
the moral rules and norms meaningful, full of life. The key to understanding the roots of 
the spirit of love and its work lies in an infant’s development, according to Nussbaum. In 
this regard she again turns to the works of Donald Winnicott. 
Nussbaum considers love as a way to relate to the other, a relationship and it 
involves “a delighted recognition of the other as valuable, special, and fascinating; a drive 
to understand the point of view of the other; fun and reciprocal play; exchange, and what 
Winnicott calls ‘subtle interplay;’ gratitude for affectionate treatment, and guilt at one’s 
own aggressive wishes or actions; and finally and centrally, trust and a suspension of 
anxious demands of control.”264 Only through trust in the world we cannot control can one 
find a way out of narcissism. This trust does not grow out of nothing, it has its roots in the 
infant’s developmental circumstances. And it is made possible by “the lovable behavior of 
the parent – combined with the wonder, love, and creativity of the child, which has its 
ultimate roots in the child’s wonder at the light, its erotic outward-moving curiosity.”265 
Nussbaum emphasizes that this is ultimately the idea behind her project and quoting 
Mozart and Da Ponte she adds: “this day of torment, of craziness, of foolishness – only 
love can make it end in happiness and joy.”266 
It seems that Nussbaum is convinced that ‘all we need is love’ which animates our 
relationships and our ethical conduct. Furthermore, the absence of love at a young age 
makes children incapable of managing their aggressive wishes and later on they do not 
become capable of endowing rules of conduct with inner life.267 Nussbaum understands 
that stable concern has to be safeguarded by ethical norms and respect, but she is 
convinced that “morality cannot survive in a world where anxiety is unrelieved by trust and 
love; that genuine concern for others rests on a capacity for empathetic understanding and 
the sense that the other’s perspective matters; and, finally, that genuine concern requires 
confidence in one’s own ability to give, an attitude that is deeply imperiled by both shame 
																																																								
262 In Chapter I, section 1.5 Nussbaum’s Judaism we explored her view on love. 
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at helplessness and the awareness of one’s own aggressive wishes.”268 Nussbaum is 
convinced that the moment of generosity in life, the ‘yes’ toward the other becomes 
possible through the spirit of love and in fact is this spirit: “There has to be moments of 
generosity, in which one is willing to be at the mercy of another who is mysterious, and 
approachable only in a spirit of play and wonder.”269 
We might wonder why an ethical project (and in Nussbaum’s case, also a political 
project) needs to take into account these personal matters? Nussbaum’s answer remains the 
same – if we take a critical look at who we are and our own development, if we utilize 
adequate sources to investigate and understand it, we can find resources necessary for a 
good emotional and ethical functioning. Ethics needs to “tap these sources of early trust 
and generosity, the erotic outward movement of the mind and heart toward the lovable.”270 
The attempt to discover and work with the deeper motivations and the existential meaning 
of ethical conduct can aid at sustaining our institutions “against the ongoing pressure 
exerted by egoism, greed, and anxious aggression.”271 
 
4.4.1 Ethics, Compassion, and Play 
 
Ethics seems a serious matter, and rightfully so. Yet Nussbaum, inspired by Winnicott’s 
account draws our attention to a very important aspect of any ethical project – a sense of 
playfulness in it. “Play, for Winnicott,” Nussbaum claims, “in its most general sense, is an 
imaginative activity in which one occupies a ‘potential space,’ a realm of unreality that is 
peopled with stories that enact hypothetical possibilities. In this realm children do exercise 
a greater measure of control than in the world of reality, since they write the script.”272 
Nussbaum is convinced that Winnicott’s definition of play is very close to what Aristotle 
ascribes to tragic drama – that we confront in it things that are not personally painful, so 
we can learn the general structure of life there.273 
Play as such facilitates very important primary experiences and it is a space where 
children learn to explore their emotions. A key term in understanding play in Winnicottian 
terms is a ‘transitional object.’274 Young infants are eased only by the presence of an actual 
person. Older infants learn to comfort themselves through certain things (a toy, a blanket) 
to which they ascribe security-giving characteristics. Through the transitional objects 
infants learn to calm themselves and they explore all sorts of feelings and emotions in 
connection to it. Children experience anxiety when they lose the toy and joy when they 
rediscover it; they also channel their emotions through that toy. This very investment in the 
external object presupposes surrender. This is the moment where a child learns “to play 
																																																								
268 Ibid., 176-177. 
269 Ibid., 177. 
270 Ibid., 177. 
271 Ibid., 177. 
272 Ibid., 178. 
273 Cf. Ibid., 178. 
274 Cf. Ibid., 178-179. Nussbaum uses arguments found in Donald W. Winnicott, “Transitional Objects and 
Transitional Phenomena,” in Playing and Reality (Abingdon: Routledge, (1971) 2005a), 7. 
		 133	
alone in the presence of its mother”275 and in this world “others may go their own way and 
there is no need to subordinate them constantly to the child’s own anxious projects.”276 
Nussbaum’s aim in presenting these concepts of Winnicott is to argue that all good 
human relationships contain the qualities of play: “The capacity to be alone in the presence 
of the other (not constantly demanding slavish attention); trust in the other and the 
willingness to relax the demand for complete control in the presence of the other; the 
capacity to respond to subtle cues with an appropriate reaction; the ability to imagine what 
the other intends and feels.”277 For Winnicott all love is a form of this ‘subtle interplay’ 
and no flourishing human relationship can be imagined without it. 
Play is something that oversteps the desire for omnipotence, for subordination. Thus 
Nussbaum, together with Winnicott, is convinced that human development is a never 
ending process “and it needs the resources of play and imagination at every stage in order 
to reinforce trust, reciprocity, and respect for the separate world of others.”278 But how do 
people play in later life? Well, we already discovered the answer – Winnicott is convinced 
that love is one of the ways; moreover, the most successful human relationships contain an 
aspect of this subtle interplay. 
In this regard we have to note that play is also experienced in adult age through art 
and culture. Here people can experience various emotions without real life stress and create 
a ‘potential space.’ Winnicott states that “this intermediate area, rich in enjoyment, is in 
direct continuity with the play area of the small child who is ‘lost’ in play.”279 And he 
adds: 
 
It will be observed that I am looking at the highly sophisticated adult’s enjoyment of living or 
of beauty or of abstract human contrivance, and at the same time at the creative gesture of a 
baby who reaches out for his? mother’s mouth and feels her teeth, and at the same time looks 
into her eyes, seeing her creativity. For me, playing leads on naturally to cultural experience 
and indeed forms its foundation.280  
 
Nussbaum agrees with Winnicott that much of our life we live in “a ‘potential space’ 
of imaginative possibilities”281 and this space essentially is in continuity with childhood 
experiences and adult participation in culture. For Nussbaum then the outlet of the spirit of 
play in cultural and artistic experiences have the same qualities as a child’s play (such as 
trust and reciprocity) and it can aid at transcending our narcissism, where the solitary I is 
imagining to be the owner of everything around him or her. 
Essentially love is an answer to the problem of radical evil we encountered in 
previous sections.282 Radical evil, as we have seen, is entrenched in the very structure of 
human life. For Nussbaum radical evil is not an outcome of any particular culture, it is the 																																																								
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fruit of the human developmental story, a fruit of human bodily weakness and high 
cognitive abilities which gives birth to narcissism, which wants to subordinate others 
entirely to our needs. At the very fundamental and inherent level love comes to aid in this 
situation. At the same early stage of development the outward curiosity and wonder 
presents the world as lovable. This trust helps to transcend the egoistic narcissism. In later 
developmental stages young infants through play learn to tame their persisting narcissism 
and the need for omnipotence. This reciprocal phenomenon of subtle interplay is 
something much needed not only for the early stages of human life, but throughout all life 
stages, really. Human development is an ongoing process and the dynamics which make 
love necessary do not fade away; thus love needs to always be there to safeguard adult 
relationships and actions so that they would not lapse into egoistic narcissism. 
 
4.4.2 Concluding Remarks 
 
When we discussed Nussbaum’s ethical project we discovered the pillars of the good 
human life, the intuitions re-emerging in her major works, such as practical reason, 
compassion, love, subtle interplay, to highlight a few. Those are also the intuitions we can 
encounter in Western culture when one reflects on the nature of human beings and it seems 
that Nussbaum aims to ground them philosophically. To achieve this goal, she takes us to a 
journey through various landscapes ranging from evolutionary insights of human 
development and morality, psychological accounts of the same issue, insights of the 
ancient and modern philosophers, the values of the tragic and comic dramas and literary 
works. The discussion ranges from defining emotions and their possible meaning in human 
life, to defining the constitutional principles of liberal democracies – and this wide scope 
of discussion is aimed to illustrate that various aspects of life are always interconnected 
and that emotions can be a thread that holds the social fabric of societies strongly together.  
We have seen that Nussbaum does not advocate trusting emotions only – that is a 
sure recipe for going astray – we need well-grounded ethical theories and norms, adequate 
procedures, in-depth knowledge of our subject matter, to consult various disciplines to 
have a well-informed opinion. But ultimately Nussbaum seems to suggest that all of that 
rests on the relational aforementioned pillars to reach its full flourishing. We have noted 
that Nussbaum presented us with a complex picture of the human person who has a long 
evolutionary history, is defined in multiple ways by the circumstances he/she was born in, 
having various inherent emotional dispositions – and yet for Nussbaum this person 
ultimately has a power of self-definition through capacity of practical reasoning which can 
take information from the various faculties (intellectual, emotional, appetitive) and see the 
connection between them and give meaning to it all. The emotive knowledge of 
compassion and love in this case come to show the best way things can be – we can be 
moved by the situation of the other and feel the active need to help and we can also move 
beyond frozen inner states and see life and people around as full of wonder and worthy of 
trust.  
 
5. NUSSBAUM ON COMPASSION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 
 
		 135	
As we have discovered Nussbaum’s views on compassion and allowed the author to lay 
her case down, it is time to take a look at the critical discussion surrounding this topic. Our 
approach to the discussion remains the same – in the beginning we allowed Nussbaum to 
talk on her own terms, appreciating and trying to grasp her argument without initial 
predisposition to rebuke it. This way, we believe, allowed us to get to know her argument 
intimately and helped to dwell on it in more depth. As we have obtained the knowledge of 
her line of thinking we turn to its reception.  
Starting with our own theological interest we will engage with ideas of ethicist Diana 
Fritz Cates. Cates primarily works in the Aristotelian-Thomistic moral tradition and is 
particularly keen to research emotions, including concrete emotions such as love and 
compassion (in her thought those are ultimately conceived as virtues, to be sure), anger and 
hatred. Cates’ ideas are interesting because she can help us to bridge gaps between the 
authors that are primary to our research – Nussbaum and Thomas Aquinas, as she offers 
comments on both of them. In our current discussion on Nussbaum’s views on 
compassion, Cates’ thought is relevant because she offers criticism of Nussbaum’s views 
which stems from the same Aristotelian tradition, but appropriated with Christian thought. 
Furthermore, Cates has also worked out a Christian account on compassion and it is in our 
interest to compare it with Nussbaum’s secular account of the same emotion. In the 
upcoming sections we will assess Cates’ criticism of Nussbaum’s conception of 
compassion, especially, the way we become aware we are experiencing compassion, the 
elements of pain and the desire to help intrinsic to this emotion, the thought of nondesert in 
compassion, and Nussbaum’s idea that life could be described as unpredictable. 
Subsequently, we will move to a presentation of Cates’ account of Christian compassion 
which is conceived as compassion for friends. In this section we will offer a presentation of 
Cates’ key terms of virtue, infused virtue, friendship and compassion; we will also offer a 
presentation of her views of compassion best understood as virtue rather than only 
emotion. While presenting Cates’ views at the same time, we will draw a comparison with 
Nussbaum’s views on compassion, in this way comparing Christian and secular views on 
this phenomena. 
 After presenting Cates’ case, we will move to question the influences of Judaism in 
Nussbaum’s thought together with Martin Kavka, a professor of Judaism studies and 
philosophy. We will explore whether there is a place for theology in Nussbaum’s ethics 
and if we could find a way to speak of external transcendence claims without making them 
superfluous. Kavka will suggest that emotions of love and compassion might be a gateway 
to a meaningful theological language. 
We will close this chapter with insights of Amia Srinivasan, a professor of 
philosophy. Together with her we will challenge Nussbaum’s idea that compassion is the 
only basic social emotion we owe to each other. In fact, Srinivasan seems to suggest that 
compassion promoted by a state might be dangerous, as we have seen in a short 
introduction of views on anger.283 We will look at compassion from the sides of the ones 
experiencing compassion for the victims and, then, victims being encouraged to feel 
compassion by the state. We will conclude this discussion on looking at anger and 
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compassion, as we move a step closer to our next chapters on Thomas Aquinas and his 
view on the passions and the case study of anger.  
 
5.1 CATES’ THEOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF NUSSBAUM’S CONCEPTION OF COMPASSION 
 
5.1.1 How Do We Know That We Experience Compassion? 
  
Cates acknowledges that Nussbaum uses a very Aristotelian definition of compassion as 
composed of three value judgments. She is, however, suspicious of the way we come to 
acknowledge we are having an emotion of compassion in real life experiences. Cates 
claims “she argues, however, that when one fails to acknowledge fully the relevant 
compassion beliefs, one fails to experience compassion.”284 Cates hence worries – how do 
we distinguish between the full acknowledgement sufficient for compassion and one that is 
not full, insufficient for the occurrence of emotion?285 This argument of Cates, 
unfortunately, does not refer us to the page number in Nussbaum’s own work where she 
requires the ‘full acknowledgment’ of the three thoughts to have compassion.  
Based on our own reading of Nussbaum, we judge that the presence of the three 
thoughts is necessary for the emotion to appear because they are the cognitive elements of 
which the emotion consists. Once we judge a certain situation to have these three 
characteristics, for Nussbaum, it is sufficient to say one is compassionate about it – the 
upheaval itself being an unnecessary element. If we comprehend the situation in that way 
we are compassionate. If emotions are equivalent to thoughts, Nussbaum presupposes, we 
are aware of what we think. In some cases the emotion can be delayed because people 
“simply haven’t yet taken in what has happened”286 and this means “that the belief itself 
has not become a part of my cognitive repertory, in such a way that it will affect the pattern 
of my other beliefs and actions.”287 Nussbaum further advocates that there is also a 
possibility for an unconscious compassion – “for surely it is possible to have compassion 
and not be aware of it – if one is not reflecting on one’s own emotions, or if one has been 
led to suppose that real men don’t have such soft sentiments. Then one could well have and 
be motivated by the thoughts, without being in any noticeable phenomenological state.”288 
Nussbaum thus seems to imply that as much as we are aware and reflective about our 
thoughts and inner life, we are also aware of our emotions and their meaning. 
 
5.1.2 The Elements of Pain and Helping Behavior in Compassion  
 
Cates is also hesitant about other provocative elements of Nussbaum’s approach to 
compassion (and in this regard we could say to her theory altogether since those elements 
																																																								
284 Diana Fritz Cates, “Conceiving Emotions: Martha C. Nussbaum’s ‘Upheavals of Thought,’” The Journal 
of Religious Ethics Vol. 31, No. 2 (2003): 335. 
285 Ibid., 335. 
286 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 324. 
287 Ibid., 324. 
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are inherent to all the emotions according to Nussbaum). Cates points out that Nussbaum 
excludes pain and helping behavior from the nature of compassion.289  
Even physiological pain seems to be very closely related to this emotion, in fact, it is 
often described as a particular type of pain. Yet Nussbaum keeps on asking about the 
nature of this pain and her answer we met already290 – the pain is something “closely 
linked to the thoughts that we might call it the affective dimension of the thought, a pain 
‘at the thought of’ the bad things, as Aristotle puts it.”291 The pain hence is a consequence 
of the thought and no matter how close it is related to the emotion, it is not a constituent 
part of it. Nussbaum seems to suggest that the emotion is an outcome of our complex 
world of values, the moment of recognizing that value is represented by our emotions. The 
subsequent physiological experiences are related to the force of this thought, but they vary, 
so it seems not wise to include any particular type of physiological response into the 
definition itself. The psychological literature on emotion repeatedly tells us that there is no 
one definition of emotion that researchers widely agree upon, but most of them seem to 
consider the physiological aspect a very important, constituent part of emotion. Cates 
follows the mainstream psychology and experiential wisdom in this regard and considers 
the physiological element as part of the emotion of compassion.  
She also links compassion to behavioral expressions of help. Nussbaum seems to 
suggest that if one undergoes the experience of compassion, this experience can lead one to 
helping behavior where an “available course of action suggests itself.”292 Cates thus 
concludes that “the motive, in any case, is caused by compassion, but it is not itself a 
component for compassion.”293 Cates conceives the concern for the other as an inherent 
part of compassion and more than the three judgments:  
 
‘[C]oncern’ is also soothing more than these three beliefs plus some additional beliefs, such as 
the belief that ‘it is good for me to help.’ A compassionate person is (among other things) 
captivated by and drawn toward the person who is in pain, and she wants to alleviate (at least 
some dimension of) the other’s pain and/or suffering, commonly by removing one or more of 
its causes (which could be anything from ignorance, to a physical cause, to the fear of being 
alone in one’s pain).294        
 
In this regard, Nico H. Frijda, a professor of psychology, once again reaffirms that 
the definition of emotion is ‘a perennial problem’ in the field of emotion. He, together with 
Cates, suggests that the physiological element should be considered a part of emotional 
experience. Frijda also notes that the phenomena of emotions signify that “people, objects, 
and events, and the feelings they evoke, moreover, do not leave one cold. They affect one’s 
body and one’s cognitive functioning. One may tremble, become confused, or believe what 
one knows to be untrue. The psychologists’ point of view thus points to a domain of 
phenomena of feelings, behaviors, and bodily reactions.”295 Nussbaum is suggesting not a 																																																								
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psychological, but philosophical account on the nature and meaning of emotion, yet she 
always asserts the force of experiential evidence and respect for the reality suggested by 
research. One may consider that her commitment to analytical philosophy’s respect for 
logical and consistent argument, does not allow her to incorporate physiological change in 
the definition of emotion if it is perceived as a thought. The cognitive element becomes 
central and the physiological change it brings about is linked to the reason as dynamic and 
able to move us, but that element is not part of the thought that emotion is. While we 
consider Nussbaum’s thought on the emotions insightful and philosophically compelling, 
we wonder whether she remains faithful to her own commitment to present emotions from 
an experiential point of view by disregarding the bodily aspect of them. 
 
5.1.3 Do We Feel Compassion Only for Those Who Experience an Undeserved 
Predicament? 
 
Cates acknowledges the conceptual differences between the two accounts in such striking 
ways that she wonders if they still discuss the same phenomenon. She thus attempts to 
highlight yet another feature which divides her and Nussbaum’s thought and which she 
finds particularly provocative, namely, the thought of nondersert in Nussbaum’s way of 
conceiving compassion. We remember that Nussbaum argues that compassion comes to 
being, if we think that the person did not bring the suffering upon himself/herself 
willingly,296 and in the case of the thought that the person came to the predicament due to 
his/her fault we “blame and reproach, rather than having compassion.”297 Cates urges us to 
see that this point is far from obvious and she argues that “it is possible to make a moral 
judgment concerning someone’s action or character, to hold him fully responsible for a 
serious failure, and to feel compassion for him at the same time.”298 Cates draws our 
attention to the fact that the element of blameworthiness is also conceived rather 
differently in religious traditions such as Buddhism and Christianity. Buddhists, for 
instance, believe that everyone is in a state of suffering due to ignorant desire, to put it 
simply. This suffering does not imply that one is blame-free, yet Buddhists advocate 
universal compassion. 
Christian tradition that takes Jesus as a moral exemplar sees him “as someone who 
exercised unconditional compassion toward the people who crossed his path, even as he 
judged some people’s actions to be wrong and their hearts to be deformed, and urged them 
to change their ways.”299 Christianity perceives exemplary divine compassion as 
‘unmerited and extravagant’300 (Cates refers to the parable of the prodigal son as a good 
example of it). We may remember that while arguing for a judgment of nondesert 
Nussbaum argues for a legal system inhabited by compassionate judges (not merciful, note, 
which would imply that the wrongdoing is there but I choose to recognize the obstacles on 
the way to becoming morally good). Why is it so? Nussbaum seems to argue that we 
should not assume too quickly that someone is substantially at fault and that his/her 																																																								
296 See section 2. Compassion and its Cognitive Content of this chapter. 
297 Cates, “Conceiving Emotions,” 336. Here she quotes Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 331. 
298 Ibid., 336.  
299 Ibid., 337. 
300 Cf. Ibid., 337. 
		 139	
social/material/emotional circumstances are not accidental to the person’s choices and acts, 
but is an inherent part of them, enabling people to choose in one way or the other (for 
better or worse in this case). Cates still remains hesitant about this aspect of Nussbaum’s 
thought and wonders should non-fault form the definition of compassion because “the 
recognition that making a judgment of this kind is a serious matter, and that it must be 
made only after a careful consideration of all relevant details of a person’s case, is likely to 
forestall compassion indefinitely.”301  
Cates argument implies that if we encounter a person in distress, experiencing any 
predicament we should be compassionate even without assessing the question of fault and 
scrutinizing the backstory of the person. Nussbaum’s view considers the judgment of 
nondesert as a part of compassion’s nature, but it seems to be conceived in a way that 
people’s, even criminals’ actions that bring predicaments upon them are deeply embedded 
into their story and contexts. This means that the question of guilt and responsibility is not 
an obvious one, but requires careful deliberation. Cates, on the other hand, suggests that 
compassion should be an immediate response to human suffering, independent from how 
much they earned it themselves. Nussbaum sees compassion as a good guide for our 
political communities and so suggests a more procedural account of it, where compassion 
is not unmerited and extravagant, but is offered to victims. Nussbaum’s concept of 
compassion, however, does not seem to offer just an empty shell; it implies a real concern 
for the other and his/her predicament. Nonetheless, we believe that Cates suggests a 
relevant argument pointing out the question of guilt in compassion and compassion as a 
personal, immediate response to the other who is undergoing a serious predicament 
whether it is deserved or not. 
 
5.1.4 Compassion and Religion 
 
Cates asserts that emotions for Nussbaum register truths about life, but what are these 
truths?302 Cates, however, argues that this conception of emotion might be influenced by 
Nussbaum’s own religious views and she refers us to the quotation we have already 
discovered in our presentation of Nussbaum’s ethics:303 
 
To put my cards on the table, then, what I say henceforth is said from the point of view of 
someone who has converted from Christianity to Judaism, and whose understanding of 
Judaism gives the moral sphere considerable autonomy and centrality, seeing the concern of 
God for man as essentially moral and political, focused on this-worldly concerns and actions, 
and intelligible from the point of view of a this-worldly use of intelligence.304 
 
This quotation, to be fair, is taken from the third part of the Upheavals of Thought – 
each part represents related, but independent reflections with the last concerned with erotic 
love and its possible ascents. But Nussbaum’s insistence that any argument should always 
appeal and hold criticism of a contemporary critical rationale and that what happens to 
people here and now is our ultimate concern is very true to her philosophical works 																																																								
301 Ibid., 338. 
302 Cf. Ibid, 339. 
303 See Chapter I, section 1.5 Nussbaum’s Judaism. 
304 Cates, “Conceiving Emotions,” 339. Here Cates quotes Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 549. 
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altogether. The appeal to the other-worldly desire and gratification is alarming to 
Nussbaum because it can encourage quietism and take real suffering of the people as 
irrelevant. These are important and significant elements that theological reflections should 
take seriously, we argue, if they attempt to become equal partners in any discussion. Yet 
Cates initiates an interesting question: how much might our own perception of the world 
and religious convictions, for that matter, influence our theoretical outcomes. Emotions are 
very closely linked to this matter, if we believe that our stipulation that they deal with 
moral value is correct. Because of this reason Cates wants to think of compassion as a 
virtue and we will offer some of her reflections here and in later sections we will come 
back to the question of Judaism in Nussbaum’s thought and its possible influence in her 
own conception of compassion. Yet beforehand we would like to assert that we do not 
agree with Cates’ stipulation that Nussbaum’s views on emotions or compassion is formed 
by her religious conviction in the way that Cates wants to see it. Nussbaum perceives her 
Jewish affiliation as a rational choice – she chose to convert from Christianity to Judaism 
at a mature adult age. Moreover, as our analysis of her theory of emotions in general and of 
compassion in particular has shown – Nussbaum attempts to access her subject matter in 
ethical terms only. Thus she does not offer a religious appropriation of emotion in a way 
that we will encounter Cates doing in her Christian appropriation of compassion. As we 
mentioned above, if emotions have to do with value judgments, they will indeed be 
nurtured and influenced by the images of the religious affiliation one has, in a similar way 
that literature and imagination will affect its content, as we have seen from Nussbaum’s 
works.305 Yet we would not go as far as to state that religious imagination using 
metaphysical arguments have produced Nussbaum’s conception of emotions and 
compassion – they are concepts molded by the appropriation of ancient philosophy, the 
Greek tragic dramas, and the psychoanalytic psychology’s stream of object relation theory, 
to name the biggest influences. Thus together with Martin Kavka we would much more see 
Judaism as forming a landscape of Nussbaum’s approach to ethics and much less directly 
influencing her main concepts. 
 
5.2 CATES’ CONCEPTION OF COMPASSION: IS COMPASSION EMOTION OR VIRTUE? 
 
Cates’ critical assessment of Nussbaum’s conception of compassion can be better fleshed 
out in light of her own work. Coincidentally, Cates has worked out her own account of 
compassion as a good way to live in the presence of so much suffering present in the 
world. Her work aims to be “partly an effort to uncover, elucidate, and celebrate, a moral 
excellence that is all too frequently dismissed as a mark of weakness.”306 We believe that a 
short introduction of the Christian account of compassion can clarify some questions that 
can be posed to Nussbaum’s account from a Christian perspective (and Cates, indeed, 
poses them). It will also illustrate why in certain cases we judge Nussbaum to have a 
stronger and better developed argument to defend her case. After this section we will come 
back to the discussion on Judaic influences for Nussbaum’s thought – this discussion will 																																																								
305 See again section 4.3.1 Humanities at the Aid of the Eudaimonistic Judgment: Tragedy and Comedy as 
Didactical Tools for this question. 
306 Diana Fritz Cates, Choosing to Feel. Virtue, Friendship, and Compassion for Friends (Notre Dame: The 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 1. 
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help to bind all the strings together and hopefully will help to understand what kind of 
ethics we are defending in our project. 
Cates, to put it simply, defends a Christian account of compassion where she chooses 
to present it as a virtue exercised for friends (as she judges that this way of presentation 
might aid to imaginatively capture the nature of this emotion). Her account is held together 
by the works of Aristotle and Aquinas when it comes to defining virtue, friendship, and the 
role of practical wisdom in ethical deliberation (thus, also the role of perception and 
emotion/passion in moral judgment). Compassion itself is conceived in the context of Nel 
Noddings’ care ethics307 (where the weak parts are attempted to be corrected by Cates) and 
the context of Christian compassion is worked out by resting on the work Compassion: A 
Reflection on Christian Life by Donald McNeil, Douglas Morrison, and Henri Nouwen,308 
(Cates broadens and redefines it where needed). In the upcoming reflection we will 
encounter a few elements that are very similar to Nussbaum’s thought due to the same 
source of Aristotle, but the way it is fleshed out differs considerably. But first of all, let us 
define the key terms in Cates’ account and in doing so let us look at the differences and 
similarities with Nussbaum. 
 
5.2.1 Defining Key Terms 
 
5.2.1.1 Virtue 
  
Cates conceives virtue in classical Aristotelian terms as a habitual disposition concerned 
with choosing both to act and feel in accordance with the mean.309 “In other words,” Cates 
asserts, “it is a deeply rooted, stable disposition to act and to feel in light of rational 
deliberation – where rational deliberation is guided by desires for goods that we judge 
reasonably and with keen perception to be productive or constitutive of eudaimonia.”310 
Aristotelian virtue is a matter of steering between excess and deficiency, it is a matter of 
acting and feeling “at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right 
people with the right motive, and in the right way.”311 Deliberative process is always 
particular and contextually related (instead of applying universal rules to the particular) 
and it is essentially a delicate interplay between desire, belief, and perception: 
 
The deliberative process that terminates in choice can be represented in the form of a particular 
syllogism, which is an argument composed of two premises and a conclusion. The major 
premise of the practical syllogism is a desire for a given end. The minor premise is a belief or a 
perception regarding what in the present situation best contributes to the desired end. The 
conclusion combines desire, belief, and perception. It is an action or the intention to act (when 
the time is appropriate) in a way that best contributes to the desired end.312 																																																								
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Cates consults Nussbaum’s analysis of Aristotelian discernment and argues that it is 
a matter of imaginative and passionate perception.313 This discernment is an imaginative 
perception where one is aware of the particularity of the situation, but at the same time is 
attentive to the prior well-deliberated desires for the good (the latter is done as phronimos 
would choose – a person of practical wisdom, as teaching that communities’ most 
exemplary moral teachers would choose (1140a26)). There is no thumb rule to moral life; 
there is a particular situation and moral wisdom habituated by virtue that leads us through 
the improvisation of life with a commitment to become “finely aware and richly 
responsible”314 moral agents (or to word it differently, virtuous people). 
 
5.2.1.2 Infused Virtue 
 
Cates constructs her approach to the virtue of compassion by using the works of Aristotle 
and Aquinas, but she turns to the latter to search for the understanding of the acquired 
moral virtue as a transformed Christian experience. For Aquinas there is a two-fold rule to 
measure human action – natural law and eternal law. The acquired moral virtue is in 
accordance with the first and infused virtue has to do with the second, as it is concerned 
with grace. We will not dwell too long on these questions as we will return to them in our 
discussion on Aquinas. At this stage we attempt to present Cates’ terminology to make her 
argument clear. Theological virtues, understood traditionally, and, indeed, formulated in 
that way by Aquinas “are habits that are infused by God, ‘entirely from without,’ and 
cannot be acquired by means of deliberate human action (I-II 62.1, 63.1).”315 Infused virtue 
leads a human to supernatural happiness that is proportionate to human merit only and 
insofar as he/she is a participant of divine creation. The exercise of infused virtue can lead 
us to the experiences of ultimate meaning and significance of human reality.316 Moreover, 
“infused virtue, for Thomas, does not overcome or oppose acquired virtue, but perfects and 
elevates it. The infusion of habitual grace, in its many forms, enables us to assent with 
certainty to revealed truths that we cannot completely comprehend.”317  
Cates finishes her reflection on infused virtue with the following thought: “It is, I 
think, this understanding of openness to Mystery and the ways in which this openness 
alters the experienced content and interaction of belief, perception, and desire in the moral 
life that makes Christian ethical accounts of good human living and of compassion, in 
particular so provocative.”318 The openness to M/mystery of life, the intuition and hope 
that there is something beyond what the eye meets and that something is worth our trusting 
fall because ultimately there will be the hand to catch us. This is an intuition inherent to 
Christian ethical projects. We judge it legitimate and thought and debate provoking. Yet 																																																								
313 Cf. Ibid., 9. Here Cates refers to Aristotle 1109b13-24, 1126a33-1126b5, 1143b2-6. She also utilizes 
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the mystery is something that ultimately escapes our definitions and we can only attempt to 
describe our experiential glimpses of it. An adequate theological ethics project, in our 
judgment, should indeed be open to a sense of mystery, the mystery of unpredictable and 
uncontrollable life and the ultimate Mystery, but its premises should always start from this 
world (thus not supernatural) argument. To keep our language based on rational arguments 
and yet being open to M/mystery is not an easy task, to be sure. Yet it may be a good way 
in suggesting that theological ethics can indeed be a legitimate partner in ethical 
discussions which are respectful to secular and other religious traditions’ conceptions and 
achievements and comes to the discussion not as an all-consuming ultimate narrative, but 
as an equal partner ready to share the highlights of its long tradition of reflection on the 
meaning of human life and at the same time be able to listen truly openly to other opinions 
which might be radically different. In that way we can only hope that ethical projects will 
reach their ultimate end – inspire people for a good life. Christian ethical projects in their 
regard should be able to define and re-define (which is a never ending process as long as 
human history does not stop) themselves in terms of reflection on human action, inspired 
by Christian sources and beliefs.  
 
5.2.1.3 Friendship 
 
Cates plugs in the notion of friendship in her discussion because she wants to explore “the 
relational context within which virtue is exercised.”319 She furthers that “Aristotle defines 
friendship (philia) as a relationship between separate beings (1161b28) consisting in 
affection and well-wishing (1155b29), where this affection and well-wishing are reciprocal 
(1155a33, 1155b29) and mutually known (1156a5), and where each friend wishes the other 
well ‘for his own sake’ (1155b31).”320 Aquinas appropriates this notion of friendship and 
plugs in a possibility of friendship with God. Hence: 
 
In Thomas’s view, friendship with God gives a believer a new orientation toward a new end, 
and it gives her special resources to pursue the new end in intimate relationship with others – 
others who have their goodness in their own irreplaceably unique pursuits of the same end. 
Friendship with God pursued in friendship with others gives a believer the unforgettable 
impression that all human beings have a share in the divine Life, that all human beings by 
virtue of our participation in the same life are embedded in each other’s lives, that the genuine 
good of each of us includes inescapably the good of every other, and that finally we will 
flourish – or wither – together.321 
 
What Cates attempts to do is to construct a relational model of the self and in this 
model the self and the ‘other self’ or a friend engages in a co-construction of a shared 
moral agency.322 It appears that this relational selfhood seems like an adequate house to 
construct the account of compassion. Cates’ final goal is to think of the virtue of 
compassion in the following context of friendship: “Our concern will be to plumb for an 
understanding of what it might mean for a Christian who shares a life with God to exercise 																																																								
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virtue in friendship with God and in friendship with those whom God has befriended or 
wishes to befriend.”323 
 
5.2.2 Defining Compassion 
 
Cates argues that she began to construe her account on compassion starting with a certain 
western understanding of compassion as a suffering-with. She uses the quotation of a 
philosophy professor Lawrence Blum to illustrate her starting intuition: 
 
Compassion is…a complex emotional attitude toward another, characteristically involving 
imaginative dwelling on the [painful] condition of the other person, an active regard for his 
good, a view of him as a fellow human being, and emotional responses of a certain degree of 
intensity…Characteristically,…compassion [also] requires the disposition to perform 
beneficent action, and to perform them because the agent has had a certain sort of imaginative 
reconstruction of someone’s condition and has a concern for this good.324 
 
Though Cates finds this definition true to some extent, it also leaves her dissatisfied 
as most of the reflections in philosophical literature on the phenomenon of compassion. 
Cates claims that they fail to capture “what is most profound, puzzling, and precious about 
compassion.”325 Her own views on compassion consist of a three-fold argument: 
 
First, compassion is not, strictly speaking, a passion, although it has a great deal to do with 
passion. It is, instead, a virtue, i.e. a habitual disposition concerned with choosing both to act 
and to feel in accordance with a certain rule. Second, compassion is a virtue that human being 
can, do, and should learn to exercise within the context of certain relationships, most notably 
relationships in which friends are attracted and attached to each other on the basis of each 
other’s moral character. Third, compassion is a virtue that human beings can, do, and should 
learn, within the context of character-friendships, to extend toward those whom we would not 
ordinarily regard as friends.326 
 
Cates, as mentioned before, construes her account of compassion in the Aristotelian-
Thomist framework of understanding virtue and friendship. To define compassion, 
however, she relies on Nel Noddings’ Caring as both Aristotle and Thomas do not have 
elaborate accounts of compassion (Aquinas, indeed, speaks very little of compassion and 
Aristotle on his behalf describes it in the cognitive content way we have met in 
Nussbaum.327 Cates seems to be after more phenomenological-experiential descriptions. 
She chose an author who attempts to describe human cares from that perspective). The 
weakness of Noddings’ account in certain philosophical ideas is discussed by Cates herself 
(and also noted by Nussbaum and Martin Kavka whose ideas we will discover in the 
upcoming section).328 Cates utilizes Noddings’  work to define the concept of care and thus 																																																								
323 Ibid., 48. 
324 Ibid., 3. Cates here quotes Lawrence Blum, “Compassion,” in Explaining Emotions, ed. Amelie 
Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 509. 
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328 Martin Kavka argues that Nel Noddings presents an underdeveloped view of motherhood and the 
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selfless giving, while Kavka inspired by Nussbaum asserts that even motherly care emotions should always 
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the element of complacency in compassion, but she moves beyond that account to include 
what it means to care for the other who’s in pain. Noddings describes caring as perception 
of the other’s reality as a possibility for one’s own reality – and in this way it evokes a 
double ‘I must.’ The first element of this imperative is a movement to help the other for 
his/her own sake, to enhance his/her well-being. The second element has to do with me 
seeking to be my best ethical self, so I help the other also for my own sake.329 This 
mechanism is analogous for compassion’s complacency.  
 
5.2.2.1 Compassion’s Complacency: Pain 
 
Pain is a very important element in Cates’ account of experience of compassion. Let us 
remember that Cates’ starting point is compassion for friends, for our ‘extended selves.’ 
Through the metaphor of a shared body Cates wants to present her argument for a co-
experienced physical and passional pain with a friend/the other self who suffers. She’s 
pressing on the argument for an interbodied connectedness where in compassion’s 
complacency we can actually share others’ sensation: 
 
That is to say, it is rare in our compassion for friends that we experience in our own bodies a 
physical sensation that we would describe in exactly the same way that our friends would 
describe their own sensation. Most of time when we co-feel bodily pain with our friends, we 
seem to co-feel some of the physical agitation that is part and parcel of the passional 
component of their pain – an agitation that tends to be much less intense, localized, and 
focused than the original sensation. But it does sometimes happen, I think, that we experience 
with our ‘other selves,’ if only in a flash, something of the original physical component of their 
pain.330 
 
Cates, then, advocates an understanding of human relationality where our physical 
and emotional boundaries are rather flexible. For Cates a life of friendship is a life of 
sharing – with our friends we share visions, perceptions, desires, joys and pains – they 
create an extended body of experience.331 Cates offers an example of her own daughter 
falling and skinning her knees and argues that in experience of this fall she does not 
experience herself as a separate person imaginatively bridging her own and the separate 
person’s experiences: “My experience is that we are one extended self, skinning our knees 
together. There is no distance between us to overcome, no chasm to bridge, only the 
immediate, shared sensation of knees scraping pavement: my knees, her knees, where these 
seem for the moment to be the same.”332 We can already see why Cates is critical of 
Nussbaum’s account of compassion – the element of shared pain is essential to it. Cates 
account is much more based on describing the experiential elements of compassion and 																																																																																																																																																																							
fall under scrutiny – there will always be a separation between the two subjects (the caregiver and the 
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including what is happening cognitively and physiologically in the experience of this 
phenomenon. Nussbaum’s focus in describing any emotion is its intentional cognitive 
content – the very moment of the value recognition is emotion, all the rest being just 
closely linked to it. Her choice do go through this path of explanation is again the universal 
focus of her project – we believe that Nussbaum does not want to tie particular people to 
any universal account of what an experience of compassion should feel like. The 
recognition of the tragic predicament of compassion is the core of the emotion, not the 
painful co-suffering described by Cates (though in many cases it will be, yet Nussbaum 
does not compel anyone to go through an experience of compassion in that particular 
way). 
We might have also noticed that Cates and Nussbaum’s starting point of experience 
of compassion is somewhat similar – both start with a more particular context of 
experiencing compassion for the ones close to us and then expand it. Nussbaum, however, 
starts with immediate parent-children experience as a first, biologically (and evolutionary) 
grounded seed of emotion and Cates starts with the concept of friends (friendship in the 
common usage of the word is the main case, but it also includes parent-children and 
intimate relationships). We argue that the movement from particular to universal seems to 
be a good starting point, especially having in mind adequate moral education where we 
already can plug ethical notions into existing experiences and try to work to extend them. 
Yet we also think that Cates starting point of friendship is less self evident. The first school 
of emotional experiences in the immediate family ties relationships seems to be a more 
evident (and interdisciplinary based, in that regard) approach, while friendship, as 
conceived by Cates seems to represent a second concentric circle of care.333 Furthermore, 
the conception of friendship Cates describes resembles more of an ethical ideal and 
something to constantly attain in our friendships. If we say that compassion appears in this 
context of the experience of extended self in friendships – do we really give it a right home 
to start building our reflections about this phenomenon? We argue that Nussbaum chooses 
a more realistic starting point.  
 
5.2.2.2 Compassion’s Desire 
 
Cates, like Nussbaum, constructs compassion as having a cognitive element (in Nussbaum 
compassion is entirely a cognitive phenomenon, to be sure). Cates chooses to focus on the 
process of deliberation which, according to her, is central to the exercise of compassion. 
She tackles this task in a form of Aristotelian deliberation which, as we have seen before, 
is presented in a form of practical syllogism – the major premise being desire for a 
particular good, the minor premise representing a belief or perception of what in a current 
situation can help to attain that good, and a conclusion representing an action or intention 
to act in a way that is perceived to help to contribute to the desired end. 
Cates’ compassion as a major premise has different layers of desire. In the first place, 
Cates argues “although in any given process of decision making we begin our deliberations 
with a desire for a good that is specific to the circumstance at hand, such a desire cannot be 																																																								
333 Look at this chapter’s section 2.3.4 The Limits of Compassion: The Problem of Bias where we discuss 
how Nussbaum appropriates Hierocles’ image of concentric circles to grasp compassion better. 
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separated completely from more general desires regarding the kinds of people we want to 
be and the kind of world we want to inhabit.”334 The moment of someone’s predicament is 
seen as an opportunity to enhance the observer ethically (at this point Cates comes back to 
Noddings’ analysis of what care means). The object of this ethical caring is three-fold. 
First of all, it’s a desire for my own eudaimonia; here Cates makes a relational argument 
where as relational human beings we flourish by giving and receiving care. Secondly, the 
object of care is eudaimonia of the person in predicament. Lastly, through caring behavior 
we desire to contribute “to the formation and maintenance of a flourishing human 
community.”335  
Cates describes the general desire of compassion as care for the flourishing of the 
self, the other, and the larger community, then. Compassion’s desire, according to Cates, 
also has a layer of context-specific particular goods. This particular desire of compassion is 
brought up in a dynamics of the relationship between you-me (the compassionate person 
and the person in predicament) and so the intentional content of caring ideally should be a 
composition of my own understanding of good and a genuine attempt to respect the other’s 
understanding of the good. And so Cates argues: “It is when the other’s wanting becomes 
partly our own that we are most likely to have the other’s interests, rather than our mere 
projections of his interests, at heart in our deliberations.”336 As we have already 
encountered, Cates’ compassion is a phenomenon which is born in a context of friendship, 
where “our unique and separate selves have been knit together into a single, extended 
self.”337 So for Cates compassion’s desire for good is sort of a dynamic movement between 
my and your understanding of it. Cates thus argues that in compassion we can find a 
double wanting for and with the other. 
When I want something for you (in the case where I want something for you that you 
do not want for yourself or you can want it but I do it on behalf of my own desires) – “I 
experience myself to be separate from you in my wanting.”338 In the experience of 
compassion one also wants things with the other (in both cases when I want something that 
I would not want naturally but you want it and when I would want it anyway and I want it 
on behalf of our common loves, we experience a shared desire). And so Cates furthers that 
“I experience myself as me-you, and I experience the center of myself to be moving back 
and forth between me and you, such that is sometimes closer to the me-pole and sometimes 
closer to you-pole.”339 The ultimate want of compassion is my desire to ‘save’ the other: 
 
We might say that, at bottom, what I want in compassion is to ‘save’ you, but I want to save 
you in the sense of empowering you by means of enlarging and expanding you, by means of 
adding myself – my presence and my power – to you and thus eliciting within you an uncanny 
sense that this life of yours, which might seem to you in your pain to be so puny and 
insignificant, so expendable, is actually a component part of something larger. It is minimum a 
part of my life.340 
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Cates articulates a picture of compassion which is born out of an intimate 
interpersonal relationship and thus presupposes it. It also speaks in terms of the ‘extended 
self’ where compassion and its desire move in a continuum of separateness and unity – and 
Cates very clearly wants to make compassion an existential commitment thus Nussbaum’s 
more procedural account of it seems to her a thin understanding of the richness the notion 
of compassion can bear. Cates asserts that “the effort to define compassion is itself a 
normative enterprise. It is implicitly a way of indicating how people ought to receive and 
respond to those who are suffering.”341  
There is certain truth in her claim, to be sure, but it also seems that Cates’ and 
Nussbaum’s accounts might serve different purposes of the academic discussion. We 
believe that Nussbaum targets a larger audience by choosing a more universally applicable 
language to depict compassion as an adequate response to human suffering. Cates seems to 
target a Christian audience where she is concerned with a rich descriptive account of 
compassion where experience of compassion starts from a not so self-evident notion of 
friendship and reaches its heights in friendship with God and the people who are his 
friends (thus Christian community) and the people who He wants to befriend, as we shall 
see later in our exposé.  
In addition, we could say that the focus of the two authors is different in other 
aspects too. When dissecting compassion Nussbaum seems to focus on the nature of the 
emotion itself. Thus she is preoccupied with defining the cognitive structure of it in the 
terms she finds suitable and true, leaving the experiential aspects of emotion out of the 
definition (the content of the emotion is universal, thus, not the expression). Cates in her 
own right seems to focus on what is happening to the person who experiences compassion. 
She engages in descriptions of the you-I movement in a desire of compassion by stating 
that this experience is normative to what true compassion is. We argue that vivid 
descriptions of experience of compassion are needed and very useful – as they do disclose 
what compassion is (and can contribute to more adequate definitions, thus). They also 
seem very useful for educating compassion after we have already recognized the ethical 
worth of it, which is not a self evident fact in a pluralist contemporary society. 
 
5.2.2.3 Compassion’s Belief and Perception 
 
Let us now look at the element of belief or perception in Cates’ account of compassion. 
We have seen that in Cates’ compassion we desire something for and with our friends and 
“it is because (and only because) we feel bound by this bundle of desires that we are 
moved to initiate a deliberative process aimed at assisting our ‘other selves’ in their painful 
predicaments.”342 Central to this discernment of particulars (in compassions’ case – the 
discernment of the predicament and the most appropriate ways to respond to it) is 
perception (stated by Aristotle and affirmed by Aquinas). Thus Cates wishes to take a 
closer look at perception that contributes to compassion and subsequent decisions that 
show compassion. 
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Cates’ goal in this section is to show that our desires, perceptions, and thinking are 
always intertwined. She wants to leave the dichotomy of rational and emotional behind 
(thus, seeing one as containing no emotional element whatsoever and the other as having 
no cognitive achievement) and to look at what is really happening in our moral 
deliberations. Thus Cates declares: 
 
[A] great deal of our deliberative activity concerning what is going on, what is at stake, 
whether and how it matters, and whether and how we are able and willing to assist our friends, 
is accomplished in our integrative wanting, perceiving, and believing. It is a mistake to suggest 
that I can or should put my feeling and my perceiving on hold in order to reason ‘objectively’ 
about what is really going on. What is really going on is that I am deeply attached to your well-
being, I am intensely desirous of meeting your immediate needs, I am afraid that I might not be 
able to meet some of these needs, and I want to meet whatever needs I can in a way that has a 
positive and lasting impact on our relationship.343 
 
Cates, thus inspired by the same source as Nussbaum (Aristotle) comes to the 
conclusion that our moral deliberation is a complex phenomenon where various faculties 
work together and the knowledge that emotions bring to it deserves not only our attention, 
in fact, it has an integral role in our deliberations. By ignoring it practically (thus when we 
engage in moral decision-making), we choose not to engage in moral deliberation in its full 
force because we choose to ignore part of the information available to us. By ignoring it in 
our academic discussions we choose to omit a part of moral discernment that plays a 
legitimate part in who we are as moral agents. In addition, acknowledged or not, our 
desire, perception, and thought is intertwined and if we attempt to suggest ethical 
reflections that are attentive to it we might hope that they will have certain force as they 
will be able to reflect the actual experience of people in it and so be appealing. 
Cates’ account is certainly attentive to this element and trying to advocate ethics 
which would have some experiential force. Together with Nussbaum she recognizes the 
intentional element of desire which enables one to see things about the person in 
predicament that would otherwise be absent (“it is only because I treasure you that I notice 
how helpless you are”344). Our desires are not the clear cut notions we can easily access, 
though. We know that experientially, we have seen that Nussbaum calls our emotions 
‘messy.’345 Cates suggests in line with Nussbaum that our goal should not be to extricate 
our desire (and it is an impossible aim, ultimately). “Rather,” Cates argues, “the thing to do 
is to feel the range of our desires and to reflect upon them honestly in light of a well-
deliberated vision of the good and an abiding desire for its realization.”346 
 
5.2.3 Compassion’s Act or Intention to Act: Compassion as Virtue - Choosing to Feel 
Compassion in the Right Way 
 
Cates defines compassion understood as virtue in the following way: 
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Qua virtue, compassion is a habitual disposition concerned with choosing both to act and to 
feel (passion) in the way that we deem to be best on the basis of our deliberations. It is a 
habitual disposition concerned with choosing both to act and to feel in accordance with the 
mean, where the mean just is the best action-passion possible (i.e., the ‘right’ action-passion) in 
a given circumstance.347 
 
Cates argues that we can choose whether and how to feel compassion’s 
complacency. Furthermore, she argues in Aristotelian spirit “that the best choices rest with 
well-educated, empassioned perception.”348 The choice to opt for compassion when we do 
not feel it spontaneously is an exercise of practical wisdom and thus it requires prudent 
movement of the mind and heart between various extremes. Cates claims that balance can 
be a good key term in exercising our compassion prudently: “Achieving balance in our 
overall pattern of decision making requires achieving balance in our character, which 
requires living reflectively with others in the pursuit of a life that we take, with good 
reason, to be good.”349 The adequate mean of compassion can aim at “targets” like these: 
“remaining attentive to multiple particulars, yet focused on those that are most significant; 
remaining vulnerable to being moved by the desires of others, yet centered within context 
of our own desiderative awareness; remaining open to feeling with and for any human 
being in particular, yet decisive with respect to how we will expend our finite human 
resources.”350 
 
5.2.3.1 Exercising the Virtue of Compassion as a Christian 
 
Cates concludes her analysis of compassion in discussion of it as a virtue conceived in 
Christian terms. She attempts to demonstrate how friendship with God can alter the way 
we stand in the relationship with friends who are in pain and how we can extend our 
compassion to people who we would not ordinarily see as friends. At this point her 
Aristotelian-Thomistic framework, infused by Noddings’ understanding of care is 
grounded in a Christian context by utilizing the work of Donald McNeil, Douglas 
Morrison, and Henri Nouwen called Compassion: A Reflection on Christian Life, the work 
Cates chooses to use because it was one of the few religious, ethical works dedicated to the 
analysis of compassion. 
In Cates’ analysis Christian compassion represents an ‘elevated’ response to human 
suffering because we become elevated moral agents participating in God’s vision of the 
good. We become the carriers of the divine compassion, “participants in God’s desire to 
accomplish this good, participants in God’s belief and perception of how this good could 
best be accomplished in a given situation, and participants in the action-passion with which 
God seeks to accomplish this good.”351 
For McNeill, Morrison, Nouwen, and Cates divine compassion does not refer to an 
abstract conception, but the concrete experience of who Jesus was, found in the Scripture: 
“We will never really know God as a compassionate God if we do not understand with our 																																																								
347 Ibid., 177-178. 
348 Ibid., 206. 
349 Ibid., 206.  
350 Ibid., 207. 
351 Ibid., 208-209. 
		 151	
heart and mind that ‘[God] lived among us’ (Jn 1:14).”352 This essentially means that God 
has entered human life in its fullness – he “has chosen to enter with us into the depths of 
human uncertainty and vulnerability.”353 This recognition of vulnerability (and in certain 
sense brokenness of human condition) is also found in Nussbaum’s analysis. Cates, 
however, makes it directly linked to the divine incarnation and our trust that God took all 
human experiences into his compassionate embrace. Through our faith, then, we are reborn 
from ‘the womb of God’s compassion’354 and we are ready to receive our elevated moral 
agencies as participants of the divine vision. When we receive our new selves from God, 
we can also see a change in our perception: “Encountering with Christ the reality of our 
own brokenness, we are able to encounter the brokenness of other human beings, and we 
are able to perceive their brokenness, not as something that makes them different from us, 
but rather as something that makes them like us.”355 The movement of compassion as a 
recognition of our common humanity with others and especially through experiences (or 
witnessing) vulnerability is also prominent in Nussbaum’s works. What Cates seems to 
argue implicitly is that we can fully understand the meaning of compassion when it is 
infused with the Christian faith that trusts that God also suffered with us. Divine suffering 
gives the ultimate meaning to ours and it also gives Christians somewhat superior moral 
agency (the term ‘elevated’ which is often employed by Cates refers to raise something to 
a higher position, after all).  
While Cates tries to access the heart of compassion with a full existential force – 
compassion should move one deeply and personally till one almost becomes the sufferer – 
it leaves us with a question – Can only Christians, then, access the full meaning of 
compassion? Cates chooses to devote the final chapter of her analysis of compassion to a 
Christian account of it and this might imply that she sees it as an ultimate expression of 
compassion. We will see later on that Nussbaum chooses to see a Jewish account of love 
and compassion as most convincing – yet this analysis appears as an independent third part 
of the Upheavals of Thought, discussing ways of purifying erotic love. Nussbaum suggests 
reversing the ladder to ideal and argues that only our attentiveness to the real, to the 
phenomena of daily life will restore our loves for the ideal. Nussbaum’s issue with Cates’ 
account might be precisely Cates’ decision to stop at the ideal where only the fact that 
Jesus took up the human nature and plunged into our brokenness and elevated it, makes 
one able to experience and understand what compassion truly is. Our suggestion would 
resemble Nussbaum’s in this regard – theological ethical reflections on the ethical 
accomplishment of compassion should focus on the more universal aspects of it so we 
would not risk stripping non-Christian participants of society of the possibility of being 
truly compassionate. Yet we also argue that Christian theologians have a legitimate right to 
suggest their vision of what Christian faith can offer to common human compassion, 
especially by connecting it with the divine compassion and the images found in numerous 
writings of tradition and the Scripture. These images can nurture our understanding of 
compassion and sustain it in a similar way that Nussbaum suggests the art and literary 
works can. 																																																								
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5.2.3.2 Christian Faith and Charity Altering Compassion’s Complacency 
 
Now let us continue together with Cates to look at her suggested ascent of compassion. We 
have already pointed out that compassion infused by Christian faith and charity is changed 
and becomes a somewhat elevated moral response to the suffering. It makes us aware of 
our own humanity and vulnerability and by this makes us also aware and comfortable in 
the presence of the other human being who is similar to us. 
Christian compassion is ultimately a gift (thus it is understood in terms of an infused 
virtue) and it is “not a result of systematic study or effort.”356 Nonetheless, Cates suggests 
together with McNeil, Morrison, and Nouwen that there are, indeed, certain practical steps 
that can enhance our openness to Christian compassion’s complacency. The first one is a 
practice of voluntary displacement. This, to put it simply, refers to displacing ourselves 
from situations of seeming comfort and control to places where ambiguity and 
powerlessness rule, to the places where human hurt appears. Those can be geographical, 
work and attitude related displacements.357  
The strength and patience to sustain ourselves in these displacements come from the 
cultivation of the life of prayer because it aids at coming into ‘a deep solidarity’ with the 
other: 
 
To pray for others means to make them part of ourselves. To pray for others means to allow 
their pains and sufferings, their anxieties and loneliness, their confusion and fears to resound in 
our inmost selves. To pray, therefore is to become those for whom we pray, to become the sick 
child, the fearful mother, the distressed father, the nervous teenager, the angry student, the 
frustrated striker. To pray is to enter a deep inner solidarity with our fellow human beings so 
that in and through us they can be touched by the healing power of God’s Spirit.358 
 
Christian community through a common practice of prayer forms an extended moral 
agency with partly shared deliberations and commitments and can enjoy an intimacy of 
‘mutual indwelling.’359 
 
5.2.3.3 Christian Faith and Charity Altering Compassion’s Desire 
 
We should keep in the back of our heads that Cates analyses compassion in terms of 
practical syllogism where desire represents a major premise, perception and belief a minor 
premise of compassion and the conclusion is compassion’s choice for action-passion 
(intention to act and to feel when it is appropriate). Christian faith and charity in this regard 
comes to aid at our conceptions of the parts of compassion’s structure. 
Cates argues that a Christian wants to want what is good and “she believes that 
God’s desire is determinative of what is good, and she therefore wants more than anything 
to want what God wants as a participant in God’s own wanting.”360 This wanting is 																																																								
356 Cates quoting McNeil, Morrison, and Nouwen, Compassion, 90. 
357 Cf. Cates, Choosing to Feel, 214. 
358 Cates quoting McNeil, Morrison, and Nouwen, Compassion, 110. 
359 Cf. Cates, Choosing to Feel, 217-218. 
360 Ibid., 220. 
		 153	
educated in a prayerful and ongoing conversation with a Friend whose nature is to desire 
good and in a relationship with friends who have an interest in moral growth. By these 
means we can specify further the intentional content of the Christian compassion’s desire. 
This changed desire can aid us in seeing ourselves as relational beings “who have a 
personal stake in the flourishing of every other human being.” Cates seems to argue that 
choosing to feel compassion in the right way for a Christian and non-Christian remains a 
task of appropriating the intentional content of what it means to suffer with and for the 
other; these deliberations are born in the critical conversations in the context of friendship. 
The desire itself should arise and be habituated according to the best vision of good and 
love available to the person. Christians, however, seek the education of desire in the 
explicit friendship with God and the other friends of God (and in this context we not only 
form our desire, we allow it to be formed): 
 
She seeks the education of her desires for eudaimonia and the goods that contribute to 
eudaimonia partly by appropriating prayerfully Biblical and other narratives about the 
compassion (and the other excellences) of God, Jesus, and the followers of Jesus, i.e., by 
listening to, reflecting upon, conversing about, critiquing, reading, reciting, studying, singing, 
and enacting in ritual a variety of stories that disclose the compassionate God’s engagement 
with human beings.361 
 
5.2.3.4 Christian Faith and Charity Altering Compassion’s Belief and Perception 
 
At this stage Cates enters yet another delicate issue prone to spark some debate and 
controversy. The main question is how our friendship with God can condition the 
perception and belief constituting compassion? McNeil, Morrison, and Nouwen argue that 
in the encounter with the suffering others Christians always keep their attention focused on 
God. And they claim “what they seek is not misery and pain but the God whose 
compassion they have felt in their own lives. Their eyes do not focus on poverty and 
misery, but on the face of the loving God”362 and though Christians reach out for those in 
need they always give “full undivided attention to the voice of the beloved Father.”363 This 
would raise Nussbaum’s critical question (and so would ours) does a Christian ultimately 
reduce the suffering person to the God he/she dearly loves and so takes away an authentic 
experience of the real, particular person in his/her predicament? This was indeed one of the 
reasons why Nussbaum refuses Augustine’s ascent of Christian love – for her it does 
ultimately consume the particularity of the other in a name of one’s love for God.364  
The second, important issue is the suggestion of McNeil, Morrison, and Nouwen that 
‘Christian eyes do not focus on poverty and misery’ – this point is yet another delicate 
issue to highlight. Does this mean that a Christian does not take suffering seriously and 
sees the love for God and otherworldly promise as an ultimate refuge? For Nussbaum pain 
should never not be taken seriously or be romanticized, we may remember that through her 
works she constantly stresses that pain infantilizes human agency and can ultimately strike 																																																								
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the very human agency stripping one of the possibility to engage in it fully.365 The way 
chosen by McNeil, Morrison, and Nouwen seems to suggest that temporary suffering is not 
that urgent compared to the hope of an eternal beatitude. 
Cates does not address the question about the way McNeil, Morrison, and Nouwen 
conceive human suffering, yet she comments on their insistence that the focus of our 
compassion is God alone. She insists that the perception of compassion is focused on a 
particular person, his/her suffering and possible means of alleviating that pain. “To make 
God,” she furthers, “the focus (i.e., the object) of compassion is to reduce compassion to 
the love of God.”366 Cates argues that a Christian can see the suffering person as God-
related and thus to see the ways of helping him/her with reference to his/her God-
relationality. But she concludes: “If the Christian does not, in a given situation, have the 
alleviation of this (God-related) person’s (God-related) pain at the center of her (God-
related) attention, then what she is feeling is not properly characterized as compassion.”367 
And though Cates attempts to find a balance in the object of Christian compassion – it is 
the suffering person primarily – we wonder how much helpful is her God-related nuance 
that she chooses to leave in brackets. What is the meaning of this God-relatedness in 
compassion? This in a way seems to resemble Nussbaum’s conception of similar 
possibilities and eudaimonistic judgment (thus intentional content) of compassion.368 In 
Cates’ thought, Christians seem by the virtue of common creaturely nature to extend their 
compassion to others and the God-relatedness which implicates relationality makes your 
flourishing part of my own. 
 
5.2.3.5 Christian Faith and Charity Altering Compassion’s Choice to Act 
 
Finally, Cates concludes her analysis on the reflection of compassion’s choice to act and 
feel when the situation is appropriate. This reflection wants to inquire into the question of 
how our friendship with God can alter a Christian’s decision to judge who is a proper 
object of compassion. Thus Cates wants to discuss the possibility of extension of our cares 
(we may remember that her concept of compassion is exercised within a context of 
friendship with people with whom we share similar moral character, thus in her framework 
these friendships also seem to be situated primarily within a Christian community). 
Cates constructed friends as ‘the other selves’ with whom we share very intimate 
connection and thus compassion is in no way a strange moral response to their 
predicament, but in what sense can we be compassionate to complete strangers and even 
our enemies, then?  
Cates tries to construct compassion to strangers and even enemies as an act of 
befriending. This seems a logical move in an account where compassion is seen as “a 
disposition deliberately to receive and respond to persons in pain as if they were persons 
with whom we share our lives.”369 Extending compassion to people other than our friends 
does not turn the sufferer into our friend (friendship is always a mutually recognized 																																																								
365 Cf. Nussbaum, Political Emotions, 263-264. 
366 Cates, Choosing to Feel, 226. 
367 Ibid., 226. 
368 See section 2.1 Altering the Judgment of Similarity: Eudaimonistic Judgment of this chapter. 
369 Cates, Choosing to Feel, 231. 
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benevolent relationship), but it is an initial recognition of likeness (thus, be attentive, this is 
a recognition of common humanity found also in Nussbaum). Cates hence furthers: 
 
We do not need to spend our days with a particular stranger or enemy to presume with good 
reason and passion that he is like us in the way that he experiences certain pains: he, too, has 
life plans that he wishes to accomplish; he, too, fears the frustration of these plans; he, too, 
feels vulnerable when his plans are frustrated by awareness-consuming sensations of pain; he, 
too, is afraid of being abandoned in his pain; he, too, is afraid to abandon those who are 
depending upon him to stay well; he, too, gets tired of life’s struggle, yet he, too, is afraid of 
dying.370 
 
Here Cates does not appeal to Christian faith to make this recognition, yet Christian 
faith can be a catalyst in actually being able to see the other as a fellow human being. The 
act of befriending is an extension of affection we usually feel for friends – a one-sided act 
of making a far away one our own. “It is a preparedness,” Cates argues, “to allow our 
broader patterns of wanting, thinking, and perceiving to be altered by the other, such that 
the other really does become (and remains) an integral part of us.”371 Cates very clearly 
wants to make compassion not a moral sentiment of a broad sort, but a strong, particular 
emotion which moves me very deeply and personally to you – I recognize you as you are, a 
person, even though I might not be linked to you more than through the recognition that we 
both are human beings and so we share similar hopes and woes. 
Of course, constructing compassion and its extension in such terms have minuses. 
One can presuppose that if we take a notion like befriending and place it closely to the 
definition of compassion – our compassion for the far other might imply that we seek a 
long-term relationship with him/her, which is clearly untrue in a lot of cases. The notion of 
befriending might also have negative effects for the concept of friendship itself – Cates 
construes it as a deep intimacy, after all. If we see extension of our compassion to those 
who are not our friends at the moment as an act of befriending, this can water down the 
meaning of a true friendship because we will be using the term to describe a phenomena 
that does not hold the characteristics of it. 
Cates recognizes these possible disadvantages, but she argues that her concept of 
befriending has a strong point, a point that she considers to be essential to what 
compassion is, in fact. And so Cates argues: 
 
[T]o construe an act of compassion for a stranger or an enemy as an act of befriending is to 
suggest that compassion is not something that we do-feel for people ‘in general.’ That is 
something that we must do-feel for them in ‘particular.’ That is, it requires encountering 
persons in pain in their particularity, feeling attracted to them, wanting to be with them, and 
wanting to benefit them as the unique persons that they are.372 
 
Cates argues that defining compassion descriptively is already a normative enterprise 
– it always implies how we think compassion should be exercised. Thus she employs rich 
descriptions not to ‘water down’ the meaning and experience of compassion. This 
definition, Cates argues, applies to a Christian and non-Christian audience. A Christian 																																																								
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extending compassion to a stranger or an enemy will go cognitively and emotionally 
through the same mechanisms as a non-Christian, the difference between the believer and 
non-believer being Christian imagery forming the imagination and thus perception of the 
former. Cates thus furthers that in this regard a Christian virtuous character is formed in 
accordance with the Word: “You shall be disposed to regard and to treat every person in 
pain, in her particularity, as ‘another yourself.’”373 
This imperative is an opening gate to make others’ flourishing important to my own 
because this brings me closer to God who is the ultimate flourishing. This is a starting 
point of being sensitive and open to the other’s pain and this does not give ready-made 
solutions of how to practice compassion in particular cases or how to balance our 
immediate and less proximate cares. That is ultimately the task of practical wisdom (the 
same Aristotelian concept that manages our ethical decisions also in Nussbaum’s thought). 
Practical wisdom is cultivated through a long life span, through our experiences and 
critical reflection upon our lives that aim at mutual flourishing. Our perception is, indeed, 
aimed at being one with God’s but as long as it is separate, (and we always keep the 
separateness even in unity with God in Catholic doctrine) a Christian – “will have to make 
decisions about how to construe what she perceives and how to act-feel on the basis of 
those construals – decisions that emanate from the aspect of her extended moral agency 
which she has learned to recognize as most intimately, irreducibly, and continuously ‘her 
own.’”374 
 
5.2.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
After reading Cates’ concerns we see the validity of them, we could also say that her 
Christian appropriation of compassion and Nussbaum’s philosophical concepts of 
compassion can, in fact, strike as different notions. Christianity advocates a particular and 
‘extravagant’ conception of compassion which is infused with religious imagery that 
speaks to the adherents of this tradition (just think of the parable of the prodigal son as a 
perfect example of unmerited and extravagant compassion found in the Scripture). 
Nussbaum’s scope is different altogether – she wants to access the value of emotions 
from an ethical point of view, suggesting that they are also important for our political 
arrangements. She envisions a liberal democracy where the knowledge conveyed by 
emotions can be utilized in a rational and institutionalized way. Her compassion has a 
fixed cognitive content that can be educated. It is also promoted by a political regime for 
the citizens of various religious backgrounds. This context causes her to search for 
universal ways to define compassion and defend its utility. Cates doubts if Christian 
compassion and the phenomenon Nussbaum defends is the same thing and it indeed has 
some evident conceptual differences. What Nussbaum attempts to do, however, is to find 
something universally communicable in this phenomenon as she is convinced that it can 
provide some strong elements in strengthening the social fabric. What is common in 
various conceptions of compassion, we argue, is the recognition of the other as a fellow 
human being and that his/her predicaments can in fact move me.  																																																								
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Christian compassion, inspired by a metaphorical language of the Scripture, can 
indeed form our treatment of others and Nussbaum seemingly would not argue against it. 
Yet, if one proclaims compassion as a leading social and political sentiment and argues for 
its constitutional and legal implementations (like Nussbaum does through her advocacy of 
the capabilities approach) one cannot argue for an ‘extravagant’ and more arbitrary use of 
it. If we value one tradition’s wisdom (or even hold it true to that extent) in arguing what 
compassion truly is, we cannot utilize it in a totalitarian way and undermine the freedom of 
the people who cannot agree with the religious premise of it. One cannot compel liberal 
contemporary societies to a Christian compassion. As theological ethicists we can learn 
from Nussbaum’s sensitivities in defining what we hold good and truthful, yet without 
dragooning people against their will to it. We also argue that the creation and 
argumentation for a compassionate society requires building bridges. Thus Christian 
theology can find an ally in Nussbaum’s philosophy of emotion and a stimulus to construct 
a thought through argument if it wants to contribute to wider academic and societal 
reflections on questions addressing fundamental issues of human nature. 
Finally, one could hardly deny Nussbaum’s hesitation about one writing a normative 
ethical project from a particular conviction, especially if we have in mind a religious 
reflection that presupposes external transcendence (thus, writing from the premise that we 
know something about God as it is and making subsequent normative claims stemming 
from it).375 We can understand Nussbaum’s hesitation in this regard, but we also cannot 
agree that theological ethics cannot make any legitimate normative claims. Inspired and 
moved forward by Nussbaum’s critique we will attempt to find a balanced way to express 
our religious convictions in theological ethics in a non-totalizing, but universal and 
respectful manner. Cates’ account on Christian compassion can be an example of a good 
starting point with rich experiential descriptions of compassion, yet we do think in certain 
areas, we have highlighted in our presentation, it lacks universal communicability. 
In our upcoming section we want to turn to Nussbaum’s own religious conviction 
and suggested by Cates take a look at how much it influences her own ethical project. This 
exercise, we hope, can shed more light on a way an adequate ethical project discussing the 
most fundamental human motivations should be constructed.  
 
5.3 JUDAISM IN NUSSBAUM’S ETHICS  
 
Nussbaum’s relationship with Judaism might be the key in understanding why she chooses 
to construct compassion in the form of three rational thoughts and does not entertain 
talking about it as a virtue as Cates does. The very core of this reasoning, namely, the this-
worldly focus, is acknowledged by Nussbaum herself and pointed out by Cates. But let us 
take a closer look at Judaism in Nussbaum’s ethics. 																																																								
375 Carlo Leget in his “Martha Nussbaum and Thomas Aquinas on Emotions” points out that Nussbaum is 
critiqued for marginalizing people who write from their particular commitment (be it Christianity, Judaism, 
feminism). Though, he also argues that gradually her works changed perspective and we can see it in her 
writings on human development that usually tightly discuss females in their particular context (mainly India) 
and her confession of the sympathy for Judaism in the Upheavals of Thought. See Leget, “Martha Nussbaum 
and Thomas Aquinas on Emotions,” 568. Here Leget refers us to a critique of Nussbaum by L. Gregory Jones 
found in “The Love Which Love’s Knowledge Knows Not: Nussbaum’s Evasion of Christianity,” The 
Thomist 56 (1992): 323-337.  
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Martin Kavka, a professor of Judaism studies and philosophy, reaffirms that 
Upheavals of Thought associates Judaism with carnality and vulnerability.376 Kavka, in 
fact, reaffirms our suggested insight that the dynamics between the perfect and the real can 
be a key point in understanding her ethics. For him all of Nussbaum’s publications can be 
seen as extensions of her basic claim “human limits structure the human excellences, and 
give excellent action its significance.”377 Moreover, “whether treating legal, literary, social, 
or political matters, she has consistently argued that any comprehensive ideology that 
claims to understand the good and the perfect leads to hatred and disgust unless it is 
accompanied (but not replaced) by a love for that which is finite, incomplete, and 
imperfect in humanity.”378  
 
5.3.1 External Transcendence Claims in Theological Ethics 
 
Kavka also helps us to situate Nussbaum’s ethics in a relationship to transcendental claims. 
Her ethics suggest a wave like motion between internal transcendence and real life 
circumstances and so Kavka argues: 
 
While accepting the human impulse to seek to transcend the limits of a mortal life, Nussbaum 
has criticized any account of ‘external transcendence’ which takes this impulse to such an 
extreme that it ends up devaluing the mortal and the human in favor of the immortal and 
divine, and has instead offered an account of ‘internal transcendence’ which struggles to create 
a more excellent world through a never-ending negotiation and renegotiation of the external 
heterogeneity of our personal and political relationships.379 
 
We believe that this is a very true and insightful explanation of Nussbaum’s ethics, 
but this inevitably poses some problems to theological ethics which aspires to make any 
normative claims utilizing ‘external transcendence’ claims. 
Nussbaum’s views on external transcendence claims are influenced by her 
liberal/Enlightenment Judaic views. Nussbaum proclaims herself an ‘Enlightenment Jew’ 
and associates herself with Kantian rationalism of German reform thinkers and the passion 
for social justice that this position entails.380  
Nussbaum claims, then, that any normative theorizing about the good is always 
theorizing about the human good with no reference to transcendent good as existing and 
making any claims. And thus Kavka sums up her position: 
 																																																								
376 Martin Kavka, “Judaism and Theology,” 343. 
377 Kavka quoting Nussbaum’s, “Transcending Humanity,” in Love’s Knowledge. Essays on Philosophy and 
Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 378. 
378 Kavka, “Judaism and Theology,” 343. 
379 Ibid., 343-344. 
380 In this instance Kavka refers us to Nussbaum, “Judaism and the Love of Reason.” Kavka continues that 
Nussbaum identifies Reform Judaism with a return of the religion to its original Biblical heart (in a sense that 
the struggle for justice is found more easily in the writings of the Biblical prophets than in the Talmud). He 
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between God and the people of Israel at Mount Sinai where the unmerited presence of God in the history of 
his people is affirmed and the performance of mitzvot is understood as a mediation between the mundane and 
the sacred. Kavka, “Judaism and Theology,” 346. Kavka shares Nussbaum’s loves for Kantian rationalism of 
Reform Judaism and the social justice it seeks, yet he refuses to tie Judaism to a dichotomy, where on one 
side we have the heteronomy of rabbinic legalism and the autonomy of Reform Judaism, on the other. 
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The model for the good that this theological ethics would offer is a human model, rooted in the 
contingencies and particularities of mortal life, in which the divine conveniently happens to 
share. Nussbaum’s account of internal transcendence allows for religious ethics as a 
descriptive enterprise that seeks to answer the question of how various religious traditions and 
figures have adapted an understanding of human limitations in theology, and also allows for 
religious ethics as a narrative enterprise that uses stories to become more finely aware of how 
to apply universal moral ideas to specific cases. But it would not allow for a constructive 
project in which ethics would be grounded in the incursion of the divine – as the divine, 
transcendent and external – into the human.381 
 
We agree with Nussbaum’s approach to ethics and confirm the idea that questions 
about the good are always questions about the human good (Kavka also confirms this line 
of thought), but we question together with Kavka whether there is a way to speak of the 
divine in theological ethics without making those claims superfluous. Kavka agues that it is 
precisely in human experiences of compassion and love that we can find this way – these 
experiences of vulnerability and passivity in the presence of the other is disclosing “that we 
cannot aim at the targets for flourishing which we have set for ourselves.”382 “Rather,” he 
continues, “at certain moments of sensing the claims that others have over us, the agency 
that is making the claims on us and briefly foiling our intentions is non-natural, although it 
enters into nature in the act of claiming.”383 
Kavka refers us to the foundational document of the Reform Judaism movement in 
America, namely, the Pittsburgh Platform of 1885 which is grounded in a belief of “the 
indwelling of God in man.”384 This reaffirms Nussbaum’s intuitions that God dwells in me 
and places my modern autonomous voice over the rain of heteronomous rabbinic 
conceptions of Judaism.385 Yet it also reaffirms “that God dwells in – or, perhaps more 
felicitously, speaks indirectly through – humans who are not me, who pull me toward 
them, and thereby simultaneously toward the human good and its foundation, the good that 
is beyond the human.”386 
 
5.3.2 Carnality, Aristotle, and Perception 
 
But for a moment let us come back to Nussbaum’s conception of God’s indwelling as an 
absolutely this-worldly experience. We have already affirmed that the material aspect, the 
reformed Judaism’s concern, this this-world justice influences the landscape of 
Nussbaum’s ethics. In this regard we should expand the discussion on the element of 
carnality – the element where Nussbaum’s reformed Judaism and her Aristotelian 
affiliation come together. 
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Nussbaum conceives perception in Aristotle in the following way – “the 
psychological activities of living beings, such as perceiving, desiring, and imagining, are 
realized or constituted in matter, are in fact the activities of some suitable matter.”387 
“Thus, for Nussbaum, ‘Jewishness’ in Aristotle can begin to be defined by carnality.”388 
Nussbaum clearly associates the element of carnality or materiality with reformed Judaism 
and she finds the same affirmation in Aristotle’s conception of perception. This meeting 
point allows Kavka to synthesize the very important element of Nussbaum’s ethics: 
 
For to speak about carnality or materiality as the necessary substrate for any portrait of human 
perception, when transferred from psychology to ethics, is to speak about the importance of the 
perception of the particular in making right decisions. If Aristotle is right in claiming that 
human acts are realized in matter – or, at the very least, something other than completely 
rational and disembodied awareness – then right practical reasoning will pay attention to this 
material substratum of human act. One gains the right to bring into ethics those elements that 
evaporate in the alleged clarity of the general dogmas of reason: emotions, history, the 
particular capabilities of other people, and the concrete circumstances of a narrative that 
remind us that ethics can be agnostic. […] Perception says something not simply about what is 
perceived, but about the judgments of the perceiver. It refers not only to the subject-matter of 
the percept, but also the ‘matter’ of the perceiving subject, the situation from which one 
perceives and makes decisions.389 
 
This lengthy quotation captures Nussbaum’s views on the importance of the material 
aspect in ethics and the implications if we consider it seriously. It changes the landscape of 
ethics in dramatic ways including new elements that need further reflection and 
appropriation. Perception “is a process of loving conversation between rules and concrete 
responses, general conceptions and unique cases, in which the general articulates the 
particular and is in turn further articulated by it.”390 We believe that Christian theological 
ethics from time to time tends to forget the meaning of the loving conversation (meaning, a 
respectful and attentive to each other discussion between general norms and concrete life 																																																								
387 Kavka here refers us to Martha C. Nussbaum and Hilary Putnam, “Changing Aristotle’s Mind,” in Essays 
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“Judaism and the Love of Reason,” 27-28. 
390 Kavka quoting Nussbaum’s, “The Discernment of Perception,” 95. 
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circumstances) and its aim and gets lost in the dichotomous debates between traditionalist 
and revisionist conceptions of the good life (the point which is somewhat similar to 
Kavka’s mentioned simplistic focus on dichotomy between rabbinic legalistic and 
reformed Judaism). 
 
5.3.3 Nussbaum’s Carnal Ethics Challenge for Christian Otherworldliness  
 
Every argument leading to this point already revealed the intimate relationship between 
some core ideas of Nussbaum’s ethics and reformed Judaism. We may remember the 
image from James Joyce Ulysses we have presented in the general introduction of 
Nussbaum’s theory of emotions.391 The image so inherent to Nussbaum’s conception of 
ethics speaks of climbing the upside down ladder for the perfect and yet from time to time 
looking at a real person “in bed or on the chamber pot.”392 The Jewish figure of Leopold 
Bloom in Ulysses is a “cosmopolitan conception of a common humanity”393 and Kavka 
furthers that this stems from Joyce’s focus on the themes of embodiment and erotic desire 
– “showing that this absence of boundaries is grounded in the absence of a bounded, self-
sufficient, contemplative identity.”394 Thus for Nussbaum “one cannot affirm a 
cosmopolitan rational ethic without also affirming materiality, eros, and the vulnerability 
of our erotic striving, without ‘saying yes to all in life that defies control.’”395 The element 
of carnality, the embrace of what is imperfect to truly seek the good, which Nussbaum 
ascribes to the Jewish figures in her texts, implicates that for her Judaism is a good way to 
seek a flourishing human life. Furthermore, ethics inspired by these values seem to seek 
the human good in the most adequate way. 
The lack of the carnal/material element in a substantial amount of Christian ethics is 
something that raises Nussbaum’s critical assessment.396 In the Upheavals of Thought 
Nussbaum looks to Augustine’s and Dante’s Christians and finds them guilty of 
disregarding the real, material, present in the name of immaterial, otherworldly and behind 
history. While those two figures cannot be held as representatives of Christian theology as 
such (Nussbaum always speaks of Augustine’s and Dante’s Christian avoiding 
generalizations, though), they without a doubt represent some of the issues inherent in the 
tradition.  
We may remember that for Nussbaum the landscape of human life without the 
upheaval of emotions lacks “mystery and depth, a tremendous power that can make us 
wonder, at least, whether a life that forgoes this passion would be impoverished, a life 
without radiance.”397 Nussbaum’s defended ‘internal transcendence’ in principle is not at 
odds with the Christian narrative (think of the kenotic aspect of it). What Nussbaum seems 																																																								
391 See  section 5.3.5 Concluding Remarks of the Chapter I. 
392 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 713. 
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to suggest, however, is that “the teleology of Christian praxis is at odds with the values 
embodied in its foundational narrative.”398 What she seems to miss is precisely a true 
appreciation of emotive experiences captured in the aforementioned Proust’s conception of 
erotic love. Nussbaum seems to assume that a good deal of Christian ethics omits the 
‘mystery and depth’ and the wondrous aspect of life by neglecting emotional experiences. 
We also remember that Nussbaum’s conception of care for others is rooted in childhood 
emotional experiences which later are broadened to care for distant others (and sustained 
by good ethical principles). This element Nussbaum finds entirely absent in the classical 
conceptions of Christian ethics. 
In this light Nussbaum perceives all Christian cares for the real, tangible lives of 
others (which is always connected to the real suffering of this world, to its uncertainty, to 
the mortality) as ultimately consumed by the otherworldly desire and love for God. This 
makes, she claims, all Christian concerns instrumental and not authentic in a sense that 
ultimately we care and love God, but not the real person in front of us and his/her life is not 
an “intrinsic source of value for our lives.”399 And so Kavka continues “the emotional 
maelstrom of the Christian’s longing for God is so all-encompassing and otherworldly in 
its orientation that it becomes impossible for the Augustinian Christian to love others as 
ends in themselves. Other people become instruments for the self’s love of God, and the 
emphasis on the universally sinful nature of humankind leads to a compassion that ‘is 
committed to denying the importance of the worldly losses and injustices to which my 
neighbor may attach importance, in order to assert the primacy of the need for God and the 
potential for grace.’”400 
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death is the spirit’s ‘return home to God.’ Kavka, “Judaism and Theology,” 352. With this explanation Kavka 
wants to point out that it is very difficult to offer a picture of Jewish eschatology as such and Nussbaum’s 
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whose eschatology? Christian theological debates also do not offer monolithic accepted-by-all interpretations 
of life after death and its connection to the ethical action here and now. 
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This poses some real questions to theological ethics inspired by Christian narrative – 
is there a way to suggest universal ethics meeting the standards of contemporary academic 
(and social-political) discourse, attentive to concrete material circumstances of people and 
also making claims referring back to that narrative which are not superfluous (thus not 
appealing to the rationale of the otherworldly premise as having a right to consume the 
other conceptions of the good as less)? We believe that any attempt to perceive Christian 
ethics as having a right to make a totalitarian move towards other ethical conceptions 
defeats not only its contemporary credibility, but also its Christian nature as such. 
Nussbaum claims that Christian ethics tends to dismiss real, non-instrumental cares of 
humans, outgrowths of emotional experiences. Furthermore, we also agree with 
Nussbaum’s conception of emotions as playing an important role in ethics as disclosing 
value. It is our hope that our careful examination of Aquinas’s thoughts on the value of 
passions in human morality can prove that Christian tradition did not always dismiss this 
aspect of the flourishing life (which, indeed, has an element of passivity which is so 
important for Nussbaum in countering the illusion of omnipotence). It is also our hope that 
the rediscovery of the role of emotions in the landscape of our moral lives can enrich the 
discourse of theological ethics opening the window to the world of meaning, where we can 
truly care for others and in the same life not abandon the longing for God. 
 
5.3.4 Is There a Place for Theology in Nussbaum’s Ethics? 
 
Kavka accompanied us through the journey of understanding the influence of Judaism in 
Nussbaum’s ethics. We have seen Nussbaum’s rejection of any external transcendence 
claims in our ethical reflections, as the premise of ethics is conceptions of the human good 
which entirely corresponds to the modern autonomous reason. But is there a way to make 
any comprehensive theological claims at all which would refer to external transcendence 
claims? Kavka already gave his answer – the experiences of compassion and love – he 
wants to see these claims as the claims of the external transcendence mediated by others. 
Thus it seems that the emotion can be a gateway to speak meaningfully of the external 
transcendence claims. And thus Kavka continues “this mysterious non-natural origin of 
emotional judgment can be found in parts of Nussbaum’s work, most clearly in the 
opening description of Upheavals of Thought of feeling ‘invaded by the world’ after 
learning of her mother’s death.”401 Emotions understood in the Aristotelian perception 
sense triggered by the experience of material disclose something supernatural to Kavka 
(and Nussbaum’s conception of emotions seems to make this theological extension valid). 
Let us follow his argument closely to understand its full force. For this, once again, we 
will have to take a look at Joyce’s Leopold Bloom and the intuitions it discloses. Kavka 
refers us to the moment in Ulysses where Bloom rediscovers the items of his late father and 
as a consequence is captured by memories and emotions. This experience brings out two 
salient elements. First of all, Bloom rediscovers Judaism, but in a unique way. Joyce’s 
language is anti-metaphysical suggesting that Judaism is no more or less rational than other 
practices and beliefs (including democratic practice) – “this may imply that he does not 
perceive democracy or revealed religion as foundational truths, but as practices in which 																																																								
401 Kavka, “Judaism and Theology,” 355. Kavka here quotes Upheavals of Thought, 19. 
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we acknowledge those uncontrollable forces in the world that makes our autonomous 
judgments possible.”402 From Nussbaum’s own interpretation we remember that Bloom’s 
figure represents democratic values and cosmopolitan universal ethics and the newly 
experienced remorse over his dismissal of his father’s belief in revelation, Kavka claims 
“that a joy in the contingency of the material world and a traditional Jewish theology do 
not have to contradict each other.”403 
More than that – these two elements might be linked. As Bloom goes through the 
drawer with his father’s possessions: 
 
The objects found in the drawer serve as signs of larger truths about the way in which Bloom 
cannot control life – he cannot control his father’s pain, his father’s suicide, and most 
importantly, his own reaction to them. Bloom does not decide to feel remorse (indeed, the 
absence of such a decision seems to be what distinguishes remorse from regret). The remorse is 
the result of the memories that had been involuntarily evoked by the sight of these possessions. 
Bloom is passive in the face of his emotions, and it is this passivity that leads him ways from 
the autonomous judgment of what is and is not Judaism, past and appreciation of ritual action 
as a vehicle for becoming conscious of moral truths, and towards the real possibility of the 
truth of the supernatural origin of the Torah.404 
 
We can see that neither Joyce nor Kavka implies that Bloom change his ways to that 
one of an orthodox Jew. His metanoia, his different conception of what might be true or 
what might count as a valid belief comes to being through the material medium – the items 
that belonged to his grandfather and father suddenly become “imbued with a power that 
goes far beyond their natural capacity.”405 And thus for Kavka “mysteriously, that which is 
beyond nature has participated in natural objects, and perhaps it is this manifestation that 
leads Bloom respond to these objects in his appreciation for the possibility that revelation 
is irreducible to reason.”406 
The figure of Leopold Bloom is one of the ways to illustrate Kavka’s conception of 
value judgment. His aim fundamentally is to draw our attention to the nature and origin of 
our emotional experiences and its connection to value judgments we make. For Kavka 
there is a moment of passivity, of being moved that precedes judgments we make or have 
made already.407 The shifts of our concern that are evoked and claimed by external 
agencies and the force before which we are passive “cannot be defined in any natural 
terms, but only affirmed as numinous, transcendent, sublime, and worthy of awe.”408 For 
Kavka, this split second recognition of the possibility of transcendence is a legitimate 
reason to engage in theological reflection: “And in the desire to explore exactly what we 
might be able validly to say about this dazzling sublimity and how it leads us to apprehend 
																																																								
402 Ibid., 354. 
403 Ibid., 354. 
404 Ibid., 354-355. 
405 Ibid., 355. 
406 Ibid., 355. 
407 Cf. Ibid., 356. 
408 Ibid., 356. Kavka goes as far as claiming that “instead, this situation has disclosed something that other 
situations have occluded, that there is a moment of passivity that is the matrix out of which all autonomous 
judgments arise, a passivity in the face of some exteriority that transcends one’s own arena of self-
sufficiency.” Ibid., 357. 
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the humanly good, it will claim that the theological enterprise is valid.”409 This leads 
Kavka to conclude that the theological enterprise which is inspired by the moment of 
passivity and its awareness seeks to bring together Aristotle and rabbis, philosophy and the 
Jewish tradition (thus essentially, philosophical and theological enterprises together), the 
intellectual and the carnal and “that which transcends externally and internally.”410 “But in 
the mysterious pacts we make with others,” Kavka continues, “in our acts of compassion 
and love it will also see echoes of the covenantal basis of Judaism.”411 Thus for Kavka 
there is something normative in our emotional experiences – they refer us to the intuition 
of how things should be. Our emotional experiences are also, then, windows through which 
external transcendence makes its claims and leads us to the divine vision of good. We 
believe that Kavka offered some very insightful comments of the ‘Jewishness’ of 
Nussbaum’s ethics.  
 
5.3.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
We also believe that his insertion of the space for theology in the reflection of emotions is 
valid; moreover, it has some direct links to Aquinas’s conceptions of the passions as 
passivity through which God works, but these we will discuss in the upcoming chapter.  
Kavka’s analysis also offered some points where we can see similarities between 
Nussbaum’s and Cates’ conceptions of ethics and the role of emotions in it. As we have 
highlighted before both thinkers are influenced by Aristotle and his conception of 
perception which is always perception of particulars. This is prominent in the works of 
both thinkers. This conception of perceptions opens the landscape of ethics to new 
elements – and we have seen that Nussbaum’s ethics and Cates’ religious ethics 
incorporate emotions as valid elements of our ethical reflections. Both of them also see the 
process of ethical decision making as a complex dynamics between our perception, desires, 
emotions and cognitive capacities. This decision-making and self-definition is guided by 
practical reason which in both cases is understood as a conversation between our 
experiences and tradition(s), universal rules and concrete circumstances.  
Cates’ claim that Nussbaum’s own religious affiliation influences her conception 
seems to be correct. Yet Nussbaum’s conception of Judaism does not stand at odds with an 
autonomous reason and her interest in justice that can be achieved (or at least strived for) 
here and now.  
The struggle of our own project is not only to re-discover the role of emotions in 
theological ethics, we also attempt to find a way to talk about emotional experiences in 
theological terms without making them superfluous. Kavka seems to suggest that through 
our emotions something very important is disclosed to us, and this something is even more 
than the disclosing of value found in Nussbaum; it is, indeed, the glimpse to the divine 
vision of the good. Our own challenge is, then, to find a balance in expressing the hope that 
transcends this life, but without undermining what is happening here and now and our dues 
to fellow human beings. 
 																																																								
409 Ibid., 357. 
410 Ibid., 357. 
411 Ibid., 357-358. 
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5.4 IS COMPASSION THE ONLY POLITICAL EMOTION WE OWE TO OTHERS? 
 
We seem to refer to our second main thinker more and more, but before we enter into the 
world of Thomas Aquinas let us try to build another bridge and question Nussbaum a little 
further – is compassion the only emotion that contributes the best for the building of just 
societies? For this question we turn to Amia Srinivasan. In her thought Srinivasan proposes 
a tragic approach to epistemology, ethics and metaphilosophy – this entails that our 
knowledge is hostage to powers beyond our own control (the intuition, without a doubt, is 
very much at home in Nussbaum’s thought). We will look into Srinivasan’s thoughts on 
Nussbaum’s compassion and we will highlight some important critical thoughts she raises 
to question Nussbaum’s claim that only compassion and love contribute to the building of 
aspiring liberal democracies. Srinivasan makes a plea to anger, as one of the possible 
responses in the face of injustice, and so we judge that her assessment of Nussbaum’s 
thought can be a good bridge to enter the world of Aquinas and his views on the passions 
and particularly the ethical worth of anger.412 
Srinivasan offers a rather positive view on Nussbaum’s work on compassion and 
argues that her disagreement with Nussbaum might not be a disagreement after all – she 
agrees with Nussbaum’s stipulation that aspiring liberal societies with good institutions 
need love and compassion to sustain themselves, yet Srinivasan cannot see these societies 
and just or almost-just institutions that inhabits them as currently present.413 Srinivasan 
argues that Nussbaum sees the US as founded on correct foundational principles and 
having more or less adequate institutions. In this case, what one needs “is a renewed 
commitment to those principles, and in particular renewed commitment to social welfare 
programmes that ensure that no one is too badly off, and that everyone has equal 
opportunities for living a worthwhile human life.”414 And, indeed, we can find a 
confirmation in Political Emotions that Nussbaum thinks that way. “My question,” 
Nussbaum confirms, “is how to render political principles and institutions stable, and thus 
the inquiry presupposes that basically good institutions exist, or can be rather shortly 
realized, albeit in a form that will require ongoing work to improve and perfect.”415 Thus 
compassion and love comes as good motives in perfecting something that is already there.  
Srinivasan agrees with this claim, but as mentioned before she cannot see examples 
of such countries. She views the US and the UK (the alleged examples of Western liberal 
democratic states) as countries that systematically enact violence against their worst off 
citizens through state sponsored policies of discrimination (here she invites us to think of 																																																								
412 We will continue the conversation with Srinivasan on the emotion of anger in Chapter IV, see section 2.2 
Contemporary Thinkers on Anger: Anger as a Moral Response to an Imperfect World. 
413 Amia Srinivasan was one of the key speakers at a workshop on Nussbaum’s Political Emotions organized 
by the Institute for Human Rights at the University College London. The title of the workshop is Why Love 
Matters for Justice: Workshop on Martha Nussbaum’s Political Emotions (31st May, 2014). 
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/human-rights/ihr-events-past/2014/martha-nussbaum-political-emotions [accessed 12 
November, 2014]. The text of the presentation can be found following the link to 
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~corp1468/Welcome_files/Nussbaum%20-%20political%20emotions.pdf [accessed 12 
November, 2014]. 
414 Amia Srinivasan, “Comments on Martha Nussbaum’s Political Emotions (May, 2014),” 8. 
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~corp1468/Welcome_files/Nussbaum%20-%20political%20emotions.pdf [accessed 
November 12, 2014]. 
415 Nussbaum, Political Emotions, 23. 
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black Americans who after being emancipated from slavery suffered from exclusionary 
Jim Crow Laws or in other words segregation laws, were systematically put into ghettos by 
the Federal Housing Administration, were excluded from the benefits of the Roosevelt’s 
New Deal, just to mention a few cases out of many). Having that in mind Srinivasan 
worries that there is something “morally inappropriate and ethically off-key”416 to 
incorporate compassion as a right response to the wide spread injustice which for her is a 
key characteristic of the aspiring liberal democracies. 
 
5.4.1 Looking at the Suffering Other: Do We Owe Him/Her Something More Than Only 
Compassion? 
 
Srinivasan offers a two-fold outlook to compassion as a response to the predicament of 
others – she wants to draw our attention to the position of the observer of the predicament 
and the position of the victim. We will start with the short comment on Srinivasan’s ideas 
about the position of the observer when he/she encounters a fellow citizen in a 
predicament. We have discovered in Nussbaum’s works that she does not see compassion 
as merely instrumental to liberal societies – there is something good as such about a 
compassionate human life. This point seems to leave Srinivasan restless when she 
imagines fellow citizens undergoing unjust predicaments; (this is a classical case for 
compassion in Nussbaum’s thought as it falls beautifully into the three judgments that 
make compassion) and that the only emotion we can offer is compassion. And what is 
missing is the role of me in what is happening – “For I should also feel that distinctive 
sting of shame and self-indictment that is the proper response to my complicity in the 
political structures that have caused and perpetuate this suffering, that I have bought my 
privilege at the expense of this suffering.”417 Srinivasan argues that pain is indeed part of 
the experience of witnessing predicament but that pain is not only due to the pain of the 
other, it is also the pain of my own complicity with the unjust institutions that continue to 
perpetuate the institutionalized injustice. Nussbaum makes compassion a eudaimonistic 
emotion stressing that the suffering of others should fall in our own circle of concern, so 
what happens to you touches and matters to me deeply and personally. Srinivasan seems to 
suggest that this is not enough and compassion is not the only moral emotion that we owe 
to our fellow human beings, especially if we stand on a privileged position and benefit 
from the government’s choices to exclude some groups for our own prosperity. 
Compassion alone cannot work fully as a good response to the suffering caused by 
injustice, the sense of self-indictment. The sense that I personally cause your pain seems a 
more just path to Srinivasan. Srinivasan argues that compassion seems like a good 
response to natural causes predicaments such as death and illness, but as a response of 
citizens to injustice and moreover being encouraged by the political regime, indeed this is 
Nussbaum’s argument, might be a misleading paradigm. Srinivasan sees compassion as 
“too distanced, too un-self-implicating, and too naïve to be the emotion appropriate to our 
current political realities.”418 
 																																																								
416 Srinivasan, “Comments on Martha Nussbaum’s Political Emotions,” 1.  
417 Ibid., 5. 
418 Ibid., 6. 
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5.4.2 Being a Victim of Political Injustice: Is Compassion an Appropriate Response 
When We Suffer Injustice? 
 
Srinivasan wants to twist a coin of her argumentation and look at the other side of it and 
thus she questions – is it right for political regimes to teach their citizens compassion, even 
when those citizens are actually victims of political suffering? She draws our attention to 
the fact that Nussbaum employs examples of Martin Luther King and Gandhi as exemplary 
political leaders.419 Srinivasan argues that a liberal state can indeed ask citizens to respect 
its foundational principles and its laws – but can it ask them to love them? “But can the 
liberal state,” Srinivasan continues, “also ask of its marginalized and disenfranchised 
citizens that they love those principles, and feel compassion towards those who, under the 
cloak of those principles, oppress them?”420 
For Srinivasan there is something clearly coercive about this line of thought. 
Nussbaum, we might remember, suggests that people should be invited to emote in a 
particular way, but never be forced to it – thus, she speaks about the strong protection of 
disagreement and dissent.421 But for Srinivasan the protection of disagreement and dissent 
seems not to be enough as “we should be suspicious of any top-down programme that 
encourages those who have greatest reason to be angry to transform that anger into 
compassionate love.”422 Srinivasan does not imply that there is nothing deeply admirable 
about King and Gandhi, quite on the contrary (there is something very powerful about the 
image of people from the oppressed community showing love and compassion). The 
compassion encouraged by the state, for her, tips too dangerously into social control and 
should be met with high suspicion by those who the state has the most interest of 
controlling. 
Srinivasan also offers some interesting comments on the nature of anger. Anger can 
be seen as a form of moral insight, as a means to disclose what is really going on. Anger 
and the way to deal with it is ambivalent, yet anger can offer experiences of disclosing 
something essential, especially in the face of injustice. “Anger can call us into a new 
existence,” declares Srinivasan.423 In anger we can discover who we are and see that the 
labels given to us by others (think of the names given to people of color, to homosexuals, 
to opinionated women and many others) are designed to prevent us from being recognized 
as equal in our humanity. 
Anger is an emotion that is often dismissed especially when it comes from the people 
within the wronged community. Srinivasan invites us to consider the, image of an angry 
black man haunting the public image of Barack Obama, for instance, or the image of an 
angry Arab, ‘hot-blooded, death-seeking and impervious to reason;’ or even the image 
older than these two – an image of an angry woman.424 For Srinivasan, these images are 
weapons of control and so she continues: “To dismiss someone as angry is to say that she 
is governed by emotion rather than reason – that she is uncivilized, not fully human – and 																																																								
419 Cf. section V. History: Washington, Lincoln, King, Gandhi, Nehru of Nussbaum’s Political Emotions, 
225-239. 
420 Srinivasan, “Comments on Martha Nussbaum’s Political Emotions,” 7.  
421 Cf. section V. Content and Freedom of Nussbaum’s Political Emotions, 388-390. 
422 Srinivasan, “Comments on Martha Nussbaum’s Political Emotions,” 7.  
423 Srinivasan, “In defense of Anger,” 3.  
424 Cf. Ibid., 2. 
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so not worthy of serious engagement. To dismiss someone as angry is to say that she 
herself is the problem – not whatever it is that she is angry about.”425 The images of control 
obscure the fact that sometimes anger is a reasonable response to a world which is 
unreasonable. 
Even though discerning, anger has its limitation, just as any other moral emotion. 
Anger in its raw form has few chances to be listened to; sometimes to get heard we need to 
calm down. Eloquent anger has more opportunities to be heard.426 Sometimes the call to 
get calm is not an attempt to control, but to genuinely help. But to constantly remind the 
victim of political suffering that anger is counter-productive is morally dubious at best. 
Srinivasan argues that from this perspective everyone can continue to act morally wrong, 
but the wronged one has to police his/her natural reaction to injustice. 
Anger is not always useful, notes Srinivasan, but it does not have to be justified by 
its utility only. For her, anger can be justified when it responds to the moral failing in our 
societies – “anger, at its best, is a way of seeing clearly, a form of emotional insight into 
the world.”427 And Srinivasan continues “for if anger is a form of moral seeing, then telling 
the powerless not to get angry is an exhortation to blindness.”428 Finally, though she never 
mentions Nussbaum explicitly, Srinivasan inspired by her earlier comments on Political 
Emotions states that the powerless should always be suspicious when the powerful tell 
them just to calm down. Anger is a powerful weapon in the hands of the suffering – it 
broadcasts the injustice, it attracts attention, it frightens. And it is never welcomed by those 
who want to keep the status quo and those who comply in explicit and implicit ways by 
benefiting from unjust privileges. Thus Srinivasan concludes: “And we should ask 
ourselves what might happen if we were angrier: about the privatisation of public goods 
and the erosion of the private sphere; about austerity in an age of massive inequality; about 
the demise of social security and the rise of corporate subsidy.”429 
 
5.4.3 Balancing Between Compassion and Anger 
 
Srinivasan, as mentioned before, does not dismiss Nussbaum’s view on compassion in 
societies where justice is already present in some form, her aim is to note that we are not 
there yet. In the present state of affairs, Srinivasan argues, compassion might not be the 
only emotion we owe to each other when we observe or experience suffering. We think 
that Srinivasan offers some insightful comments on Nussbaum’s proposal and highlights 
the possible dangers if we were too optimistic about the current state of history we are in. 
We also highlight together with Srinivasan that compassion and self-implicating anger of 
compliance and anger when one undergoes injustice are not mutually self-excluding. 
Anger, though also discerning, is a more morally ambiguous emotion that should not be the 
final stop of our political communities and relationships. We would point out that 
Nussbaum’s insistence on compassion as an adequate moral emotion sustaining and 
advancing our societies is also born out of her concern about the practical goal and 																																																								
425 Ibid., 3. 
426 Cf. Ibid., 4. 
427 Ibid., 5. 
428 Ibid., 5. 
429 Ibid., 3. 
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achievement of ethics. Anger can be a moment of revelation that there is something 
incredibly morally wrong about some particular situation, but compassion is an emotion 
that builds bridges and seeks a long runt sustainment. We believe that Nussbaum crafts her 
philosophy of emotion with this goal in the back of her head. This is also recognized by 
Srinivasan and so she argues “that as a matter of human psychology, simple compassion – 
compassion without a sting – is probably a better motivation for getting privileged people 
to do things like pay their taxes and support welfare programmes. People don’t like feeling 
the sting of shame.”430 Thus to try to achieve some positive outcomes it seems to be better 
to tap into people’s desire to be good and help others. The self-indictment, Srinivasan notes 
herself, might be psychologically weakening the work which she wants to build. Srinivasan 
suggests that if this is really the case that maybe ultimately there is a tragic conflict 
between the pragmatic philosophical proposals and the emotions that are beneficial for it 
and the emotions that justice might demand. And thus she concludes that “for the aspiring 
liberal societies I do know, a proper emotional reckoning with our fellow citizens must 
involve a confrontation with our own bloody hands.”431 
The balance is indeed difficult to achieve, but to think of questions of guilt, 
complicity and anger in our societies is certainly important. Nussbaum might see 
compassion as a most universally communicable emotion that appeals to the goodness of 
people and encourages them to act positively to relieve the pain of suffering. By the appeal 
to create safe spaces for a good emotional functioning in her capabilities approach and by 
insistence of practical wisdom as guiding our ethical lives, Nussbaum might hope that once 
we are in a sphere of recognizing each other as fellow human beings whose happiness and 
wellbeing are interrelated, we can tackle the questions of guilt and self-compliance to the 
system that oppresses; but that is a second step. We judge that she would not omit these 
questions, but they would fall under the sphere of personal moral psychology and tackling 
the questions of particular moral communities. To start with finger pointing and guilt might 
be not the most proactive step, but to omit it as to omit the right to anger for people who 
suffer injustice would be unethical. Nussbaum finds a place for a justified transitional 
anger in the capability of emotional functioning while being very critical to every other 
instance of anger.432 Yet to wrestle with the right balance between what compassion and 
anger owes to justice is an open ended and never explicit task, but a task to which our own 
project wants to contribute.433 
 
 
 
																																																								
430 Ibid., 6. 
431 Ibid., 9. 
432 See this chapter’s subsections 4.1.1.3 Capabilities Approach and the Relevance of Emotions and 4.1.1.4 
The Case of Anger. 
433 We will continue the discussion on anger in Chapter IV, see section 2. Continuing the Case of Anger with 
all its subsections. 
 
CHAPTER III. AQUINAS ON THE PASSIONS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the upcoming pages we will encounter our second main interlocutor – Thomas Aquinas. 
We will unlock Aquinas’s account on the passions1 with the help of three authors, namely, 
Robert Miner, Nicholas Lombardo, O.P, and Diana Fritz Cates, all of whom have 
developed contemporary interpretations of Aquinas’s thought on the nature of the passions. 
We should note that the accounts of these thinkers are similar in their positive retrieval of 
Aquinas’s views on the passions and such is, indeed, our own perspective.2 These authors, 																																																								
1 We are convinced that Nussbaum and Aquinas attempt to describe the same psychological phenomenon that 
today is broadly called ‘emotion.’ But as we have seen from the discussion in Chapter I, section 3. Thinking 
of Nussbaum’s Account of Emotions: Some Critical Reflections with all its subsections, even today the debate 
about what exactly falls into the category of emotions is an ongoing struggle. Though some authors choose to 
utilize Thomistic passiones as emotion (See, for example Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions or Robert C. 
Roberts, “Thomas Aquinas on the Morality of Emotions,” History of Philosophy Quarterly Vol. 9, No. 3 
(1992): 287-305), we prefer to use the term passion which does not suggest that the contemporary ‘emotion’ 
is a direct descendent of the scholastic passiones. Our task is not a historical discernment of the terms, yet 
being attentive to historical differences between the terms seems a good way to precede our investigation of 
Aquinas’s views on the passions. Thomas Dixon, a historian of philosophy, science, medicine, and religion, 
with particular expertise in the history of emotions, suggests that “[i]t may be helpful, in order to clarify what 
I mean by saying that ‘emotions’ are not the same things as ‘passions’ to make a distinction between the 
extensions and intensions of these terms. Modern-day uses of ‘emotions’ have different extensions and 
different intensions from older uses of ‘passions.’ Of course neither term has ever had a fixed meaning or a 
fixed extension, but there have been general tendencies, and some degree of consensus. The extension of 
‘emotions’ (the items included in the category), for example, tends to include many feelings that might 
previously have been categorised not as passions but as appetites (e.g. lust), or affections (e.g. religious 
feelings), or sentiments (e.g. sympathy)…The intension of ‘emotion’ (the definition of the term) has differed 
very significantly from the intension of ‘passion:’ the former has tended to be defined in an amoral way as an 
autonomous physical or mental state characterised by vivid feeling and physical agitation, the latter has been 
defined in more morally and theologically engaged ways as a disobedient and morally dangerous movement 
of the soul (as well as often being used in a vague and general way to refer to a variety of lively mental 
states.” Thomas Dixon, From Passions to Emotions. The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 18. When it comes to the Christian conceptions of the 
passions Dixon wants to clear some shadows traditionally cast on it: “It is particularly important, then, to 
realise that – contrary to popular opinion – classical Christian views about reason and the passions were 
equivalent neither to the view that reason and the ‘emotions’ are inevitably at war, nor to the idea that 
‘emotions’ overpower us against our will. Appetites, passions and affections, on the classical Christian view, 
were all movements of different parts of the will, and the affections, at least were potentially informed by 
reason.” Dixon, From Passions to Emotions, 22. Early secular conceptions of emotions did not have the 
theological connotations of the passions and the elements close to them as connected or guided by reason. 
“The most important text was Thomas Brown’s Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (1820) in 
which ‘emotions’ was the term adopted for all those feelings that were neither sensations nor intellectual 
states. Brown developed a new terminology and classification of mental states, motivated by a desire to break 
away from tradition faculty psychology, and to create a de-Christianised and scientific alternative. 
‘Emotions’ included a wide variety of states that had previously been differentiated, and many of which had 
been considered active powers of the soul. The term ‘emotions’ was baptized in a way that suggested these 
mental states were passive and non-cognitive.” Dixon, From Passions to Emotions, 22-23. From this 
perspective an English translation of passion seems to stand closer to Aquinas’s passiones and to avoid any 
misunderstandings we will utilize this term. 
2 A telling example of contrary views could be Leonard D. G. Ferry’s position that the positive retrieval of 
Aquinas’s views on the passions is inadequate. In his article written vis-à-vis Miner’s position in Aquinas on 
the Passions. Ferry argues that Aquinas devotes so much attention to the passions precisely because they are 
dangerous and disruptive and they can threaten the human good by undermining the resources that rationality 
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however, suggest positive interpretations on the nature of the passions from slightly 
different perspectives: Miner provides us with a philosophical exposition; Lombardo’s 
project is theological thus it also inquires into that aspect of Aquinas’s theory; Cates’s 
account is written from an ethical perspective and is aimed not only at conceptual clarity, 
but also at providing a possibility for self-understanding for its readers. These different 
angles of looking at the Thomistic passions complement each other by creating a fuller 
perspective. Where the discussion requires it, we will turn to other sources of specialized 
literature to search for some elements that are further developed there, but, generally 
speaking, we will read Aquinas’s thought on the passions together with Miner, Lombardo, 
and Cates. 
The chapter itself consists of two main parts – the general introduction of Aquinas’s 
ethical thought and the presentation of his account of the passions. Because Aquinas’s 
ethics is such a vast subject in itself, our presentation will use large strokes to present a 
general picture of it and we will present only those concepts and terms that bear direct 
relevance in order to better understand the passions. We will start by briefly indicating the 
context of Aquinas’s thought and some of his epistemological premises. We will move on 
to the presentation of his ethics as an ethics of happiness which stands on two major pillars 
– natural law and virtue. Much of this discussion will help us to understand in what context 
Aquinas’s account on the passions appears. It will also, additionally facilitate the 
discussion in our last chapter where we will build bridges between the ethical thought of 
Aquinas and Nussbaum. We will proceed, then, to discuss the concept of the appetite in 
general as an important aspect of Aquinas’s writings indicating the dynamic nature of the 
creation and will show how it is related to the notions of good and evil. 
The discussion on the passions themselves will largely follow the structure of the so-
called Treatise on the Passions, inquiring together with Aquinas into the nature of the 
passions. This, indeed, is the prime interest of this chapter; to discover what the passions 
are according to Aquinas and subsequently to inquire into their moral character. We will 
start with the definition of the passions, moving on to the presentation of their activation 
mechanisms. This discussion is important to understand the way Aquinas relates our 
cognitive and emotional capacities. Among our main interlocutors, there are contrasting 
views regarding interpretations of this subject, and as the discussion progresses we will 
support one position over the other. This discussion will be followed by the consideration 
of the sense appetite as a movement contributing to achieving our final telos and a bodily 
movement. The next major section will discuss the structure of the sense appetite, namely, 
its division in the concupiscible and the irascible passions. Here we will encounter a 
detailed discussion, yet, we consider, it is necessary to understand Aquinas’s vision on the 
passions (it will also be helpful to precipitate the discussion on anger which will be dealt 
with in the upcoming chapter), and to explore the texture of his account – that is, to see 
how he portrays the passions as interconnected inner movements in relation to their 
intentional objects. At this point we will, again, encounter differences in interpretation and 
we will explore at greater length how we should think of love as a passion in Aquinas’s 
thought. The last substantial section will discuss the passions in their connection to reason 																																																																																																																																																																							
can bring to our practical-decision making. See Leonard D. G. Ferry, “Passionalist or Rationalist? The 
Emotions in Aquinas’ Moral Theory,” New Blackfriars 93.1045 (2012): 308.  
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and will (here we will also discuss the category of the affections of the will). We will 
inquire into the questions of mutual influence among reason, will, and the passions and 
will explore whether we can speak meaningfully about affective knowledge in the context 
of Aquinas’s thought, arguing that, indeed, the knowledge we gain through the passion of 
love seems to provide such a possibility. We will further our discussion into the questions 
of morality, normativity, and responsibility of the passions arguing that Aquinas suggests 
original ideas in these areas which can be nurturing to contemporary ethical projects. The 
final sections will touch explicitly on the theological aspects of the Thomistic passions and 
will discuss them in connection with habit, virtue, sin, and grace. At this point of our 
discussion we will suggest that Aquinas speaks of the possibility of the transformation of 
our affectivity through our Christian faith. But we now start at the beginning of this story – 
the general contours of Aquinas’s thought.  
 
1.1 SITUATING THE THOUGHT OF THOMAS AQUINAS 
 
As mentioned above, our main interest is the Treatise on the Passions which is found in 
Summa theologiae, the most renowned work of Aquinas. The Summa is composed of three 
major parts, each devoted to a major theological theme: the first part is concerned with 
God and His creation; the second part inquires into human acts by which we return to our 
Creator, the Treatise is located in this part (in the first part of it); the third second part 
explores the figure of Christ and the sacraments. Moral theologian Stephen Pope notes that 
“[t]his overarching structure represents Aquinas’s creative adoption of the Neoplatonic 
emanation and return (exitus-reditus) motif within his Christian depiction of the emergence 
of all creatures from God the Creator and the return of creatures of God the Redeemer.”3  
Aquinas’s ethics is renowned for multiple distinct interpretations and this may be 
attributed to the different philosophical premises guiding the research of the scholars, as 
well as the various influences traceable in Aquinas’s writings. Fergus Kerr, O.P., a 
prominent scholar of Aquinas’s thought, notes that “by the time he was 20, Thomas had 
been exposed to two radically different cultures: the age-old tradition of Latin 
monasticism, richly indebted to Augustine and Christian neo-Platonism, and, on the other 
hand, the pagan philosophy of Aristotle, brought to the West by Jewish and especially 
Muslim scholars. The tension between what seemed at the time two apparently 
incommensurable traditions was to dominate Thomas’s intellectual work.”4 
While traditionally Aquinas is considered ‘Aristotelian’ in the light of contemporary 
																																																								
3 Stephen J. Pope, “Overview of the Ethics of Thomas Aquinas,” in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. 
Pope (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 30. As we will shortly discover, the exitus-
reditus structure also defines the nature of human appetite. Wayne J. Hankey also refers to the Neoplatonic 
structure holding the architecture of the Summa. Aquinas conceived that created beings are separated entities 
from the First Principle and this “requires that we are simultaneously looking at reality in a human way, and 
regarding our place in the cosmos from the divine perspective. The capacity to look at ourselves from beyond 
ourselves is consequent on our participation in the higher knowing of separate substances, a characteristically 
Neoplatonic reworking of a reconciled Aristotle and Plato.” Wayne J. Hankey, “Aquinas, Plato, and 
Neoplatonism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas, eds. Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 62. 
4 Fergus Kerr, O.P., After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), 4. 
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research, many scholars now nuance this claim. 5  The discussion is complex and 
multifaceted, but what truly holds Aristotle and Aquinas together, research suggests, is 
their epistemology and this, we think, is an essential point to present to get a full grasp of 
Aquinas’s thought. On the level of epistemology Aquinas’s and Aristotle’s worlds meet: 
 
Thomas is palpably at home in Aristotle’s world: a world that is saturated with purposefulness, 
a world that is meant to be understood in the sense that it is our nature as rational beings to 
inquire into the world’s order and to come to understand it. Our sense of the intelligibility of 
the world is not, for Aristotle or for Thomas, a projection of mind onto nature, as it seems to 
many philosophers and others nowadays. To the contrary, Aristotle’s world is a projection of 
intelligible, teleologically ordered nature onto the human mind.6  
 
That means that Aristotle and Aquinas both held that all naturally attainable 
																																																								
5 Kerr suggests this view in After Aquinas, 9; the essay of Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R, “Aristotle and Aquinas,” in 
The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, eds., Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 38-60 is devoted to showing the distinction between Aquinas’s and 
Aristotle’s systems suggesting that while the concepts utilized are, indeed the same, one should be aware of 
the different meanings they entail. Owens indicates the apparent similarities: “Today a somewhat prevalent 
impression links Aristotle and Aquinas as though they both represented the same general type of 
philosophical thinking. Prima facie indications, it is true, may seem to point in the direction of a unitary 
trend in their basic philosophical procedures. Aquinas uses Aristotle's formal logic. Both of them reason in 
terms of actuality and potentiality; of material, formal, efficient, and final causes; and of the division of 
scientific thought into the theoretical and the practical and productive. Both regard intellectual contemplation 
as the supreme goal of human striving. Both look upon free choice as the origin of moral action. Both clearly 
distinguish the material from the immaterial, sensation from intellection, the temporal from the eternal, the 
body from the soul. Both ground all naturally attainable human knowledge on external sensible things, 
instead of on sensations, ideas, or language. Both look upon cognition as a way of being in which percipient 
and thing perceived, knower and thing known, are one and the same in the actuality of the cognition.” 
Owens, “Aristotle and Aquinas,” 38. Yet he claims that when it comes to Aquinas’s and Aristotle’s 
metaphysics the differences are essential: Aristotle considered essence and being to be identical. Aquinas, on 
his behalf, claimed explicitly that in all creatures there is a real distinction between essence and being. Owens 
furthers: “In fact, the real distinction between essence and existence could be regarded in neo-Thomistic 
circles as the fundamental truth of Christian philosophy, which pervaded the whole of Thomistic 
metaphysics. It was the nerve of the distinction between God and creatures.” Owens, “Aristotle and 
Aquinas,” 39. A whole work dedicated to the differences between Aquinas and Aristotle can be found in 
Mark D. Jordan, The Alleged Aristotelianism of Thomas Aquinas, Etienne Gilson lecture (Toronto: Pontifical 
Institute of Medieval Studies, 1992). Yet, for instance, James Doig conceives the relationship between 
Aquinas and Aristotle in different terms. While he acknowledges the distinct doctrine of esse (being) as the 
intrinsic principle which united with essence constitutes a thing as real, he, nonetheless, argues that: “The 
dependence of Aquinas’s theology on the philosophy of Aristotle appears then in two forms. One is the 
evident application of Aristotle’s doctrines or concepts; the other, not as noticeable, is the application of the 
method Aquinas found proper to Aristotle’s metaphysician” James Doig, “Aquinas and Aristotle,” in The 
Oxford Handbook of Aquinas, eds. Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2012), 40-41. The method Doig indicates refers to ‘the way of predication’ found in Aristotle’s works: “In 
contrast, in the Metaphysics an examination of ‘the way of predication’ is noted as Aristotle’s procedure in 
comparing the diverse contents of knowledge expressed through predicates used ‘denominatively,’ that is, 
when they ‘name’ a subject…As it is true of every essence, its intelligibility is traced to its form…The same 
‘way of predication’ is central to Aquinas’s understanding of the clarification of ‘common’ concepts that 
constitute Metaphysics V. Whether the concept of ‘being’ or ‘principle,’ ‘habitus’ or ‘act,’ or any other of the 
more than thirty terms studied, Aquinas clarifies its meaning by noting the ways in which it is used to name 
something.” James Doig, “Aquinas and Aristotle,” 38. This makes Doig conclude that Aristotle was the 
Philosopher for Aquinas. 
6 Fergus Kerr, O.P., Thomas Aquinas. A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
28. 
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knowledge originates in external sensible thing.7 External things are thus epistemologically 
prior. 
 
1.1.1 A Short Note on Epistemology  
 
Before we take up the task of discussing the Treatise on the Passions to avoid reading and 
appropriating him anachronistically we should note that his writings represent a pre-
Cartesian state of philosophy. Aquinas offers a different conception of the self, the relation 
of the mind-to-the-world from the one we are used to in modern and contemporary 
philosophical and theological thought (with its insistence on the subjective, reality-
appropriating concept of the self and debates over whether we really can know the world 
outside our own minds). Our aim is not to enter a debate on how human consciousness 
works; our task is to highlight the nature of Aquinas’s epistemology in order to engage 
with it in meaningful terms. 
Kerr notes that a distinction between prevailing contemporary conceptions of the self 
and the one that Aquinas held could be demarcated as a difference between ‘subjectivist-
observing’ and ‘objective-participant’ perspectives: “On the Cartesian view we think of 
having a mind and being a person very much in terms of the ‘subject,’ the ‘I’ as privileged 
and unified locus of self-consciousness, facing an array of objects out there (including 
other human beings) which one apprehends initially in the images, impressions, sense data, 
or other representations of them which we make, or they force on us. In contrast, Thomas 
Aquinas has a non-subject-centred conception of the self: the objects out there in the world 
become intelligible in the act of awakening the intellectual acts on our part which manifest 
our intelligence.”8 
Aquinas’s epistemology hangs on his doctrine of creation which he purports human 
intelligence as capable of comprehending. He also opines the world as intelligible and both 
these ideas meet at the dimension of meaning:  
 
Thomas sees no gap between mind and world, thought and things, that needs to be bridged, 
either by idealist/empiricist representations or (as with Barth) by divine intervention. His view 
of how our minds are related to the world is interwoven with his doctrine of God: no 
epistemology without theology. But his (perhaps naive) confidence that things are indeed as 
they seem, that there is no veil between the world and our minds, springs from, indeed is 
identical with, his belief in the world’s belonging to God. In the end, as at the outset, unity, 
truth, goodness and beauty coincide, Thomas thinks, in being: in particular, ens et verum 
convertuntur: what is, is the case…And Thomas quotes Aristotle: ‘the soul, in a way, is 
everything’ – a neat paraphrase, he no doubt thought, of the doctrine of creation and, 
specifically, of the human being as created in the image and likeness of God (De veritate, 1). 
Our experience of things is not a confrontation with something utterly alien, but a way of 
absorbing, and being absorbed by, the world to which we naturally belong. The mind does not 																																																								
7 Owens, “Aristotle and Aquinas,” 53. Owens agrees that starting from the sensible things is a common 
epistemological ground of Aristotle and Aquinas. However, he further argues that what exactly the ‘sensible 
things’ are, are conceived differently by both thinkers: “To that extent they present a common ground upon 
which they may be judged. Through that ground their similarities may be explained. But in those external 
sensible things Aristotle sees finite form as the highest actuality. Aquinas, on the other hand, sees existence 
as the highest actuality. Existence of itself is not finite, since it is originally the object of a judgment and not 
of conceptualization.” Owens, “Aristotle and Aquinas,” 54. 
8 Kerr, After Aquinas, 27. 
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primarily depict, reflect or mirror the world; rather, it assimilates the world as it is assimilated 
to the world.9  
 
Because of its creaturely status the world is not a hostile place for Aquinas. The 
world is so much home for the human person that one can say “I am so much at home in 
the world that, in a certain way, in the event of meaning, I may be said to be the world, and 
the world to be in me.”10 Moreover, due to its creaturely character, the human person 
enters a unique kind of relationship with the things to be known. Kerr furthers, “the 
Thomist wants to say that knowledge is the product of a collaboration between the object 
known and the subject who knows: the knower enables the thing known to become 
intelligible, thus to enter the domain of meaning, while the thing’s becoming intelligible 
activates the mind’s capacities…For Thomas, meaning is the mind’s perfection, the 
coming to fulfillment of the human being’s intellectual powers; simultaneously, it is the 
world’s intelligibility being realized.”11 Kerr thus argues that human beings in Aquinas’s 
thought are created to the image and likeness of God which means that their minds are 
connaturally open to the world which in fact reveals itself to us. Furthermore, the image of 
God is found in the human being in the way he/she is carried towards God in the acts of 
knowing and loving God (ST I 93.8).12 And finally, Aquinas’s views on human knowing 
could be put in a nutshell in the following way: “Thomas’s treatise on human 
understanding is not only never independent of a theological interest in creation as flowing 
from and being drawn back into God as principium et finis but, in this consideration of the 
human being as imago Dei, the epistemology is always already a contribution to the 
doctrine of God as Trinity.”13 
 
1.2 ETHICS AS AN INQUIRY TO HAPPINESS  
 
Now if we look at the Prima secundae itself we notice that primarily it is an inquiry into 
happiness:14 it starts with the discussion about happiness/beatitude, moving to questions 
about action, the passions, habit, virtues, sin, vice, law, and finishes in the discussion about 
grace. These topics, then, are all related, important to ethics, and have a part in attaining 
our final goal. 
Question 1 of the Prima secundae identifies the final goal of human life with 
beatitude or happiness. First of all, we should note that the English word ‘happiness’ can 
be understood with at least two Latin terms: felicitas and beatitudo. Though there are times 
Aquinas uses the words interchangeably, felicitas primarily refers to earthly happiness and 
beatitudo is a form of complete happiness, true fulfillment that can be reached only in our 
																																																								
9 Ibid., 30-31. 
10 Ibid., 32. 
11 Ibid., 30. 
12 Cf. Ibid., 34. 
13 Ibid., 34. 
14 Miner argues: “Thomas begins the 1a2ae with an inquiry into happiness, considered as the ultimate end for 
human beings. Ethics is, above all, the study of what human beings need to know in order to attain happiness. 
Anything belonging to the consideration of moral matters in general that constitutes the 1a2ae is meant to 
serve this end.” Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 6. 
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existence after death.15 Aquinas is primarily and mostly interested in beaititudo, hence his 
notion of happiness is a heavily theologically and eschatologically loaded concept. Thus 
Aquinas says: 
 
It is impossible for man’s beatitude to lie in any created good. For beatitude is a perfect good 
that puts the appetite totally to rest – it would not be the ultimate end otherwise, i.e., if 
something remained to be desired. But the object of the will, which is man’s appetite, is the 
universal good, just as the object of the intellect is universal truth. From this it is clear that 
nothing can put man’s will to rest except the universal good. But the universal good is found 
only in God and not in any created good, since every creature has participated goodness. 
Hence, only God can satisfy man’s will – this according to Psalm 102:5 (‘He satisfies your 
desire with good things’). Therefore, it is in God alone that man’s beatitude lies.16 
 
This conclusion relies on Aquinas’s assumption of the general structure of all things 
created. Thus human happiness defined in this way rests on Aquinas’s analysis of appetite 
and its intrinsic connection with the good and his conviction that human beings are “first 
and foremost thinking animals.”17 Here we can find an appeal to human rational nature and 
the end appropriate to it. Aquinas, then, drawing on his teleological conception of the 
created order sets one ultimate end for all human beings which is an attainment of an 
ultimate good. He argues: “For if there were no ultimate end, then nothing would be 
desired, no action would be terminated, and no intention of the agent’s would be put to 
rest; and if nothing were first among the means ordered to an end, then no one would begin 
to do anything, and deliberation would proceed to infinity and never come to an end.”18 
In evaluating what human good can be conceptually Aquinas: 
 
sees a nexus of connections binding human desire, the human end, and the human good. All 
humans desire their own good; that good is the end of human life; thus, all humans desire their 
own end. Accordingly, all humans want to function well, which is to say that all human beings 
want to attain the best form of life available to them as human beings.19 
 
Robert Pasnau and Christopher Shields, both professors of philosophy, further assert 
that Aquinas’s conception of the goodness of a certain thing is always sortal relative – 
“that is, judgments of goodness are always made with reference to the kind of thing whose 
goodness is under consideration.”20 Humans get a special place in the order of creation, 
thus the end suitable to them is also distinct: 
 
Now it is evident that each thing has an operation that belongs to it according to its form. But 
the form of a human being is his soul, whose activity is life, not indeed life as mere existence 
of a living thing, but a special operation of life, such as understanding or feeling. Hence, 
happiness obviously consists in some operation of life, such as understanding or feeling (InNE 
																																																								
15 Cf. Brian Davies, “Happiness,” in The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas, eds. Brian Davies and Eleonore 
Stump (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 231-232. 
16 ST I-II 2.8. 
17 Davies, “Happiness,” 229. 
18 ST I-II 1.4. 
19 Robert Pasnau and Christopher Shields, The Philosophy of Aquinas (Colorado: Westview Press, 2004), 
201. 
20 Pasnau and Shields, The Philosophy of Aquinas, 206. 
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1.10.123).21 
 
We readily know that Aquinas identifies a specific and unique human function with 
reason. “A human being is essentially an entity capable of reasoning, so the human 
function resides in the proper expression of reason. It follows, then, that the final good of a 
human being is just this: reasoning well.”22 Because the appetite can only rest when it 
reaches its perfection, Aquinas concludes that true human happiness can only be a beatific 
vision when in a state of grace we gaze at God:  
 
There cannot be ultimate and perfect beatitude except in seeing God’s essence. To see this 
clearly, there are two points that must be taken into account: the first is that a man is not 
perfectly happy as long as something remains to be desired and sought after; the second is that 
the perfection of any given power is in accord with the nature of its object.23  
 
If happiness lies in a perfection of a function of a certain entity, we have already 
discovered that what is uniquely human is our intellect, then, our capacity for reason will 
reach its perfection in union with God: 
 
Now as De Anima 3 says, an intellect’s object is the ‘what-ness,’ i.e., the essence, of a thing 
(quod quid est, idest essentia rei). Hence, an intellect’s perfection goes as far as does its 
cognition of the essence of a thing. Therefore, if some intellect has a cognition of the essence 
of some effect but cannot thereby have a cognition of that effect’s cause – i.e., a cognition by 
which the cause’s ‘what-ness’ might be known – then that intellect is not said to have attained 
to the cause absolutely speaking (non dicitur attingere ad causam simpliciter), even though it 
is able, through the effect, to have a cognition of the cause’s existence (cognoscere possit de 
cause an sit)… Therefore, if the human intellect, knowing the essence of some created effect, 
knows of God only that He exists, then the intellect’s perfection has not yet, absolutely 
speaking, reached the first cause; instead, there still remains in it a natural desire to make an 
inquiry into that cause. Hence, that intellect is not yet perfectly blessed. Therefore, what is 
required for perfect beatitude is that the intellect should reach the very essence of the first 
cause. And so it will have its perfection by being united to God as its object, and, as was 
explained above (q. 2, a. 8), this alone is what man’s beatitude consists in.24  
 
This causes Brian Davies, a professor of philosophy, to conclude “that Aquinas on 
ultimate happiness is decidedly theocentric.”25 This final end in Aquinas’s thought should 
be embraced rather than chosen, Pasnau and Shields conclude, as it stems from our 
creaturely status.26 
 
1.2.1 Earthly Happiness  
 
Human ethical activity thus is framed in a picture of happiness – the ultimate human 
happiness lies in the beatific vision, union with God, or in other words, direct experience 																																																								
21 Ibid., 207. Here Pasnau and Shields quote Aquinas’s Sententia libri Ethicorum. 
22 Pasnau and Shields, The Philosophy of Aquinas, 208. 
23 ST I-II 3.8. 
24 ST I-II 3.8. 
25 Davies, “Happiness,” 233. 
26 Cf. Pasnau and Shields, The Philosophy of Aquinas, 198. 
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of God. One has to keep this larger framework in mind while discussing Aquinas’s ethical 
views; yet as ethics is possible only here and now, Aquinas also discusses the earthly 
forms of happiness which paradoxically have a status of imperfect perfection.  
In this regard Jean Porter, professor of moral theology, claims that, generally 
speaking, ancient ethics saw its goal in attainment of happiness while contemporary ethics 
usually speaks in terms of well-being.27 She wants to draw our attention to the fact that 
while Aquinas, without a doubt, considers beatific vision as a perfect final end of the 
rational creature, we can find a gradation in his conception of happiness. Porter thus claims 
that we can distinguish four sorts of happiness proper to human beings in Aquinas’s 
thought: the aforementioned beatific vision; happiness connatural to the human being 
which is proportionate to the virtues we can attain ourselves (I-II 5.5, 7; 62.1; 63.3); 
happiness which is not connatural to human beings because it entails the help of grace but 
which is not ultimate and complete happiness (5.3 ad 1; 69.1, 2); the kind of happiness 
which one can find in fulfillment of his/her will (5.8).28 
And so Porter claims that Aquinas’s account of happiness is complex: 
 
Not only does he distinguish between perfect and imperfect happiness, he also identifies more 
than one kind of imperfect happiness, and correlatively, he understands ‘imperfect’ in this 
context in more than one way. The happiness of those who have grace is an imperfect 
anticipation of happiness in the unqualified sense, and yet it has the potential to develop unto 
full happiness (I-II 69.1, 2); the kind of happiness that is properly connatural to us, in contrast, 
is not just relatively limited and incomplete, but qualitatively different from perfect happiness 
(62.1; 63.3). As for the fourth kind of happiness, equated with the fulfillment of one’s will, 
Aquinas only mentions this in passing. However, it appears from the context that this kind of 
happiness, unlike the others, can include not only limited and imperfect but downright false 
kinds of happiness, since men and women do in fact seek happiness in all kinds of distorted 
ways (I-II 5.8; cf. II-II 23.7).29 
 
Porter wants to demonstrate that Aquinas acknowledges more than one form of 
supreme happiness, but even in acknowledging more forms of happiness he sees them 
relating to the highest form. The human being has one final end – which is supernatural 
happiness and the natural, earthly experiences relate to that end.30 The best way of thinking 
of the kinds of happiness is to think of them as levels, modalities of perfection.  
Porter furthers that while we think of Aquinas’s conception of happiness we should 																																																								
27  Jean Porter, Nature as Reason. A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law (Grand Rapids, 
Michigan/Cambridge, UK: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2005), 147. 
28 Cf. Porter, Nature as Reason, 156. 
29 Ibid., 157. 
30 In this regard Porter sympathetically quotes Kevin Staley arguing that: “Thomas does not argue that man 
has two ends, the one natural and the other supernatural. Rather, he speaks of a single end which is twofold, 
which is realized at both a natural and a supernatural level, and which he describes in the Summa Theologiae 
as imperfect and perfect beatitude respectively.” Staley, “Happiness,” 227, quoted at Porter, Nature as 
Reason, 158. She is also aware that Aquinas argues so explicitly about the beatific vision as a perfect 
happiness (which, after all, can be achieved only after death) that some of the thinkers have argued that one 
cannot find a connatural form of happiness for human being considered as human being. In this regard Porter 
refers us to the works of Anot Pegis, “Nature and Spirit: Some Reflections on the Problems of the End of 
Man,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 23 (1949): 62-79; and Kevin Staley, 
“Happiness: The Natural End of Man?,” The Thomist Vol. 53, No. 2 (1989): 215-234. See Porter, Nature as 
Reason, 156. Porter herself disagrees with this judgment. 
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always keep in mind the larger framework of this thought where everything which exists is 
in act and act itself is perfection. Human happiness is perfection of a rational creature or in 
other words – being in act in accordance to who he/she is. “The complexity of the human 
creature,” Porter claims, “implies that unlike other animals, we can attain perfection in 
diverse ways and at disparate levels, including some which go beyond our natural 
capacities. But no matter how perfection is understood, it will necessarily involve some 
degree of proper development and exercise of the capacities distinctive to us as creatures 
of a specific kind – that is just what perfection is.”31 The distinctively human operations of 
capabilities of knowledge and love in this sense can constitute a kind of happiness if they 
are genuine and leading to perfection.32 
Thus if the kinds of happiness which can be sought after in this life lie in operations 
of the well-functioning intellect, it is to say that essentially it lies in the life of virtue.  
 
1.2.2 Components of Ethics of Happiness: Natural Law and Virtue 
 
1.2.2.1 Natural Law 
 
This leads us to a brief discussion on Aquinas’s views on natural law and virtue as two 
pillars upholding his ethics of happiness. Reading and interpreting Aquinas’s views on 
these concepts is a matter of debate, to be sure.33 For this reason, we choose to present 																																																								
31 Porter, Nature as Reason, 160. 
32 Beatitude primarily lies in operations of speculative intellect, not practical – as a species get its end from 
an object and the object of speculative intellect is more universal compared to practical reason which is 
occupied with active, everyday life. Cf. ST I-II 3.5. When we think of our cognitive capacities as being 
perfect in this earthly life, we should always think of them as participating in the perfect beatitude;. 
nonetheless, they are a kind of perfection known and experienced by us here and now: “As was explained 
above (a. 2), there are two types of human beatitude, the one perfect and the other imperfect. Perfect 
beatitude has to be thought of as attaining to the true nature of beatitude (attingit ad veram beatitudinis 
rationem), whereas imperfect beatitude has to be thought of as not attaining to the true nature of beatitude, 
but instead as participating in a certain particular likeness of beatitude – in the way that perfect prudence is 
found in man, who has reason with respect to his actions, whereas imperfect prudence exists in some brute 
animals in whom there are particular instincts for certain actions that are similar to acts of prudence.” ST I-II 
3.6. 
33 One can find multiple interpretations of the concept of natural law. A significant distinction is made 
between the authors who argue that one cannot read Aquinas’s account on the natural law separated from his 
Christian theological views. Kerr’s thought is an example of this reasoning: “In sum, in the Summa 
Theologiae, Thomas presents the natural law in the context of the Torah and the New Law of the Holy Spirit, 
in the wider context of an account of the virtues (theological and cardinal) as the moral agent’s journey to 
face-to-face vision with God, all framed by the presupposition that the natural law is a participation in the 
eternal law which is identical with God himself.” Kerr, After Aquinas, 109. Anthony J. Lisska could be cited 
as an author arguing that Aquinas’s account on the natural law can be separated from his Christian theology. 
See his Aquinas’s Theory of Natural Law: An Analytic Reconstruction (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996). 
Another distinct path of interpretation is traced to the debate about how one should conceive of the precepts 
of natural law – should they be equated solely with the precepts of practical reason or natural inclinations or 
both? Lombardo noting the disagreement suggests that “perhaps it is best to say that, for Aquinas, the natural 
inclinations and the precepts of practical reason can both be called natural law, albeit in different ways. The 
inclinations are natural law in its relationship to appetite, and the precepts are natural law in its relationship to 
reason.” Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 115, footnote 95. Pasnau and Shields, in a similar fashion, flesh out 
Aquinas’s views on the natural law as both precepts guiding our practical reason and the natural inclinations. 
They also argue that despite the argument that natural law is impressed on us by God, Aquinas’s account on 
the natural law can be largely understood and defended in philosophical terms. We will turn to these points in 
our upcoming short exposé.  
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Pasnau’s and Shields’ account on natural law and virtue as it is meant to be a general 
introduction to Aquinas’s philosophical thought and as such is not tied to a particular 
defended ethical framework. This does not make it entirely uncontroversial, yet this 
account seems a good candidate to proceed with, while attempting to present a general 
outline of Aquinas’s views on ethics. 
Pasnau and Shields assert that what is characteristic to Aquinas’s views on ethics is 
that it  
 
altogether lacks any sort of substantive, straightforward criterion for the rightness and 
wrongness of moral acts. Although he believes, as we will see, that there are ethical first 
principles, known to all, he sees these as too general to offer any substantive ethical guidance 
in particular cases…Aquinas does identify a single, ultimate goal for human life: blessedness, 
understood as eternal life with God in heaven. Right actions, he holds, are all and only those 
actions that contribute to the attainment of that end.34 
  
Pasnau and Shields further that Aquinas is aware that practically fleshing out what it 
means to attain that goal is not always straightforward. Thus they claim that Aquinas’s 
account of ethics is itself complex and multifaceted, yet essentially it can “be broken into 
two components, a theory of natural law and a theory of virtue, each of which depends 
crucially on each other.”35 
When we start to think of the natural law framework of Aquinas’s ethical thought, 
first we should think of eternal law, which simply put refers to God’s plan for the universe, 
his providential guidance. Or to put it in words found in the Summa: 
 
Now as was established in the first part (ST 1, q. 14, a. 8), it is through His wisdom that God is 
the creator of the totality of things, and He is related to those things in the way a craftsman is 
related to his artifacts. As was likewise established in the first part (ST 1, q. 22, a. 2 and q. 103, 
a. 5), God is also the governor of all the acts and motions found in each creature. Hence, just as 
the divine wisdom’s conception has the character of an artistic conception or exemplar because 
all things are created through it, so too the divine wisdom’s conception has the character of law 
insofar as it moves all things to their appropriate ends. Accordingly, the eternal law is nothing 
other than the divine wisdom’s conception insofar as it directs all acts and movements. 36 
 
Every human being participates in the eternal law which is a source of all other laws 
through his/her rational nature at the moments of grasping truth: “However, every rational 
creature knows the eternal law with respect to more or less of what radiates from it. For 
any cognition of the truth is a sort of radiation from and participation in the eternal law, 
which is unchangeable truth.”37 Pasnau and Shields explain that for Aquinas “[s]ince 
God’s eternal plan extends to every aspect of the universe, any truth whatsoever will count 
as part of that plan…In this sense, the eternal law shines forth in the created world, and we 																																																								
34 Pasnau and Shields, The Philosophy of Aquinas, 218. 
35 Ibid., 218. Pasnau and Shields also note that, generally speaking, Aquinas’s account on ethics can be 
labeled eclectic as it contains multiple items normally representing different conceptions of ethics: “It is, all 
at once, a virtue theory and a natural law theory, with divine commands playing a role as well. It combines 
deontological and consequentalist aspects and in addition has a strong teleological component. All of this, 
Aquinas seems to think, needs to be embraced by a complete theory of human ethics.” Pasnau and Shields, 
The Philosophy of Aquinas, 217. 
36 ST I-II 93.1. 
37 ST I-II 93.2. 
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grasp that law simply by observing the world around us.”38 What is more, matters of 
grasping value instead of empirical facts for Aquinas are the clearest instances of 
participating in eternal law. 
In the Treatise on Law (ST I-II 90-108), Aquinas distinguishes between human laws 
(imposed by governments and other institutions), divine laws (revealed truth surpassing 
human reason), and natural law which is central to Aquinas’s ethical theory.39 Natural law 
is nothing else than “the light of natural reason, by which we discern what is good and 
what is evil. This has to do with natural law, which is nothing other than the imprint of 
God’s light within us. Hence, it is clear that natural law is nothing other than a 
participation in eternal law on the part of a rational creature.”40 And here we should be 
attentive to the fact that for Aquinas, natural law refers to our capacity to discern the good 
from the bad, which stems from nature of our reason and not divine or governmental rule. 
Even though natural law is an imprint of eternal law which refers to prudential divine 
government – Pasnau and Shields claim that the account can be understood and defended 
in philosophical terms. Thus they claim, “it is much more than a crude ethical innatism: it 
is not that we all just know right and wrong when we see it because God has built that 
information into us. What is innate within us, instead, is a capacity to see the truth of 
certain basic ethical principles, from which it is our responsibility to develop a more 
comprehensive moral outlook.”41 
Pasnau and Shields further that this structure of ethical theory is continuous with 
Aquinas’s general theory of rational thought. When it comes to theoretical knowledge 
Aquinas holds that it is “built up on the basis of first principles, such as the principle of 
noncontradiction, and that we have an innate intellectual ability to grasp such first 
principles through the light of agent intellect, a light that is given to us by God.”42 He 
makes precisely the same move when discussing ethical theory.  
What, then, are the first ethical principles to be grasped? “Therefore, the first precept 
of law is that good ought to be done and pursued and that evil ought to be avoided. And all 
the other precepts of the law of nature are founded upon this principle – so that, namely, all 
the things to be done or avoided that practical reason naturally apprehends as human goods 
are such that they belong to the precepts of the law of nature.”43 Thus Aquinas states that 
good should be done and evil avoided – at this point we should also note that above we 
have defined a Thomistic understanding of good in terms of desirability. Thus we know 
what to seek and what to avoid through our appetite – “[G]ood is the first thing to fall 
within the apprehension of practical reason, which is ordered toward action. For every 
agent acts for the sake of an end, which has the character of a good. And so the first 
principle in practical reasoning is what is founded on the notion of good, which is the 
notion (quod fundatur supra rationem boni quae est): The good is what all things desire.”44 
Pasanau and Shields argue that one cannot replace ‘good’ or ‘evil’ with just anything 
that turns out to be so in the analysis – we can replace ‘good’ or ‘evil’ only with 																																																								
38 Pasnau and Shields, The Philosophy of Aquinas, 219. 
39 Ibid., 220. 
40 ST I-II 91.2. 
41 Pasnau and Shields, The Philosophy of Aquinas, 220. 
42 Ibid., 220. 
43 ST I-II 94.2. 
44 ST I-II 94.2. 
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specifications that are universally desired or despised.45 Precisely this makes it difficult to 
utilize the first principle of practical reasoning as a premise for some more substantive 
conclusions about what should be pursued and what avoided. How can we then establish 
more substantive moral principles? For this step Aquinas relies on what human beings 
desire: 
 
(I) [the first principle of practical reasoning] seems to be foundational in the sense that it is a 
kind of template for this strategy, a normative thesis established on the basis of facts about 
human desire…Aquinas, far from wanting to separate morality and inclination, takes the two 
to be tightly linked, holding that: II. ‘The order of the precepts of natural law accords with 
the order of natural inclinations’ (ST 1a2ae 94.2c)…As a result, he supposes that our best 
guide to the natural law is an analysis of our natural inclinations. The human good is to act in 
such a way as best to satisfy those inclinations, and the precepts of the natural law are just so 
many rules for how we should act in order to achieve that end. This means that, for Aquinas, 
normative principles are always conditional upon certain facts about what we desire. There is 
nothing about these principles that makes them true in the abstract, independently of facts 
about human nature. Instead, those acts are morally right that best allow us to achieve the 
various ends that human beings all desire.46 
 
We may then suggest that Aquinas derives ethical principles from human cares. Thus 
Pasnau and Shields conclude: “[g]enerally, [Aquinas’s] ethics is the product of rational 
deliberation about what will best achieve the ends to which human beings aspire. 
Presumably, this is an attractive feature of the account.”47 
 
1.2.2.2 Virtue 
 
Now Pasnau and Shields further indicate that one may wonder why Aquinas develops an 
account of virtue. The natural law account already suggests an explanation of foundations 
of ethics and our grasp of it; our actions are evaluated on the basis of whether they are 
conducive to the ultimate interests which promote our flourishing as rational beings.48 Yet 
Aquinas still makes a move towards an account of virtue. Why is that? To answer this 
question we should look at what virtue according to Aquinas is. Question 44, Article 1 of 
																																																								
45 Cf. Pasnau and Shields, The Philosophy of Aquinas, 221. 
46 Ibid., 222. The natural inclinations defining Aquinas’s ethical framework are the following: “Why would 
Aquinas defend (II)? For him, this is just one more way in which we can see imprinted on us the influence of 
the eternal law. God created human beings for certain ends, and so he naturally gave us not only the ability to 
recognize how to pursue those ends but also the inclination to pursue them. Reason alone would be of little 
value unless we also had the appropriate desires. Accordingly, immediately after stating (II), Aquinas goes 
on to classify the different sorts of natural inclinations and the kinds of precepts they give rise to. First, is the 
inclination for self-preservation, which we are said to share with all substances. Second are those inclinations 
that we share with all animals – such as for sexual intercourse between male and female, and for the rearing 
of children. Last are specifically human inclinations, such as to grasp the truth about God and to live in 
society.” Pasnau and Shields, The Philosophy of Aquinas, 222-223. Inclinations themselves, Kerr furthers, 
should be understood as “something between psychology and ontology, somewhere on the range between 
instincts and existential orientations. When he considers the ‘content,’ or the ‘extent,’ of ‘the order of the 
precepts of the natural law’ he equates it with the ‘order of the natural inclinations’ – the instincts and 
ontological orientations of the human creature (94.2).” Kerr, After Aquinas, 108. 
47 Pasnau and Shields, The Philosophy of Aquinas, 223. 
48 Cf. Ibid., 228-229. 
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Prima secundae indicates that virtue is “a certain perfection of power.”49 Virtue is a habit 
which is always related to what is good and “since a virtue is a habit directed toward an 
operation (sit habitus operativus), the end of a virtue is the operation itself.”50 Pasnau and 
Shields explain that this essentially means that: “In terms of Aquinas’s standard 
explanatory framework, a habitus brings its possessor part way toward actuality, in such a 
way that what formerly had the bare potential to act in a certain way now has the 
pronounced ability to do it well. Second, the moral virtues always inform a power that is 
either rational itself or under reason’s control; only in such powers do we find the sort of 
capacity for alternatives that Aquinas associates with moral responsibility.”51 We need 
virtuous dispositions for three things: uniformity of action (actions stabilized by 
dispositional inclination), to perform perfect action readily, to complete perfect action with 
pleasure.52 And thus Pasnau and Shields interpret the relationship between natural law and 
virtue in the following way: “The framework of the natural law is available to ground the 
rightness or wrongness of certain sorts of actions, but in standard cases it can remain in the 
background, leaving the virtues to guide an agent toward the good.”53 
The presentation above is aimed at engaging meaningfully with Aquinas’s thought 
on the passions. We wanted to demonstrate the world of Aquinas’s subject and to look 
more carefully at the terms which will be used frequently in the discussion. Furthermore, 
to touch upon the contours of Aquinas’s concept of happiness and, indeed, to frame his 
ethics around this concept can help us to differentiate it attentively from the contemporary 
ethics of flourishing or well-being (and so prepare us to engage in dialogue with 
Nussbaum’s ethical project). The manner in which Pasnau and Shields present Aquinas’s 
ethics, standing on the pillars of virtue and natural law, already indicates the role the 
passions might have in our ethical deliberations – if Aquinas establishes his ethical claims 
on the observation of human desire, the passions as manifestations of that desire, seem to 
offer themselves as sources of ethical reflection. Now, the upcoming pages will explore 
this thesis and inquire whether and in what form Aquinas suggests that the passions can 
contribute to human perfection. 
 
1.3 THE APPETITE IN GENERAL 
 
																																																								
49 ST I-II 55.1. 
50 ST I-II 55.4. 
51 Pasnau and Shields, The Philosophy of Aquinas, 229. 
52 Here Pasnau and Shields quote a lengthy passage from Aquinas’s Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus in 
communi: “[W]e need virtuous disposition for three things: 1. For uniformity of action. For what rests on the 
action alone changes easily if it has not been stabilized by a dispositional inclination. 2. To perform a perfect 
action readily. For unless there is a disposition somehow inclining the rational power in one direction, then 
whenever we have to take action, we will always have to take up first an inquiry into the action. This is clear 
in the case of someone who wants to reflect on something and hasn’t yet acquired the dispositional 
knowledge, and in the case of someone who wants to act virtuously and lacks the virtuous dispositions…3. 
To complete our perfect action pleasurably, something that occurs through a disposition. Because it works in 
the manner of a kind of nature, it makes the action proper to it natural, in effect, and therefore pleasurable, 
since appropriateness causes pleasure. Accordingly, the Philosopher, in Ethics II, holds that pleasure in one’s 
action is a sign of a disposition (QDVC 1c).” Pasnau and Shields, The Philosophy of Aquinas, 230. 
53 Ibid., 231. 
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As we approach the discussion on the passions themselves, we should touch upon the 
notion of the appetite which is of particular importance to our research. In Question 78, 
Article 1 of the Prima pars,54 Aquinas establishes five powers of the soul:551) the 
vegetative, 2) the sentient; 3) the appetitive; 4) the locomotion; and 5) the intellective.56 
The vegetative, sentient, and intellective powers are called three souls57 and the fourth, 
excluding the appetitive power constitutes the ways of being alive (modi vivendi). The 
appetitive power does not constitute a separate mode of being because appetite exists in 
everything in which sentience exists. Furthermore, the locomotive and the appetitive 
powers are shared with beings that possess different kinds of soul, thus they are not 
ascribed a specific type of soul. The rational soul is differentiated from the vegetative and 
sentient because it does not need a bodily organ to function.  
The powers of the soul are distinguished by virtue of their object – the more 
universal the object, the higher the power. The souls itself tend toward exterior being and 
in accord with this, the two powers of the soul are operational – appetitive and locomotion. 
The appetitive power in this regard signifies the soul’s relation to “an extrinsic being as to 
an end, which is the first thing in intention[.]”58 
In Question 5 of the Prima pars Aquinas defines appetite as “a sort of movement 
toward a thing.”59 Miner suggests that we should be attentive to the wording ‘sort of’ 
(quidam) because it is used intentionally by Aquinas. Appetite does not refer to literal 
motion, rather it should be understood “[i]n its most basic sense, appetitus [as] a reaching 
forth, a stretching toward some kind of object.”60 It has been well established that 																																																								
54 We are primarily utilizing English translations of Aquinas’s works. Following directions of Fergus Kerr 
we utilize authoritative translations found on Thérèse Bonin’s webpage (Kerr suggests the English 
translations of Summa in Kerr, Thomas Aquinas, 121): 
http://www.home.duq.edu/~bonin/thomasbibliography.html. We primarily use the translation of Alfred J. 
Freddoso, trans. Summa Theologica text at www3.nd.edu/~afreddos together with Fathers of the English 
Dominican Province, trans. The Summa Theologica 2d, rev. ed. 22 vols. London: Burns, Oates & 
Washbourne, 1912–36; reprinted in 5 vols., (Westminster, Md.: Christian Classics, 1981). E-text in html at 
http://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/index.html. All the quotations of the Summa in our text come from 
Freddoso’s translation unless indicated otherwise.  
55 Aquinas defines a human soul as an immaterial, rational principle of life: “In order to inquire into the 
nature of a soul, one must take for granted that what is called a ‘soul’ (anima) is a first principle of life in 
those things around us that are alive; for we say that living things are ‘ensouled’ (animata) and that things 
which lack life are ‘not ensouled’ (inanimata).There are two operations by which life is especially made 
manifest, viz., cognition and movement.” ST I 75.1. 
56 Here he defends Aristotelian doctrine found in De anima 2.1, 412a28 and 412b12. Cf. Miner, Aquinas on 
the Passions, 13. 
57 “For certain things, e.g., plants and inanimate bodies, are inclined toward the good only through a natural 
disposition and without any cognition. This sort of inclination toward the good is called a natural appetite. 
Other things are inclined toward the good with some sort of cognition, not in the sense that they understand 
the very concept of the good (ratio boni), but in the sense that they know some particular good – as, for 
instance, the senses, which know the sweet and the white and other things of this sort. The inclination that 
follows upon this type of cognition is called a sentient appetite. Finally, certain things are inclined toward the 
good with a cognition by which they know the very concept of the good, and this is proper to an intellect. 
These things are inclined toward the good in the most perfect way – not, as it were, directed toward the good 
only by another, as are things that lack cognition, and not directed toward a merely particular good, as are 
things that have only sentient cognition, but inclined, as it were, toward the universal good itself. And this 
sort of inclination is called a will.” ST I 59.1. 
58 ST I 78.1. 
59 ST I 5.4. 
60 Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 16. 
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Aquinas’s views are teleological – thus appetite conceived in this framework refers to an 
inclination of all creation towards the end proper to it, its completion. Vegetative, 
sensitive, and rational appetites are qualifications of appetite – but, generally speaking, 
appetite as such signifies a state of created being, it is a potency seeking its actualization. 
“What causes a creature to have an appetite,” Miner argues, “is nothing less than the fact 
of creaturehood itself.”61 
Lombardo argues that the appetitive power is what gives creation its dynamism. 
“Without appetite,” Lombardo says, “there would not be this dynamic movement, and 
creation would not move toward its perfection.”62 The notion of appetite also refers to a 
certain passivity in creation as it refers to the way in which creation relates to its creator: 
 
Appetite plays a central role in the Neoplatonic exitus-reditus theme of creation flowing from 
God and then back to him, a theme that structures Aquinas’ entire theology of creation (as well 
as Summa theologiae). According to this view, first, God is the source of creation, both as its 
Creator and as the exemplar of all perfections found in created things, and then, creation is 
oriented back to God and ordered to the manifestation of God’s goodness…Appetite is the 
engine driving the exitus-reditus: both in the divine exitus, since it flows from an act of God’s 
will, and in the creaturely reditus, since appetite motivates creation to return to God.63 
 
1.3.1 The Good  
 
The notion of the good is a cornerstone of Aquinas’s thought. It is particularly important to 
our own inquiry as we will focus on his conception of appetite (sense appetite in particular) 
– the good is what the appetitive part of the human being seeks. In Question 5 of the Prima 
pars Aquinas considers the good in general. Here we can find Aquinas’s explanation of the 
ontological structure of goodness – goodness and being are equated and goodness itself is 
described in terms of desirability. In the first Article Aquinas thus argues that: “Good and 
being are the same in reality and differ only conceptually. This is clear from the following 
line of reasoning: The nature of the good consists in something’s being desirable; thus, in 
Ethics 1 the Philosopher says, ‘The good is what all things desire.’”64  
Goodness, then, can be understood in terms of perfection and a final end. In Question 
5, Article 4 Aquinas affirms that the good has the character of a final end: “Since the good 
is that which everything desires, and since [being desired] has the character of an end, it is 
clear that good expresses the nature of an end.”65 Goodness as understood by Aquinas 																																																								
61 Ibid., 16. Potentiality is characteristic only to created order. God, in Aquinas, is defined as ‘a pure act,’ 
lacking in nothing. See ST I 3.7. The appetite in God does not contain any passivity and is defined in terms of 
the divine will which can be seen as intellectual appetite which inclines toward unqualified and unlimited 
goodness. See ST I 19-20, ST I 59.1. 
62 Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 28. Consequently, Lombardo argues that for Aquinas all being is ecstatic. 
He draws his argument from G.J. McAleer, Ecstatic Morality and Sexual Politics: A Catholic and 
Antitotalitarian Theory of the Body (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 13-33. 
63 Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 29-30. Lombardo bases the claim of the exitus-reditus structure of the 
Summa on Marie-Dominique Chenu, Toward Understanding Saint Thomas, trans. A.-M. Landry and D. 
Hughes (New York: Macmilan, 1968), 297-322 and Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., Aquinas’s Summa. 
Background, Structure, and Reception, trans. Benedict M. Guevin, OSB (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 2005), 17-62. 
64 ST I 5.1. 
65 ST I 5.4. 
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“radiates; it is communicative, active, generous.”66 Lombardo notes that the implications 
of this definition are ‘startling:’ 
 
Appetite is inextricably linked to being and goodness. Also, appetite is not just good in itself; 
appetibility, that is, desirability, is the defining characteristic of goodness. The goodness of 
appetite is bound up with the goodness of being. This positive evaluation permeates his 
appraisal of human appetite[.]67 
 
Furthermore, Article 6 of Question 5 divides good into three species: the pleasant 
(delectabile), the useful (utile), and the noble (honestum). This threefold division 
“corresponds exactly to the three kinds of friendship distinguished by Aristotle: friendship 
based on pleasure, usefulness, and virtue.”68 Different powers of the soul seek different 
goods, with noble/honest good indicating the highest good which sought by our rational 
appetite. Furthermore, “Aquinas also finds the threefold division of good to inform the 
distinction that Aristotle makes at the beginning of the Ethics between three kinds of lives: 
the pleasurable, the civic, and the contemplative (see Nicomachean Ethics, 1095b15–
20).”69 Thus for Aquinas whatever good may be materially, it is always sought in the three 
aforementioned forms. 
 
1.3.2 The Appetite and the Notions Good and Evil 
 
Thus for Aquinas the notion of the appetite always signifies a kind of motion toward the 
good. In Question 19, Article 9 of the Prima pars discussing God’s will Aquinas argues:  
 
Since, as was explained above (q. 5, a. 1), the nature of the good is the nature of what is 
desirable, whereas evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be 
desired either by a natural desire or by an animal desire or by an intellective desire, i.e., by the 
will. However, an evil may be desired per accidens to the extent that it follows upon some 
good. This is evident with every kind of desire. For a natural agent does not desire privation or 
corruption…Thus, an evil that is conjoined to one good is the privation of some other good. 
Therefore, evil would never be desired – not even per accidens – if the good that the evil is 
conjoined to were not desired more than the good that is undermined by the evil.70  
 
As good is equated with being, evil lacks ontological reality and is described as 
privation by Aquinas. And from the description of the nature of appetite and evil we can 
claim that “[t]he basic structure of appetitus ensures the impossibility of seeking evil as 
evil.”71 Aquinas describes the relationship of good and evil as possible objects of appetite 
in the following way:  
 
Since the good is the more principal and per se object of will and appetite, whereas evil is the 
secondary and per aliud object, insofar as it is opposed to the good, it follows that acts of will 
and appetite that have to do with the good must be naturally prior to those that have to do with 																																																								
66 Servais Pinckaers, O.P., The Sources of Christian Ethics, translated from the third edition by Sr. Mary 
Thomas Noble, O.P. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 417. 
67 Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 27. 
68 Ibid., 416. 
69 Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 17. 
70 ST I 19.9. 
71 Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 26. 
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evil. For instance, joy is prior to sadness, and love is prior to hate. For it is always the case that 
what is per se is prior to what is per aliud.72  
 
This means, Miner claims, that “[a]ppetitus names a primary tendency toward good, 
and a derivative inclination away from evil.”73 Aquinas’s thought is embedded into a 
fundamental principle that creation is good and everything that is created seeks perfection 
(or the good). Or in other words: “Every being that is not God is a creature of God. But, as 
1 Timothy 4:4 says, every creature of God is good, while God is maximally good. 
Therefore, every being is good.”74 Another prominent Thomistic scholar Servais-Théodore 
Pinckaers, O.P, notes that the primacy of good on the level of appetite indicates that 
“everyone spontaneously desires what appears as good and spontaneously avoids what 
appears as evil; our natural tendency is to do the one and avoid the other. It is the 
expression of a primordial spiritual instinct, the basic sense of good and evil.”75  
 
2. DEFINING THE PASSIONS 
 
Now having established the background of Aquinas’s thought we can enter the discussion 
on the passions themselves. As we have indicated in the introduction of this chapter – the 
goal of the upcoming pages is a positive retrieval of Aquinas’s views on the passions and 
their ethical meaning. The setting of Aquinas’s writings is very different to ours and he 
raises some questions that are not evident for a contemporary reader. However, we want to 
demonstrate that even today there are aspects of his theory of the passions that are relevant 
for the construction of our ethical projects and personal consultation. The claim that 
Aquinas’s philosophical psychology can still make a positive contribution is also the 
leading intuition of the works of our three main interlocutors – Miner, Lombardo, and 
Cates. Professor of philosophy and medieval studies, Peter King, notes that Aquinas’s 
faculty psychology resembles an image vast inner cathedral.76 Aquinas believed that the 
inner space of a person is constituted by sub-personal mechanisms (or in other words, the 
faculties) which intersect and causally interact, in this way, giving rise to psychological 
phenomena. The inner cathedral of Aquinas is made up of three parts – vegetative, 
sensitive, and intellective (we will soon discover these distinctions in greater detail). Our 
prime interest is the sensitive part of the soul which accounts for movement and sensation 
and its connection to the mechanisms of assimilating and understanding our world – thus 
cognitive or apprehensive powers – and furthermore their connection to the mechanisms 
through which we engage with the world we understand – thus appetitive powers. We want 
to argue that Aquinas suggests illuminating thoughts on the way our cognitive and 
appetitive parts interact. Especially revealing is his thought that the passions represent the 
ways we relate to and are engaged with our surroundings. Aquinas was convinced that the 
passions always have an object, and moreover, that they interact with and even activate 
each other. Aquinas’s views, we argue, can contribute to a fuller understanding of the 																																																								
72 ST I 20.1. 
73 Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 26. 
74 ST I 5.1. 
75 Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics, 421.  
76 Cf. Peter King, “The Inner Cathedral: Mental Architecture in High Scholasticism,” Vivarium 46 (2008): 
254. 
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dynamics of our inner space and the turmoil it sometimes faces. He shows that the passions 
are connected to the objects in our lives and that they are not entirely independent of the 
ways we conceive of our surroundings. We will discover in Aquinas’s thought that some of 
the passions are caused by our cognitive capacities and so enter the domain of rational and 
willful. His works, furthermore, allow us to stipulate an account of responsibility for our 
passions. In the upcoming pages we want to demonstrate that together with Aquinas and 
his interpreters we can get to know and understand our inner space better and by 
consequence take better care of it. 
Aquinas starts the Treatise on the Passions with Question 22 which locates the 
passions in the soul, judges that they are more in the sensitive than in the apprehensive 
power and culminates in the affirmation of the definition of the passions taken from John 
Damascene. When it comes to locating the passion in the soul, Aquinas points out that a 
passion refers to passivity, a certain kind of reception, it is a soul’s ability ‘to be acted 
upon.’ He holds that there are two ways that refer to being acted upon – when we receive 
something (he uses the example of receiving health instead of sickness) and when we lose 
something (he uses the example of losing health and receiving sickness).77 A passion 
should be understood as being acted upon in the latter sense.78 At this point we should be 
careful and note that Aquinas further indicates that “[o]n the other hand, a passion with a 
loss occurs only through a bodily change (secundum transmutationem coporalem), and so 
a passion properly speaking belongs to the soul only per accidens – viz., insofar as the 
composite is acted upon.”79 The passions, as we will see shortly, belong to the sentient 
appetite which needs bodily organs to function according to Aquinas (unlike thoughts and 
volitions), but they are not solely the acts of the body because they are shaped by the 
power of apprehension. This means that the actual subject of the passions is always the 
																																																								
77 ST I-II 22.1. 
78 Miner suggests that we should not look at Aquinas’s interpretation of the passions as a change to the worse 
but in the light of tension between the rational nature of a human versus irrational passions. He argues that 
this move might be Aquinas’s way to explain the passions in terms of daily speech and experience: “When a 
person is affected by an outside force, but in a way that coincides with what he antecedently desired, his 
disposition is far brighter than when he is acted upon in a manner that he experiences as violent.” Miner, 
Aquinas on the Passions, 33. The unexpected external force that diverts one from this natural course is 
identified more with what passion is and how it can affect our lives. Yet Miner also points out that while 
Aquinas distinguishes two senses of being acted upon and identifies one of them, a sense of loss, to be more 
proper to the nature of the passions, this identification does not champion the subsequent discussion on the 
passions. That means, that an identification of the passions with a loss does not bear any direct link with what 
Aquinas considers to be most essential about the passions. In this instance Miner quotes Eileen Sweeney: 
“For Aquinas begins pessimistically, taking passion in its most proper sense as the loss of what is natural and 
the receiving of what is not; hence sorrow is more a passion than joy. He then works through the next 24 
questions to construct an account which emphasizes just the opposite, converting the reader to a vision of the 
passions as forces for good, moving away from seeing them as a detriment or something to be merely 
tolerated or controlled. (1999, p. 220)” Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 33-34 quoting Eileen Sweeney, 
“Restructuring Desire: Aquinas, Hobbes and Descartes on the Passions,” in Stephen F. Brown, ed., Meeting 
of the Minds: The Relations between Medieval and Classical Modern European Philosophy. Rencontres de 
Philosophie Médiévale, VII (Turnhout: Brepols, 1990), 220. Lombardo on his behalf also joins this 
interpretation of Thomistic passions. He, as Miner, quotes the same work of Sweeney and concludes that “By 
laying out the various meanings of passion side by side, as he does repeatedly, Aquinas stresses the possible 
positive connotations of passion and minimizes the negative. In the end, he locates passion’s defining 
characteristic in receptivity rather than suffering.” Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 36-37. 
79 ST I-II 22.1. 
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body-soul composite.80 
Seeing a strong link between apprehension and appetite in the structure of the 
passion Aquinas further inquires whether passions are more in the apprehensive or 
appetitive part of the soul. In this regard Aquinas concludes that, even though the sense 
appetite is triggered by apprehension the definition of a passion shows that a subject is 
drawn to an object.81 And so “the soul is drawn toward a thing through its appetitive power 
rather than through its apprehensive power. For it is through its appetitive power that the 
soul is ordered toward the things themselves insofar as they exist in themselves (ad ispsas 
res prout in seipsis sunt).”82  
Miner comments that Aquinas’s inquiring into the relationship between apprehension 
and sense appetite in the case of passions does not break the relationship between the two 
powers and he concludes, be attentive to the wording – the passions are more (magis) in 
the appetitive part than in the apprehensive.83 Aquinas makes this conclusion because the 
sense appetite is drawn to the things themselves and so its connection to the object is more 
tangible than that of apprehension which grasps the intentions of the objects.84 Miner thus 
argues that Aquinas’s position is to construct desire as a power that puts us into a more 
intimate relationship with the good than our perception does.85 
After positioning the passions in the sense appetite, but keeping their connection 
with apprehension, Question 22 culminates in Article 3 inquiring whether, after all, the 
passions are more in the intellective appetite than the sensitive? Here we can finally 
encounter Aquinas’s affirmation of the definition John Damascene ascribes to the passions 
claiming that “[a] passion is a movement of the sentient appetitive power upon one’s 
imagining something good or bad.”86 Because any passion, properly speaking, exists only 																																																								
80 This is a common interpretation among all our main thinkers working on the topic of Thomistic passions. 
Cf. Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 32; Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions, 62; Lombardo, The Logic of 
Desire, 20.  
81 ST I-II 22.2. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Cf. Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 35. 
84 In this regard Aquinas claims that “[b]y contrast, the apprehensive power is not drawn to things insofar as 
they exist in themselves; rather, it has cognition of a thing in accord with the thing’s intention (secundum 
intentionem rei), which it has or receives within itself in its own mode. Hence, in the same place the 
Philosopher says that ‘the true and the false’ – which pertain to cognition – ‘exist in the mind and not in the 
things.’ ST I-II 22.2. 
85 Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 34. 
86 ST I-II 22.3. This definition is not formulated directly in Aquinas’s response, but rather in the but contrary 
to this part that serves to illuminate the mistakes of the objections in the structure of any question in the 
Summa. Furthermore, Miner points out that Aquinas, if we look closer, does not provide a full definition of 
the passions – he indicates only the formal aspect of the passions, the movement of the sentient appetite, but 
leaves out what is material in it – the bodily change, and indeed for Aquinas a physiological aspect is a 
necessary component of any true passion. Following Ramirez he claims that a full definition of a passion 
would look like this: “Passion ought to be defined thus: ‘A motion of the sensitive appetite following the 
sensitive apprehension of sensitive good or evil with a corresponding bodily or organic transmutation 
(alteration).’(1973, p. 33).” Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 31, quoting Santiago Ramirez, De passionibus 
animae in i-ii Summae Theologiae divi Thomae expositio (qq. xxii–xlviii). Obras completas de Santiago 
Ramirez, V (Instituto de Filosofía Luis Vives, Madrid, 1973), 33. Miner holds, however, that Aquinas did not 
accidentally leave out a piece of the definition. He sees it rather as a pedagogical move that fits his dialectical 
manner of argumentation. Thus Miner claims: “Rather than provide a complete definition of passion at the 
beginning, Aquinas employs a more subtle strategy. He desires that the reader should sift through the 
proposals of a range of auctoritates – Aristotle, Cicero, Damascene, Nemesius, and Augustine among them – 
so that she might arrive at a conception that includes elements of the integral tradition. This means: not 
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if a bodily change occurs, passion belongs more to the sensitive appetite. Intellective 
appetite by contrast does not require a bodily change because it is not attached to a 
particular bodily organ.87  
As we have seen from Question 22, discussing the subject of the passions of the soul, 
the structure of a passion involves two important elements – apprehension which deals 
with an activation of a passion and a movement of a sentient appetite which is passion 
itself. Now we need to discuss these two elements separately and in more detail to better 
grasp Aquinas’s views on the nature of the passions and their role in the picture of human 
psychology. 
 
2.1 ACTIVATION OF A PASSION: SENSE AND INTELLECTUAL APPREHENSION 
 
Lombardo explains that we can find two kinds of cognition88 in Aquinas’s thought – sense 
cognition and an intellectual cognition.89 The first one applies to material reality while the 
intellectual cognition is ordered to the universal principals of that reality. What we should 
always bear in mind, however, is that the conceptual distinction of the two kinds of 
cognition does not imply that they function separately.90 And since a kind of apprehension 
that forms a passion is sense apprehension,91 Lombardo urges us to see that it is also not 
just sheer perception: “It involves both kinds of cognition and includes shaping the 
perception into a coherent object from an undifferentiated blur of data, and some 
evaluation of the sensible object vis-à-vis the subject.”92 
We have seen that the appetite grasps the thing in itself, sense apprehension. Aquinas 
states it “is not drawn to things insofar as they exist in themselves; rather, it has cognition 
of a thing in accord with the thing’s intention.”93 This means that a passion is elicited by an 
object grasped under a specific aspect. Question 78, Article 3 establishes that we receive 
sense data from the five external senses via the power of sense apprehension. Article 4 																																																																																																																																																																							
giving a formula that would enable her to cast the tradition aside, like a ladder that can be discarded when it 
is no longer useful (see Wittgenstein 1922, 6.54).” Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 31.  
87 ST I-II 22.3. 
88 The terms cognitive or apprehensive are used interchangeably in the literature to refer to the capacities 
through which we acquire and assimilate the information concerning the surrounding world. 
89 Cf. Ibid., 21. Aquinas discusses these matters in the so-called Treatise on the Human Nature, questions 57-
102 of the Prima pars; see especially questions 77-81. 
90 Both kinds of apprehensions being in close communication and participating in most, if not all, our 
conscious cognitions seems to be a general consensus of the scholars investigating Aquinas’s account on the 
passions. We will also encounter this argumentation further in the text. 
91 Aquinas defines sense apprehension in the following way: “Now a sensory power is a passive power that is 
susceptible to being affected by an exterior sensible thing. Therefore, the exterior things that effect the 
changes are what a sensory power perceives per se, and the sensory powers are distinguished from one 
another in a way that corresponds to the diversity of such things. Now there are two kinds of change, natural 
change (immutatio naturalis) and spiritual change (immutatio spiritualis). A change is natural insofar as the 
form of the thing that effects the change is received with its natural esse in the thing changed, e.g., heat in a 
thing that is heated. The change is spiritual insofar as the form of the thing that effects the change is received 
with spiritual esse in the thing changed, e.g., the form of a color in the pupil, which does not thereby become 
colored. And for the operation of a sensory power what is required is a spiritual change, through which an 
intention of the sensible form (intentio formae sensibilis) comes to exist in the organ of the sensory power. 
Otherwise, if a natural change were by itself sufficient for sensing, then every natural body would have 
sensation whenever it was altered.” ST I 78.3. 
92 Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 21. 
93 ST I-II 22.2. 
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goes on to establish that the external senses’ input is then processed by four internal 
senses: common sense, imagination, estimative cogitative power, and memorative power – 
all powers that are essential in eliciting a passion. The sense input (the external five senses 
together with common sense) and imagination present the most basic forms of 
apprehension, while estimative power, which is a power Aquinas ascribes to non-human 
animals, and cogitative power which is a human version of it represents more complex 
evaluative kinds of judgments of the object (Note, this is still a sensory judgment, but the 
power in virtue of which this judgment takes place is akin to the works of intellective 
reason as it imitates them on the sensory level). We will take a closer look at them shortly, 
but for now we should pause to think of the nature of the object that triggers the passions. 
 
2.1.1 Object of the Passions 
 
There seems to be a general consensus among the scholars interested in Aquinas’s account 
on the passions that the passions are intentional phenomena.94 Cates argues that the 
passions are irreducibly intentional. “[A]n emotion is not itself an act of sensory 
apprehension, but an emotion relies on an act (or process) of sensory apprehension at all 
times in order to be what it is, namely, an appetitive motion that is about something in 
particular[;]” Cates writes, “[o]ne could say that an emotion includes, but is not reducible 																																																								
94 By using the term ‘intentional’ we simply indicate that in Aquinas’s view the passions always have an 
object. Lombardo briefly discusses the terminological issues and indicates that, even though, the term 
‘intentionality’ has a specific meaning in contemporary phenomenology, a prominent German philosopher, 
Franz Brentano, who launched the contemporary discussions on intentionality derived this concept from the 
scholastic intentionalitas. Furthermore, Brentano was deeply influenced by Aristotle and Aquinas in his 
general framework of psychological philosophy. Lombardo guides us to the work by Dermot Moran, 
Introduction to Phenomenology (London: Routledge, 2000), 43, 45, 47-54, esp. n80 for further inquiry into 
this topic. In addition, Lombardo notes that Mark Drost also considers that Aquinas had an idea which is 
similar to the contemporary idea of intentionality, see Mark P. Drost, “Intentionality in Aquinas’ Theory of 
the Emotions,” International Philosophical Quarterly 31 (1991): 449-460. See Lombardo, The Logics of 
Desire, 21 footnote 5. 
Now when it comes to the topic of the objects of the passions themselves, Miner acknowledges the problem 
of objectless emotions, such as angst, but he argues that for Aquinas this claim would rest on fundamental 
confusion (a passion is elicited by apprehension thus it necessarily has an object). Miner refers us to the 
research of two Catholic psychologists who specialized in research on the emotions and based their works on 
the thought of Aquinas. They noted the problem of angst observed by Freud, but argued that: “We experience 
anxiety because we are, know, or believe ourselves unable to avoid the threatening evil. For example, we are 
unable to come to grips with the object of our fear when we suffer from repressive neurosis. This is so 
because the object of fear has been repressed and, though still present in the subconscious, is no longer 
known as clearly as before, if at all. On the other hand, we may experience anxiety, and without necessarily 
being neurotic, in the presence of a danger known to us (p. 12).” Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 64 quoting 
Anna A. Terruwe, MD, and Conrad W. Baars Conrad, MD, Loving and Curing the Neurotic: A New Look at 
Emotional Illness (New Rochelle, N. Y.: Arlington House, 1972). Thus Miner’s interpretation of the 
objectless emotions as angst is to see them as not lacking the object of fear, but as being characterized by the 
presence and subsequent psychological repression of it. And so he concludes: “While the particular object 
causing the fear is not present to consciousness, it is hardly ineffective or non-existent.” Miner, Aquinas on 
the Passions, 64. Another scholar interested in Aquinas’s account on the passions, Peter King, also concisely 
notes the probable existence of objectless emotions but suggests that we see them in the following way: 
“This is not to say that there cannot be ‘objectless’ states of the sort that are so important to contemporary 
philosophy, such as angst, dread, or boredom, but that they are not to be understood as emotions: they are 
rather akin to moods, somatic states that influence psychological states.” Peter King, “Emotions,” in The 
Oxford Handbook of Aquinas, eds. Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2012), 215. 
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to, an act of sensory apprehension.”95 Without an object there would be no passion. Cates 
construes the ‘agent,’ the formal cause eliciting the passion as its object which has 
properties that are capable of being sensed.96 
Lombardo furthers that we should interpret the term intention as sense perception 
combined with cognitive evaluation of an object as it is relevant to the perceiver. Once a 
subject apprehends an object as desirable through the intention, the passion is evoked. 
Lombardo furthers that by consequence “[t]he dependence of the passions on the 
apprehension of intentions means that the passions themselves are intentional. Every 
passion responds to a particular intentional object, and the passions can be classified 
accordingly.”97 In parallel to the logic behind distinguishing particular appetites, passions 
also are separated according to the kind of intentional object triggering them. He thus 
argues that the passions correspond to the intentional objects rather than objects in 
themselves. In this regard, Lombardo further explains that the concept of intention – a 
concept that essentially refers to perception that is colored by cognitive evaluation – is 
crucial in maintaining Aquinas’s object-centered account on the passions.98 In other cases 
the logical conclusion would be that the same object would always elicit the same passion 
and this is evidently not true. It is not the perception of an object in itself that gives rise to 
a passion, but the perception of an object perceived under a certain aspect (for example, the 
same meal elicits different passions once we are hungry and when we are full). This 
distinction between object per se and the object apprehended by its intentions also 
represents the distinction between material and formal objects of a passion respectively. 
Lombardo also holds that the cause of the passion is also its object. 
Miner considers the intentional object of the passions primarily in terms of 
presence/absence and approaching/withdrawal. Let us clarify his position. He agrees with 
the aforementioned authors that a passion is only elicited if there is an ‘agent’ or an 
‘activator’ acting on it, which is also an object of that passion. Miner specifies “[a]ctivators 
of the passion of concupiscence, for example, may be nothing other than its objects: a 
warm bath, a cold dessert, a cup of hot coffee.”99 These examples clearly indicate concrete 
things, material objects to which the passions of a concupiscible sort are prone to react.100 
Miner inquires into the question of what these material objects have in common in order of 
being able to elicit a passion. His answer lies in specifying the formal object of these 																																																								
95 Ibid., 131. 
96 A Thomist scholar Claudia Eisen Murphy furthers that the prime objects of sense appetite are “sensorily 
good particular things. The sensory part of a human being includes the body, so things that are good for the 
body will be sensory goods (health, safety, pleasures associated with the five senses). Sensory goods also 
seem to include something like the preservation and protection of the ego. So things that promote a good 
image of one’s self – like other people’s admiration, or being treated fairly by others, or power over others, 
or a sense of superiority over others – all seem to count as sensory goods, and therefore as objects to which 
the sensory appetite is moved naturally.” Claudia Eisen Murphy, “Aquinas on Our Responsibility for Our 
Emotions,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 8 (1999): 171.  
97 Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 43. 
98 Cf. Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 24-25. 
99 Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 59. 
100 Aquinas divides the sense appetite into the concupiscible and irascible powers. Following this logic, there 
are two sorts of passions corresponding to these two powers. The concupiscible passions are inclined to good 
absolutely speaking and the irascible seek good under qualification of it being arduous, difficult good. Here, 
we will not engage in a longer presentation of the concupiscible/irascible division as it will be presented in 
the upcoming discussion 3. Structure of the Passions: The Concupiscible and the Irascible Division.  
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activators. Once we want to distinguish one passion from the other, formal object is what 
stands for and makes that difference. We know that a general object of the sense appetite is 
a sensible good, thus, we can say that any passion formally is a movement toward the 
apprehended good or away from apprehended evil. Yet, Miner points out, this general 
statement does not aid at differentiating the particular passions. He claims that Aquinas 
defines formal differences in the passions in the following way:  
 
He [Aquinas] finds these differences in a ‘diversity which is according to the activating power’ 
(that is, the power of apprehension) and which ‘makes a formal difference among the passions, 
according to which passions differ in kind’ (30.2.co). Because it is possible to apprehend 
sensible goods under distinct rationes – ‘aspects’ or ‘descriptions’ – there are formal 
differences among sensible objects.101 
 
Because the concupiscible passions in Aquinas’s thought are the sort caused by the 
pleasurable good, this kind of object is formally apprehended in terms of being present or 
being absent. When an appealing object is grasped as present – the result is pleasure, when 
it is apprehended as absent – the resulting passion is desire, and if the object is 
apprehended as pleasant abstracting from the characteristics of possessing it, the occurring 
passion is love. Miner construes the formal object of the concupiscible passions as resting 
on the perception of an object as being desirable and being distinguished according to the 
properties of presence/absence. Miner continues that the passions of the irascible sort are 
also distinguished according to their formal object. These passions seek the arduous good 
or turn away from painful evil, thus their domain formally is useful good rather than the 
pleasurable one. To specify concretely, the formal objects of arduous good, and so the 
qualities that distinguish one irascible passion from another, are the notions of approach 
and withdrawal.102 For Miner, this consideration of the formal differences in the fields of 
pleasant good and arduous good gives rise to the identification of the eleven primary 
passions in Aquinas’s thought.  
Yet Miner does not stop here and wants to highlight one more distinction in the 
elicitors of the passions and argues that the formal object is crucial in triggering the 
passions, but it seems to not be the only factor. Sometimes when we inquire into the cause 
of the concrete passion, we are actually referring to the concrete particular object, a 
material specification of the formal object. He argues that the clearest instance of Aquinas 
distinguishing between the object (material and formal) and the cause of the passion can be 
found in his discussion on the passion of fear. Miner points out that Aquinas devotes 
Question 42 to the object of fear and Question 43 to its causes. He furthers that what 																																																								
101 Ibid., 60. Here Miner quotes ST I-II 30.2. 
102 Miner illustrates this point with the genesis of the irascible passion of hope: “As an irascible passion, hope 
concerns the arduous good. Goodness and difficulty constitute two of the ‘four conditions’ that anything 
must satisfy in order to be hope’s formal object. What are the other two conditions? The object of hope 
necessarily exists in the future; we do not hope for what we presently have. In this respect, hope is akin to 
desire; the difference between hope and desire lies in the first condition. While only arduous goods are the 
object of hope, the object of desire may be either easy or difficult to obtain. Finally, the object of hope must 
not only be good, difficult, and future, it must also be possible to obtain. If these conditions are met, the 
appetite will move toward the difficult possible future good. This ‘approach’ of the appetite is hope. If the 
same object is apprehended as not simply difficult, but impossible, the motion of the appetite will be 
‘withdrawal.’” Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 61-62.  
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makes us see a concrete face (the material object) as an instance of terrible evil (the formal 
object) might be some characteristic of our condition: a certain disposive cause from the 
side of the subject. It alternatively can be a disposive feature of the object itself or 
something that transgresses the subject/object boundary, something which can be called a 
‘side condition’ something without which a passion would not be elicited.103 Miner 
concludes his analysis of the intentional nature of the passions with the argument that: 
 
It is vital to keep these distinctions in mind. When a person asks about the ‘cause’ of a passion, 
she may be asking about either the formal object, the material thing perceived under a certain 
formality, or the factors (whether in the perceiver or the thing perceived) that lead a person to 
construe the concrete thing in a manner that activates the passion. She may even be asking 
about all these things simultaneously. Alternatively, her question may concern the multiple 
‘inputs’ possessed by animals which, under the right circumstances, reliably activate the full 
range of passions.104 
 
2.1.2 Apprehensive Powers of the Sensitive Soul 
 
Question 78, Article 3 establishes that we receive the sense data from the five external 
senses via the power of sense apprehension. Article 4 goes on to establish that the external 
senses input is then processed by four internal senses: common sense, imagination, 
estimative power, and memorative power (all of these are the same for human and non-
human animals, except that the estimative power takes on a more complex form in humans 
being termed the cogitative power or practical reason). The role of the common sense is to 
gather sense images into a coherent whole; the capacity to retain and be moved by sense 
objects even in their absence is called imagination. Estimative power in a non-human 
animal is there to trigger sense appetite by estimations of what is dangerous/useful which 
are not merely perceptions of what is pleasurable/painful.105 The estimative power does not 
merely receive sense data, but it receives the intentions106 that are not accessible to the 
exterior senses. The power that is capable of storing these intentions is memory and so 
Miner concludes – “[w]hat the imagination is to sensation, the memorative power is to the 
estimative power.” 107  Miner further argues that, though, Aquinas conceptually 
distinguishes the separate powers, the estimative and the memorative powers cannot work 																																																								
103 Cf. Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 64-65. Apart from fear, Miner points out Aquinas discusses love and 
pleasure in a similar fashion – emphasizing conditions which participate in eliciting a passion. 
104 Ibid., 65. 
105 Aquinas describes the function of the estimative power in the following way: “Again, note that if an 
animal moved solely because of sensibly pleasurable or painful things, one would have to posit in the animal 
only an apprehension of forms that the sensory power perceives and with respect to which it takes delight or 
feels revulsion. But an animal has to seek out or flee from certain things not only because they are pleasant or 
unpleasant to sense, but also because of other kinds of suitability and utility, or harm – as, for instance, when 
a sheep, seeing a wolf coming, flees not because of the ugliness of the wolf’s color or shape, but because of 
the danger to the sheep’s nature; or as when a bird collects straw not because the straw delights its senses, but 
because this is useful for building a nest. Therefore, an animal has to perceive intentions of this sort which 
the exterior sensory powers do not perceive. And for this sort of perception there has to be some distinct 
principle, since perception of sensible forms comes from changes effected by the sensible thing, whereas the 
perception of the intentions just alluded to does not.” ST I 78.4. 
106 Miner suggests that we should understand the intentions in an animal’s case as non-empirical valuations 
of the apprehended object as useful or dangerous. The valuations are not perceived by the external senses but 
by natural instinct. Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 70-71. 
107 Ibid., 70. 
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without the first input of sensation and imagination.108  
Now there appears to be a disagreement among scholars on whether 
estimative/cogitative powers participate in activation of each passion or whether the sense 
apprehension and imagination being the more basic powers are also capable of moving the 
sense appetite. One group of scholars bases their argumentation on Question 78 Article 4 
claiming: 
 
Now note that as far as sensible forms are concerned, there is no difference between man and 
the other animals, since they are affected in similar ways by sensible exterior things. However, 
there is a difference with respect to the intentions we have just been talking about. For the other 
animals perceive intentions of this sort only by a sort of natural instinct, whereas man also 
perceives them through a certain comparison (per quandam collationem). And so what in 
animals is called the natural estimative power, in man is called the cogitative power, which 
arrives at intentions of this sort through a certain comparison. Hence, it is also called particular 
reason, and physicians assign it a determinate organ, viz., the middle part of the head; for it 
compares intentions of individuals in the way in which intellective reason compares intentions 
of universals.109  
 
If we look at the passage above, we may get an impression that each passion is 
reason dependent in Aquinas’s thought. Lombardo seems to argue that the 
estimative/cogitative powers are present at the formation of any passion since it always 
involves an act of evaluation of the sensible object. The kind of apprehension the passion 
responds to is an apprehension of an intention of the object, as we have seen. And this kind 
of apprehension occurs through estimative/cogitative power. The role of this power is 
precisely in coloring the object with some evaluation of it. We have also seen that 
Lombardo maintains that seeing the process of the activation of the passions in this way 
safeguards the object-centeredness of Aquinas’s account of the passions.  
Peter King joins this track of interpretation and explicitly writes that Aquinas is 
cognitivist about the passions: “Aquinas is therefore a cognitivist about emotion, since 
cognitive acts are not only causal preconditions of emotion, but contribute their formal 
causes as well.”110 He argues that the sensitive apprehension is not enough for a passion to 
occur – in addition, to the act of five sense powers there must be a power that links the 
apprehension to the appetite and estimative/cogitative power is that link. King quotes 
Aquinas’s writing, illustrating that “the lower appetitive power does not naturally tend to 
anything until after that thing has been presented to it under the aspect of its proper 
object.”111 He thus comes to the conclusion that: “What does matter to Aquinas is that 
thinking and reasoning affect the evaluative response-dependent concepts that trigger the 
sensitive appetite, and that human ‘cogitative power’ is involved in the process.”112 
Another scholar Elizabeth Uffenheimer-Lippens joins the discussion to defend the 
claim that the estimative/cogitative power is a necessary element of activation of all 
passions. She further claims that appetite necessarily presupposes knowledge in Aquinas’s 
																																																								
108 Cf. Ibid., 73. 
109 ST I 78.4. 
110 King, “Emotions,” 215. 
111 Ibid., 214 quoting QDV, q. 25, a 4, ad 4.  
112 King, “Emotions,” 215. 
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thought rendering knowledge at the basis of passions.113 As King and Uffenheimer-
Lippens argue, apprehension of an object alone is not enough to evoke a passion. For 
passion to be raised the object has to be apprehended as attractive or repugnant. And so she 
argues that: “In other words, the knowledge of the object must be accompanied by a value-
judgment. The power that judges the attractiveness of a known object at the sensitive level 
is called the estimative power (vis aestimativa) in the animal and the cogitative power (vis 
cogitativa) in man [sic].”114Uffenheimer-Lippens considers the cogitative power as being 
directly connected to universal reason and by this being able to judge the object against a 
comprehensive background. She furthers: “The object that arouses the passions is never a 
mere material object. It is a ‘known’ object that is evaluated for its attractiveness or 
repulsiveness. In man [sic] this evaluation is subject to reason.”115 
Now there is another path of interpreting the role of the cogitative power in the 
activation of the passions and we could say that, generally speaking, it consists of 
interpreting Question 78 vis-à-vis Aquinas’s claims in Question 81 of the Prima pars. 
Namely: “For the sentient appetite is apt to be moved not only by the estimative power in 
other animals and the cogitative power (which is ruled by universal reason) in man, but 
also by the power of imagining and the sensory power.”116 In Question 78, Article 4, as we 
have seen, Aquinas claims that there are four distinct internal powers of the sensitive soul 
and Miner argues that each power can activate the sense appetite directly as Question 81 
states.117 He holds that the estimative power in animals and the cogitative power in human 
beings are not activated at each instance of the occurrence of a passion. Miner also argues 
as evident the fact that the motion of the sensitive appetite follows sensation. He thus 
claims: “If I put my hand on a stove, I feel pain at once. Greek and Latin capture the 
closeness of the connection between sense perception and appetitive motion; aisthesis and 
sensus signify both ‘sensitive apprehension’ and ‘feeling.’” 118  He also wants to 
demonstrate that even though the ‘common sensibles’ or the sense impressions gathered 
via the five senses and the common sense usually work together (we typically perceive the 
sensible qualities of an object in a united fashion), there is still a possibility for the 
common sense to activate the sense appetite on its own influence at some level. “This does 
not prevent, however, the possibility of other instances in which the act of the common 
sense plays a decisive role in moving the sensitive appetite[,]” Miner writes, “[i]f I 
perceive a certain combination of qualities as united in the same painting, I may be 
affected by the painting as a whole in a way quite different from how I would be affected if 
I were only to perceive the proper sensibles of texture, color, shape, etc., without 
recognizing them as belonging to a unified object[.]”119 It is also rather clear that we do not 
have to possess an image in front of our senses for the passion to be elicited – the power of 
imagination aids this task. Miner argues that, as in the case of sensation and common 
sense, imagination and sensation usually also work together, but not necessarily. Both of 																																																								
113 Cf. Elizabeth Uffenheimer-Lippens, “Rationalized Passion and Passionate Rationality: Thomas Aquinas 
on the Relation between Reason and the Passions,” The Review of Metaphysics Vol. 56, No. 3 (2003): 539. 
114 Ibid., 540. 
115 Ibid., 541. 
116 ST I 81.3 ad 2.  
117 Cf. Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 66. 
118 Ibid., 66. 
119 Ibid., 67. 
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these powers bring the images before apprehension in essentially the same way and are 
capable of moving the sense appetite.120 
In the same vein, Miner argues that “[w]hat rational animals actually perceive as 
appetible is always influenced by intellect.”121 He is not entirely clear on the role of 
intellect in the four internal powers of the sense apprehension. His argument might be 
similar to the one stated in the above section by Lombardo in which he argues that sense 
apprehension is never just a sheer perception and that the human being is a unity of its 
various capacities, even in apprehending a sense object. It is nevertheless, clear that Miner 
wants to demonstrate that the sort of evaluation which is typical to estimative/cogitative 
power is not occurring with activation of every passion and that all four distinct powers 
can move the sense appetite.  
Claudia Eisen Murphy building on the same claim of Question 81, Article 3, also 
argues that some passions can be moved by reason through mediation of cogitative power, 
but she also holds that Aquinas does not claim that all the passions are activated through 
this mediation: 
 
In fact, the passage might seem to suggest that all passions are responses to reasoned 
judgments, because here Aquinas is focusing on reason as a source for the objects of the 
sensory appetite. If a person is responsible for a passion when the passion is somehow 
dependent on reason, and if all passions, by their very nature, are always caused by reasoned 
judgments through the mediation of the particular reason, then we are responsible for all 
passions. This, of course, would not be a very attractive view, and it is not the view Aquinas 
accepts. Aquinas holds that although the sensory appetite can be moved by reason (in the way 
described above), it can also be moved by its own source of cognition[.]122  
 
Cates also argues that cogitative power is not involved in activation of every passion. 
Her argumentation centers on showing that humans are uniquely intellective creatures, yet 
at the same time akin to other animals. She wants to invite her reader to imagine what it is 
to conceive the objects of the passions in sensory terms without reducing the sensory to the 
five senses. Cates suggests that it is best to try to understand the argumentation of Aquinas 
in terms of range: 
 
With respect to the examples at hand, the range might extend from a simple impression that an 
object is attractive to the eye (which might not engage the cogitative power) – to a judgment 
that an attractive object is suitable for eating (which appears to engage the cogitative power on 
a basic level) – to a judgment that an object (such as a fellow human being) is suitable 
company (which engages the cogitative power to a greater degree) – to a judgment that ‘this 
person qua moral agent is good, and is also good for me’ (which takes us well beyond the 
cogitative power and requires the engagement of the intellect).123 																																																								
120 Miner explains the mechanism of imagination producing concrete passions in the following way: “The 
first passion that imagination will produce is either pleasure or pain. Any image that moves the sensitive 
appetite is, as such, experienced as either pleasant or painful. But when the image is present and the thing is 
absent, another passion will be experienced. If the image is experienced as pleasant, then the combination of 
the image’s presence and the thing’s absence will produce desire. Should the image be painful, the thing’s 
absence and the image’s presence will yield aversion.” Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 68. 
121 Ibid., 69. 
122 Murphy, “Aquinas on Our Responsibility for Our Emotions,” 177. 
123 Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions, 120. Note, in this quote Cates allows the passions not only to be formed 
by the mediation of the cogitative power, but to be responsive directly to the intellect. 
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Now Cates still argues that sensation (input of the five senses and common sense), 
imagination, memory, and estimative/cogitative powers are always object-oriented. She 
builds her argument in light of Damasio’s research that the human brain contains older and 
newer parts – the evolutionary older parts contain certain pre-organized neural circuits that 
will register some of the sensory input in concrete ways before the newer parts of the brain 
are able to register it and activate related cognitive activities.124 Cates illustrates the case 
with the following example: “[I]t is common for humans to judge a long, thin object 
moving quickly through the grass at their feet to be a threat of some kind, even before they 
have time to think, ‘this is a snake, and some snakes are dangerous.’”125 This refers to the 
concept of basic emotions which are there to assure immediate reactions of an organism in 
possibly threatening situations. Cates wants to demonstrate that Aquinas’s account can, 
indeed, accommodate what we understand in contemporary terms as basic and complex 
emotions.126  
Drawing from ST I 81.2 ad 2, Cates argues that Aquinas indicates that the cogitative 
power is at least present in the formation of the irascible passions.127 Cates furthers that 
from Aquinas’s texts it is not clear whether he thinks that cogitative power participates in 
eliciting the concupiscible passions, but her thesis is that he, nonetheless, judges the 
cogitative power to be involved in the formation of many (if not most) concupiscible 
passions. The concupiscible passions are reactive to the sensory input alarming the subject 
with the pleasurable/painful properties of the object, Cates in this regard argues that 
Aquinas must also hold that there are such objects of the concupiscible power “that a 
subject perceives or judges via the cogitative power to be suitable or unsuitable with 
respect to one or more of the subject’s purposes – with respect to appetites for more than 
pleasing sensations per se.”128 																																																								
124 Cf. Ibid., 114 referring to arguments found in Damasio, Looking for Spinoza, 60. 
125 Cf. Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions, 114. 
126 Cf. Ibid., 114. We could say that the whole of chapter 5 Approaching the Human Sensory Appetite from 
Below (I) is geared to show that Aquinas’s account can accommodate a range of emotions from those that 
require relatively low cognitive input to the ones that involve complex cognitive activity – as long as they 
have an object. See especially note 88 on page 127 where Cates allows hunger, thirst, and sexual desire to be 
construed as passions as long as they imply an interior objectual motion. 
127 Cf. Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions, 117. The reply to the object found in the question argues: “Just as, in 
keeping with what was pointed out above (q. 78, a. 2), among the apprehensive powers of the sentient part of 
the soul there is an estimative power that perceives things that do not affect the sensory powers, so also in the 
sentient appetite there is a power that does not seek what is appropriate for delighting the senses, but instead 
seeks something that is appropriate insofar as it is useful to the animal for its own defense. And this is the 
irascible power.” Miner in his argumentation also notes that estimative/cogitative power activates irascible 
passions and seems to think that this does not include the concupiscible passions. See Miner, Aquinas on the 
Passions, 73. 
128 Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions, 120. In this regard we could draw our attention to Cates’s examples of 
motions of hunger and sensory love. In the case of hunger if we consider it being elicited only by the sensory 
input (look, smell, taste), we may miss out on the fact that everything pleasing to the senses is not suitable for 
eating. Cates concludes: “It is thus doubtful that the property ‘suitable for eating’ is given immediately with 
the five senses and common sense. Apprehending this property requires the exercise of the estimative or 
cogitative power (and, in some cases, the exercise of higher intellectual powers as well).” Cates, Aquinas on 
the Emotions, 119. In the case of sensory love she argues that we can see that the five sensory judgments 
might not be enough to arouse this passion: “[T]he sorts of judgments that arouse sensory love are principally 
sensory and particular: This person has many attractive qualities; he or she is fun to be with. Yet these 
judgments involve more than undergoing (and being aware that one is undergoing) enjoyable five-sensory 
		 200	
What does this analysis leave us with? First of all, a recognition that Aquinas’s texts 
contain many different elements that allow scholars to construe similar yet distinct 
interpretations. Could we, after all, conclude that Aquinas is cognitivist about the passions? 
We would argue not entirely – he seems to distinguish between the passions being 
triggered by external sensation and the passions that are formed by a sensory kind of 
judgment informed by reason. If this interpretation is correct, it makes Aquinas’s account 
very attractive in light of contemporary research arguing that there, indeed, are emotions of 
a basic and complex character.129 His account, then, can accommodate our animal130 and 
distinctively human characteristics and provide some illuminating insight into the way we 
undergo such emotional experiences. Cates’s suggestion to see the passions in the light of 
range is particularly helpful as it aids us in understanding how we can be moved by the 
things around us with various levels of engagement – some objects will appear attractive 
and inviting, some objects will draw us toward them as suitable and some will involve 
significantly more complex cognitive judgments.  
 
2.1.3 Role of the Cogitative Power 
 
Now we can take a closer look at the role of cogitative power in forming distinctively 
human passions.131 This power, as we have seen, enables one to make a sensory evaluation 																																																																																																																																																																							
impressions: It is not simply that he or she is pleasing to the eye or smells good. Emotions such as love must 
ordinarily involve the exercise of the cogitative power.” Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions, 119-120. The core 
of her argument lies in the thesis that some objects that elicit the passions of the concupiscible type are 
apprehended as pleasing or displeasing to the senses, but they are usually simultaneously judged to be 
suitable or unsuitable for one – “where one is aware, on a basic sensory level, of having a life and wanting it 
to go pleasantly or well. Most sensory beings have an appetite to engage in countless activities beyond five-
sensory experiences, and it is against the backdrop of this appetitive tending that they construe the 
significance of particular sensible objects.” Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions, 119. 
129 This discussion can be found back in Chapter I, section 3. Thinking of Nussbaum’s Account of Emotions: 
Some Critical Reflections with all its subsections. 
130 This should not be understood in a way of conceiving animals as brute creatures. Aquinas, as we have 
seen, ascribes the estimative power to animals which has its source in instinct but is also understood in the 
sense of sensory judgment. Furthermore, Aquinas claims: “In brute animals the sentient appetite does not 
obey reason. And yet insofar as brute animals are led by a certain natural estimative power that is subject to a 
higher reason, viz., God’s reason, there is in them a certain likeness of moral goodness with respect to the 
passions of the soul.” ST I-II 24.4 ad 3. 
131 Miner, Lombardo, and Cates indicate that Aquinas’s account on the cogitative power or particular reason 
lacks a considerable amount of detail. Cf. Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 80 and Lombardo, The Logic of 
Desire, 24; Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions, 115-116. The term is not used in great frequency so it is difficult 
to reconstruct the exact meaning of it, especially in relation to other terms referring to human cognitive 
capacities. Lombardo judges Peghaire’s study to be the most comprehensive up to this day. See Julien 
Peghaire, “A Forgotten Sense, the Cogitative, According to St. Thomas Aquinas,” Modern Schoolman 20 
(1943): 122-140, 210-229. He also refers readers to more recent studies on the matter, for example, Anthony 
Kenny, Aquinas on Mind (New York: Routledge, 1993), 37 and Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human 
Nature: A Philosophical Study of Summa Theologiae Ia 75-89 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002). Lombardo, Miner, and Cates also offer different perspectives on the discussion of cogitative power – 
Lombardo discusses it briefly together with the other four internal senses (pages 22-24), while Miner devotes 
the whole of chapter three to discussing the powers activating the passions in general, of which he devotes 
pages 76-82 in particular to the cogitative power. Cates devotes pages 113-120 to discussing the cogitative 
power and its role in activation of a passion and in chapter 7 of her book she looks into the relationship 
between intellect and cogitative power. The discussions also take different angles. Cates, for example, offers 
insights on how cogitative power can be understood in contemporary terms, while Lombardo and Miner are 
busy with the presentation of the concept. 
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of the sensible object. We also saw Aquinas arguing that: “[T]he cogitative power arrives 
at intentions of this sort through a certain comparison. Hence, it is also called particular 
reason, and physicians assign it a determinate organ, viz., the middle part of the head; for it 
compares intentions of individuals in the way in which intellective reason compares 
intentions of universals.”132 Miner argues that particular reason imitates universal reason, 
but on the lower level. The task of universal reason is to ‘compose and divide’ (ST I 85.5) 
and by the analogous rudimentary form of ‘composing and dividing’ particular reason 
discovers not the universal concepts, but individual intentions.133 Yet particular reason is 
not an immaterial power. As we have seen, Aquinas ascribes a bodily organ to it, thus its 
discoveries are not genuinely universal (in Aquinas’s thought only immaterial powers can 
reach truly universal truths). The intentions are not sheer perceptions which are accessible 
by sensation and imagination. Miner claims that, generally speaking: 
 
The particular reason, according to Aquinas, is the power that enables a person to attach a set 
of particular sensible qualities to images stored in the imagination that are directly connected 
with experiences of pain. Through making this connection between sensible forms and painful 
images, it estimates the sensed forms as ‘dangerous,’ despite the fact that nothing about these 
forms directly produces pain. In this way, its function is precisely analogous to the estimative 
power’s capacity to apprehend some sensed objects as dangerous, although nothing about the 
sensible forms themselves is painful.134 
 
If we look at this description we can see that the human cogitative power and the 
non-human animal estimative power have some essential similarities, (both serve the 
natural preservation of an organism by natural instinct), yet in the human case – we learn 
the intentions of objects largely led by our previous experience, not the immediate 
instinct.135 Miner captures this conviction of Aquinas in the following way: 
 
Since its intentiones are largely given by instinct, non-rational animals discover very little by 
the estimative power. The sheep does not learn from prior experience that the wolf is 
dangerous; it already ‘knows’ this. By contrast, much of particular reason’s work consists in 
the actual discovery of intentions. Certainly humans are able to make some estimations 
innately, as can a baby searching for the mother’s breast. Generally speaking, however, 
humans do not know by instinct what is useful or dangerous for them; they must learn this 
from experience.136  
 
Cates also notes that Aquinas usually construes the notion of intention under 
properties of ‘threatening’ or ‘useful.’ She furthers that Aquinas’s concept of intention 
“seems to refer, instead, to a sensory impression of the property itself. Yet the property the 
animal apprehends is a property of the object, which the animal must also apprehend.”137 																																																								
132 ST I 78.4. 
133 Cf. Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 77. 
134 Ibid., 78. 
135 Cates wants to construe non human animals’ instinct in such a way that it respects their capacity to make 
basic sensory judgments: “However, Aquinas says that a nonhuman animal can and often does make a ‘well-
regulated judgment [iudicium]…about certain things.’ In his perspective, animals make judgments ‘from a 
natural estimate, not from any deliberation, since they are ignorant of the basis of their judgment.’” Cates, 
Aquinas on the Emotions, 114. Here Cates quotes Truth 24.2.  
136 Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 80. 
137 Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions, 114. 
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Cates suggests that like the estimative power in other animals, the cogitative power in 
humans allows one to perceive the sensible qualities of the object that go beyond the 
capacities of the five senses, but unlike other animals, humans can apprehend multiple 
properties in complex relations within several objects at the same time. She argues that 
Aquinas takes human sensory cognition seriously and by consequence, he identifies the 
powers of perception and judgment also at this level. This conjunction helps us to see in 
which ways we are akin to other animals when we act on the basis of sensory judgments138 
without losing sight of the fact that even at this level humans can be influenced by intellect 
to some degree. Cates quotes Aquinas arguing that “[t]he cogitative power owes its 
excellence ‘not to that which is proper to the sensitive part; but to a certain affinity and 
proximity to the universal reason, which, so to speak, overflows into [it].’”139 We should 
be attentive to the fact that the cogitative power indicates what is on the sensory and 
particular level; this power does not signify an ability to engage in sophisticated acts of 
understanding or practical reasoning: 
 
Yet it is significant that even on this level a human can perceive or imagine a ‘sensible good or 
evil,’ namely, an object with sensible properties that appear to be relevant to the human’s 
efforts to go on living and doing what he or she wishes to do. By virtue of the cogitative power, 
a human can form impressions of many different objects and their suitability or unsuitability 
with respect to his or her basic concerns.140 
  
To end our discussion on the cogitative power we would like to draw attention to 
some interesting thoughts by Miner on the effects of the cogitative power on human 
psychology. He suggests that the estimations of the cogitative power which are stored in 
the memory are “literally ingrained in a person’s soul”141 according to Aquinas (remember, 
the bodily organ responsible for the cogitative power is ‘the middle part of the head’ and 
the estimations of it become ingrained in our psychological and physical make up). As 
these estimations have become part of our material make up they prove to be very difficult 
to alter. Leaving out the medieval primitive knowledge of the human brain, Miner wants to 
point out that the vital element in Aquinas’s conception of the cogitative power’s ingrained 
estimation “is that a person will approach maturity with a system of neurological 
correspondences between sensible patterns and estimations of usefulness and danger.”142 
Despite the difficulty to alter the estimations which become part of human psyche, Aquinas 
																																																								
138 Cates explains the meaning of sensory judgment: “Humans often behave more like nonrational animals 
than like rational animals, especially when we have the impression that our lives or safety, or the lives or 
safety of our kin, are at stake – or food, sex, or other tangible pleasures are involved. Often, in such 
situations, humans do not act in the absence of judgment; rather, we act on the basis of sensory judgments 
that have not been informed by rational reflection. It is helpful to be able to say what these lower-order 
judgments are like – how they are judgments about objects and their properties, and judgments about how 
these objects are significant for one’s well-being – but also how they differ from higher-order intellectual 
judgments that presuppose a reflective view of what is good for a human being and for oneself as a human 
being.” Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions, 116. 
139 Ibid., 116 quoting ST I 78.4 ad 5. 
140 Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions, 115. 
141 Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 80. 
142 Ibid., 80. 
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also points to the relationship the cogitative power has to human reason.143 Question 81, 
Article 3 claims that: “But as was explained above (q. 78, a. 4), in man the estimative 
power is replaced by the cogitative power, which some call ‘particular reason’ because it 
brings together intentions of individuals (collativa intentionum individualium). This is why 
the sentient appetite is apt to be moved by the cogitative power in a man. Now particular 
reason is itself apt to be moved and directed by ‘universal reason,’ and so there are 
syllogisms in which singular conclusions are derived from universal propositions.”144 The 
distinct powers of the soul are interacting in Aquinas’s faculty of psychology and reason, 
since the highest power in a human person, is, in fact, capable of correcting the distorted 
estimations that give rise to the passions that involve an act of the cogitative act in their 
formation. We will dwell on the relationship between reason and the passions further on in 
our discussion,145 yet at this point it is important to highlight Aquinas’s conviction that the 
person always represents a fundamental unity of his distinct powers/capacities. It is also 
essential to note, once more, that for Aquinas reason plays a role even at the initial stage of 
activating some of the passions – since it is able to affect estimations that give rise to them 
through the mediation of the cogitative power. In a best case scenario universal reason will 
correct the distorted estimations of the particular reason, yet it can also comply with them 
(making, let us say, a universal abstraction of estimation that ‘this particular dog is 
dangerous’ to the general idea that ‘all dogs are dangerous’ and in this way giving rise to a 
passion of fear each time one is in proximity to any kind of dog). Universal reason itself 
needs appropriate guidance and so Miner suggests that “[w]ithout virtue (both infused and 
acquired), universal reason stands a poor chance of being able to revise and reshape the 
historically established judgments of particular reason. Instead, it will merely perform 
induction on the estimations already stored in the memorative power.”146 This means that 
universal reason which is able to guide particular reason needs to be adequately formed by 
virtuous habit in order to affect our estimations correctly. Furthermore, this also indicates 
that virtue stands as a source of formation and activation of orderly passions. 
 
2.2 MOVEMENT OF THE SENTIENT APPETITE  
 
After an apprehension of the object the movement of the sentient appetite may follow, that 
is, a passion may occur. We have discovered Aquinas’s metaphysics of the appetite in 
general as central for his anthropology.147 We can recall that an appetite, generally 
speaking, is a kind of movement toward what the appetite seeks as the good. Created 
appetite is a passive power and so its movement is always conditioned by an external 
object. Human beings have all three sorts of appetites: natural, sense, and the will – they all 																																																								
143 Miner refers us to the research of two Catholic psychologists who specialized in the research on the 
emotions and based their works on the thought of Aquinas. They considered the cogitative power to be 
essential to human psychology: “This conception of particular reason has a profound bearing on the subject 
of our discussion because certain of the disorders of emotional life can be traced to this faculty. The 
transition from instinct to particular reason, or the penetration of the purely sensory estimative power by 
reason, constitutes one of the most important developmental processes of the human mind (p. 29).” Miner, 
Aquinas on the Passions, 80, footnote 21 quoting Terruwe, and Baars, Loving and Curing the Neurotic. 
144 ST I 81.3. 
145 See section 4. The Passions, Reason, and Will of this chapter. 
146 Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 81. 
147 See section 1.3 The Appetite in General of this chapter. 
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respond to different kinds of desirable objects, but once activated they signify movement 
to perfection in the way that is natural and appropriate to them. We have also already 
discovered that there is a hierarchy in the appetites according to the type of cognition they 
depend on. Natural appetite is surpassed by sense and the rational because the two latter 
imply cognition and willful engagement. The rational appetite surpasses the sense appetite 
because it corresponds to the highest form of universal cognition and seeks unqualified 
goodness. Humans take a special place in all there is – only we possess all three kinds of 
appetites according to Aquinas. Lombardo suggests that this fact makes humans 
complicated – the appetites, when operative, can compete with each other as they incline 
us to incompatible goods.148 Yet despite the difficulties that arise due to the interaction 
between the appetites, “each moves us toward our perfection; each is necessary for human 
flourishing; each is a God-given inner compass oriented toward happiness; none can be 
ignored without cost.”149 
 
2.2.1 Movement of the Sentient Appetite as a Movement Toward Telos  
 
Our task is precisely to describe what kind of compass sense appetite is in its movement. In 
Question 81, Article 1 Aquinas discusses the sensitive appetite in general, when making a 
conceptual distinction between it and apprehension. He describes the natures of both in the 
following way: “For an act of the apprehensive power is not called a movement in as 
proper a sense as the action of the appetitive power is, since the apprehensive power’s 
operation finds its perfection in the fact that the things apprehended exist in the one 
apprehending them, whereas the appetitive power’s operation finds its perfection in the 
fact that the one who has the desire is inclined toward the desirable thing. And so the 
apprehensive power’s operation is more like rest, whereas the operation of an appetitive 
power is more like a movement.”150 Now Miner suggests a lengthy discussion on what the 
term ‘movement’ may actually mean. The interpretations range from suggesting that the 
term ‘motion’ referring to passion means an actual physical movement (as in the sense of 
local motion)151 to seeing passions as movement to a certain telos, as we have indicated 
above. Miner dismisses the literal interpretation of the passions as physical movements and 
he suggests that a first step in understanding the passion as movement is to see it as 
alteration of a soul-body composite (alteration meaning “the actualization of what exists 
potentially, insofar as it exists potentially”).152 However, Miner also indicates that seeing 
motion qua alteration does not exhaust the meaning of this concept. Together with 
Lombardo, he interprets it as a motion toward telos and so he argues that “Aquinas 
privileges the category of ‘motion’ not because he intends a crude physicalism, but 																																																								
148 Cf. Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 33. 
149 Ibid., 34. 
150 ST I 81.1. 
151 In this case, Miner refers us to the research of Eric D’Arcy and Simo Knuuttila. See Eric D’Arcy, 
Introduction to Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (1a2ae QQ22–30), xix, tr. E. D’Arcy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006f) and Simo Knuuttila, “Medieval Theories of the Passions of the Soul,” in 
Henrik Lagerlund and Mikko Yrjönsuuri, eds., Emotions and Choice from Boethius to Descartes (Boston: 
Kluwer Academic, 2002), 49-79.  
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directly from Physics 3.1, 202a11, Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 39. 
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because he wants the likeness of motion to evoke the pattern of human life itself, 
conceived as a return to the end.”153  
We are primarily interested in the interpretation of Thomistic passions as a 
movement toward telos – an active dimension of the passions which according to 
Lombardo is prime and more central to the nature of the passions in Aquinas’s thought.154 
And thus Lombardo argues that “[t]he primary function of the passions is not to allow 
sensible objects to act upon us, although of course they do that, but to incline us toward the 
perfection of our nature.”155 Passions are not obstacles to the telos of human existence, 
they participate in attaining it. Lombardo argues that the placement of the Treatise on the 
Passions itself, shortly after the discussion on happiness as a final end of human life, 
indicates the centrality of the passions in human flourishing in Aquinas’s anthropology.156 
We should be careful, however, since the Thomistic passions can also lead one astray due 
to the reality of sin, and so they need the guidance of reason and virtue. Yet 
“[p]aradoxically, however, even when the passions prompt us to act in ways that we 
ultimately judge inappropriate, in their essential structure, the passions still serve the 
attainment of our telos.”157 Furthermore, as we have seen from our introduction to the 
ethical framework of Aquinas – virtue is needed to attain our telos,158 and what Lombardo 
wants to demonstrate at this point is that virtue itself requires the passions. Thus he argues 
that “[w]ithout the passions, we would not respond to sensible objects, and without this 
first step toward engaging the world, human flourishing would not be possible.”159 He 
interprets the role of the passions to be precisely this – respond to the stimuli around us and 
prompt a person to act in the face of those stimuli, yet the course of actual action is always 
decided by reason. A human passion signifies this receptivity for the world around us and 
our inner movement toward that world, but only rational appetite commands human action 
judging the information a passion conveys to be worthy to act upon or no. And so 
Lombardo further claims that “[w]hen rational analysis concludes that acting on a certain 																																																								
153 Ibid., 41. 
154 Cf. Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 38. We should note that Lombardo argues that the passions have both 
aspects, passive and active, but he considers a passion qua movement to be a more central characteristic. We 
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expected that Aquinas would characterize such acts in passive terms: A sensory being is drawn toward an 
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prompting of the passions is not conducive to the attainment of our final end, the passions 
have not failed to offer reliable guidance: they have provided precisely the sort of first-
order response and motivation that is their sphere of competence.”160 This means that the 
passions have an essential role, together with other appetites, in guiding us to our 
flourishing and happiness. To see the passions as our compasses to the fullness of life is 
not merely an outcome of philosophical reflection, Lombardo furthers – “there is a massive 
theological premise that is never explicitly stated because it is so obvious: the passions 
carry us toward our telos (and therefore happiness) because they were created by a God 
who is trustworthy, God is the guarantor of desire. In him, there is a metaphysical basis for 
welcoming and trusting the passions.”161 
 
2.2.2 The Passions and the Body 
 
We have thus discovered the Thomistic passions to be an object directed (or in other 
words, intentional) movements of the sentient appetite which contribute to attainment of 
human happiness. At this moment, however, we should consider the second half of the 
definition of the passions, namely, that “a passion properly speaking exists when there is a 
bodily change (ubi est transmutatio corporalis).”162 
Miner points out that the history of interpreting the relationship between the passions 
and the body is not a history of agreement. There are authors arguing that Aquinas 
defended a materialist account of the passions;163 yet the most prominent course of 
interpretation is to understand that “[t]he act of the sensitive appetite, though an appetitive 
motion that is accompanied by a physical change, is not itself a bodily motion.”164 We 
should see the relationship between the appetite and the somatic event as a relationship 
between formal and material aspects of the same act. And even though Aquinas usually 
treats the somatic aspect of the passions in the discussions about the particular passions 
under the heading ‘effects,’ we should be aware that “[f]or Aquinas, events within the soul 
produce distinct bodily events. But the distinction is not a separation. Because the body 
and soul are fundamentally integrated, there will always be an ordered connection between 
them.”165 Passion, then, is an event that occurs in unity of the powers of the human person, 
encompassing his/her capacities to comprehend, to undergo an inner movement, and to 
feel. Apprehension, the movement of sentient appetite, and the bodily event, then, stand in 
an intimate relationship in an experience of the passion and the latter two appear to be 
constitutive elements of it. 
Lombardo adds that while we surely see the passions as an experience of the body-
soul composite, “matter is the metaphysical realm of passive potency par excellence”166 
and thus “the bodily dimension of the passions makes their subjective experience more 																																																								
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dramatic than that of immaterial psychological movement.”167 He also argues that the fact 
that Aquinas gives substantial attention to the discussion of bodily aspects in discussing 
particular passions (as their causes and effects) shows that he takes the bodily dimension of 
a passion very seriously. 
Cates joins the discussion with a claim that “[t]o say that emotion is a motion of the 
soul-body composite is to say that the main powers or capabilities that are involved in the 
production of an emotion are exercised directly by means of the body.”168 Taking into 
account contemporary research of neuroscience she furthers: 
 
It makes sense to say that emotion necessarily involves bodily changes if we think emotion 
occurs by virtue of the brain and [the rest of the] the nervous system – particularly if we 
recognize that ‘the brain and the body are indissociably integrated by mutually targeted 
biochemical and neural circuits.’ It makes sense to say also that at least some emotions have a 
characteristic brain-body signature – that there is a patterned way in which the brain and the 
rest of the body tend to be altered when a person is moved by certain objects of 
apprehension.169 
 
Cates interprets that Aquinas surely holds that the passions have correlative material 
expressions. But she also argues that these expressions are understood in a flexible manner 
as ‘a certain bodily change’ and not necessarily as one-to-one correspondence between a 
particular passion and a highly specified set of bodily reactions. A passion is always about 
a perceived or imagined situation, Cates furthers, and not about the body itself (unless the 
object of the passion is the body or its particular state). Thus Cates wants to respect the 
bodily dimension in the account of the passions, but also gives it a certain character of 
flexibility. Her position is best summarized in the following way: 
 
Nevertheless, I take it that for Aquinas most emotions register to some degree – for most 
people – as familiar patterns of feeling enlivened, agitated, lifted up, weighed down, 
constricted, relaxed, or the like. This is presumably why most people speak of ‘feeling’ an 
emotion: We feel an interior motion or a tending in relation to an object of apprehension (for 
example, we have the experience of rising to meet a challenge – or resting, subsequently, in a 
goal attained), and we feel a related change in the body (for example, an increase in energy 
level – or a subsequent sense of euphoria or relaxation). It is the first sort of feeling (the 
imaginative experience of tending or coming to rest) that is most definitive of emotion, but this 
feeling has a material dimension. It occurs by means of changes in the body.170 
 
We judge Aquinas’s attention to the body in the experience of the passions to be a 
strong element of the account. He, in fact, considers the bodily element so essential that it 																																																								
167 Ibid., 46. 
168 Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions, 81. Concretely: “Experiencing an emotion involves having a sensible 
object in mind, on some level of awareness. An act (or process) of sensory apprehension might involve, for 
example, receiving and entertaining sensory impressions, making basic judgments of the significance of the 
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is taken into the very definition of a passion. Aquinas, indeed, holds a passion to be an 
event of the body-soul composite: “As was explained above (q. 28, a. 5), in the case of the 
passions of the soul, the movement of the appetitive power is itself like a form, whereas the 
bodily change is like matter, and the one is proportioned to the other. Hence, the bodily 
change follows as a likeness to the appetitive movement and in keeping with the character 
of that movement (secundum similitudinem et rationem appetitivi motus).” 171  Both 
components are essential to the nature of the passions. Sometimes attending to our 
cognitive capacities can help us to understand the roots of the emotion we are experiencing 
and by this aid at giving it its place. But at the same time, we would argue, being attentive 
to our bodies can help us to grasp that we are experiencing a certain emotion (or being 
attentive to other bodily signs to be aware of their emotions). Certain bodily expressions 
are indicative of emotions, even when our mind refuses to acknowledge it. Being sensitive 
to it can be a path by which we consciously attend to our feelings, deliberate on their 
possible source, and thus their object, and can become aware more consciously and 
honestly about the ways we relate to this object and thus engage with our surroundings. 
 
2.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Up to this point we have seen that Aquinas describes the passions in terms of appetite; that 
means that they signify the ways we are engaged with our surroundings. The appetite is 
triggered only when we apprehend an object as being sensorily attractive or repulsive and 
it comes to its movement by the means of a bodily change. The above discussion 
endeavored to present these three fundamental points – the passions themselves as 
movement of the sense appetite, their connection to apprehension (and by consequence, 
their intentionality) and the role of the body in the experience of the passions. 
When it comes to the apprehensions activating the passions, generally speaking, our 
main interlocutors showed a consensus that the kind of sense apprehension eliciting the 
passions is not just a sheer perception; it involves our cognitive capacities because a human 
being, normally, functions as a unity. In this regard, Cates notes: “[I]t is to be expected that 
humans will ordinarily exercise both powers at the same time in assessing the significance 
of various objects. When we apprehend an object to be good on an intellectual level, we 
will ordinarily apprehend it (or an image or impression of it or something related to it) to 
be good on a sensory level as well, and vice versa.”172 We also indicated that for Aquinas, 
sense apprehension includes these powers: external senses (sight, smell, touch, taste, 
hearing) and internal senses (the cogitative power, the common sense, the imagination, and 
the memorative power). At this point, the interpretations diverged – the role of the 
cogitative power in the activation of each passion appears to be a locus of academic debate. 
Our own reading of relevant passages of the Summa sides with an interpretation that the 
passions appear to be elicited either by mediation of the cogitative power or they follow 
sensation and imagination. This line of interpretation will allow us to speak of the passions 
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that are influenced by reason on various levels and it will help us to speak of responsibility 
for them depending on it.173 
We should also note that our main interlocutors credit Aquinas for making a 
conceptual distinction between appetite and apprehension while keeping their unity in 
operation. For Lombardo this distinction is more truthful for our daily experience – we 
seem to speak more often about emotions as responses to some cognitive appraisal than 
something that includes both, the appraisal and the response. He argues:  
 
When someone says, ‘I feel angry’ or ‘I am afraid’ or ‘I am sad,’ we understand what is meant, 
even when we do not know why the person feels this way. We presume that there are reasons, 
conscious or otherwise, and we may immediately ask what they might be, but inquiring about 
the reasons is another question and a different question. ‘How are you feeling?’ and ‘Why do 
you feel that way?’ are getting at two different realities.174 
 
Cates credits the distinction between apprehension and appetite for being able to 
account for the experience of turmoil when our evaluative judgments seem to contradict our 
appetite motions. She claims: “[T]hinking something to be good (judging, say, that it 
contributes directly or indirectly to one’s flourishing as a human being) does not 
necessarily amount to being drawn toward it, and thinking something to be bad does not 
necessarily amount to finding it unattractive or being repelled by it.”175 At this point, we 
would like to highlight the importance of the distinction and we will flesh it out in greater 
depth in the upcoming chapter comparing the accounts of Aquinas and Nussbaum.176 
We have also presented the Thomistic passions qua movement – the passions 
themselves are movements of the sense appetite, but theologian and Thomist, Thomas Ryan 
explains that Aquinas uses the model of physical movement as a heuristic tool to illustrate 
the dynamics of the passions. “As a body moves toward its object,” he writes, “so a person 
moves toward the goal of living which is happiness. The person and the human powers 
(operations) move (are activated) by being drawn (‘inclined’) by the desire for 
happiness.”177 Lombardo seconds this opinion and argues that Aquinas takes seriously the 
notion that all created beings tend toward their telos by the means of their appetites 
implanted by God. He furthers that the logics of Aquinas’s position is intrinsic to a 
Christian understanding of creation as good – every element constituting our nature must be 
good. “Since desire and all other forms of emotion are manifestations of appetite,” 
Lombardo argues, “emotion in all its elemental forms is not just tolerable: it is essential to 
human flourishing.”178 Aquinas’s understanding of the appetite provides a metaphysical 
foundation for the psychology of the passions. Aquinas is aware of the gravity of the reality 
of sin and the distortions it introduces to human nature and, by consequence, our desires. 
Yet he shows in his account on the passions that human appetites remain fundamentally 																																																								
173 See the discussion on the responsibility for our passions in section 4.2.2 Responsibility for the Passions 
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174 Lombardo, The Logics of Desire, 226. 
175 Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions, 70. 
176 See Chapter IV, section 3.2.1 Reason and Emotion: Intelligent Responses and Apprehension-Appetite 
Distinction. 
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orientated toward authentic happiness even after the fall. Lombardo furthers that Aquinas 
also identifies the nature of our telos by the method of observation of our inclinations. 
Aquinas looks into constitutive elements of a given nature and observes what brings that 
nature to fulfillment: “He begins with a close examination of what actually exists, trusting 
that whatever exists comes from God, and therefore, in its essential ontological structure, 
contains within itself its own measure of goodness.”179 That means that in Aquinas’s 
system our inclinations themselves serve as sources of information in constructing the 
picture of authentic human happiness. Lombardo claims: “We can discover something 
about human flourishing by reflecting on our subjective experience of desire. Our 
experience of desire cannot be taken entirely at face value, due to the possibility of 
disordered desire and self-deception, but it does provide a legitimate, if incomplete, basis 
for determining how we should live.”180 Lombardo interprets that Aquinas makes the 
goodness of the appetite the cornerstone of his account of the passions and this means that 
our inclinations are fundamentally trustworthy.181 Consequentially, this makes the nature of 
the appetite a fundamental reference point in ethical reflections. 
Lastly, we should not forget that the passions are psychosomatic events. For Aquinas, 
they come to be through bodily change. The passions are embodied states of awareness. As 
Cates puts it: “Emotions are, in part, ways of taking in certain features of reality in ways 
that reverberate in the body.”182 The body is the matrix of the affective change183 and thus, 
we argued, we should be attentive to it in our emotional experiences as it can be an 
important source of information. Our bodily reactions and feelings can be indicative of our 
emotions and can lead us to delve into the sources of our emotions. 
 
3. STRUCTURE OF THE PASSIONS: THE CONCUPISCIBLE AND THE IRASCIBLE DIVISION 
 
Question 23 of the Treatise on the Passions presents the structure of the passions dividing 
them into two different species – the concupiscible and the irascible. Lombardo claims that 
this division is one of the most important structural features of Aquinas’s account.184 This 
division differentiates the passions according to the ease or difficulty in achieving their 
objectives and Lombardo is convinced it holds up when we are thinking about human 
experience. “There are first-order emotions that often have objectives beyond their own 
resources to achieve,” he writes, “and there are also second-order emotions that serve first-
order emotions by tackling obstacles that get in the way of their interests.”185 In this 
hierarchy the irascible serve the concupiscible passions and the distinction itself aids 
discerning the elements of an authentic human flourishing. The distinction illustrates the 
nature of the particular passions and what purpose they serve – by attending to the 
discussion on the particular passions, we can see how they are related to each other and we 
can see which passions Aquinas considered to be truthful to our nature and which he saw 																																																								
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as parasitic. In this regard Lombardo adds: “Envy, for example, is not an elemental 
component of human affectivity; it is the corruption of something good, that is, the passion 
of sadness.”186 
Now the division of the passions into concupiscible and irascible lies in the initial 
division of the sentient appetite into these two powers established in Question 81, Article 2 
of the Prima pars.187 Here Aquinas claims that: 
 
The sentient appetite is generically one faculty (una vis), which is called sensuality, but it is 
divided into two powers, which are the species of the sentient appetite, viz., the irascible and 
the concupiscible…Therefore, since the sentient appetite is an inclination that follows upon 
sentient apprehension in the way that a natural appetite is an inclination that follows upon a 
natural form, it must be the case that in the sentient part of the soul there are two appetitive 
powers: (a) one through which the soul is simply inclined to pursue those things that are 
agreeable according to the senses and to avoid those things that are harmful, and this is called 
the concupiscible power; and (b) a second through which the animal resists aggressors that 
pose obstacles to what is agreeable and that inflict harm, and this is called the irascible power. 
Hence, the object of the irascible power is said to be what is difficult (arduum), because the 
irascible power tends toward overcoming contraries and winning out over them.188 
 
The basic distinction of the appetite into two powers highlights Aquinas’s conviction 
that the concupiscible simply seeks pleasure and shies away from pain and the irascible 
power of sense appetite inclines the soul to resistance even when an apprehended good 
involves something unpleasant and painful. We could put it simply and say that the 
distinction stands for an appetite seeking something under the quality of pleasant in the 
concupiscible case and something as useful in the irascible case (we may remember that 
Aquinas divides the good under the aspects of befitting the good, the pleasant and the 
useful – the two latter are precisely the formal objects of the concupiscible and the 
irascible powers, respectively). And these two are quite different instances for Aquinas. 
Miner explains that “[t]he irreducible distinction between the pleasant (painful) and the 
useful (dangerous) accounts for Aquinas’ differentiation of the sensitive appetite into a 
concupiscible and an irascible component.”189 This, for Miner, is clearly visible from our 
common experience – it seems rather impossible to collapse our perception of something 
useful to something pleasant.190 
 Article 1 of Question 23, assuming we are already familiar with the distinction 
within the appetite, inquires whether the passions residing in both powers are the same or 
different. Aquinas suggests that the concupiscible and the irascible passions are different 
because just as in the case of the two species of the sensitive appetite they respond to 
different formal objects. The generic object of concupiscible is “the sensible good or the 																																																								
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sensible bad taken absolutely (bonum vel malum sensibile simpliciter acceptum), i.e., the 
pleasurable (delectabile) or the painful (dolorosum).”191 In the case of the irascible 
passions, we should note that “because it is necessary for the soul to suffer sometimes from 
difficulties and opposition in attaining a good of this sort or in avoiding something bad, 
and to the extent that attaining the good or avoiding the bad is in some sense elevated 
beyond the animal’s easily exercised power (quodammodo elevatum supra facilem 
potestatem animalis), it follows that the object of the irascible power is the good or the bad 
insofar as it has the character of being arduous or difficult (secundum quod habet rationem 
ardui vel difficilis).”192 Thus we can say that the concupiscible passions seek an easily 
attainable good, here and now, and the irascible are inclined to the future good with the 
qualification of something difficult to attain. Miner wants to demonstrate that the division 
of the two powers is also useful practically because “[w]hen the division is made, he will 
show, multiple relations among the passions naturally fall into place that would otherwise 
be difficult to explain or even acknowledge.”193 
 Article 2 of the same question starts to inquire precisely into the relationships that 
the passions residing in the different powers have with each other. For Aquinas the 
passions relate to each other through the principle of contrariety. Aquinas argues that “two 
sorts of contrariety are found among the passions of the soul – (a) one involving a 
contrariety among their objects, viz., the good and the bad, and (b) the other involving 
approach toward and withdrawal from the same terminus.” 194  The passions of the 
concupiscible power are mutually related only through the first kind of contrariety because 
they involve the good in an absolute sense. Because the good is what everyone desires they 
can only be inclined to,, but never withdrawn from it. At this point Aquinas starts to 
introduce the pairs of eleven principle passions and show how they relate to each other. 
Love (amor), desire (desiderium), and joy (gaudium) seek the good itself and the passions 
that have to do with evil – hatred (odium), withdrawal (fuga), and sadness (tristitia) – shies 
away from evil itself. Thus the concupiscible passions cannot be moved toward and 
withdrawn from the same object.  
As we have seen, the object of the irascible passions is not the good absolutely 
speaking, but the good perceived as difficult to achieve. And at this point we can encounter 
five irascible passions: hope (spes), despair (desperatio), fear (timor), daring (audacia) and 
anger (ira). Hope tends toward an arduous or difficult good. Despair, on the other hand, 
withdraws from it under the same aspect (if the object in the course of action is judged to 
be unattainable). When an arduous evil cannot be avoided, the culminating passion will be 
fear. An arduous evil can also incline one to act upon it, but only in order to avoid it in the 
future, and in this instance one experiences the passion of daring. And so, Aquinas 
concludes, “among the passions of the irascible power one finds (a) a contrariety according 
to the good and the bad, as in the case of the contrariety between hope and fear, and again 
(b) a contrariety according to approach toward and withdrawal from the same terminus, as 
in the case of the contrariety between daring and fear.”195 																																																								
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Aquinas moves to Article 3 to show that the case of contrariety is more complex in 
the irascible passions – anger is an irascible passion, yet, in Aquinas’s thought, anger does 
not have a passion which is contrary to it. Aquinas holds anger to be a reaction, attack of 
the present evil. Precisely due to this already-there temporal category, he judges that it is 
impossible for anger to have an irascible contrary. If one experiences the present evil, the 
appetite may move – which is a passion of anger itself; or the appetite may succumb and 
remain at the experience of sadness which is a passion of concupiscible power. Aquinas 
argues that an appetite cannot experience a movement towards withdrawal and so anger 
does not have an irascible opposite. When it comes to the distinction between the good and 
evil as a basis for contrariety, Aquinas holds that if the object of anger is already present 
evil, the only contrary to it is already acquired good, but in this case it loses the character 
of arduous or difficult. No other movement remains when a good is present, unless it is 
joy, which is a concupiscible passion. Aquinas thinks that there is no passion of irascible 
power which could count as a genuine contrary to anger qua movement; the only 
opposition seems to be calm – but it lacks the characteristic of movement and it is rather 
anger’s privation when a genuine contrary passion. 
Article 4 goes on to establish the eleven principle passions residing in the two 
powers of the sensitive appetite; the concupiscible power contains six passions, the three 
pairs of the contrary passions: love (amor) and hatred (odium): love is an inclination 
toward a connaturality with the good, hatred pertains to the same when one apprehends the 
object as evil; desire (desiderium) or sentient desire (concupiscentia) and withdrawal 
(fuga) or aversion (abominatio): desire is a movement toward an absent good, withdrawal 
or aversion is a contrary on the side of absent evil; and pleasure (delectatio) or joy 
(gaudium) and pain (dolor) or sadness (tristitia): pleasure or joy signify a certain rest of an 
appetite in the good, pain or sadness is a terminus of an appetite in evil.196 The irascible 
passions are five, three groups constituted of hope (spes) and despair (desperatio): both are 
responses to the unattained good, but hope judges it to be attainable and despair judges the 
object unattainable; fear (timor) and daring (audacia): inclines to the future evil, fear 
apprehends it as unavoidable and daring inclines to act upon it to avoid it; and anger (ira) 
that has no contrary signifies, as we have seen, a response to present evil.  
Commenting on Article 4, Miner points out that this Article is geared to show the 
non-ultimacy of irascible passions.197 They are always framed within the concupiscible 
passions; they cannot arise first because they are always presupposing some prior 
inclination toward the good or withdrawal from evil; nor can the irascible be a last passion 
in any emotional experience. When it comes to the final stage, no irascible passion can 
correspond to an attained good; that is the task of the concupiscible. We could say, thus, 
that the concupiscible concern first-order desires, withdrawals and pains, while the 																																																								
196 The translation we are utilizing is the one provided by Fredosso. Miner, for example, translates the pairs 
of the concupiscible passions as: love/hatred, desire/aversion, pleasure/pain. See Miner, Aquinas on the 
Passions, 54. Lombardo translates them as love/hatred, desire/aversion or repulsion, pleasure/sorrow or pain. 
See Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 51. Cates translates these passions as love, desire, delight, aversion, 
hatred, sorrow. See Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions, 134-149 for her discussion on the particular passions. 
Joy and sadness are both species of pleasure and pain, respectively; both joy and sadness depend on interior 
apprehension while pleasure and pain depend on the exterior apprehension (ST I-II 35.2). The translation of 
the irascible powers is identical among all the authors. 
197 Cf. Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 57. 
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irascible are inclined to the second-order of the same and they evaporate once the 
concupiscible passion attains its goal.198 Anger, as an answer to the present evil, also does 
not constitute the final passion for Aquinas – it necessarily has to terminate in joy or 
sorrow. While we will not expand on this discussion here, it is essential to note this 
characteristic of anger as it is important for our upcoming discussion on the moral status of 
anger – anger for Aquinas has a fundamentally transitional character. 
 
3.1 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CONCUPISCIBLE AND THE IRASCIBLE PASSIONS 
 
Question 25 of the Treatise on the Passions continues to inquire into the way the passions 
are ordered with respect to one another – that is – are causes of each other.199 Article 1 
goes on to solidify Aquinas’s view that the concupiscible passions are prior to the irascible. 
Aquinas argues that the concupiscible passions are related to more things than the irascible 
– they can be described in terms of movement and rest, while the irascible can be described 
only in terms of movement. From this perspective, as we have just discussed, the 
concupiscible passions are always prior because they seek unqualified good and they are 
also the last because they have a quality of appetite attaining rest. The irascible passions, 
on the other hand, are always an addition to the already present concupiscible passions as 
they signify how the object relates to the desired good in terms of a possibility to attain it. 
From this perspective the irascible passions stand as defenders of the concupiscible desire 
when the good cannot be attained immediately. 
Discussing the passions in order of execution, Aquinas suggests a particular scheme 
of how passions are causes of each other. In this picture Aquinas arranges the passions in 
the particular order to show that irascible passion always signifies a midway between the 
two concupiscible passions. Thus Aquinas suggests that in the case of an object being 
apprehended as good, desire is the first movement, hope the second (if one judges it to be a 
not easily attainable good), and joy then constitutes the rest of the appetite (this is the case 
of the successfully attained good). Similarly the passions that deal with evil as their object 
proceed with withdrawal/aversion, are followed by fear and culminate in sadness (if the 
feared thing happens). Things get a little more complex in the case of anger – for Aquinas 
sadness is a cause of anger. Miner explains that “Aquinas holds that what makes sorrow a 
passion in the strictest sense is its radical unsuitability for human beings who seek what 
completes them by nature. The soul does not naturally reconcile itself to sorrow.”200 In this 
situation anger is what follows the passion of sadness as it hopes to repay the evil and 
substitute what is bad with the good. If the vindication is achieved, the movement from 
sadness to anger culminates in joy. Thus Aquinas concludes that all of the irascible 
passions necessarily culminate in the concupiscible passions of joy or sadness 
(corresponding to the positive or negative culmination of a situation from the subject’s 
perspective) as a terminus of the passion. 																																																								
198 Cf. Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 51. 
199 Normally, we follow the structure of Aquinas’s Treatise and progress with it, yet at this point for the sake 
of the coherence of the discussion we skip Question 24, which discusses the morality of the passions, and 
continue the discussion about the concupiscible and irascible passions. We will take up the discussion on the 
moral character of the passions right after our current exposé.  
200 Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 83. 
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3.1.1 Love: Principle of all the Passions and a Passion Itself 
 
Now one might have noticed that Aquinas did not discuss the place of love in the ordering 
of the passions. He fills the void in Article 2 of this question where he establishes love as 
prior among all the passions. At this point Aquinas distinguishes between the ‘order of 
generation’ and ‘order of intention.’ In the order of intention – pleasure is the passion that 
causes others (the intended pleasure causes desire and love). In the order of generation love 
is a primary passion from which all the rest flow. Aquinas describes this mechanism in the 
following way:  
 
Now the appetite’s very readiness for or proportion to the good is love (amor), which is 
nothing other than being pleased with the good (quid nihil aliud est quam complacentia boni). 
On the other hand, the movement toward the good is desire or sentient desire (desiderium vel 
concupiscentia), whereas rest in the good is joy or pleasure (gaudium vel delectatio). And so in 
accord with this ordering, love precedes desire and desire precedes pleasure.201 
 
Love is described as a principle of every desire (and in construing this argument 
Aquinas reinstates that good is fundamentally prior to evil and any passion seeking good is 
naturally prior).202 By this virtue love is a principle of any passion. Love as ‘being pleased 
with the good’ or a certain complacency with the good produces desire for that good which 
terminates, if attained, in pleasure. The order of generation, thus, is as follows – love, 
desire and pleasure. 
We consider it useful to discuss love to a greater extent here since it is a passion of 
prime importance for Aquinas, a passion that holds all the rest together and so it is 
essential to our understanding of his account. Yet his conception of the passion of love and 
its subsequent relationship with desire and pleasure is a locus of very different 
interpretations. What precisely does Aquinas mean when he says that sensitive love is a 
principle of other passions and yet the passion itself (thus including a movement)? What is 
the precise relationship that love has with desire and pleasure and how exactly does love 
differ from them? Our three main interlocutors suggest rather different interpretations of 
Aquinas’s account on sensitive love. Miner and Cates present a positive interpretation of it, 
agreeing with Aquinas’s views on love and seeing internal logic behind conceiving love as 
a principle and as a passion and appreciating the differences between the passions of love, 
desire, and pleasure. Lombardo struggles to find an inner coherence of the account, cannot 
see an actual difference between the functions of love, desire, and pleasure and suggests a 
revision of the account on the passions by removing love as a passion with desire and 
pleasure being able to perfectly subsume the functions of love and so relieving the account 
from incoherencies and redundancies.  
 
3.1.1.1 Defining the Terms 
 
																																																								
201 ST I-II 25.1. 
202 Cf. ST I-II 25.2. 
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Yet before we dwell on this discussion let us demarcate the ground of discussion and 
clarify the main terms to see precisely why these tensions arise. Question 26, Article 1 
takes up the task of defining the passion of love. Aquinas writes that love involves appetite 
since the good is the object of both of them, thus the distinction among types of love 
follows the distinction among the appetites. Aquinas, then, describes sense love vis-à-vis 
natural and rational kinds of love. First of all, all types of love follow apprehension: in the 
case of natural appetite, apprehension is inherent by nature of a thing and not dependent on 
the subject itself (natural appetite follows and relies on the all-encompassing apprehension 
of the Creator); in the case of sense appetite it follows apprehension of a subject itself but 
without free will (this is in the case of an animal which follows instinct). In human beings 
this apprehension ‘has some participation in freedom’ since passions have a natural 
tendency to obey reason (we will discuss this essential point further on when discussing the 
relationship between the passions and reason).203 In the case of rational appetite, love 
follows apprehension of a free subject. What is called love in all these appetites is “the 
principle of the movement that tends toward the end that is loved.”204 This principle takes a 
form of certain bonds in different kinds of love: in natural love it appears as connaturality, 
a certain fit between a thing having appetite and the thing toward which it tends. Aquinas 
considers that love exists in the same way in sense and intellective appetites: “Similarly, 
the bond (coaptatio) between the sentient appetite or the will and some good – i.e., its 
being pleased with the good (ipsa complacentia boni) – is called ‘sentient love’ or 
‘intellective (or rational) love.’”205 Now love as a passion is described as a first change in 
the appetite produced by the appetible thing and love signifies the appetite being pleased 
with the object: “Thus, the first change effected in the appetite by the desirable thing is 
called love, which is nothing other than the appetite’s being pleased with the desirable 
thing; and from its being pleased there follows a movement toward the desirable thing, and 
this movement is desire; and, finally, there is rest, i.e., joy.”206 
In Question 30 of the Prima secundae, Aquinas describes desire as movement toward 
pleasurable good. Here Aquinas restates that the passions are distinguished by their 
objects. The object of all concupiscible passions is the good and so Aquinas claims that 
they are differentiated from one another by way of relating to this object. He chooses to 
distinguish the good as object of the concupiscible in terms of its presence and absence. 
Absent good moves the passion of desire toward itself. Pleasure, which is a motion of the 
soul, but also its terminus (ST I-II 31.1) is then a passion which is distinguished by the 
present good. Aquinas distinguishes all three passions in the following way: “Hence, what 
is pleasurable to the senses is a cause of love insofar as the appetite adapts and conforms to 
it in a certain way, whereas it is a cause of concupiscence insofar as, when absent, it draws 
the appetite to itself, and it is a cause of pleasure insofar as, when present, it brings the 
appetite to rest in it. So, then, concupiscence is a passion that differs in species both from 
love and from pleasure.”207 We can instantly see that he describes the good as object of 
desire in its absence, the present good as an object of pleasure, but in the case of love he 																																																								
203 See section 4. The Passions, Reason, And Will in this chapter. 
204 ST I-II 26.1. 
205 ST I-II 26.1. 
206 ST I-II 26.1. 
207 ST I-II 30.2. Fredosso uses the term of concupiscence instead of desire. 
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bypasses this kind of explanation and describes the good in terms of a change in the 
appetite. This results in multiple interpretations of what the object of love really is and how 
its role is distinct from desire and pleasure in Aquinas’s thought. 
 
3.1.1.2 Is Sense Love a Distinct Passion? 
 
Now when it comes to interpreting Aquinas’s account on love, Miner points out that all 
three types of love just encountered are unified, at least analogically in their status as 
principle of motion.208 For him, to give love such a broad meaning reflects an interplay 
between sameness and difference. In this instance Miner quotes a prominent Thomist 
scholar Josef Pieper observing that “a single fundamental word apparently underlies all the 
variety in vocabulary and binds together all special meanings.”209 He elegantly illustrates it 
by showing that our language allows us to say – ‘a stone’s love of downward motion, a 
dog’s love of his master, a young man’s love of his fiancée, a woman’s love of chocolate, a 
drinker’s love of wine, a mathematician’s love of calculus, a philosopher’s love of 
wisdom’ – and so he concludes that our language itself points to the unity in diversity of 
loves. Aquinas’s description of love as a basic adaptation (our encountered ‘first change’ in 
the appetite) toward the object which is apprehended as suitable signifies the unity in these 
diverse experiences of love. “In this most basic respect,” Miner writes, “language does not 
lie. The minimal grammar of love requires a subject (a ‘lover’) and an object (a 
‘beloved’).”210 He also argues that love is experienced most tangibly where the appetite is 
in motion; yet he defends Aquinas’s views that love and desire cannot be equated because 
the motion of desire may cease while inclination remains. Miner illustrates his argument 
through an example of a chocolate-lover desiring a chocolate cake and after eating it 
feeling satisfied. Desire is satisfied and the appetite is no longer in motion, but does it 
mean that the love for chocolate also ceased? That does not seem to be the case and for 
Miner, Aquinas’s separation of love and desire rests precisely on this point, love does not 
signify a motion of an appetite, but its fundamental inclination (Lombardo as we will see 
later on in a discussion considers love and desire to be inseparable in an actual human 
experience). 
Yet if we want to construe love as a constant which remains when desires change and 
as a principle, in other words, it raises some serious questions about postulating it also as a 
passion, that is, a movement. And Aquinas does defend a view that love is a passion in a 
true sense. Miner appeals to the interpretation that Aquinas uses the term motion in an 
elastic sense. Yes, love is not a motion in a sense that desire is but, nonetheless, it is a 
motion. Miner points out that love signifies a motion of appetite where appetite is changed 
by means of the appetible thing.211 When the passion of love is there, it is present because 
we were acted upon by the thing outside ourselves. Precisely because of this passivity the 
passion of love is love in the most true sense and so Miner leads us to a passage of crucial 
importance in understanding Aquinas’s account on love: 																																																								
208 Cf. Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 118. 
209 Ibid., quoting Josef Pieper, “On Love,” in Faith, Hope, Love (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1997), 146-
147.  
210 Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 118. 
211 Cf. Ibid., 119. 
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Some have claimed that even in the case of the will itself, the name ‘love’ (amor) is more 
divine than the name ‘elective love’ (dilectio). The reason is that ‘love’ implies a certain 
passivity (passio), mainly because love exists in the sentient appetite, whereas elective love 
(dilectio) presupposes the judgment of reason. But a man is better able to tend toward God 
through love (per amorem), having been attracted passively in a certain way by God Himself, 
than he is able to be led to this by his own reason – which, as has been explained, is what is 
involved in the nature of elective love. And in this sense love (amor) is more divine than 
elective love (dilectio).212 
 
Miner notes that this passage disturbs the conventional wisdom that the rational 
creature moves to his/her end mostly through an act of will (he, in fact, attributes this 
conventional thought to the fact that the questions on the passions received little interest in 
comparison to other topics in the Summa in the history of theology and philosophy). 
Precisely due to its passivity, love is the most potent. And so Miner states that: 
 
Far from being collapsible into rational love, the amor proper to the senses has a function of its 
own. The power of God to draw creatures to himself by sensible means exceeds the power of 
human reason. Amor sensitivus cannot be neglected by the rational creature in its motion 
toward God: ‘The highest does not stand without the lowest.’213 
 
When it comes to the object of love, we have seen that Aquinas avoids a clear 
definition and describes it in terms of an effect it has on the appetite. Object of love is a 
desirable thing acting upon the appetite (ST I-II 26.6). Thus, Miner points out that in 
Question 27 discussing the causes of love, Aquinas claims that ‘properly, the cause of love 
is the object of love.’214 Article 1 reminds us that the proper object of love is good. Article 
2 goes on to specify that the good cannot be an object of appetite unless it is apprehended, 
thus love requires some sort of apprehension of the loved thing. “So, then,” Aquinas 
writes, “cognition is a cause of love for the same reason that the good is, viz., that the good 
cannot be loved unless there is a cognition of it.”215 Article 3 then adds that likeness with 
specification of the subject having in potentiality what the object has in actuality also being 
a cause of love: “For each thing that exists in potentiality has as such a desire for its own 
actuality, and, if it is something with sentience and cognition, then it delights in attaining 
that actuality.”216 
Miner claims that by naming cognition as a cause of love Aquinas regards 
knowledge as a precondition of love. One cannot love something which he/she does not 
know. This, he suggests, reminds us of the architecture of the Summa itself – before 
addressing the human love for God, it lays out what we know, even very limitedly, about 
God.217 Love does not require full knowledge of its object, only some apprehension of it. 
The passage from ST I-II 26.3 points out that for Aquinas love always outruns knowledge 
and so love goes beyond the qualities of the loved that we apprehend. This, Miner notes, is 																																																								
212 ST I-II 26.3. 
213 Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 122. 
214 Cf. Ibid., 126 referring to ST I-II 27.1. 
215 ST I-II 27.2. 
216 ST I-II 27.3. 
217 Cf. Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 128. 
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evident from the experiences of love of a newborn baby, love of a spouse, love of God.218 
Aquinas concludes Question 27 with Article 4 where he affirms once more that there is no 
other passion prior to love (he states that for the first time, as mentioned, in ST I-II 25.2). 
There is no other passion of the soul that does not presuppose some instance of love. “The 
reason for this,” Aquinas writes is, “that every other passion of the soul involves either a 
movement toward something or a resting in something. But every movement toward 
something or instance of resting in something proceeds from some sort of connaturality or 
bond (ex aliqua connaturalitate vel coaptationem procedit), and this belongs to the nature 
of love.”219 Seeing love at the root of every other passion and as a first inclination to the 
perceived good resembles Nussbaum’s theory of emotions which presupposes that prior 
involvement, care and attachment to an object has to be there for one to have subsequent 
emotional experiences. Miner concludes his analysis of love by stating that the primacy of 
love in the Prima secundae prepares and builds Aquinas’s argument toward the primacy of 
caritas in the Secunda secundae.220 
 Cates joins the discussion essentially agreeing with Miner’s line of interpretation. 
Cates suggests that we should, indeed, see love as a certain bond between the subject and 
the object. 221  Before the object arouses desire, an actual movement towards the 
apprehended good, the object causes an aptitude for itself and this is what love, as a 
passion, is for Aquinas, according to Cates – a link corresponding to the good, finding it 
fitting, but yet not producing a movement toward it. She construes Aquinas’s description 
of love as ‘the appetite’s being pleased with the desirable thing’ and in more contemporary 
terms as “resonating pleasantly with an object in its suitability.”222 She goes on to 
characterize this experience of sensory love “as a state of the soul in which we have an 
impression that that there is a ‘likeness of proportion’ (a fitting relationship) between a 
sensible object and ourselves. In love, we apprehend that some object of experience is such 
that we are capable of acting on it, being acted upon by it, or interacting with it, in ways 
that allow us to be ourselves and to actualize some of our potential.”223 Particular love is 
activation of this tendency. Cates recognizes that Aquinas does not classify love as 
movement toward a particular object; that is the task of desire. Yet she wants to argue 
together with Miner that love is still a form of appetite’s motion: 
 
An emotion of sensory love is a tending in the sense that it is an activation or expression of a 
tendency to be changed with respect to one’s sensory appetite when one apprehends certain 
objects of apprehension, under certain conditions. In love, the tendency to undergo responsive 																																																								
218 Cf. Ibid., 128. 
219 ST I-II 27.4. 
220 Cf. Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 139. Miner also asserts that the most decisive authority in Aquinas’s 
treatment of love is Dionysius. First, his influence appears in defending the fundamental primacy of the good 
and by consequence securing the primacy of love. Miner writes: “Thus we may conclude, at least 
provisionally, that Aquinas’ consideration of the fundamental passion, and therefore his treatment of the 
passions as such, has a deeply Platonic character, even as it makes use of Aristotelian materials throughout. 
As Pinckaers suggests, Question 28’s consideration of love’s effects ‘evokes directly the language and the 
experiences of Christian mysticism; the numerous citations of the De divinis nominibus of Denys the 
Areopagite are there to confirm it (1990, p. 382).” Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 138-139 quoting Servais 
Pinckaers, “Les passions et la morale,” Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques (1990): 382.  
221 Cf. Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions, 138. 
222 Ibid.,140. 
223 Ibid., 139. 
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appetitive motion takes the initial form of resting in the awareness that a perceived object is 
suitable to oneself. It takes the form of appreciating the object’s attractive properties. It takes 
the form of resonating with pleasure in the presence of an object to which one is already united 
by a sensible suitability (‘connaturalness’) and by the apprehension of this suitability.224 
 
As we have seen, Miner construes love as a motion where appetite is changed by the 
object: love is set in motion by the object and the very change in the appetite is seen as a 
motion. From the quotation above we can see that Cates also associates the motion of love 
with its object, but she sees it under the aspect of ‘resting in the awareness that a perceived 
object is suitable.’ Thus Cates considers the motion of love to be very close to what the 
passion of pleasure is for Aquinas without further indicating the actual distinction between 
the two if we choose to see love as an appreciative resonating with the attractive properties 
of the object (this, indeed, seems to be a function of pleasure already).  
The possibility to arrive at these similar, yet distinct interpretations shows that 
Aquinas’s account of love is fluid and not entirely clear in the meaning of its concepts. 
Lombardo presents the most critical view on Aquinas’s account of love from our three 
main interlocutors. He finds it difficult to fully understand Aquinas’s account on love as 
passion precisely due to its unclear relations with desire (understood as movement toward 
the good), pleasure (resting in the good) and apprehension (recognizing the good). He thus 
judges Aquinas’s views on the passion of love to be ‘evocative’ but ‘elusive.’225 Building 
on the same Thomistic descriptions of love as Miner and Cates,226 he finds it difficult to 
grasp the concrete meaning of it. How is love concretely and differently from the passions 
of desire, pleasure, and our apprehending the good? Lombardo suggests that one way to 
explain the nature of the passion of love as principle of all other passions and distinct from 
desire is to interpret it as a movement of a general kind (somewhat similar to Miner’s 
interpretation of love as motus). If Aquinas argues that love is not an appetitive movement 
that tends to something desirable, but it names an appetitive movement in which the 
appetite is changed by the desirable object so that the appetite becomes complacent with 
the object (ST I-II 26.2 ad 3), Lombardo suggests interpreting love as a movement of a 
general sense, not a movement of a specific kind seeking the good. “Desire is the 
movement toward a good,” says Lombardo, “while love is an inclination or a kind of 
complacency, and, as such, the principle of desire and pleasure and the rest of the 
passions.”227 Yet even this partial explanation seems dissatisfying for Lombardo. He 
wonders if we construe desire as a movement toward an object, what room is there for love 
which moves from an indifferent state toward complacency with the object, without 
actually moving toward the object?228 This is a curious objection since from our reading of 																																																								
224 Ibid., 140. 
225 Cf. Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 57. 
226 He points to the multiple phrases which Aquinas uses to characterize the passion of love as: affinity with 
(connaturalitas) or aptness to (coaptio) some good (ST I-II 27.4.); a certain consonance (consonantia 
quadam) with something agreeable (ST I-II 29.1); affective union (unio affectiva) (ST I-II 25.2 ad 2); a 
change caused in the appetite (immutatione appetitus) by the appetible object (ST I-II 26.1.); movement 
toward good (accessum ad bonum) (ST I-II 29.2 obj. 3); complacency in some good (complacentia boni) (ST 
I-II 26.1.); complacency as something desirable (complacentia appetitibilis) (ST I-II 26.2.). 
227 Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 58-59. 
228 Cf. Ibid., 59. Here Lombardo indicates that Knuutila notes the same ambiguities in Aquinas’s account on 
the relationship between love, desire, and joy. He refers us to Simo Knuutila, Emotions in Ancient and 
Medieval Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 249-51. 
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Aquinas, love does not move from an indifferent state as it indicates the first change in the 
appetite already by virtue of apprehending the object as good, it seems to signify a very 
first relation and connection between the subject and the object before one starts to have a 
range of passions directed to that object. But Lombardo continues his argument and states 
that love and desire are both forms of psychological movements; neither can be 
distinguished by a voluntary/involuntary basis (both can be pleasing or displeasing to the 
will in particular cases). Here once more we could note that if love is a first change of the 
appetite by being acted upon by the object which is found good and pleasing, this argument 
might not seem entirely true. Love, then, appears to be the occurrence of the object 
‘catching’ our attention as something suited for us, apprehended under this aspect and so it 
seems to be able to become displeasing to the will only when it is connected to the 
movement of desire. Lombardo furthers that we may want to distinguish love and desire by 
indicating that desire prompts voluntary action, which love does not, it simply rests in the 
good229 (something similar to Cates’s interpretation). But then we could not separate love 
from pleasure. What is more complex is Lombardo’s interpretation that the Thomistic 
passion of love always has to coexist with desire and pleasure; consequently this means 
that “we cannot isolate love’s characteristics from those of desire by imagining what it 
would be like to feel love without desire, insofar as it is metaphysically impossible to have 
such an experience.”230 
Lombardo argues that if we want to look at the object of love for some clarification, 
it does not prove to be helpful as Aquinas avoids a clear answer on what actually is love’s 
object. He points to the fact that love is not specified by its object (in terms of presence or 
absence) and in this way is distinguished from desire (and pleasure by consequence). It is 
rather distinguished from desire, the effect that the object has on the appetite.231 Love’s 
object adapts the appetite to itself, while the object of desire attracts the appetite to itself 
																																																								
229 Cf. Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 59. 
230 Ibid., 59. Lombardo argues that for Aquinas, as Augustine, love is not separable from desire and pleasure. 
He refers us to Aquinas quoting Augustine with approval: “Love longing to have what it loves is desire, 
while love having what it loves and the benefit of it is joy,” (ST I-II 25.2; Augustine, City of God 14.7). 
Lombardo furthers that “[b]y way of comparison, Augustine avoids the problems Aquinas encounters 
because, being less metaphysically oriented, he is content to define love in terms of desire and joy. For 
Augustine, love is a twofold passion manifested as either desire or joy, and it is not distinct from either.” 
Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 59, footnote 48. Lombardo is also aware that his interpretation of Thomistic 
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Aquinas love can exist without desire: “The ontological possibility of loving something without taking 
delight in it or desiring it,” he writes, “is a consequence of Aquinas’s understanding of the passion of love.” 
Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 59, footnote 49 quoting Mark P. Drost, “In the Realm of Senses: Saint 
Thomas Aquinas on Sensory Love, Desire, and Delight,” Thomist 59 (1995): 48. Lombardo, however, argues 
that Drost does not provide any textual evidence to support his thesis. Drost seemingly construes the 
Thomistic passion of love as ‘inclination’ and ‘complacency’ and Lombardo argues why it then cannot be 
seen as aspects of desire and pleasure, respectively. And so he concludes that “[w]ithout a clear, 
unambiguous distinction between inclination and desire, and between complacency and pleasure, it is 
difficult to maintain that it is ontologically possible to experience love without either desire or pleasure.” 
Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 59, footnote 49. Lombardo additionally points out that Christopher Malloy 
suggests the same interpretation as his – the view that love is always accompanied by desire or pleasure. See 
Christopher J. Malloy, “Thomas on the Order of Love and Desire: A Development of Doctrine,” Thomist 71 
(2007): 65-87. 
231 Cf. Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 60. 
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(and so makes it move toward itself). Thus we are left without a clear description on the 
nature and essence of love’s intentional object. 
 Lombardo agrees that the inclusion of love among the passions and the attempt to 
systematically unite them under it has a certain intuitive appeal and elegance, yet he also 
argues that the passion of love, as construed by Aquinas, seems not to find a proper 
function separately from desire and pleasure. Lombardo thus offers a revision which, 
according to him, would not collapse the coherence of the account of the passions itself, 
but would eliminate the ambiguities and redundancy. He thus suggests: “The essential 
structure of his system can be preserved by interpreting the sense appetite itself, in place of 
love, as the principle of desire and pleasure. Additionally, the qualities Aquinas attributes 
to the passion of love can be interpreted as a combination of apprehension, desire, and 
pleasure: apprehension subsuming the attentiveness of love; desire subsuming the 
movement of love; and pleasure subsuming the complacency of love.”232  
Now we can be sure that the discussion on the exact meaning of Aquinas’s views on 
love as a passion is a large topic in itself and we cannot hope to solve it here.233 Our own 
reading of Aquinas’s texts stands more in line with Miner’s and Cates’s where love is seen 
as a first change in the appetite triggered by the things outside ourselves in the sense of a 
bond between the subject and the object. To omit love, as Lombardo suggests, from the 
Thomistic account of the passions, even with all its incoherencies, seems like a move that 
takes away the intuitive force, the vitality, from the account. It would also mean omitting 
one of its most evocative claims; that God leads us through our passivity. If love is not a 
passion, what counts as one? Miner also indicates that Aquinas’s views on amor pave the 
way to crown caritas as the queen of virtues; the highest cannot exist without the lowest. 
Lombardo’s views might be influenced by his conviction that what corresponds to the 
contemporary category of emotions is the category of affections (affectiones, taken in a 
broad sense, encompassing passions and intellective affections of the will) – in this case, 
love can be seen as a higher order affection of the will involving a cognitive dimension.234 
We conclude, however, that Lombardo’s suggestion that love as amor is redundant in 
Aquinas’s account of the passions seems to be a move that takes something essential away 
from that account. 
 
3.1.2 Ordering the Passions: Questioning the Status of Hope, Daring, Fear and 
Despair  
 																																																								
232 Ibid., 62. 
233 Not in the work of our prime concern, but elsewhere Cates also acknowledges that scholars still attempt to 
put the puzzles on how many things Aquinas said on love fit together. In this instance she highlights this 
segment of conducted research: Frederick E. Crowe, “Complacency and Concern in the Thought of St. 
Thomas,” Theological Studies 20, nos. 1, 2, and 3 (March, June, and Sept.,1959): 1-39, 198-230, 343-395; 
Patrick A. Messina, “Love Lost and Found: The Ambiguities of Amor, Caritas and Concupiscentia in St. 
Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae,” Confessions of Love: The Ambiguities of Greek Eros and Latin 
Caritas, eds. Craig J. N. de Paulo et al. (New York: Peter Lang), 55-73; Guy Mansini, “Duplex Amor and the 
Structure of Love in Aquinas,” Thomistica (1995): 127-196. See Diana Fritz Cates, “Love: A Thomistic 
Analysis,” Journal of Moral Theology Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012): 6. 
234 We will discuss the category of the affections of the will in the upcoming section 3.3 Affections of the 
Will. 
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Returning to our discussion on the order among the passions, Aquinas continues Question 
25, Article 3 establishing hope as a prime passion among the irascible passions. Even 
though the power of irascible passions is named after the most familiar passion with the 
most profound sensations – anger (ira), (the same occurs with the concupiscible power 
named after concupiscentia), the passion of hope is called the first among the irascible 
because it is closest to love, (with anger itself being the last, since it is the last in order of 
generation according to Aquinas). In Question 40, Article 1 Aquinas describes hope vis-à-
vis its object: hope is a passion which after apprehension seeks an arduous future good 
which is possible to attain. Since the irascible passions always follow upon the 
concupiscible and, generally speaking, those passions following the good are naturally 
prior, it follows that the sequence of the irascible passions is as follows: “hope (spes) and 
despair (desperatio), are naturally prior to the passions whose object is the bad, viz., daring 
(audacia) and fear (timor). However, this is so in such a way that hope is prior to despair, 
since hope is a movement toward the good as a good that is attractive by its nature, and so 
hope is a per se movement toward the good, whereas despair is a withdrawal from the good 
– a withdrawal that (a) belongs to the good not insofar as it is good, but insofar as it is 
something else, and hence a withdrawal that (b) is, as it were, per accidens.”235 
Aquinas goes on to conclude this question with Article 4, referring to an inherited 
tradition which designates joy and sadness, hope and fear as four principal passions. He 
explains that the enumeration of these passions as principal has to do with the qualities of 
present and future. Joy and sadness, as we have already encountered, deal with a present 
good/evil and in this sense they are always final as each movement of a passion necessarily 
culminates in either. The second pair of passions of hope and fear has to do with the future 
good/evil – the result of future good is hope and fear is an answer to awaiting evil. And so 
Aquinas concludes: “Now all the other passions that have to do with a good or an evil that 
is present or future are traced back to these four as their culmination. Hence, some writers 
call the four passions in question ‘principal passions’ because they are general.”236 
Lombardo points out that Aquinas’s separation between the passions of hope and 
daring may pose some philosophical problems to their being considered distinctly. 237 The 																																																								
235 ST I-II 25.3. None of our primary interlocutors offers a lengthy discussion of hope as passion (with an 
exception of Miner who offers a presentation of Question 40 of the Treatise which discusses the passions of 
hope and despair together). Aquinas does not devote a large discussion to the passion of hope either. He not 
only discusses it together with despair, but also discusses the causes and effects under the heading of the 
same question (while usually devoting separate questions to them). Miner suggests that there might be 
several reasons for this: first many aspects of hope are already discussed while addressing love and desire; 
the passion of hope may raise less questions than a corresponding theological virtue of hope which is treated 
in the Secunda secundae and, finally, the historical conversations about the qualities of the passion of hope 
are not as complex as those concerning love, pleasure, and sorrow, for instance. See Miner, Aquinas on the 
Passions, 215. 
236 ST I-II 25.4. Miner points out once more that this kind of ordering of the passions is little indebted to 
Aristotle: “The continual insistence that passions tending toward good are naturally prior to those which shun 
evil derives from Augustine and Dionysius, not Aristotle…Inspection of the arguments sed contra in 
Question 25 confirms the point. The first and third Articles cite no auctoritas; the second quotes Augustine 
on the power of love to generate desire and culminate in joy. Aristotle’s authority plays only a small role in 
securing the architectonic principles that inform Thomas’s ordering of the passions.” Miner, Aquinas on the 
Passions, 87. Miner thus continuously argues that a great deal of Aquinas’s views on the passions is of 
Platonic origin. 
237 Cf. Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 67. 
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object of hope is a future object that is judged possible to attain while the object of daring 
is future evil judged to be possible to overcome. Aquinas, additionally, holds that daring is 
a result of hope. This, Lombardo argues, seems like a problematic position – if we look at 
the intentional objects of both (actual objects that define the passions), the intentional 
object appears to be the same – a future, arduous good which is perceived as possible to 
attain. For hope and daring to be distinct passions, their intentional objects need to have 
some intrinsic difference. Lombardo points out that Aquinas attempts to solve this problem 
by referring to the movement of the passions: hope moves toward the object that is good in 
itself, daring moves toward the good of overcoming evil. “However,” Lombardo writes, 
“the object’s arduous quality already denotes the presence of some obstacle, and hope, like 
daring, necessarily moves toward the overcoming of some evil. So in the end we are left 
with the tenuous distinction that hope moves toward a good by overcoming an evil, while 
daring moves toward an evil in order to overcome it and attain some good.”238 And so 
Lombardo asserts that it is difficult to see a real distinction between the two intentional 
objects; ultimately they seem to be the same. According to the principles of his own 
system, it seems for Lombardo, that Aquinas should not postulate hope and daring as 
distinct passions, even though he clearly regards them as two different passions.239 
Now, according to Lombardo, there are some other problems with Aquinas’s 
ordering of the passions. Despair which is discussed together with hope in Question 40 is 
defined in similar terms as hope itself – despair is an outcome of one losing hope to attain 
good; thus its object per accidens is evil.240 This makes it impossible, Lombardo argues, to 
distinguish despair from either fear, if we want to see it as an irascible passion, or aversion, 
if we attempt to construe it as a concupiscible passion (if the intentional object is an 
arduous future evil – the outcome of Aquinas’s account would be fear, if the evil is not 
arduous – the consequential passion for this situation is aversion). Lombardo correctly 
observes that in Question 25, Article 3 Aquinas claims that despair is a cause of fear and so 
precedes it, but in Question 45, Article 2, he claims the reverse.241 There are multiple ways 
to interpret this contradiction: we can claim that fear and despair are discussed in their 
relationship from different angles and perspectives; to say that at times one can be the 
cause of the other and this does not appear to be directly or logically contradictory. But 
these unresolved tensions signal for Lombardo an inherent ambiguity in the treatment of 
fear and despair by Aquinas: “The haphazard character of his comments about the 
relationship between fear and despair suggests that Aquinas’s primary point of reference 
for his account for despair (which is much less developed that his account of fear) is the 																																																								
238 Ibid., 70. 
239 Lombardo argues that there are different ways to remain faithful to Aquinas’s phenomenological 
description of hope and daring, but revises his taxonomy in order to be faithful to the metaphysical principles 
of the overall account on the passions: “In one model, daring remains the affective movement toward an 
arduous good, and hope ceases to denote a distinct passion. Hope, instead, names a combination of 
concupiscible passions: desire for some absent good and pleasure in the mental presence of that same good. 
Another model defines hope as the movement toward an arduous future good, while daring and anger denote 
a movement toward the elimination of some present evil, as opposed to the elimination of some future evil 
that, in this interpretation, would be constitutive of the object of hope. Although this would eliminate any 
formal distinction between daring and anger, Anna Terruwe, for instance, argues that daring and anger are 
the same passion[.]” Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 71. 
240 ST I-II 40.1. 
241 Cf. Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 71. 
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phenomenology of the psychological experiences that Aquinas intuitively characterizes as 
despair, and not the logical implications of his metaphysical principles, despite his interest 
in making despair fit with the rest of his system.”242 
Miner suggests an alternative interpretation of the relationship between hope and 
daring and fear and despair. As we have seen, Aquinas defines hope as seeking future, 
arduous good when one estimates that this good is possible to attain. In Question 45, 
Article 1 Aquinas defines daring vis-à-vis fear and writes: “But what is maximally distant 
from fear is daring. For fear withdraws from a future harm because of the harm’s victory 
over the one who fears it, whereas daring attacks the imminent danger for the sake of 
winning a victory over the danger itself.” 243 Miner does not question whether the 
intentional object of hope and daring is the same. In this argumentation he wants to show 
that hope and daring are distinct passions and that daring can follow hope. Miner argues: 
“He now provides a metaphysical explanation. Good is pursued per se; evil can be pursued 
only per accidens, on account of some annexed good. Correlatively, good cannot be 
avoided per se, but only per accidens, on account of some annexed evil.”244 This means 
that what is per se is prior to something per accidens, thus, Miner stipulates, essential 
pursuit of good is prior to accidental pursuit of evil and essential withdrawal from evil is 
prior to accidental withdrawal from good (these distinctions are considered superfluous by 
Lombardo, as he judges hope and despair, for instance, to ultimately correspond to the 																																																								
242 Ibid., 72. Lombardo observes that Knuuttila also notes the contradiction and suggests that Aquinas 
mistakes natural precedence with the order of occurrence. This means that Aquinas wanted to say that fear 
chronologically precedes despair, but is ontologically preceded by it in the case of despair being concerned 
with good rather than evil. Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 71 footnote 103 referring to Knuuttila, Emotions, 
246. Lombardo responds that: “Knuuttila seems correct that Aquinas uses precedence equivocally in these 
different contexts. However, since Aquinas sometimes suggests that despair chronologically precedes fear 
(ST I-II 25.3, 25.4 obj. 3), Knuuttila’s analysis cannot stand as it is.” Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 71 
footnote 103. He once more reaffirms that Aquinas’s account on the relationship between fear and despair 
strikes one as more impressionistic than logically precise and these ambiguities signal that Aquinas did not 
fully conceptualize the relationship between the two passions. Further in his discussion he, as usual, offers a 
remedy to keep the conceptual coherence of the account, since despair together with love and hope seem 
incapable of being distinct passions because their intentional object is not distinct enough from other 
passions already accommodating those objects. Lombardo thus suggests that the phenomenon Aquinas calls 
despair could be reconciled with the logics of his system in the following way – it should be perceived as a 
combination of two things – “first, the passion of sadness (tristitia) in not being able to attain some future 
good, and second, the experience of the fading of the passion of hope, after its object is judged less attainable 
than previously thought. So despair would be the fading of hope combined with sadness in the seeming 
impossibility of attaining a certain good…but this proposal fits well with the logic of his system.” Lombardo, 
The Logic of Desire, 71 footnote 104. This is a curious suggestion because Lombardo just described what we 
know experientially as an emotion of despair, which Aquinas himself, it would seem, from the same 
experiential point of view denoted as a passion, but refuses this recognized experience to be a part of 
Aquinas’s account of emotion. Lombardo is truly after the logic behind the Thomistic account of the passions 
(even though his interpretations suggesting elimination of certain passions belong to the disputable questions 
and does not represent a scholarly consensus), willing to eliminate elements that clearly respond to 
experience and allow them to exist not under the names that encapsulate that experience (in this case – 
despair), but as less self evident elements of other passions (in this case, hope of which legitimacy as a 
passion he doubted himself). This approach seems to attempt to clear Aquinas’s account from possible 
incoherencies, but to forget the human relevance and meaning of Aquinas’s thought for today. Sadness and 
loss of hope seem to correspond to what we commonly know as despair and the relations between it and the 
other passions that Aquinas suggests are still illuminating for self-knowledge and learning the emotional 
vocabulary.  
243 ST I-II 45.1. 
244 Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 256. 
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same object). He argues that Aquinas establishes this structure in the following quotation: 
“These four things pertain to the four passions, for pursuit (prosecutio) of good pertains to 
hope, withdrawal from evil pertains to fear, motion toward the terrible evil (insecutio mali 
terribilis) belongs to daring, and withdrawal from good pertains to despair. Whence it 
follows (sequitur) that daring is consequent upon (consequitur) hope, for it is thus that 
someone hopes to overcome a terrible threatening thing (terribile imminens), and thereby 
attacks boldly (audacter insequitur).”245 This, according to Miner, establishes the priority 
of hope metaphysically and Aquinas reinforces this view again and again rhetorically. 
Moreover, to claim that the withdrawal from evil per se is prior to the withdrawal from 
good per accidens is a way to affirm that fear is prior to despair (as Aquinas does in 
Question 45). But can this be reconciled with the contradiction already noted by Lombardo 
that earlier (ST I-II 25.3) Aquinas writes that despair is prior to fear? Miner suggests an 
interpretation which holds that Aquinas arrives at Question 45 after having reconsidered 
the position in actu.246 He suggests that the following passage confirms his interpretation: 
“Although good simply is prior to evil, yet withdrawal from evil must be prior to 
withdrawal from good, as the pursuit of good is prior to the pursuit of evil. And thence just 
as hope is prior to daring, so fear is prior to despair.”247 Miner argues that hope does not 
have to necessarily result in either daring or despair, likewise, not each case of fear 
generates despair – it has to be strong.248 Thus Miner concludes: “When an object is 
regarded as a threatening evil, but the hope for victory is more intense than the 
accompanying fear, the result is daring. If the fear increases to the point that hope for 
victory is obliterated, the result is desperatio. Thus, ‘properly speaking, daring is not a part 
of hope, but its effect, just as despair is not a part of fear, but its effect.’”249 
 
3.1.3 Concluding Remarks 
  
Aquinas’s account on the eleven elemental passions divided into the concupiscible and 
irascible, as many facets of his ethical thought (we think of multiple interpretations of his 
account of natural law, virtue, human nature etc.), contains ambiguities, especially, in the 
way one can interpret their intentional objects. Lombardo suggests some critical remarks 
concerning this matter and while he seems to agree with the argumentation holding the 
metaphysical background of the account, he holds that the same principles do not allow 
one to fit certain passions into that account. Miner and Cates follow and defend Aquinas’s 
logics by trying to defend the position that the passions Aquinas postulates, resonate with 
our common emotional experiences. We argue that Aquinas’s account in its current form is 
illuminating for discerning the dynamics of human emotional experience even today. 
Aquinas presents an account where he conceives of the passions as depending on 
apprehension of an object. By attempting to show how passions cause each other, he 
highlights, essentially, their relatedness and the fact that a great number of human 																																																								
245 Ibid., 256, Miner quoting ST I-II 45.2. 
246 Cf. Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 256. 
247 Ibid., 256 quoting ST I-II 45.2 ad 2m.  
248 Indeed, Aquinas claims so: “And just as despair does not always follow from fear, but only when the fear 
is more intense, so, too, daring does not always follow from hope, but only when the hope is strong.” ST I-II 
45.2 ad 2m. 
249 Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 258 quoting ST I-II 45.2 ad 3m. 
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emotional experiences depend on the relationship between a person who has an emotion 
and its object. Aquinas names the first connection between a subject and an object love – 
this recognized fit between the subject and the object marks the start of the unfolding 
emotional experience. Cates, similarly, observes that Aquinas’s account provides a helpful 
structure to discern our emotional lives and at the same time it offers great flexibility.250 
Aquinas points out the key motions that can expand in number by identifying their 
intensity, by further specifying the object and by showing how these motions can be 
combined in different ways. Cates also argues that the account is particularly illuminating 
in the way it accentuates the dynamics between the subject and the object – one can 
apprehend an object in multiple ways, from multiple angles; many of these apprehensions 
eliciting the motions can be implicit, some of the motions can occur immediately and some 
unfold during time as they grow from the previous passions. If we see the passions as 
related, it will be easier to detangle the complex emotional experiences and see how a 
person can be drawn to different directions by various appetitive motions depending on the 
assessment of the object. 
Aquinas’s account of the passions is common for human and non-human animals. 
The animal and human passions depend on similar activation mechanisms; they imply 
similar physiological changes and effects. Cates adds that all beings capable of sensuality 
are aware that they stand in relation to other things: 
 
As sensory beings, nonhuman and human animals have a lot in common: They share a set of 
appetites that dispose them to resonate with, to desire, to pursue, and to enjoy what contributes 
to their sensory well-being. They also share a set of appetites that dispose them to find 
disagreeable, to be repulsed by, and to resist or suffer in pain what causes them dysfunction 
and diminishment. To recall Aquinas’s theological frame, nonhuman and human animals both 
participate as sensory beings in a universe ordered by Love, which is the first principle and 
final goal of all tending.251 
 
The fact that Aquinas construes human and animal sense appetite as being almost 
identical is another strong aspect of his account because it allows to account for the 
animality element in our emotions and so is capable of accommodating the basic emotions. 
However, we should also note that Aquinas considers that human and non-human animals, 
while similar on the sensory appetite level, nonetheless, are distinct. The activation 
mechanisms while manifesting similarity are also distinct in the case of human beings. 
Here, estimative power becomes cogitative which is influenced by universal reason. That 
means that humans are capable of emoting not only in relatively basic instances (a sudden 
fright reaction), but in complex social situations (as we will see Aquinas portraying in the 
description of the passion of anger). Cates adds a very important observation concerning 
the human-animal case – humans are also aware of themselves undergoing an emotion in 
the sense that they are capable of detaching from it and evaluating it prudentially and 
morally.252And, indeed, Aquinas’s account constructs the passions in such a way that a 
human person still has the opportunity to not consent and act upon the influence of the 																																																								
250 Cf. Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions, 155. 
251 Ibid., 156. 
252 Cf. Ibid., 157. 
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sensitive motion. These observations lead us to inquire into the relationship the passions 
have with our intellective capacities. 
 
3.2 AFFECTIONS OF THE WILL 
 
Before we turn to the question of the relationship the passions have with our reason and 
will, we need to highlight an important distinction found in Aquinas’s thought in order to 
be able to understand some conceptual distinctions emerging in that discussion. In addition 
to our prime interest – the passions, Aquinas distinguishes something he calls the 
affections of the will. We will use Lombardo’s account of the category of the affections of 
the will since he explains it in detail, with conceptual clarity and since neither Miner’s nor 
Cates’ accounts offer competing views.253 																																																								
253 We should note that Lombardo has a special interest in the affections of the will because he considers 
them, together with the passions of the soul, as corresponding to the contemporary account of emotions. 
Lombardo writes: “Aquinas classifies psychological phenomena such as desire, joy, sadness, fear, anger, and 
hope as affections, and, when he is more specific, as either passions of the soul or intellectual affections. 
Since these psychological phenomena are today classified as emotions, it seems at first glance that there is a 
clear correspondence between Aquinas’s category of affection and the contemporary category of emotion.” 
Lombardo, The Logics of Desire, 224. Cates equates the passions of the soul and the emotions and leaves 
affections of the will as a separate category. Her interpretation of the category of affections of the will is 
essentially similar to Lombardo’s: she considers the affections of the will to result from an act of the 
intellective apprehension of the intelligible goodness of an object (p. 193). They do not need to be mediated 
directly by the body (but in intense cases of affections they ‘overflow,’ ‘spill’ into the sense appetite (p. 193); 
they have an active dimension of self-moving (p. 194). In addition, Cates discusses the affections of the will 
in light of the absence of the body in the state after death and before the general resurrection (p. 90-92). She 
attributes to God passionless affections (p. 92-95). When it comes to the human experience here and now, 
Cates furthers that we can make sense of the affections which are purely intellectual acts in light of the 
understanding that the acts of the intellect and the will are always bound to sensory experience in one way or 
another. She explains: “Humans rarely wish simply and abstractly to unite with goodness as such. Usually we 
wish to unite with particular objects in respect of their goodness. In tending toward good things, we tend 
toward possibilities for ourselves or for others that we cannot help but imagine, in some form, with reference 
to phantasms, examples, or experiences. If a way of uniting with a prospective good strikes us as significant 
for our well-being, partly through the use of our interior sensory powers, then our sensory appetite is likely to 
become engaged…That is, our experience of being perfected in relation to an intelligible good will be 
accompanied by noticeable bodily changes, such as a heightening of our energy level, a lessening of our 
awareness of physical discomfort, or a relaxation response.” Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions, 204. Miner, on 
his behalf, is the most careful in attempts to equate the Thomist passions with the contemporary category of 
emotions. His task is to discern what the passions mean on their own right and, for Miner, they represent a 
segment of a long history of philosophical discussions leading from pathe, passiones, to the passions and 
finally to the emotions. He, however, briefly mentions that the category of affectiones has some 
correspondence with the contemporary usages of the term ‘emotion’ – Both Miner and Lombardo note that 
Aquinas’s’ affectiones, taken to include both intellective and sense movements of appetite, indeed, come 
close to contemporary parlance about the nature of emotions (p. 35-36, footnote 6). Now, when it comes to 
the category of affections of the will itself Miner follows the lead of King. (Peter King, “Aquinas on the 
Passions,” in Scott MacDonald and Eleonore Stump, eds., Aquinas’s Moral Theory: Essays in Honor of 
Norman Kretzmann (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 101-132). He argues that we can label them as 
pseudopassions – they are analogous to the passions in a proper sense, but the affections of the will pertain to 
the purely intellective part of the soul and so they lack bodily dimension. Pseudopassions are proper to God 
and the angels because they lack a material body. King’s distinction is not at odds with Aquinas’s own usage 
of the concepts, Miner suggests, as “Thomas consistently reserves passiones for acts of the sensitive appetite. 
He uses affectiones (and, less frequently, affectus) for acts that may or may not belong to the sensitive 
appetite.” Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 35. 
Lastly, we should note that Aquinas never clearly defines his category of affection, therefore its 
contemporary interpretations vis-à-vis the category of emotions rest on the theory of emotions the author 
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Aquinas does not explicitly define the category of affection in general thus the exact 
meaning of it is a work of reconstruction and interpretation. Lombardo suggests that the 
term affection can serve as a synonym for the passions. It can also indicate the affective 
movements of the will in humans and in God and angels.254 The affections in God and 
angels are an important point of reference for Aquinas as they are geared toward 
explaining the immaterial power of will in humans. Lombardo explains that this analogy is 
most clear when Aquinas speculates about the nature of the human soul when it is 
separated from the body after death and not yet rejoined with it in the general resurrection. 
“The body is dead, yet the soul perdures, and ‘separated souls grieve and rejoice at the 
rewards and punishments they have.’”255 Aquinas considers that joy and sadness in 
separated souls are in the intellectual appetite and not in the sense; this is why he also 
needs to postulate an account of affections which are proper to the immaterial part of a 
human being. Lombardo furthers that from Aquinas’s writings we can see that all the 
passions of the soul are affections, but not all the affections are passions. In addition, it 
also appears to be unclear whether all movements of the will are affections (while it is 
taken for granted that every affection of the will is a movement of the will). Because of 
this uncertainty and because Aquinas seems to use the term affection only to describe 
movements of the will analogous to the passions, Lombardo suggests that “it is also 
possible that he [Aquinas] would reserve the term ‘affection’ for only those phenomena 
that somehow resemble the subjective experience of the passions.”256 To avoid any 
misinterpretation, Lombardo discusses only those phenomena that Aquinas himself 
describes as affections.  
Now when it comes to the intellectual affections themselves, as in the case of the 
passions, they also respond to cognition (in their case, intellectual affections correspond 
directly to the intellectual apprehension of an object). Intellectual affections in their 
structure also parallel the structure of the concupiscible passions – love is the first 
movement of the affections of the will and it rises from an intellectual apprehension of the 
good. When the good is absent, the affection of desire (desiderium) occurs and the pleasure 
(delectatio) called joy (gaudium) is present when the good is obtained and the will can rest 																																																																																																																																																																							
finds the most credible. We should further indicate that Lombardo’s interpretation of the category of 
affection in a broad sense (including the passions and the affections of the will) being close to the 
contemporary understanding of the emotions is echoed by several other authors. Carlo Leget, for instance, 
puts it rather straightforwardly: “The emotions found in the appetitus sensitivus are called passiones animae. 
The same emotions insofar as they are found in the appetitus intellectivus (the voluntas or will) are called 
affectus. This distinction enables Aquinas to clarify how certain emotions (affectus) can be attributed to God, 
angels and demons, although neither of them has a body.” Leget, “Martha Nussbaum and Thomas Aquinas 
on the Emotions,” 573. 
254 Cf. Lombardo, The Logics of Desire, 75. Lombardo explains that God, in Aquinas’s thought, does not 
experience affections in the same way angels and humans do – God is a fullness of being and his affections 
do not imply potentiality and change. He furthers: “Passions like love and joy are analogously present in 
God, but passions that imply some imperfection, such as sadness and anger, which each imply the experience 
of some evil, cannot be analogously present in God; they can be only metaphorically attributed to God.” 
Lombardo, The Logics of Desire, 83. Angels, in Aquinas’s thought, also do not experience passions due to 
the lack of a body. Yet, Lombardo explains that “[t]heir affections still involve passion in one of the more 
qualified senses of passio, however, because they are creatures, and as such their created appetites are 
passive powers directed toward goods outside themselves.” Lombardo, The Logics of Desire, 83. 
255 Ibid., 84. Here Lombardo quotes ST I 77.8 obj. 5. 
256 Ibid., 77. 
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in it. Sorrow (tristitia) is a species of pain (dolor) and if Aquinas speaks of sorrow as 
affection of the will, he refers to an interior pain that results from interior apprehension 
(yet can also accommodate exterior pain). Lombardo emphasizes that “[j]oy is described as 
a movement of the will, but sorrow is defined as an interior affection without specific 
reference to the will, and consequently, it is not clear whether sorrow (tristitia) is proper to 
the will in the same way as joy (gaudium).”257 
Lombardo furthers his inquiry and explains that in one area Aquinas’s distinction 
between a passion and an intellectual affection becomes especially murky, namely, in 
Aquinas’s account of the nonnatural passions. We have encountered that natural passions 
are common to humans and other animals and they respond to objects that are 
harmful/useful for self-preservation. The nonnatural passions are unique to humans and 
they stem from an apprehension of objects as harmful/useful through the judgment of 
reason. By consequence, the passions become responsive to immaterial objects by the 
influence of reason and the will. Lombardo argues that the category of nonnatural passions 
seems to accommodate any passion, but Aquinas discusses it mainly through cases of 
nonnatural desire, pleasure, and fear.258 
 Aquinas dedicates special attention to nonnatural desire and by taking a closer look 
at it we can get a sense of the mechanism of other nonnatural passions. Nonnatural desire 
is inclined toward objects that are seen as pleasurable through a rational judgment of their 
desirability (instead, of being just pleasing to the senses as in the case of a passion of 
desire). Lombardo gives an example of a nonnatural desire in the instance of desiring a 
particular kind of food because it is conceived as particularly tasty or healthy.259 He 
furthers that Aquinas is not explicit about how the nonnatural desires are formed, but his 
suggestion is that the nonnatural desires are formed, in time, through activities of reason 
while intellectual affections are formed into the patterns of nonnatural passions. 
Lombardo’s argument, then, is that reason and intellectual affections can over time spread 
throughout the memory and sense appetite. He claims: “Very quickly, a complex web of 
associations penetrates the sense appetite and forms many nonnatural desires. For the most 
part, then, with the possible exception of infants and very young children, purely natural 
desires are rarely experienced.”260 
The ambiguity arises because Aquinas never states whether the nonnatural desires 
are movements of the sense or rational appetites. Lombardo attempts to reconcile the 
ambiguities found in Aquinas’s writings by suggesting that we should see nonnatural 
desires as movements involving both the sense and rational appetites. Furthermore, 
because the same mechanism applies to all of the nonnatural passions, generally speaking, 
we can apply this interpretation to the rest of the nonnantural passions. 
Lastly, we can find yet another doctrine in Aquinas’s thought connecting the 
affections of the will and the passions, namely, an account of an overflow. Aquinas claims: 
“There is an overflow in the powers of the soul from the higher ones to the lower ones. 																																																								
257 Ibid., 86. 
258 Lombardo indicates the instances in the Summa where we can find these discussions: Aquinas discusses 
nonnatural desire ST I-II 30.3-4, nonnatural pleasure ST I-II 31.3, 31.7, nonnatural fear ST I-II 41.3. See 
Lombardo, The Logics of Desire, 87 footnote 66. 
259 Ibid., 88. Lombardo takes this example from Loughlin, “Human and Animal Emotion,” 57-58. Lombardo 
bases a great deal of his analysis of the nonnatural passions on Loughlin’s article. 
260 Lombardo, The Logics of Desire, 88-89. 
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Accordingly, the pleasure of contemplating, which is in the higher part, overflows to lessen 
even that pain that exists in the sensory power.”261 Lombardo explains: “According to 
Aquinas, the will’s loves, desires, and joys, as well as its hates, aversions, and sorrows, can 
spill over into the passions of the sense appetite by a kind of overflow, because ‘it is not 
possible for the will to be moved intensely toward something without exciting some 
passion in the sense appetite.’”262 Again, it is not entirely clear how precisely the overflow 
works, but Lombardo suggests his own interpretation: “The will first moves the intellect by 
the vehemence of its affections regarding some objects, so that the intellect causes the 
particular reason to form an intentional object that engages the passions. This new 
intentional object then immediately prompts a response from the sense appetite.”263 																																																								
261 ST I-II 38.4 ad 3.  
262 Lombardo, The Logics of Desire, 89. Here he quotes ST I-II 77.6. Lombardo lists the instances of the 
overflow: “The will’s desire for wisdom or other spiritual goods can spill over into the sense appetite” (ST I-
II 30.1 ad 1); “the joy of contemplation can sooth pain felt in the senses” (ST I-II 38.4 ad 3; “the will’s joy in 
an act of justice can redound to the passions” (ST I-II 59.5); “and in heaven, after the resurrection, though 
beatitude consists first and foremost of the soul’s vision of God, the intense spiritual joy of the saints will 
flood their passions and bodies with a kind of overflow” (ST I-II 3.3, 4.5-6); “[l]ike spiritual joy, spiritual 
sorrow can also overflow and affect the passions and the body” (ST I-II 37.2). See Lombardo, The Logics of 
Desire, 89-90. 
263 Ibid., 90. Robert C. Roberts is a scholar who is critical of the overflow doctrine primarily because he 
thinks that Aquinas locates the passions wrongly in the sense appetite – first, he equates Aquinas’s account of 
the passions with the contemporary cognitive interpretations of the emotions and argues that even from 
Aquinas’s own argumentation we can see that the passions are basically rational and their rationality is not 
derivative, but intrinsic. Roberts furthers that Aquinas acknowledges that some objects of the passions are 
not necessarily sensory (like the joy of overcoming certain injustice, for instance). He ascribes experiences 
similar to the passions to God and the angels (and they are beings without bodies, so they cannot experience 
the changes in the sense appetite); but Roberts judges that Aquinas’s answer for justifying the existence of 
these phenomena is to deny that they are passions and he construes them, rather, as movements of the will. 
Roberts further argues that sensory and rational appetites are not as distinct as Aquinas would like them to be 
since we can find a conviction in Aquinas’s writings that “when the object of an appetitive mental state is 
intellectual, the state will not be accompanied by bodily changes; and that when there are no bodily changes, 
the object of the mental state will be non-sensory. But this prediction is not borne out by experience.” 
Roberts, “Thomas Aquinas on the Morality of Emotions,” 295. Roberts argues that it is evident from our own 
experience that we can get emotional about the objects that can be present only to our intellect. He writes: 
“We get to sweating and pumping about theories, injustices, betrayals, guilts, moral improvement, and the 
kingdom of God. Aquinas responds to this kind of case with the overflow theory: When we have bodily 
reactions of an emotional sort it is because the movement of the will is so intense that it overflows into the 
sensory appetite. This certainly looks like an ad hoc move to save the faculty psychology. It seems clear that 
the enterprise of associating emotions with the senses and the body, and dissociating them from reason and 
the intellect, was a mistake. If so, then we are free to think of the sway that reason has over the emotions not 
as something extrinsic to them, but as something fundamental to their nature as mental states.” Roberts, 
“Thomas Aquinas on the Morality of Emotions,” 295-296. Lombardo answers Roberts’s critique by pointing 
out the distinction between natural and nonnatural passions – the latter allow passionate reactions to 
immaterial objects. Furthermore, Lombardo reminds us that Aquinas explicitly argues that we know 
immaterial objects through phantasms – a concept that stands for a kind of interior image of a material object 
– thus our intellect does not know objects without mediation of phantasms. This is another way to show why 
passions are, indeed, responsive to concepts – “[s]ince concepts are known through phantasms abstracted 
from material objects, they are directly related to sense experience and thus the sense appetite, and so it 
follows naturally that the passions might respond to the apprehension of a concept.” Lombardo, The Logics 
of Desire, 91. Miner, on his own right, responds that while Roberts raises some important points to join the 
complex discussion, it seems that some of his critique is rooted in a misinterpretation of the sense appetite as 
Aquinas ascribes a large role to the intellective apprehension in an activation of some of the passions. Miner 
claims: “Aquinas does not reduce the passions to instinctive reactions that are impermeable to rational 
apprehension. King rightly concludes that for Aquinas ‘the passions are not, after all, similar to our reactions 
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Can we say that Aquinas considers that we can experience an intellectual affection 
without any kind of overflow to the sense appetite? In many instances, as in this one, there 
are various interpretations,264 but Lombardo chooses to follow the line of thought arguing 
that we, indeed, can experience an affection of the will without an accompanying passion. 
He chooses this interpretation on the basis of the textual evidence and also because the 
separation between an affection of the will and a passion, for him, constitutes an important 
aspect of human experience. It allows one to have affection for divine things without 
undergoing a bodily change (ST I-II 22.3). Furthermore, it explains a reality of emotional 
conflict – Lombardo locates it within competition between the will’s and sense appetite’s 
desires. His argument is that by our own experience we know that our will’s desires and 
the passions do not always move in tandem; additionally, we can experience good and bad 
feelings toward the same object on different levels. 
 
4. THE PASSIONS, REASON, AND WILL  
 
Now much of Aquinas’s arguments about the relationship between the passions and reason 
and will can be found in Question 81 of the Prima pars discussing the sentient appetite in 
general. In this question Aquinas, as we remember, divides the sense appetite into the 
concupiscible and irascible powers. In Article 3 of this question he goes on to express his 
views on the way sensitive and intellective powers of the human being interact. In this key 
passage Aquinas claims: 
 
[I]n man the estimative power is replaced by the cogitative power, which some call ‘particular 
reason’ because it brings together intentions of individuals (collativa intentionum 
individualium). This is why the sentient appetite is apt to be moved by the cogitative power in a 
man. Now particular reason is itself apt to be moved and directed by ‘universal reason,’ and so 
there are syllogisms in which singular conclusions are derived from universal propositions. 
Thus, it is clear that universal reason gives commands to (imperat) the sentient appetite, which 
is divided into the concupiscible and irascible, and that this appetite obeys it.265 
 
Now Aquinas goes on to solidify his argument with an appeal to common 
experience, stating that we can observe the relationship between reason and the passions in 
situations where through the application of universal consideration, (thus actually 
deliberating about the case) the passions of anger and fear (and other passions) can be 
mitigated and instigated. 
When it comes to the relationship between the passions and the will, we have already 
encountered in the discussion above that one of the ways in which rational and sense 
appetites interact is through ‘a kind of overflow’ where the affections of the will ‘spill’ into 																																																																																																																																																																							
to hot peppers. They can be affected by reasons and beliefs,’ while remaining motions of the sensitive 
appetite (1998, p. 131).” Miner, Aquinas on the Passions,38 quoting King, “Aquinas on the Passions,” 131. 
264 Lombardo draws our attention to the competing accounts of Shawn Floyd who argues that we always 
experience affections in combination with the passions. On the other hand, Daniel Westberg claims that we 
can find evidence in Aquinas’s works that we experience passionless affections. See Shawn D. Floyd, 
“Aquinas on Emotion: A Response to Some Recent Interpretations,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 15 
(1998): 161-175 and Daniel Westberg, “Did Aquinas Change His Mind about the Will?,” The Thomist 58 
(1994): 41-60. 
265 ST I 81.3.  
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the sense appetite and cause its movement. Question 81, however, offers a claim that 
passions can be related and subjected to the will also in terms of execution. Here Aquinas 
claims that other animals are immediately moved upon the movement of the sense appetite, 
but this is not the case in humans. “By contrast, a man is not immediately moved by an 
appetitive act of the concupiscible or irascible powers,” Aquinas writes. “Rather, he awaits 
the command of the will (expectatur imperium voluntatis), which is a higher appetite.”266  
Aquinas goes on to explain the way reason and the passions communicate and use 
the Aristotelian image of the despotic and political rule. He holds that the latter describes 
the relationship between the sense appetite and reason. Aquinas furthers that the body is 
ruled by the soul by the despotic rule, whereas reason rules the appetite with ‘a 
constitutional and royal rule:’ 
 
Despotic rule is that by which someone rules slaves, who do not have the ability to resist the 
ruler in any of his commands, since they have nothing of their own (quia nihil sui habent). By 
contrast, political and royal rule is that by which someone rules free men, who, even if they are 
subject to the rule of the leader, nonetheless have something of their own (habent aliquid 
proprium) by which they are able to resist the leader’s command…By contrast, the intellect, 
i.e., reason, is said to rule the irascible and concupiscible powers with constitutional rule, since 
the sentient appetite has something of its own by which it is able to resist reason’s command. 
For the sentient appetite is apt to be moved not only by the estimative power in other animals 
and the cogitative power (which is ruled by universal reason) in man, but also by the power of 
imagining and the sensory power. Hence, we experience the irascible and concupiscible powers 
resisting reason when we sense or imagine something pleasant that reason forbids, or 
something unpleasant that reason prescribes. And so the fact that the irascible and 
concupiscible powers fight against reason in some cases does not rule out their being obedient 
to reason.267  
 
These are key passages to engage in further discussion on the ways reason (and the 
will) interact with the passions. We will begin our conversation with Uffenheimer-Lippens 
who represents a model of interpreting the passions as standing in a very close relationship 
to reason and arguing that the rationalization of the passions is an aim of the Thomistic 
account on human affectivity. Uffenheimer-Lippens, it seems, ends up advocating an 
ambiguous position where passions can be considered as an integral part of the human 
being only if they lose their distinctiveness as embodied movements of the sense appetite. 
Then, we will move to Lombardo’s thought. This author is fascinated by the fact that in 
Aquinas’s account, passions obey reason, but argues that the passions cannot be shaped 
into any form we desire as they have a definite structure. Lombardo suggests a positive 
perspective, where reason does not suppress the passions, but trusts their inclination to 
seek its guidance. Cates continues along the positive interpretation path and reminds us 
that we should approach Aquinas’s thought on the reason/passions relationship with an 
image of balance in our minds. Humans are intellectual and sensual beings and these 
separate, but communicating powers, ultimately, penetrate each other. From his 
perspective, Miner takes an original look at the political rule metaphor and suggests that 
we should further inquire what the passions on their own right, as free subjects, contribute 
																																																								
266 ST I 81.3. 
267 ST I 81.3. 
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to our rational capacities. At this point, we will turn our discussion to inquire into the 
possibility of affective knowledge in Aquinas’s thought. 
Uffenheimer-Lippens argues that the relationship between reason and the passions 
rests on Aquinas’s understanding of rationality: “According to Thomas, ‘rational’ refers 
not only to that which is rational per se, in itself, or essentially, as is man’s [sic] intellect 
(intellectus), reason (ratio), and will (voluntas). ‘Rational’ is also that which participates in 
reason.”268 Her argument is that it is by this that human beings differ from non-human 
animals – we are distinguishable not only by what is essentially reasonable but also by 
what participates in rationality. The sensitive soul thus by its definition participates in 
rationality. When Aquinas argues that we can look at the passions in two ways – as far as 
they are common to humans and other animals and as far as they are naturally directed by 
reason, Uffenheimer-Lippens interprets that only the second case sufficiently highlights the 
distinctively human character of the passions. Uffenheimer-Lippens suggests that Aquinas 
does not want to merely show that the passions are common to humans and other animals. 
Her thesis is that he employs this argumentation, rather, to highlight the impulsive 
character of the passions in the absence of reason. Thus, human beings have distinctively 
human passions that have very little to do with the passions of the non-human animals. 
Uffenheimer-Lippens further argues that by its very structure the sense soul is 
inclined and open to the guidance of reason. She also holds that sense appetite is directly 
related to reason and the will. “With respect to sense-knowledge, Thomas holds that 
imagination (in the sense of fantasy) and the sensitive power of judgment (vis cogitativa) 
have an immediate contact with universal reason,”269 Uffenheimer-Lippens writes. Sense 
appetite, in turn, is related to the will in terms of execution, as it ultimately needs an 
approval of the will.  
However, we also experience that the passions are not perfectly attuned to our reason 
and will; thus, Uffenheimer-Lippens attempts to give an explanation to the disorderly 
experience of the passions. Her argument is threefold: first of all, the passions sometimes 
feel unpredictable because they are reactions to the external world of changing objects. 
Secondly, they have a relationship to the body and this makes their relationship to reason 
imperfect. Ultimately, however, original sin is the cause of the rebellious character of the 
passions because it broke the harmony within human nature (that is, the perfect 
relationship between reason and the rest of the human capacities). Uffenheimer-Lippens 
argues that this interplay between inclination of the passions to obey reason and a certain 
freedom they possess, gives rise to the political rule metaphor. She, nonetheless, argues 
that the very possibility of the inner structure of the passions being open and inclining to 
the rule of reason indicates several important theses:  
 
First, it indicates that man [sic] does not have to be subject to his passions as such. The 
immediacy of his reaction to external stimuli can be broken. Human beings can wait in order to 
react to the world. They can respond at a future point of time and in a different place. Passions 
are most certainly not instincts.270 
 																																																								
268 Uffenheimer-Lippens, “Rationalized Passion and Passionate Rationality,” 542. 
269 Ibid., 543. 
270 Ibid., 543. 
		 235	
For Uffenheimer-Lippens, the passions are indicators that a human being is a 
‘frontier’ being – an intellectual being standing in the material reality. A passion, the 
author stresses once more, contains in itself rational elements (understood as an act of 
cogitative power activating the passion) and irrational elements (understood as an 
unpredictable character caused by the external object), the work of reason as a political 
ruler over the passions is precisely to increase their rational character and level down their 
uncontrollable, unpredictable aspects. “This can only be done,” Uffenheimer-Lippens 
writes, “by changing passion from a mere reaction-action into a reaction-action that fits in 
with the overall goals of human nature.”271 This is a curious comment because the whole 
Uffenheimer-Lippens’ exposé is geared toward showing that the passions are not ‘just 
mere reaction-actions,’ thus how can they be changed from something they are not in the 
first place? Uffenheimer-Lippens attempts to explain that a passion is a spontaneous 
reaction of the sense appetite to the sensible object and reason cannot control the external 
objects. Reason can only influence the passions by influencing the evaluations of the 
knowledge that give rise to the passions – thus reason can break the immediacy of this 
reaction. Uffenheimer-Lippens continues with her discussion indicating that reason’s 
political rule over the passions indicates “that reason is given a controlling and governing 
role with regard to the passions of the soul. Such a role presupposes not only that the 
passions can be controlled but also that they need to be.”272Control, Uffenheimer-Lippens 
highlights, does not mean extirpation. In Aquinas’s thought it refers, rather, to mitigation. 
The role of reason is not to make the passions disappear – its role is to ‘rationalize’ them. 
She writes: 
 
This means the development of their original capacity for responding to the command of 
reason. Only these ‘rationalized’ passions are natural for man as man [sic], that is, as a rational 
being. Those passions that transcend the limits of reason are contra naturam for man.273 
 
The rationalization of human affectivity, for Uffenheimer-Lippens, means that we 
need to learn, through our rational capacity, to react to the external stimuli appropriately. 
Reason can introduce elements of reflection, distance, delay and most importantly 
moderation of the excessive aspect of the passions.  
Now we have seen that Uffenheimer-Lippens associates the excessive character of 
the passions with their link to the body, their dependence on external objects, and original 
sin. First of all, we should be aware that an argument stating that the passions are 
uncontrollable because they have a link to our body is an argument that can be easily 
misinterpreted – we should not forget that even though they can be reactive to reason, the 
passions in their essence are embodied responses. Furthermore, to argue that they are 
problematic because of their relation to the body is not to take seriously and give its right 
dignity to our embodiment. Another aspect of Uffenheimer-Lippens’ account that seems 
not to be entirely loyal to the nature of the Thomistic passions is the sharp line she draws 
between human and other animal passions. She argues that Aquinas in many cases presents 
the human and other animal passions identically, not to show that we have the same 																																																								
271 Ibid., 546. 
272 Ibid., 547. 
273 Ibid., 548. 
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reactions to the external world, but to highlight their urgent, unpredictable character. Yet, 
the mainline reading of the fact that in the Treatise itself, especially, in the discussion on 
the passions Aquinas does not make a clear distinction between human or other animals’ 
passions is indicative of the fact that they are, indeed, very similar in their structure.274 
This is not to deny that there are distinctively human passions and their object can be 
significantly more complex, yet, these passions rest on the same mechanisms as the 
passions of non-human animals. To claim that the passions are only welcomed if they 
mimic reason, is not to venerate their distinct role in created human nature (and note, in 
Catholic teaching, created as good).  
Moreover, to suggest that Aquinas speaks of human and other animal passions as 
similar just to indicate their uncontrollable character is to deny our rightful kinship with 
other animals. Aquinas suggests that human beings have three kinds of appetites which in 
their essence show how we are similar to the rest of creation and even God himself. 
Natural appetite shows how we are linked with the non-living things, our sense appetite 
shows how we are akin to the other sensible beings, our rational appetite resembles a 
certain kind of similarity to our Creator. All these appetites are embraced by reason as the 
highest capacity of the human person. Thus, from this perspective Uffenheimer-Lippens’ 
interpretation is surely correct. But the way she attempts to reach this conclusion seems not 
to adequately respect the unique composition of the human person with his/her diverse 
powers. Reason, virtue, and grace bring human nature to its perfection by harmonizing it as 
gentle caregivers that do not demolish its essence. Looking at it from this perspective, 
Uffenheimer-Lippens’ interpretation in certain aspects may seem like suggesting 
‘rationalization’ (the term itself is indicative) of the passions in a suppressive way by not 
respecting their distinctive character, even though the aim of the article is clearly to 
vindicate the passions from the negative interpretations and their integration within the 
framework of human striving for fulfillment. 
Lombardo joins the discussion with the statement that Aquinas argues that the 
passions have certain autonomy, but paradoxically it is inclined to reason’s service.275 He 
argues that in Aquinas’s thought we can find a conviction that any cognition-dependent 
appetite, sense as well as the will, is moved by reason. Thus in the case of human passions 
they can be ‘rational in participation.’276 Lombardo notes that the fact that the passions 
tend to reason’s command does not entail that they can be passively molded as ‘a lump of 
clay’ in to any shape we desire. Sense appetite responds to reason on its own terms, since it 
has ‘something of its own.’ For Lombardo, the idea that passions, in their inner structure, 
tend to guidance of reason represents a central idea of Aquinas’s account and also serves as 
one of the most exceptional features of it. 
Now when it comes to the relationship of particular reason and universal reason, 
Lombardo holds that even though universal reason has an oversight of the cogitative 																																																								
274 Cates explicitly explains this issue in chapter 5. Approaching the Human Sensory Appetite from Below (I) 
of her book. 
275 Cf. Lombardo, The Logics of Desire, 94-95. 
276 Lombardo claims that the phrase ‘rational in participation’ is derived from Aristotle’s Ethics, I.13, 
1102b13, b26, b30. Examples of it can be found in the Summa ST I-II 56.4 ad1, ST I-II 56.6 ad 2, ST I-II 
60.1. He also refers us in this regard to the research of Uffenheimer-Lippens, “Rationalized Passion and 
Passionate Rationality,” 542-547 and that of Gondreau, “The Passions and the Moral Life,” 435. Lombardo, 
The Logic of Desire, 95 footnote 8. 
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power, “[i]ts [universal reason’s] judgments, however, have to be applied by engaging 
particular reason; its conclusions do not penetrate particular reason automatically.”277 
Again, Lombardo wants to highlight that universal reason does not have an absolute 
control over the passions and it cannot change their original structure. Universal 
considerations can influence the cogitative power’s evaluations of objects and thus 
formation of intentions that elicit the passions but there are limitations to particular 
reason’s ability to reinterpret the input of sense perception. 
Lombardo interprets the metaphor of the reason’s political rule of the passions in 
light of the argument that reason is the higher power that can affect the sense appetite even 
though it has a freedom of its own. He argues that Aquinas trusts the basic orientation of 
the passions and their inclination to be guided by reason. Thus Lombardo argues that the 
metaphor of the political rule: “[B]eautifully captures some key points that are central to 
Aquinas’s account of the passions: the passions operate independently of reason, but 
nonetheless are inclined to obey it, and yet if reason attempts to rule the passions like the 
soul rules the body, the passions will erupt in rebellion. Furthermore, the metaphor implies 
that the inclinations of the passions are basically legitimate, just in need of some 
guidance.”278 And so Lombardo finishes his discussion with a claim that “[v]irtue consists 
not in the forced submission of passion to reason, or the evisceration of passion into 
something manageable, but the rational ordering of the various faculties toward 
flourishing.”279 
Now when it comes to the relationship between the passions and the will, Lombardo 
briefly asserts that the passions are subject to the will in terms of execution – will has to 
consent to the movement of the sense appetite (though, there are exceptions where through 
bodily indisposition the appetite can overwhelm the power of will). Lombardo’s argument, 
however, is that will cannot affect the passions in the way reason does. He concludes: “But 
though the will qua will does not shape the actual passions, the will is important to 
reason’s modification of intentions, since it can command universal reason to saturate 
particular reason with its conclusions: ‘The sense appetite does not obey reason directly, 
but through the mediation of the will.’”280 
Cates comes to aid our discussion by pointing out that the various powers we are 
discussing ultimately belong to the person. Her argument goes on to highlight that we are 
embodied beings who live through engagement of our sensory powers, but we are also 
intellectual beings and this mode penetrates the way we emote. Cates writes: 
 
It is in the midst of all of this dynamic, reciprocal, causal activity that emotions are best 
located. Emotions are well construed as features of our sensory or animal nature, yet as humans 
our animal nature is informed by an intellectual principle, which means that we typically 
respond to sensible particulars in ways that are both like and unlike the ways in which wolves, 
sheep, and other animals appear to respond to what matters to them. Indeed, humans are highly 
advanced intellectual beings who can register and respond to what we believe to be beyond all 
sensory experience.281 																																																								
277 Ibid., 97. 
278 Ibid., 100. 
279 Ibid., 101. 
280 Ibid., 98 referring to ST II 46.4 ad 1. 
281 Cates, Aquinas on the Passions, 237. 
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She further notes that because of the object-orientedness of the passions they will 
reveal a certain influence of reason (reason, after all, can influence the formation of the 
intentional content of some passions).282 The fact that we are highly cognitively advanced 
animals makes it possible to be observers of our own emotional functioning and to a 
certain degree determine it.  
Cates follows the argument of Lombardo and Uffenheimer-Lippens that for Aquinas 
the passions can participate in reason. For Cates, the passions participate in reason through 
the formation of its intentional content – primarily through activity of cogitative power, but 
also through high-level activities of memory and imagination. “Activities of the cogitative 
power, or ‘particular reason,’ are rational inasmuch as they operate like – and also combine 
in seamless ways with – the activities of ‘universal reason,’” Cates writes, “most notably 
the activities of understanding and practical reasoning. Activities of particular reason are 
rational also in that they are ‘naturally guided and moved according to the universal 
reason.’”283 Some of reason’s guidance of the passions can be a deliberate activity of the 
self, but most of it just happens during a matter of course – our thinking of the particular 
situation affects our sensory powers. 
In addition to the participatory character of the relationship between reason and the 
passions, Cates argues, that reason can also influence the sense appetite by persuasion. 
This means, that one has a power to direct other capacities of oneself to agree with the 
judgments made. This is a similar argument to the one we saw Uffenheimer-Lippens 
making – one, as an intellective being, can take a step back and look at one’s own situation 
and the passions one is experiencing. According to Cates we can alter our emotional states 
in the following way: “By reflecting upon the way in which a sensible object currently 
appears, by noticing that it is possible to look at that object from a different perspective, 
and by directing oneself to look at the object from a new perspective, turning one’s interior 
sensory powers toward different features of the object, one is sometimes able to alter one’s 
emotional state.”284 This means that reason can persuade the passions to re-appropriate 
their object but it does it by directing the interior senses to present and re-present the object 
to the appetite until the movement itself is altered (we can also be moved by the 
apprehension of the universal reason, but its apprehension has to be presented as 
something particular in order to set sense appetite in motion). This, once more, shows that 
Aquinas construes objects of emotions flexibly. To put it in a nutshell, Cates argues that 
reason can affect the passions at the stage of their formation (the participation stage) and 
after the passion is already formed (the persuasion stage). That means that because of our 
intellective capacities reason can affect passions when we are not thinking of them 
directly, but we are also able to engage in conscious management (to a certain extent) of 
our sensory powers. 
When it comes to the will’s influence on the passions, Cates interprets that the role of 
the will is to move and/or motivate the other human capacities. The will cannot prevent the 
movement of the sentient appetite from arising but it exercises the capacity to consent or 																																																								
282 Cates utilizes the terms reason and intellect interchangeably, though, she tends to use the term intellect 
more frequently. For the sake of coherence of our text we continue to use the term reason. 
283 Cates, Aquinas on the Passions, 215. In the quotation Cates refers to ST I 81.3. 
284 Cates, Aquinas on the Passions, 216. 
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not to consent to it. Cates suggests that we can look at the will consenting to the passion as 
an intellectual love – one recognizes its intelligible goodness, thus, its worth to his/her 
overall course of life and rests with a consenting pleasure in it. Once our will rejects a 
particular passion, effectively, it hates the passion intellectually, Cates argues.  
Miner joins this discussion by agreeing with the core of the above discussed authors’ 
arguments – the passions of the rational human being can be considered as lying under the 
command of reason and will. He, however, suggests an interpretation of the meaning of 
reason’s political rule over the passions as not being accurately understood as a paradigm 
for control in the history of Thomistic thought.285 Miner holds that Aquinas clearly argues 
that sense appetite is subordinated to reason, yet he also holds that the distinction between 
despotic and political rule is very illuminating to the nature of their relationship. Passions 
are subject to reason; they obey it, but in the same way free citizens obey their rules. 
Considered from this perspective, Miner argues that the relationship between reason and 
the passions cannot be adequately described in terms of control. He considers that the 
Thomistic passions have a curious in-between status because they are neither rational 
volitions nor sheer bodily reactions. 286  Miner adds that while thinking of the 
implementations of reason’s political rule, we often forget to consider not only the aspect 
of a certain freedom of passions to resist the rule, but also that they can contribute 
something positively. “As free citizens contribute something of their own to the life of the 
well-governed polis,” Miner writes, “beyond what is already known or prescribed by the 
rulers, so the passions are able to contribute ‘something of their own,’ as Aquinas says 
(1.81.3 ad 2m) to the life of the human being.”287 Miner maintains that this analysis does 
not spring from the desire to romanticize passions; he holds that it is contained in the 
image of the political rule.  
 
4.1 THE INFLUENCE OF THE PASSIONS ON REASON AND THE WILL AND A POSSIBILITY OF 
AFFECTIVE KNOWLEDGE IN AQUINAS’S THOUGHT 
 
Miner’s discussion builds a bridge to look at what the passions themselves can contribute 
to our cognitive capacities. If the passions have a certain relationship with reason and will, 
this by definition indicates they also contribute, both positively and negatively, something 
to it. Our discussion partners primarily highlight some better-known aspects of the 
passions’ contribution to reason. Lombardo acknowledges that an ideal relationship 
between reason and passions is a fluid one: “Moreover, while the passions sometimes 
																																																								
285 Some examples of reason/passions’ relations as control according to him are these: Mark Jordan, 
“Aquinas’s Construction of a Moral Account of the Passions,” Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und 
Theologie 33 (1986): 96–7; Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 257–62; King, Aquinas on the 
Passions, 126; Murphy, “Aquinas on Our Responsibility for Our Emotions,” 174. Miner, Aquinas on the 
Passions, 106 footnote 23. He considers Sweeney as an interpreter who does not follow this path and quotes 
her writing: “What Aquinas does not do is express any fundamental distrust of the passions or engage in any 
heavy-handed appeals to the need for rational control of the passions.” Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 107 
quoting Sweeney, “Restructuring Desire,” 222.  
286 Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 107; the observation that the passions get an in-between status comes 
from the insights of Pasnau. See Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 257. 
287 Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 107. 
		 240	
hinder the use of reason, sometimes they sharpen it, too, since ‘pleasure that follows the 
act of reason, strengthens the use of reason,’ and moderate fear concentrates the mind.”288  
Cates notes that reason and will have only limited possibility to affect the passions 
and because these distinct capacities can interact in the first place, their relationship is 
inevitably reciprocal. She wants to highlight some possible negative influences the 
passions can have on our reason and will. According to Cates, the passions themselves 
“can exert an influence on the intellect and the will so that, for example, sometimes a 
judgment or piece of reasoning by which one seeks to shape a given emotion has already 
been shaped by that emotion and ends up functioning in the emotion’s service.”289 An 
intense passion can indeed consume one’s awareness so intensely that our entire perception 
becomes colored by the logics of that passion. Cates furthers: “This sort of collapse of the 
interior space of one’s moral agency can occur with many emotions, but Aquinas thinks it 
occurs most often with pleasing sensory-appetitive motions that have a strong material 
component, for ‘we attend much to that which pleases us.’ He notes that ‘if [a] bodily 
pleasure be great, either it entirely hinders the use of reason, by concentrating the mind’s 
attention on itself; or else it hinders it considerably.’”290 When we are overwhelmed in a 
powerful way by certain sense images, it is partially a problem of distraction. Cates also 
notes that the Thomistic passions can mislead not only by way of distraction but also by 
way of opposition; this resembles a psychological process of rationalization. Due to a 
power of overwhelming attraction which stems from the sense judgment and in turn 
reinforces it, one tries to find reasons why the sensible good is also actually intelligible 
good. Additionally, we can find Aquinas arguing that reason can be shadowed by a strong 
bodily transmutation. Here again, the main argument is that the strong working of one 
capacity (remember, the passions always occur through the bodily change for Aquinas), 
can overwhelm the other and leave it confused for a moment. 
Those were highlights of the negative impact the strong movement of the sense 
appetite can have over reason and will. Cates wants to additionally note that Aquinas 
mentions some positive contributions the passions can add to reason and the will. It is 
important to highlight that if “an emotion arises and persists in a manner that one judges 
rightly to be appropriate to the situation, and one therefore gives it one’s consent, it 
enhances one’s agency and perfects one morally.”291 Even the well-ordered passions can 
alter the way we perceive objects, but in this case it can work for one’s benefit. Cates 
suggests looking at the simple example of the parent’s love for a child. This passion can 
also assume a significant place for our awareness. It also highlights attractive qualities of 
the object, but in a case of well-ordered passions this intensity will serve virtue. 
“Consider,” Cates writes, “the way a parent’s love for a child can cause the child to appear 
especially beautiful and wonderful, and it can make it easier for the parent to do the daily 
work of caring for that child.”292 Thus, our virtuous passions aid us going about our daily 
lives by giving support and motivation to continue. This leads to a second aspect Cates 																																																								
288 Lombardo, The Logics of Desire, 101 quoting ST I-II 33.4 ad 1 and indicating Aquinas’s views on the 
sometimes positive effects of fear taken from ST I-II 44.4.  
289 Cates, Aquinas on the Passions, 229. 
290 Ibid., 230-23. Here Cates quotes ST I-II 33.3. 
291 Cates, Aquinas on the Passions, 230. 
292 Ibid., 230. 
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notes about a positive influence of the passions on the will – when aroused, sense appetite 
also energizes the will and makes it more pleasant to continue certain operations. Cates 
observes that Aquinas focuses on instances where extreme passions can hinder the acts of 
reason and will – if one makes distorted intellective judgments about the goodness of some 
union with the desired object, if reason prompts misguided motions of the will that can 
eventually yield regrettable actions, actions that set one off from true happiness, it is 
didactically wise to show that the passions, indeed, have this power. “Yet it is an important 
part of his ethic that well-ordered emotions are a reflection of goodness. They also 
motivate the further cultivation of goodness[,]”293 Cates highlights. In this instance, Cates 
quotes Aquinas arguing: “[W]hen by a judgment of reason the will chooses anything, it 
does so more promptly and easily if in addition a passion is aroused in the lower part, since 
the lower appetitive power is closely connected with changes in the body. Thus Augustine 
says: ‘The movement of pity is of service to reason when pity is shown in such a way that 
justice is preserved.’ And this is what the philosopher also says, bringing in the verse of 
Homer: ‘Stir up your courage and rage,’ because when a man is virtuous with the virtue of 
courage the passion of anger following upon the choice of virtue makes for greater alacrity 
in the act.”294 
Now Miner suggests that “Aquinas considers the passions to play an important role 
in elevating the power of human cognition.”295 His aim is to inquire whether the passions 
can suggest something distinctly qualitative that goes beyond their motivational capacity. 
He thus writes: “For Aquinas, a primary task in the moral life (perhaps even the primary 
task) is to make the ascent from the condition where the sensitive appetite is an obstacle 
for the will to overcome, to a better condition where the passions gladly serve reason. This 
means that reason must govern the passions, without ruling them despotically.”296 Miner 
wants to further inquire into the reciprocal relationship between the passions and our 
intellective powers and to think of the ways the sense appetite contributes something 
positive and distinctively its own that goes beyond motivational dimension and aids 
qualitatively in guiding us to the final telos. For Miner, this unique contribution takes place 
primarily through the passion of love which is at the root of every passion – “[i]f directed 
by reason, the energy provided by the sensitive appetite can deepen the love by which the 
rational creature is drawn to her end.”297 We have discovered already that Miner interprets 
the passion of love as the most potent passivity through which God can be active in our 
lives; sense love, additionally is the source of dilectio, rational love.298 Miner puts in a 
nutshell, what he interprets to be very essential to the Thomist line of thought: 
 
The power of God to draw creatures to himself by sensible means exceeds the power of human 
reason. Thus the passion of love cannot be neglected by the rational creature in her motion 
toward God…The teaching that rational love grows, and can only grow, out of sensitive love 																																																								
293 Ibid., 237. 
294 Ibid., 235 quoting Truth 26.7. 
295 Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 88. 
296 Ibid., 94. Lombardo appears to agree with this interpretation. He suggests the ‘matter of morals’ for 
Aquinas is our cognition and our appetites in their operations. Lombardo claims that Aquinas makes 
“affectivity, and especially its flourishing, a major organizing principle of theological ethics.” Lombardo, 
The Logics of Desire, 200. 
297 Ibid., 95. 
298 See section 3.1.1.2 Is Sense Love a Distinct Passion? of this chapter. 
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may be surprising. It disturbs the conventional wisdom that what is most relevant for the 
rational creature’s motion toward the end is the love associated with the rational appetite.299 
 
Miner wants to highlight, once more, that this is the reason why Aquinas devotes 
such a large part of the Summa to the discussion about the passions – he judges them to be 
very significant in our life’s journey. Yes, Aquinas points to the ways they can be 
dangerous and distract us from the attainment of the ultimate happiness, yet Miner 
interprets (as we also have seen Lombardo arguing) that the passions contain significant 
potency to serve as a vital energy on the creature’s movement to the end. 
Miner wants to further his inquiry and ask whether the intelligent direction of the 
passions we have just discussed can alter the capacity of the human being to know? Can 
we say that the passions have a positive, cognitive value? We will discuss the moral 
quality of the passions in the upcoming section but for now it is important to emphasize 
that Aquinas does not seem to ascribe value to ‘raw’ passion, that is, to the passion that is 
not guided and disciplined by reason. In this instance, Miner argues that we need to 
distinguish between the ungoverned passion that has difficulties getting things right and 
the immediate passions of the virtuous person. “Part of what makes the virtuous person 
genuinely virtuous, as opposed to merely continent,” Miner writes, “is that her initial 
emotional reactions do (by and large) get things right.”300 Now the question is in the actual 
meaning of it: can we say that the virtuous passions mirror our cognitive judgments? On 
the other hand, can we say that they contribute to the acquisition of this judgment? It is a 
matter of debate, as is the case with many aspects of Aquinas’s ethical thought, whether he 
would embrace affective knowledge, but Miner makes a step to argue that it seems that 
Aquinas in fact does. He cites an older essay by Victor White centered on the question of 
Thomism and affective knowledge to search for support for his argument.301 He is critical 
of the contents of the essay insofar as they attempt to show modes of knowing in 
Aquinas’s writings that are not reducible to speculative knowledge, referring more to 
experience, habits and intuition than the passions themselves. Yet, one mode suggested by 
White – the knowledge through love (per amorem) – refers to the knowledge that the 
passions can offer. When discussing the passion of love, we found Miner arguing that love 
requires a certain knowledge of a thing, but ultimately it outruns knowledge (we were 
given examples of a parent’s love of a new born baby and believers’ love of God).302 
Miner thus judges love to be a vital prerequisite of knowing in Aquinas’s thought. In other 
words, his argument is that, according to Aquinas, we cannot divide knowledge and the 
passion of love as if true knowledge is a thing that could be acquired apart from love. Thus 
Miner concludes: “For Aquinas, attributing genuine cognitive value to the passions does 																																																								
299 Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 95-96. 
300 Ibid., 97. 
301 Miner cites White declaring: “An intellectualist philosophy which is content to ignore or make light of 
affective experience is not only doomed to impermanence, it must forfeit the claim to be either truly 
intellectualist or truly philosophical. If intelligence is to be arbiter it is self-condemned if it must confess 
itself unable to account for the most vital and intimate forms of personal experience. If philosophy is by 
definition a system of universal applicability, if it is to explain to use the ultimate reasons of all things to the 
extent that these are discoverable by human powers, it follows that a system which must exclude affective 
knowledge can make no valid claim to be strictly philosophical (1943, p. 9).” Miner, Aquinas on the 
Passions, 98 referring to Victor White, “Thomism and ‘Affective Knowledge,’” Blackfriars 24 (1943): 9. 
302 See section 3.1.1.2 Is Sense Love a Distinct Passion? of this chapter. 
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not require that a passion accompany every act of ‘real’ knowledge. It lies, rather, in the 
fact that if one does not love a science or a person, the knowledge that one has of that 
science or person will inevitably be superficial, since one lacks the incentive for the 
seeking required to deepen one’s knowledge.”303 
At this point we should highlight that theologians like Daniel C. Maguire, Charles E. 
Bouchard, O.P., and Thomas Ryan S.M., explore the dimension of affective knowledge in 
Aquinas’s writings. They all carefully note the problem of textual evidence in this regard 
and the lack of a systematic approach to affective knowledge in Aquinas’s thought, but, 
nonetheless, they consider that Aquinas’s treatment of the passions, virtues, and the gifts of 
the Holy Spirit allows one to stipulate such an account.304 We argue that they, like Miner, 
suggest that the first basic instance of affective knowledge is connaturally of love (amor) 
which is described as the first attraction or the pull toward happiness. Ryan describes it “as 
an attachment to an object arising from the sense that there is a natural ‘fit’ between the 
object and oneself.”305 Ryan argues that a passion for Aquinas “is a mode of knowing, a 
being affected by, and responding to, an object. An emotion is a form of affective knowing 
or appreciation – a blend of awareness (apprehending an object), of the intentional, the 
bodily, and the affective, which coalesce as an interactive response to value or 
disvalue.”306 A raw passion does not indicate connaturality and in order to be rightly 
‘attuned’ it needs guidance of the right reason and virtue. Only in this way can it aid 
practical reason and guide us to true fulfillment. Thus, the passions signify the first level of 
our affectivity, and Maguire, Bouchard, and Ryan in their research go on to focus on the 
transformation of our affectivity through virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. The main 
idea guiding their line of thought is the claim that ethical thinking, in its very nature, is not 
only a rational and analytical endeavor having the clarity of a natural science, they are 
convinced that one of the main elements of ethics, practical reason, “is not just a function 
of intellection, but also, in some way, of volition and affection.”307 Our transformed 
affectivity gives rich material for our ethical reflections and our ethical thinking in turn 
forms our affectivity. Maguire goes on to claim that: 
 
 Without that affective base to our moral knowledge, morality would be meaningless…Does this 																																																								
303 Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 98. Lombardo also briefly notes the possibility of affective knowledge in 
Aquinas’s thought. He writes: “There is a sense in which virtuous passions impart “affective knowledge’ that 
assists moral decision making, so that the right choice is selected not just by the judgment of reason, but by 
the instinctual response of passions. Aquinas does not employ the concept of ‘affective knowledge’ 
frequently, but it is not foreign to his account: he explicitly speaks of cognitio affectiva when writing about 
kinds of knowledge of God.” Lombardo, The Logics of Desire, 106; he refers to ST II-II 97.2 ad 2 and ST II-
II 60.1. 
304 We should note that ascribing the affective dimension to Thomistic ethics is not uncontroversial. Scott 
Davies can serve as an example of a very sharp critique to Maguire’s approach (and so by consequence, the 
argumentation of Bouchard and Ryan as they build some of their essential arguments on the thought of 
Maguire). He claims that Maguire’s ethics present a distorted portrayal of Aquinas’s thought. It rests on the 
incoherent account of practical knowledge and “like previous forms of emotivism, it lacks the critical 
leverage necessary to distinguish between the description of our emotions, actions and responses and their 
judicious assessment.” Scott Davies, “Morality, ‘Affectivity,’ and Practical Knowledge,” Modern Theology 
10 (1994): 77. 
305 Ryan,, “Revisiting Affective Knowledge,” 54-55. 
306 Ibid., 53. 
307 Daniel C. Maguire, “Ratio Practica and the Intellectualistic Fallacy,” Journal of Religious Ethics 10 
(1982): 25-26. 
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mean or imply that ethics is ultimately arbitrary and at the mercy of the vagaries of feeling? No. 
But it does imply with Blaise Pascal (1965: nos. 277 and 282) that ‘we know truth, not only by the 
reason, but also by the heart.’… It makes us look to the mystical, the mysterious, the religious, and 
the contemplative capacities of the human spirit in assessing the full import of the moral.308  
 
Generally speaking, the writings of these three authors also show a great interest in a 
renewed pneumatology and a search for the crossing points for spirituality and ethics. 
Bouchard argues: “For a number of reasons, a renewed pneumatology would enrich moral 
theology. The first and most important reason is that the Holy Spirit can help make 
morality theological, by linking it more closely to systematic and Trinitarian theology and 
also to spirituality which has become a distinct discipline.”309 He furthers that focusing on 
our intellect, will, and affectivity transformed by the gifts of the Holy Spirit opens a gate to 
make ethics more biblical310 and thus opens topics about attitude and character formation. 
This consequently, would affect pastoral dimensions of Catholic theological ethics and 
would contribute to the renewal of Christian anthropology. This particular way of 
constructing projects of a theological, ethical nature seems to be a promising path, 
especially, if we are concerned with character formation in all its dimensions. We will 
briefly come back to the topic on the transformed affectivity at the end of this chapter and 
will continue this discussion in Chapter IV.311  
 
4.2 MORALITY OF THE PASSIONS 
 
Now because Aquinas makes explicit links between the passions and reason and the will 
(note that the domain of the rational and willful is the domain of the moral), we should not 
be surprised that he inquires attentively into the morality of the passions. Question 24 is 
devoted to discerning the moral status of the passions; thus Article 1 of the question asks 
whether we can say that passions are morally good or bad? Aquinas claims that we can 
look at the passions in two ways – consider them separately as the movements of sense 
appetite and look at them in connection with reason and will. Now, if we look at the 
passions abstracting them from the person who experiences them – they do not get moral 
character.312 But once we think of them as communicating or refusing to communicate 
with reason and will then they can be called morally good or bad. Aquinas, hence, writes: 																																																								
308 Ibid., 36. 
309 Charles E. Bouchard, O.P., “Recovering the Gifts of the Holy Spirit in Moral Theology,” Theological 
Studies 63 (2002): 556. 
310 Bouchard claims: “The gifts are enumerated in Isaiah 11 and are at the heart of the Gospel of John and the 
letters of Paul who invokes them not only in the service of individual moral growth in Christ, but in the 
service of the growing ecclesial community. In addition, many treatments of the gifts, including that by 
Aquinas, link each of the gifts to one of the Beatitudes.” Bouchard, “Recovering the Gifts,” 557. 
311 See sections 4.3 The Passions, Habit, and Virtue and 4.4 The Passions, Sin, and Grace. Here with the 
guidance of Lombardo we will discuss the flourishing of human affectivity (as Miner and Cates, in the works 
of our prime interest, do not go beyond the discussion of the passions and the role they, as such, play in 
ethics). In Chapter VI we will discuss our suggestion on educating the passions through prayer.  
312 Lombardo suggests that we should interpret the passions considered in themselves as a philosophical 
construct, an abstraction that does not exist in reality. Once we speak of the concrete passions of a particular 
individual they always have a moral character because they are inevitably connected to reason and will. See 
Lombardo, The Logics of Desire, 111. Miner, on his behalf, suggests that the passions in themselves are 
purely acts that we share with other animals as they represent certain motions of irrational appetite. He points 
out that for Aquinas another perspective of the passions that are distinctively human is available – “The 
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For the sentient appetite is closer to reason and will themselves than are the exterior members 
of the body, and yet the movements and acts of the exterior members are morally good or bad 
insofar as they are voluntary. Hence, a fortiori, the passions themselves, insofar as they are 
voluntary, can be called morally good or morally bad. And they are called voluntary either 
because they are commanded by the will or because they are not prohibited by the will.313 
 
Article 3 goes on to ask whether every passion is morally evil? Here Aquinas 
presents a discussion between the Stoics and the Peripatetics drawing attention to the core 
arguments of each school. The Stoics, as we may remember, considered a soul to be a one 
rational faculty entity; thus they considered the passions to be the irrational disturbances, 
sicknesses of the soul. The Peripatetics, who divided the soul into three parts (and as we 
have seen, Aquinas follows them), on the other hand, claimed that the passions moderated 
by reason are good. Aquinas, again, holds this opinion to be correct. He thus concludes: 
“Insofar as the passions of the soul lie outside the order of reason, they incline one toward 
sin; however, they pertain to virtue insofar as they are ordered by reason.”314 Aquinas, 
then, with the first three Articles establishes three essential points: passions are not morally 
neutral, passions are not morally evil and thus the goal of morality is not the extirpation but 
moderation and cultivation of the passions. 
Now in a Article 3 Aquinas inquires into the passions’ role in the goodness of the 
action. Does a passion diminish the moral goodness of an act? If we think of the disordered 
passions, they, indeed, diminish the moral goodness of an act. Yet if we think of passions 
as orderly movements of the sense appetite the contrary appears to be true. Aquinas claims: 
“[T]hen it is part of the perfection of the human good that these passions should 
themselves be moderated by reason. For since a man’s good lies in reason as its root, this 
sort of good will be more perfect to the extent that it is able to flow into more of the things 
that belong to a man.”315 By this Aquinas confirms that in their structure the passions 
incline to the good and the governed passions contribute to the moral goodness of an action 
by being ‘an extra dimension’ penetrated and regulated by reason. Miner points out that we 
should understand Aquinas correctly in this case – he is not inquiring into the passion as a 
motivational power, he is asking whether a passion can enter a moral quality of an act.316 
And thus Aquinas’s analysis of the morality of the passions tackles a far more fundamental 
question on the nature of the passions. And his answer indicates that the presence of a 
reasonable passion will increase the moral quality of an act.317 																																																																																																																																																																							
passions in rational creatures may be considered – and must be considered – as ‘lying under the command of 
reason and will’ (subiacent imperio rationis et voluntatis) (24.1.co)…The authority sed contra for every 
Article of Question 24, not coincidentally, is Augustine’s De civitate Dei. Regarding human passions, 
Augustine says: ‘They are evil if our love is evil; good if our love is good’ (24.1.sc.1.) Placed under the 
command of reason and will, the passions cannot be morally neutral.” Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 89. 
Here he refers to ST I-II 24.1. 
313 ST I-II 24.1. 
314 ST I-II 24.2. 
315 ST I-II 24.3. 
316 Cf. Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 91. 
317 Thomas Ryan, for instance, argues that the passions are integral to the moral act: “Consequent emotions 
contribute to the goodness of an act in two ways: firstly, by an overflowing of intensity downwards so that 
the emotion is both the result of the will’s orientation to goodness and a sign of the action’s greater worth. 
Secondly, the intensity of an action may result from a deliberate decision to cultivate a certain emotion 
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Aquinas discusses several ways in which the passions can be related to reason. The 
first way is antecedental – this indicates that a person acts out of the passion, instead of 
from a judgment of reason and so “it is more praiseworthy for someone to do an act of 
charity because of reason’s judgment than to do it solely out of the passion of pity 
(misericordia).”318 This kind of action out of passion diminishes the moral goodness of 
it.319 Lombardo urges us to be attentive at this point – these kinds of passions primarily 
signify the dissonance with the pre-existing inclinations of the will and affections.320 The 
passions can also be related to reason consequently. Aquinas argues that this can happen in 
two ways: 
 
(a) by way of redundancy – specifically, because when the higher part of the soul is intensely 
moved toward something, the lower part likewise conforms to its movement. And in such a 
case the passion that consequently exists in the sentient appetite is a sign of the intensity of the 
will’s act. 
(b) by way of choice – specifically, when a man chooses by reason’s judgment to be affected 
by some passion, in order that he might act more promptly because of the sentient appetite’s 
cooperation. And in this way a passion of the soul adds to the action’s goodness.321 
 
The first case is the case of volitions resonating with the sense appetite, the second 																																																																																																																																																																							
precisely to do what is good more promptly and with greater commitment. When the emotion, in either form 
of influence, is attuned to the will’s choice, in Aquinas’ view there are psychological and physical 
reverberations that facilitate and enhance the moral act. Understood thus, emotions are integral to moral 
growth and integration.” Thomas Ryan S.M., “Aquinas’ Integrated View of Emotions, Morality and the 
Person,” Pacifica 14 (2001): 63. 
318 ST I-II 24.3.  
319 Lombardo suggests that we should be attentive when thinking of the moral quality of the antecedent 
passions: “Knowing that pity prompted someone to be generous does not, of itself, tell us whether that pity 
diminishes or increases the moral value of the generosity. If one is moved by pity despite one’s normal 
volitional disposition, then the passions is antecedent, and therefore diminishes the goodness of the moral act. 
If one is moved precisely because previous acts of kindness have formed an attentive disposition to the needs 
of others, then the passions is consequent, and therefore increases the virtuousness of the generosity.” 
Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 111.  
320 Lombardo writes that “Aquinas’s few scattered comments about antecedent passions mostly seek to 
explain why sins committed out of involuntary passion are less grievous than fully deliberate sins, not how 
passions relate to subsequent virtuous acts. When this context is overlooked, it is easy to misinterpret 
‘antecedent’ as signifying simply chronological precedence.” Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 110 footnote 
84. Lombardo locates two sources of antecedent passions; original and personal repented sin. He argues that 
the passions generated by personal unrepented sins are consequent in Aquinas’s thought; when the personal 
sins are disowned they can still cause disordered passions but antecedently. Thus Lombardo argues: “Our 
disordered choices permeate our passions through vice, so that even after we decide to change our behavior, 
our passions may still show their influence. For example, the reformed binge-eater is likely to struggle with 
strong temptations to gluttony, and these temptations, insofar as they are movements of the sense appetite, 
are antecedent passions. Antecedent passions manifest the material dimension of human affectivity: even 
after their objects have been abandoned by the will, reason’s past penetration of the sense appetite remains to 
some extent, thus generating these antecedent passions.” Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 110. This seems an 
insightful comment on complexity of the mental life and can serve as an illuminating thought for anyone 
seeking a better self-understanding. Lombardo points out that in the research on Aquinas’s thought on the 
antecedent passions it is not uncommon to interpret them from the chronological perspective and 
consequently claim that the moral goodness of an action is diminished if it follows from the prompting of a 
passion. He refers to Richard K. Mansfield, “Antecedent Passions and the Moral Quality of Human Acts 
According to St. Thomas,” Virtues and Virtue Theory: Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical 
Association 71, ed. Michael Baur (1997), 221-231; and Pasnau, Aquinas on Human Nature, 262-263 as 
examples of it. He also shows that Knuuttila in Emotions, 253 disagrees with this line of interpretation.  
321 ST I-II 24.3. 
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case illustrates the case of a passion moderated by reason entering the morality of an 
action. 
In Article 4 Aquinas asks whether we can say that any passion is good or evil in its 
species? Here he repeats his argument – if we speak of a passion in its natural genus, we 
cannot talk about morality of a particular passion. If we speak of the passions in its moral 
genus – in connection to reason and will – we can, indeed, speak of the moral character of 
a passion. In the later case the passion gets its moral quality from its object. In this case, 
the passions are said to be morally good or morally evil per se and not per accidens. “The 
passions that tend toward a good are good if it is a genuine good,” Aquinas writes, “and so 
are the passions that withdraw from a genuine evil. Conversely, passions that withdraw 
from a good and approach an evil are bad.”322 
 
4.2.1 Normativity of the Passions 
 
Lombardo suggests an interpretation of the nature of the generic and specific passions 
Aquinas distinguishes in Question 24. He notes that a typical interpretation of the generic 
passions claims that they are morally neutral.323 Many of these interpretations are correct 
as far as it goes – a generic passion is a theoretical construct which does not exist in reality 
and it cannot get a moral quality because, as we have seen, the passions are specified by 
their objects.324 Lombardo’s aim is to highlight the possible problems of arguing that the 
generic passions are morally neutral – if we understand the generic passions to be neutral 
in a sense of them not having any intrinsic relation to the moral characteristic of good and 
evil, then, this interpretation is incorrect. He points out that Aquinas considers the generic 
passions neutral because they do not have a specifying object, but that does not mean that 
they bear no relation to moral value. Lombardo suggests describing the generic passions as 
morally normative, instead of morally neutral to avoid misinterpretations of the concept. 
This means that a generic passion has a certain inner structure which comes into fruition 
when that passion obtains a definite object and becomes part of our experience. Lombardo 
points out that in this instance we should think of Aquinas’s positive metaphysics of 
appetite which directs us to our flourishing. “Since the passions in their inner structure are 
directed toward our flourishing,” Lombardo argues, “and since moral goodness consists 
precisely in that flourishing, moral goodness is the default orientation of generic passion, 
even though generic passion is not itself morally good.”325 Lombardo furthers that a 																																																								
322 ST I-II 24.4. 
323 He gives examples of the articles of Judith A. Barad, “Aquinas on the Role of Emotion in Moral Judgment 
and Activity,” The Thomist 55 (1991): 403; Leo Elders, The Ethics of Aquinas: Happiness, Natural Law, and 
the Virtues (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2005), 98-99; and Gondreau, “The Passions of the Soul,” 392-
393 as typical cases of this kind of interpretation. Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 111 footnote 87. We could 
add that if we look not only in the specialized literature but also into general introductions to Aquinas’s 
thought the tendency is even more prominent. As a telling example, Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung, Colleen 
McCluskey, and Christina Van Dyke argue that “[i]n and of themselves, passions are neither good or bad; 
they are simply feelings that arise in us in response to various situations we face in our daily lives. They are 
morally neutral.” Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung, Colleen McCluskey, and Christina Van Dyke, Aquinas’s 
Ethics. Metaphysical Foundations, Moral Theory, and Theological Context (Notre Dame, Indiana: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2009), 88.  
324 Cf. Lombardo, The Logic of Desire 111. 
325 Ibid., 112. 
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generic passion has a specific internal structure and the moral quality of a particular 
passion is measured against it and not against any kind of abstract moral code which has 
nothing to do with the character of the generic passion itself. For instance, “[g]eneric 
sadness – that is, the conceptualization of the essential structure of sadness – plays an 
essential role in determining the moral quality of specific instances of sadness.”326 
Lombardo also notes that when we think of the inner structure of the generic passions, we 
cannot conceive it independently of the guidance of reason – the sense appetite, after all, is 
naturally inclined to it in Aquinas’s thought. At this point one of the most essential 
arguments of Lombardo’s work re-emerges – the conviction that Aquinas’s thought shows 
immense trust in the passions. A proper ordering of the passions is conceived in terms of 
their inner structure and not an ethical system extrinsic to the nature of the passions. 
Lombardo even furthers that Aquinas, in fact, roots natural law in the appetites and 
tendencies of the human nature.327 And so our inclinations constitute the natural law:  
 
In this understanding of natural law, the various commandments contained in divine revelation 
are not in tension with either natural law or our natural inclinations. Rather, the divine law of 
the Old and New Testaments complements natural law by pointing our desires more explicitly 
toward their authentic fulfillment. Divine law does not thwart desire. Divine law educates 
desire.328 
 
Here Lombardo makes a move to advocate a traditional understanding of the natural 
law where the precepts are not based only on our rational capacity to direct ourselves, but 
also on the natural inclinations of the human person. We cannot even attempt to reconcile 
the many interpretations of the actual meaning of the natural law, yet we want to highlight 
that Lombardo’s argument is not geared exclusively to support the traditional doctrinal 
teaching on the natural law – his argumentation, together with Aquinas, shows 
extraordinary trust in the passions and human desire as part of the good creation. 
Lombardo’s aim is to demonstrate that the actual desires and cares we have are the starting 
point of Thomistic ethics. Thus Lombardo finishes his argument by writing: 
 
The passions in their basic tendencies are not just oriented toward virtue and human 
flourishing; they constitute an indispensable norm and measure of natural law. Those choices 
that direct the passions toward their proper telos are morally good, and those choices that 
misdirect them are not. For Aquinas, natural inclination is law, and therefore so too is generic 
passion, that is, the passions themselves in their inner structure.329 
 																																																								
326 Ibid., 113. 
327 Cf. Ibid., 114. Lombardo is well aware that the contents of the natural law theory belong to the disputable 
questions. He explains that his interpretation of the natural law is similar to the one found in Pamela M. Hall, 
Narrative and the Natural Law: An Interpretation of Thomistic Ethics (South Bend, Ind.: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1994). Lombardo quotes Hall’s writing: “Aquinas holds that any knowledge of the natural law 
must be derived in part from desire for the goods to which men and women are directed by their natures; this 
form of directedness is in fact the primary sense of natural law for Aquinas. This means that people judge 
what is, or is not, in accordance with the natural law in part by deciding which actions are, or are not, 
conductive to those goods they so desire…The core sense of natural law is, as I have argued, exactly this for 
Aquinas: a kind of theology in human nature possessed within the inclinationes” (97-97, 99). Lombardo, The 
Logics of Desire, 115 footnote 95. 
328 Ibid., 115-116. 
329 Ibid., 116. 
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Lombardo puts an emphasis on the human in our thinking of ethics. While it surely 
prompts further questions on what qualifies as genuine desire and in what terms we define 
human flourishing, it also suggests a common ground for ethical discussions with a 
significant human interest as it attempts to build ethics on actual cares of a person (and this 
kind of ethics is likely to resonate with the experiences of people). 
 
4.2.2 Responsibility for the Passions 
 
As we have established that the passions have a strong relationship with our reason and 
will, and furthermore belong in the domain of the moral, we have to approach a critical 
question of responsibility for the passions and inquire whether and in what form we can 
think of accountability for the passions in a Thomistic framework. Murphy suggests some 
essential considerations on this topic.330 She starts her argument by pointing to the fact that 
Aquinas did not work out an explicit account on the responsibility of the passions himself 
– he does not directly ask whether the passions are voluntary, neither does he clearly 
distinguish between the acts that are voluntary and the acts we are held responsible for.331 
Yet, Murphy also argues that it is clear that Aquinas thinks that we are responsible for the 
voluntary acts. Furthermore, even though he does not inquire into the voluntary character 
of the passions, he, nonetheless, asks a number of related questions (many of them, 
especially on the relationship between the passions and reason and will, which we have 
already encountered in the above discussion) which allow Murphy to stipulate her account. 
We have seen above that Aquinas holds that the passions are subject to moral evaluation as 
they are subjects to reason and will and so Murphy argues that “since he maintains that 
moral evaluation is appropriate only when the agent is responsible for the action or state of 
affairs being evaluated, the conditions which he takes to be sufficient for moral evaluation 
are sufficient for responsibility.”332 Murphy’s account, then, rests on the argument that 
when passions are in communication with reason and the will we can discuss our 
responsibility for them. To put it in a nutshell, Murphy argues that:  
 
Passions are subject to the rational part of the soul (both reason and will) – that is, we are 
responsible for our passions – because they are capable of being affected by reason and will in 
different ways. It seems to me that Aquinas describes two broad ways in which passions are 
capable of being affected by reason and will: externally – when a passion is already occurring, 
it can be affected by reason and will – and internally – when reason’s or will’s activity gives 
rise to a passion. Both internal and external capacities for being affected yield responsibility for 
the passion.333 																																																								
330 Murphy thinks that Aquinas’s category of the passions alone cannot be equated with a contemporary 
category of the emotions as she sides with the contemporary philosophy that conceives emotions as involving 
cognitive states. She argues, however, that “Aquinas’s passions, taken together with their proximate 
cognitive cause, make up a complex that could match our understanding of ‘emotions.’” Murphy, “Aquinas 
on Our Responsibility for Our Emotions,” 168. Thus the core arguments of Aquinas’s account on the 
passions can be applied to our contemporary concept of emotions. We should also note that all three authors 
– Lombardo, Cates, and Miner utilize Murphy’s article as an important source. Miner explicitly engages a 
presentation of Murphy’s article (Cf. Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 100-106). Since it does not move far 
away from the main argument, we will present the original source only. 
331 Cf. Ibid., 173. 
332 Ibid., 174. 
333 Ibid., 175. 
		 250	
 
Murphy argues that the passions that are moved by reason seem to fit the category of 
both, internal and external responsibility and the passions that are subject to the will yield 
only an internal kind of responsibility.334 
 
4.2.2.1 Classifying the Passions: The Reason-Dependent Passions 
 
Now we have already encountered some contours of Murphy’s arguments in our discussion 
on the relationship between the passions and reason.335 Murphy’s core argument stems 
from a conviction that the passions cannot only be responsive to reason after their 
activation, they themselves can be responses to our reasoned judgments and volitions. The 
passions that stem from their own mechanisms (imagination and sense impressions) can be 
at a later point, responsive to reason, but the passions which occur through mediation of 
cogitative power already are responses to reason internally. Murphy claims: “He [Aquinas] 
holds, rather, that when they [the passions] are caused by a reasoned judgment, we are 
responsible for them in the intrinsic way, whereas when they are caused by the imagination 
and the sensory cognition, if we are responsible for them at all, it will have to be in a 
different way: that is, because they could have been controlled by reason’s influence, 
because they are constitutionally responsive to reason.”336 She thus classifies the passions 
into two major groups: the reason-dependent passions and reason-independent passions – 
the first group implies the account of internal responsibility and this means two things for 
Murphy: “[T]hat passions can be aroused spontaneously by a reasoned judgment or a 
volition, and that this constitutes a sufficient condition for our being responsible for those 
passions.”337 
																																																								
334 Murphy uses the following text as a paradigm of the way the passions and reason are connected: “The 
lower appetites, that is, the irascible and the concupiscible, are subject to reason in three ways. (1) First, of 
course, in connection with reason itself. For since the same thing considered under different descriptions, can 
be made either pleasurable or horrible, reason proposes to sensuality, through the mediation of imagination, 
some thing under the aspect of a pleasurable or a sad thing, in accordance with the way it seems to reason, 
and thus sensuality is moved to joy or sadness…(2) Second, in connection with the will. For in human 
beings, powers that are connected and ordered to one another [are such that] an intense movement in one of 
them, and more especially one that is higher, overflows in the other. That’s why, when the movement of the 
will, through a choice, is focused on something, the irascible and concupiscible follow the movement of the 
will…And in this way, it’s clear that the irascible and the concupiscible are subject to reason, as well as 
sensuality.” Murphy, “Aquinas on Our Responsibility for Our Emotions,” 174 quoting ST I-II 6.2 ad 3. 
Murphy notes that Aquinas is not entirely consistent in explaining his categories when it comes to the 
passions being subject to the will – sometimes the passions are portrayed as subject to the will as they 
overflow from intense movements of the will and in other passages the passions are said to be subject to the 
will in terms of execution – no external action can stem without consent of the will. Murphy chooses to 
interpret that “the passions’ being subject to the will (2), on the other hand, seems to fit only the category of 
passions’ being subject to reason internally. The will’s activities somehow, through some mysterious 
psychological connection, yield passions of various sorts.” Murphy, “Aquinas on Our Responsibility for Our 
Emotions,” 175. The extrinsic account of responsibility points to reason moderating the passions after they 
have occurred; intrinsic account points to the passions as responses to the acts of reason and will – they occur 
because of these activities.  
335 See section 2.1.2 Apprehensive Powers of the Sensitive Soul of this chapter. 
336 Murphy, “Aquinas on Our Responsibility for Our Emotions,” 177. 
337 Ibid., 175. 
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Murphy suggests a careful and in-depth interpretation of the reason-dependent 
passions. She bases her suggestion on the following paradigmatic passage from Aquinas’s 
writings: 
 
A passion of the lower appetite can follow from something apprehended by the intellect in two 
ways. [1] In one way insofar as that which is understood by the intellect as a universal is 
represented in the imagination as a particular thing. And in this way the lower appetite is 
moved—e.g., when a believer accepts with his intellect the intelligible notion of future 
punishments and forms phantasms of them by imagining the fire burning, the worms gnawing, 
and other things of that sort, from which there follows the passion of fear in the sensory appetite. 
[2] In another way, insofar as the intellective appetite is moved by an intellective cognition, from 
which, by some sort of overflow (redundantia) or command, the lower appetite is moved along 
with it.338 
 
Murphy construes the first instance [1] of the reason-dependent passions as a 
conscious construal of evaluations of object/situation in imagination which follows a 
general evaluation. These passions are reason-dependent in an obvious way, Murphy 
claims, as they “will be caused by a judgment or volition as an object of the judgment or 
the volition.”339 This is not a case of spontaneous passion as a response to the object of 
intellect, but it is a conscious response to reasoned judgment by having volition to 
experience such a passion. Murphy additionally argues that these types of passions do not 
always need to be consciously evoked; they can also arise without conscious effort as a 
response spontaneously translating the general judgment into a particular one. These kinds 
of passions, she argues, are barely distinguishable from the second type [2] occurring 
through the overflow. Murphy writes: “Since all acts of will are based on judgments of 
reason, a passion of type (2) will depend not only on a volition but on the judgment of 
reason upon which the volition depends. As far as I can see, a passion that follows on a 
volition through overflow is no different than a passion that spontaneously arises on the 
basis of a reproduction of a reasoned judgment in imagination.”340 
In addition, Murphy offers some further classifications of the reason-dependent 
passions. Firstly, they depend on a final judgment and not on a tentative judgment.341 
Murphy comes to this conclusion because Aquinas usually associates reason-dependent 
passions with volitions (as the overflow doctrine illustrates, they come to be through the 
strong affections of the will or are commanded by reason or will), but volitions depend 
precisely on our final and not on the tentative conclusions and preliminary reasoning about 
an object. In other words, Murphy’s argument is that in Aquinas’s thought only final 
judgment and not the reasoning process will yield a volition. By consequence, the passions 
that can be called truly reason-dependent will follow the same mechanism. She furthers 
that Aquinas additionally holds the reason-dependent passions to be caused by the 
judgment of reason, which also indicates that they tend not to be aroused by provisional 
reasoning, but by a conclusive judgment. Murphy indicates one extra qualification for a 
passion to be considered reason-dependent – it has to relate to volition per se and not per 																																																								
338 Ibid., 178. Here Murphy quotes QDV 26.3 ad 13. 
339 Murphy, “Aquinas on Our Responsibility for Our Emotions,” 178. 
340 Ibid., 178-179. 
341 Cf. Ibid., 180. 
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accidens. A per se relationship is the relationship of similarity, thus the attitude of the 
passion resonates with the attitude of the volition. A per accidens relationship signifies 
incompatibility – where the content of the passion is in dissonance with the content of the 
volition. A passion, hence, is reason-dependent “when it is related per se to a volition, that 
is, when the evaluative cognition that is the proximate cause of the passion is a 
particularization of the deliberated judgment of reason.”342 In this case, the passion and the 
volition are both responses to judgments that differ only in their generality. In a nutshell: 
“A reason-dependent passion, then, is one that is psychologically caused by a reasoned 
judgment or a volition, in such a way that the judgment of particular reason is a 
particularization of the reasoned judgment, and the attitudes produced by each judgment 
respectively in the will and the sensory appetite are alike.”343 
Murphy further briefly points out that Aquinas seems to argue that a passion can be 
reason-dependent even when it is not caused by an act of reason. She quotes Aquinas 
claiming that a passion can be consequent to a reasoned judgment in these two ways: “In 
one way, through overflow…In the other way, through choice – I mean when a human 
being chooses, on the basis of reasoned judgment, to be affected by some passion, so as to 
act more promptly, with the cooperation of the sensory appetite.” 344  Murphy’s 
interpretation is that here Aquinas is not describing a causal relationship but rather points 
to a mechanism of choosing to be effected by a passion because one approves of an already 
occurring passion which is different from choosing to elicit passion. Murphy concludes: 
“Rather, in this case, the passion is reason-dependent because it is the object of an 
approving or endorsing judgment from reason, and of an endorsing volition from the will. 
So passions can be reason-dependent either by being caused by a reasoned judgment, or by 
being the object of an endorsing judgment and volition.”345 In discussing the reason-
dependent passions, we could claim, Murphy’s aim is not to attempt to show that all 
passions are reason-dependent (on the contrary, she argues that some are elicited 
independently by imagination and sense cognition, as we have seen) – she wants to 
demonstrate that at least some of the passions are, indeed, related to our cognitive 
capacities in complex and delicate ways. Consequently, in the case of these particular 
passions we can speak of moral responsibility for them in quite univocal terms. 
 
4.2.2.2 Responsibility for the Reason-Dependent Passions 
 
Murphy stipulates her account of the intrinsic responsibility for the reason-dependent 
passions basing it essentially on Aquinas’s thoughts on human freedom of choice. To 
capture the core of Murphy’s argument: 
 
This should make it obvious why Aquinas thinks showing that passions are reason-dependent is 
sufficient for showing that we are responsible for them. A passion that is reason-dependent is 
caused per se by a free judgment (a judgment that is the product of reason’s capacity for 
deliberation, or could have been modified as a result of such deliberation). Unlike the will, which 
responds to free judgments directly, the sensory appetite responds indirectly, through the 																																																								
342 Ibid., 182. 
343 Ibid., 183. 
344 Ibid., 183. ST I-II 24.3. 
345 Murphy, “Aquinas on Our Responsibility for Our Emotions,” 183. 
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mediation of the particular reason and the imagination. But I don’t see why this mediation would 
make a difference where the freedom of our volitions and passions is concerned. Therefore, we 
are responsible for reason-dependent passions because they are caused per se by evaluations 
sensitive to deliberation.346 
 
The above claim rests on several presuppositions. Firstly, Murphy equates the 
freedom of human choice with the freedom of deliberation about what should be done or 
pursued. Thus, elicited acts of the will are free if judgments that give rise to them are free. 
Murphy continues: 
 
What guarantees that all human beings have such freedom of judgment is that all human beings 
have the ability to deliberate about objects and actions and their own judgments. Because we 
have the ability to deliberate, we can see and weigh the good and bad features of things, 
actions, and judgments. Because we have the ability to deliberate, we can revise our bad 
values. All rational agents have the ability to deliberate and to come to the (or one of the) 
correct decision.347 
 
Now we can say that free human acts are those over which we have control, thus our 
willed acts (the things we choose, want, intend), they are our direct choices. This group of 
acts, Murphy argues, represents consciously commanded phenomena. She furthers that 
Aquinas seems to include in the group of commanded acts of will the “acts that follow 
from elicited acts of will without being the objects of the act of will.”348 The overflow 
doctrine is a paradigm of such acts and Murphy groups them as acts of unconscious 
commands (the passions in question, we should highlight for clarity, are caused by 
reasoned judgment and a volition but they are not themselves objects of the will, they share 
the same object with an act of the will). Murphy argues that Aquinas’s texts show that the 
passions are subject to both – conscious and unconscious commands. It is more clear how 
we are responsible for consciously commanded acts of will and passions (in this case, the 
object of the will is a passion itself). When it comes to the case of the unconscious 
command, Murphy explains: “If we are responsible for the movements of the will 
themselves, which are reactions to intellective judgments, then it seems probable that we 
will be responsible in the same way for movements of the sensory appetite that are 
responses to reason-dependent evaluations (that is, to evaluations that are themselves 
caused by intellective judgments). So our responsibility for unconsciously commanded acts 
of will should be similar to our responsibility for elicited acts of will.”349 
 
4.2.2.3 Responsibility for the Reason-Independent Passions 
 
Murphy continues her account by suggesting a delicate and multilayered interpretation of 
how we could be responsible for those passions that were not caused by an act of reason. 
Her starting point is to show that we can still talk meaningfully in terms of responsibility 
even when we discuss the spontaneous reason-independent passions. Murphy points to the 
																																																								
346 Ibid., 188. 
347 Ibid., 187. 
348 Ibid., 185. 
349 Ibid., 186. 
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fact that Aquinas claims that spontaneous passions can be sinful.350 Sinful is a moral 
qualification, Murphy argues, thus we can talk about our responsibility for the reason-
independent passions. In what sense can we say that we can be held accountable for 
something which was not caused by deliberation? Murphy quotes another piece of textual 
evidence from Aquinas’s writings: “A movement of the sensory appetite is sometimes 
aroused suddenly, in response to imagination or sensory cognition. And in that case, such a 
movement occurs without the command of reason, although it could have been prevented 
by reason if it had been foreseen.”351 Thus Murphy argues that we can see from Aquinas’s 
texts that he holds that we can still be responsible for the passions that could not have been 
altered before their occurrence. Thus in this case, she stipulates an account of 
counterfactual control based on Aquinas’s teaching on indirectly voluntary acts.352  
In addition, Murphy works out an account of the foresight of an occurrence even of a 
spontaneous passion: 1) one can foresee what kind of objects one is likely to encounter; 2) 
one can foresee how one will react when/if he/she will encounter these objects. A person 
who has both kinds of foresight will have a very strong degree of an ability to manage 
his/her spontaneous responses and this strong foresight consequentially will yield a strong 
degree of responsibility for them. The case of possessing both kinds of foresight not only 
depends on a good self-knowledge, it also cannot occur very often because in many cases 
we do not know what we will encounter. 
In addition to an account of the strong foresight, Murphy suggests insights on the 
weaker form of foresight which is based on self-knowledge – one can foresee how he/she 
will react to certain objects. If one knows that he/she possesses a habit of certain excessive 
passions one can try to manage it – one can willfully attempt to break the vicious pattern 
by particularizing a new, deliberated judgment and so attempt to gain a new virtuous, 
emotional habit. Murphy puts her account in a nutshell: 
 
Therefore, the consequence of weak foresight is that we are (at least partly) responsible for any 
of our passions that arise because of our habitual disposition to feel such passions (they are 
indirectly voluntary because we have counterfactual control over them). The consequence of 
strong foresight is that in the rare cases where we can foresee our future circumstances, we are 
(somewhat more fully) responsible for the passions that arise as a result of the combination of 
these circumstances with our habitual dispositions to undergo passions in such 
circumstances.353  
 
Murphy, however, is quick to nuance her account – yes, it seems to her that many of 
our emotional reactions are the way they are because of the habitual disposition we acquire 
or, in other words, they depend on our moral character. Yet she also acknowledges that 
passions can be products of momentary dispositions and moods and in this sense we do not 
have even a weak sense of foresight. Additionally, the foresight itself, weak or strong, does 																																																								
350 Murphy quotes Aquinas’s writing: “We don’t say that there’s sin in sensuality because of the implied 
consent of reason, since when a movement of sensuality [that is, a passion] precedes the judgment of reason, 
there is no consent, whether implied or expressed. But because sensuality can be subjected to reason, it has 
the defining characteristic of sin even if its act precedes reason.” QDV 25.5 ad. 5 quoted in Murphy, 
“Aquinas on Our Responsibility for Our Emotions,” 191. 
351 Ibid., 191 quoting ST I-II 17.7c. 
352 Indeed, Aquinas claims that “something can be called voluntary directly or indirectly. That which the will 
seeks is directly voluntary; that which the will can prevent but does not is indirectly voluntary.” ST I-II 77.7. 
353 Murphy, “Aquinas on Our Responsibility for Our Emotions,” 193. 
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not yield an automatic counterfactual manageability – even if the person possesses a 
foresight in a weak sense there are cases where he/she cannot do anything about the 
disposition and this is a consequence of the fallen, injured human nature. Murphy writes: 
“In fact, Aquinas recognizes that even the ideally moral person, one who is completely 
virtuous in both secular and religious senses will, upon coming across unexpected 
situations, undergo irrational emotions. In such cases where foresight does not guarantee 
control, the person is not responsible for her reason-independent spontaneous passion.”354 
Murphy’s account, then, accommodates a large range of passions and suggests levels of 
responsibility for them, including a possibility that in some cases we just cannot alter our 
spontaneous passions. Her account allows that a person would not be held responsible for 
the first stirrings, movements of the disorderly passions (yet Murphy adds that while some 
reason-independent passions are genuinely beyond our control, if they last longer than just 
a moment and we do not act against them, they enter the domain of our accountability). 
Murphy argues that when spontaneous reason-independent passions are already 
occurring, we can find a conviction in Aquinas’s texts that we have a very limited 
possibility to manage them. At this point we can see that Aquinas suggests that to calm the 
already occurring spontaneous reason-independent passions, we need to calm our 
imagination. This is done by reviewing our general evaluations so the particular reason 
could suggest a new particularized evaluation to the sense appetite. This mechanism, we 
can experience, does not work easily and fluently in real life circumstances. Aquinas 
acknowledges that the power to manage one’s own imagination can be deformed by some 
defect or illness;355 it can also be an outcome of vicious habits.  
Yet the lack of rational manageability of the already occurring reason-independent 
passions can also be episodic. Precisely due to the influence of this kind of passion, we 
have a very limited chance to alter our imagination. Murphy argues that Aquinas’s account 
suggests two reasons for this: firstly, once we are undergoing this sort of passion our 
ability to reason is reduced; secondly, when we are undergoing a passion and are still able 
to reason – the logics and evaluation of imagination offer themselves to ground our 
reasoned judgments.356 Aquinas explains that an ability of a person to reason clearly when 
undergoing a strong, unruly passion is weakened due to this passion subsuming his/her 
awareness and attention. Murphy explains: 
 
[W]e have a certain amount of attention or capacity for consciousness, and when a lot of 
attention is demanded for one object, there is less to give to others. Because passions involve 
not only a psychological state, but also a physiological one, they tend to demand and obtain 
more immediate attention than other psychological activities (and the more intense they are, the 
more attention they command). As a consequence of this hijacking of the person’s attention by 
the reason-independent passion, not much attention or psychic energy is left to the person for 																																																								
354 Ibid., 194. 
355 “The apprehension of the imagination is subject to the ordering of reason in proportion (secundum 
modum) to the strength or weakness of the imaginative power. For that a human being cannot imagine what 
reason considers occurs either because what reason considers cannot be imagined (e.g., incorporeal things), 
or because of a weakness in the power of the imagination which comes from some defect in the organ.” 
Murphy, “Aquinas on Our Responsibility for Our Emotions,” 197 quoting ST I-II 17.7 ad 3. 
356 We have already encountered Cates making a similar argument in section 4.1 The Influence of the 
Passions on Reason and the Will and a Possibility of Affective Knowledge in Aquinas’s Thought of this 
chapter explaining the mechanism of the reciprocal influence between the passions and reason. 
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reconsidering the evaluation or examining the data rationally to see whether the passion is 
justified.357 
 
Murphy further explains that our power to manage the occurring reason-independent 
passions is weakened not only by a passion claiming all our attention, but also by the 
inherent logics of that passion. “It is always the case that an imaginative sensory evaluation 
of an object,” Murphy writes, “is part of the data considered in the formation of a final 
reasoned judgment of a situation.”358 Thus my sensory evaluation can serve as a source to 
ground my reasoned judgment. In a negative case, one can form a reasoned final judgment 
on a basis of a vicious passion. “So the sensory appetite, when it is undergoing a passion, is 
much less sensitive to the all-things-considered judgments of reason”359 – this means that 
when I am caught in a passion of irrational anger, I may act upon the judgment of this 
passion only and say hurtful words as a person appears punishable in the evaluation of a 
passion. If my particular reason is taken over by a reason-independent passion in such a 
way, it will not be able to present the judgments of universal reason to my sense appetite 
(as in, all things considered, a person who is an object of anger still deserves basic respect).  
Murphy concludes her investigation of the reason-independent passions by 
suggesting that we can judge according to Aquinas’s texts that in some cases we cannot do 
anything about the way we feel. The main source of responsibility for our passions does 
not rest on the experience of a particular passion but on our attitude toward it.360  
We have seen that Murphy recovers a complex account of emotional experiences 
from Aquinas’s texts. She argues that Aquinas suggests two main ways to view the 
passions: the first group is the reason-dependent passions caused by free beliefs and 
judgments of an evaluative nature; we are fully responsible for these passions; the second 
group is constituted by reason-independent passions. A person is held responsible for these 
sorts of passions when he/she could have avoided them and when they can be directly or 
indirectly managed by our reason and will. The second group also accommodates 
spontaneous reason-independent passions and spontaneous, but prolonged reason-
independent passions which are genuinely out of our control (yet, in the case of the latter 
we are responsible for our attempts to deal with them). This means, according to Murphy, 
that Aquinas distinguishes when we are responsible for the emotions we undergo and when 
we are free from such responsibility. We use Murphy’s interpretation of Aquinas’s account 
of the passions to advance some illuminating comments on the nature of the passions 
themselves and the way we can manage them. Additionally, it offers some comments to 
highlight the complexity of interior moral life. Murphy wants to argue that Aquinas’s 
account on responsibility for our passions is multi-layered and does not provide one single 
answer that can be utilized universally in each particular case – yet “it provides us with a 																																																								
357 Murphy, “Aquinas on Our Responsibility for Our Emotions,” 198. 
358 Ibid., 198. 
359 Ibid., 200. 
360 She bases her claim on the following text by Aquinas: “When there is an illicit movement in sensuality, 
reason can be related to it in three ways. (1) In one way, so that reason resists it; and in that case there is no 
sin, but rather the meriting of a crown. (2) In a second way, so that reason commands it, as when one elicits a 
movement of illicit desire on purpose. And then, if the illicit movement is in the genus of mortal sin, 
[reason’s eliciting the illicit movement] will be a mortal sin. (3) And, in a third way, so that reason neither 
forbids nor commands, but consents. And then [reason’s consent] is a venial sin.” Murphy, “Aquinas on Our 
Responsibility for Our Emotions,” 200 quoting QDM 7.6 ad 6. 
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principled way to make sense of and clarify our intuitions about our responsibility for 
emotions.”361 Murphy also suggests that a particular case may contain emotions of a 
different nature (as in, reason-dependent and reason-independent emotions simultaneously) 
and they may have different claims for our responsibility. She furthers, however, that even 
though in some cases it is difficult to determine the degree of mastery one has over his/her 
emotions – it will be sufficient to determine the attitude one has over them; since in 
Aquinas’s thought one is entirely responsible for it. “Examining someone’s attitude,” 
Murphy writes, “as expressed in his actions, his reasoning, his whole-heartedness in 
ridding himself of bad tendencies, will reveal something about his moral accountability, if 
not for the emotions themselves, then at least for his attitude to his emotions.”362  
Murphy’s account, then, building upon Aquinas’s thought on the passions suggests 
an insightful strategy on how to think of our own emotional experiences even today as it 
articulates some important moral intuitions on our own responsibility for the way we 
emote. Furthermore, it suggests some strategies of thinking and accessing our own and 
others’ moral emotions and attitudes about them. This, we argue, is of particular 
importance not only to the lives of particular individuals, but also to any adequate ethical 
projects that attempt to discuss moral life in all its aspects. The patterns of our emotions 
and attitudes disclose who we are at a very deep and personal level and without any doubt 
they do not only motivate our actions – they can be, indeed, evaluated on their own right. 
Murphy’s account suggests some valuable insights on trying to approach this topic and 
incorporate it especially in the agendas of moral education. 
 
4.3 THE PASSIONS, HABIT, AND VIRTUE  
 
The above discussion guides us to touch, at least briefly, on the relationship between the 
passions and our character as those are deeply entangled phenomena – as we have seen, 
our moral character can determine our emotional patterns and those, in turn, are part of 
what constitutes our character. We will address the question of human affectivity and its 
Christian formation through the lens suggested by Lombardo as he is the only one from our 
main interlocutors directing the discussion on the passions to inquire directly into their 
relationship with the categories of virtue and vice. This, without a doubt, constitutes a large 
area of theological discussion in itself and thus we will touch upon it only briefly and only 
in essential aspects directly relevant to our prime interest – the passions themselves. 
Aquinas addresses the question of a person thinking, intending, choosing, feeling, 
and acting in established ways under the category of habitus. It is a concept of Aristotelian 
origin and Aquinas describes it in the following way: “As was explained above (a. 3), habit 
implies a certain disposition in relation to a thing’s nature and to its operation or end, in 
accord with which the thing is either well disposed or badly disposed toward this.”363 
Lombardo explains that Aquinas makes the category of habitus necessary because it 
determines our rational powers toward particular actions as naturally as they are inclined 
																																																								
361 Murphy, “Aquinas on Our Responsibility for Our Emotions,” 205. 
362 Ibid., 204. Murphy uses the possessive pronoun ‘his’ because she describes a particular example where 
the agent is male. 
363 ST I-II 49.4. 
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toward many.364 “Habitus shape our entire psychical structure,” Lombardo notes, “not just 
the rational powers: they modify all faculties that have some capacity for being shaped by 
reason, and actually penetrate and subsist in them.”365 And, indeed, because sense appetite 
is capable of being shaped by reason, Aquinas writes: “[T]he sentient powers are apt by 
their nature to obey reason’s command, and so habits can exist in them. For as Ethics 1 
says, they are called rational to the extent that they obey reason.”366 By the acts of reason 
and will the passions can be shaped into habitus – stable dispositions of emotional 
reactions. 
Lombardo moves on to show that in their very definition habitus are informed by 
reason, but that does not entail that they will be informed by correct reason. Our rational 
choices and decisions penetrate into our sense appetite and this disposes our character to be 
in one or the other way – we can be, for instance, either short-tempered or patient and react 
to certain situations according to these dispositions. Once our passions are informed and 
formed by the right reason they incline us to virtue. When the habitus are informed by the 
right reason and incline us to perfection according to our nature they are virtues and when 
they are not – they become vices.367 Now this means that virtuous habitus can be perfective 
to our passions too, according to Aquinas. As far as the passions are participating in 
reason, Aquinas argues rather univocally: 
 
[T]he irascible power or concupiscibile power can be the subject of a human virtue, since 
insofar as these powers participate in reason, they are a principle of a human act. Moreover, it 
is necessary to posit virtues in these powers, since it is clear that some virtues exist in the 
irascible and concupiscible powers…Therefore, in those matters with respect to which the 
irascible and concupiscible powers operate insofar as they are moved by reason, it is necessary 
that a habit that perfects one for acting well should exist not only in reason, but also in the 
irascible and concupiscible powers. And because the good disposition of a power that is a 
moved mover involves a conformity with the power that effects its movement, it follows that a 
virtue that exists in the irascible or concupiscible power is nothing other than a certain habitual 
conformity of that power with reason.368 
 
Lombardo explains that “[f]or Aquinas, the various moral virtues are holistic 
character traits with passion and reason inclined (and mutually inclining) toward our 																																																								
364 Cf. Lombardo, The Logics of Desire, 102 with a reference to ST I-II 55.1. 
365 Lombardo, The Logics of Desire, 103. 
366 ST I-II 50.3 ad. 1. 
367 Much of what Aquinas writes about virtue applies to vice, just in reverse. Vice is a type of habitus just 
like virtue and it can also reside in the sense appetite. It shapes sense appetite in negative ways. Lombardo 
notes that in Aquinas’s writings we can see that vices incline one to enjoy disordered objects, to lose 
sensitivity to spiritual goods, they dull rational powers. If a passion is a consequence of evil acts, its intensity 
is indicative of intense vice. Lombardo points out that Aquinas gives more attention to virtue than vice in the 
Summa (Aquinas does not discuss virtues and vices in separate sections, but instead discusses vice within his 
treatment of relevant virtue). Lombardo argues that this approach is chosen not only to avoid repetition – he 
suggests that Aquinas focuses on virtues in order to frame moral life in terms of happiness and not in terms 
of avoiding vice. See Lombardo, The Logics of Desire, 107. Lombardo furthers that Aquinas’s treatment of 
vice is also indebted to his ontology of appetites as a good creation of God. He argues: “The anthropological 
foundation established in the Treatise on the Passions gives Aquinas a platform to present vice as the 
corruption of something good, and not something unremittingly evil. It also gives him the tools to isolate 
exactly where each vice takes a wrong turn and corrupts something otherwise good.” Lombardo, The Logics 
of Desire, 191. 
368 ST I-II 56.4. 
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telos.”369 Furthermore, Aquinas holds that perfection of an action can be achieved if both 
rational powers and a passion are being virtuous: 
 
Nor can there be a perfect operation that proceeds from two powers unless each of the powers 
is perfected by an appropriate habit – in just the same way that an agent’s action through an 
instrument is not perfect unless the instrument is well disposed, no matter how perfect the 
principal agent is. Hence, if the sentient appetite, which is moved by the rational part, is not 
perfect, then no matter how perfect the rational part is, the action that follows will not be 
perfect. Hence, neither will the principle of the action be a virtue.370 
 
Passion thus is an essential component of a moral virtue and virtue in turn does not 
eradicate it.371 In addition, Lombardo draws our attention to the fact that Aquinas argues 
that a well-ordered intense passion is an indication of a more perfect virtue: if the will is 
strongly seeking good, its affections overflow to the sense appetite and by this are suffused 
by a right reason.372 Thus Lombardo aids our discussion by concluding that our passions 
and affections as an essential part of our moral character consequently also reveal it. 
 
4.4 THE PASSIONS, SIN, AND GRACE 
 
Lombardo highlights the fact that Aquinas’s anthropology cannot be understood 
adequately apart from the Christian narrative of creation, the fall, and redemption. 
Humanity was created to be in harmonious community with God – man and woman sinned 
and knowingly rejected God, by consequence losing sanctifying grace.373 The communion 
with God was lost, human nature became undone and the condition was passed to the 
entire human race. 
The nature of original sin and its effects on the human condition in itself constitute a 
large area of theological debates – Lombardo’s aim is to illustrate that the topic was 
equally controversial in the thirteenth century and Aquinas also advanced some original 
thoughts here. Lombardo suggests an interpretation of the Thomistic account on the sin-
injured human nature which allows one to think of human affectivity without suspicion. He 																																																								
369 Lombardo, The Logics of Desire, 105. 
370 ST I-II 58.3 ad 3. 
371 Cf. ST I-II 59.4 and ST I-II 59.5. Lombardo claims that to make a passion seat of a moral virtue was a 
controversial position back in his time as many of his contemporaries such as Hugh of St. Cher, John of La 
Rochelle, and Bonaventure disagreed and held that virtue can be located only in reason and will as the 
passions are fundamentally irrational. Cf. Lombardo, The Logics of Desire, 104-105. Paul Gondreau 
confirms this interpretation of Lombardo and on his behalf argues that Aquinas adopted a unique approach in 
thinking of the role of the passions in the practice of virtue. Gondreau writes: “[T]his position helps 
corroborate J.-P. Torrell's qualification of Aquinas’s view on the virtuous life as ‘one of the most original 
pieces of the spiritual theology of Friar Thomas.’ This unique teaching is that moral virtue actually resides in 
the sensitive appetite, i.e., that the passions are themselves virtuous, as owing to the limited autonomy 
enjoyed by the lower appetites.” Paul Gondreau, The Passions of Christ’s Soul in the Theology of St. Thomas 
Aquinas (Scranton and London: University of Scranton Press, 2009), 276-277. Here, Gondreau quotes Jean-
Pierre Torrell, Saint Thomas d'Aquin, maîtrespirituel. “Vestigia 19,” (Fribourg, Switz: Èditions 
Universitaires, 1996) 349. Gondreau’s argument is that Aquinas’s moral theory builds on a radical synergy of 
reason and sensibility. Here, sense appetite is viewed “with all the inclinations of nature, as reason’s 
propitious companion on the path toward an authentic expression of human freedom and perfection.” 
Gondreau, The Passions of Christ’s Soul, 278. 
372 Cf. Lombardo, The Logics of Desire, 106-107. 
373 Cf. Ibid., 120. 
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argues that Aquinas’s account on original sin “provides a foundation to trust the basic 
inclinations of the passions and affections in spite of their partial unreliability.”374 Aquinas, 
according to Lombardo’s argument, then, firmly reaffirms the Catholic doctrine of the 
goodness of human nature. 
Lombardo furthers that for Aquinas the removal of grace and leaving nature by itself 
together with a combination of the habitual disorder that the privation of grace introduces 
is the essence of original sin (ST I-II 82.1 ad 1). Human nature is thus injured by original 
and personal sins – but its principles and the powers of the soul that results from them 
remain intact, even though weakened. “According to Aquinas,” Lombardo argues, “before 
the fall of man, in the state of original justice, each human appetite instinctively moved 
toward goodness in harmony with the others, and there was complete freedom from 
internal temptation and antecedent passions. Sin destroyed the state of inner harmony 
called original justice, and sin impedes human nature from attaining its perfection, but ‘sin 
does not diminish nature itself.’”375 The main argument here is that the various principles 
of human nature lack inner coordination; they also lack the subjection to God and the 
intellect (and only grace can aid in these matters) – but human nature with all its powers 
(thus appetites also) essentially remains what God created it to be. The chaos of the fallen 
human condition, hence, is located not in corruption of the basic human tendencies, but in 
their disintegration which incline the human person to different directions causing 
confusion. “No matter how much internal chaos reigns, all human appetites retain their 
basic character and, according to the Creator’s design, cannot help inclining fallen 
humanity toward the good, at least under some guise, and therefore to the perfection of the 
human person, which is virtue.”376 
Now we should not be too sanguine about Aquinas’s treatment of the fallen state – 
the original and personal sins have real effects on the inner equipment of a human being. 
Lombardo writes: “Reason, will, the irascible power, and the concupiscible power – the 
four principal powers perfected by virtue – are each wounded by original sin.”377 But 
precisely because sin wounds and not destroys completely there is a possibility of 
restoration. The renewal of a human person in his/her entirety, in both, intellectual and 
affective dimensions, is made possible through the incarnation of Jesus Christ. Lombardo 
interprets that for Aquinas redemption does not mean a legalistic pardon of sins – “Christ 
comes to restore and renew the Father’s work of creation.”378 The sanctifying grace is 
infused into the soul through the sacraments of baptism and penance. Lombardo furthers 
that re-infusion of grace contains two main elements – it elevates human nature so we can 
have union with God and it heals fallen human nature.379 He claims: “Whether grace’s task 
is the infusion of virtuous habitus from scratch (such as in the case of a baptized infant), 
and thus the uninterrupted development of those virtues over time, or the more difficult 																																																								
374 Ibid., 124. 
375 Ibid., 121 quoting ST I-II 85.1-2. 
376 Lombardo, The Logics of Desire, 123. 
377 Ibid., 124. 
378 Ibid., 125. Gondreau in his in-depth study on the affectivity of Christ notes that Jesus’ affectivity has a 
soteriological and exemplary dimension for us. See Gondreau, The Passions of Christ’s Soul, 324-333. 
Lombardo in his discussion of Christ’s affectivity echoes these dimensions, he argues that for Aquinas, Jesus 
was a model and example of graced human affectivity. See Lombardo, The Logics of Desire, 223. 
379 Here Lombardo bases himself on ST I-II 109.2. 
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task of eradicating the remnants of vicious habitus, and then transforming them into 
virtues, the gracing of human affectivity unfolds over time.”380 Lombardo wants to 
demonstrate that Aquinas suggests a view on graced human affectivity which contains a 
balanced understanding of the relationship between nature and grace, and between human 
and divine freedom. The transformation by grace Aquinas imagines is an organic process 
which joins the ordinary psychological development; it is not intrusive and it deepens only 
through our free action to cooperate with God’s grace.381  
 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
 
Aquinas presents us with a multifaceted account on the passions. We, together with the 
authors discussed above, are convinced that such an account still has contemporary 
relevance as we will illustrate in the next chapter. Not to deny that Aquinas is at times 
ambiguous in his treatment of the passions,382 we claim that overall he presents a positive 
picture of human affectivity and its vital role in endeavors for a good human life. Passions 
are an integral part of our created human nature and, as everything created, they follow a 
																																																								
380 Lombardo, The Logics of Desire, 126. 
381 Cf. Ibid., 137. 
382 Murphy captures this accurately by stating that: “Aquinas’s account of the passions is an attempt to 
reconcile two very different views. On the one hand, passions are recognized as the natural and necessary 
consequences of the fact that the human rational soul is in a body. Viewed in this light, passions are 
manifestations in a person’s sensory, bodily self of her rational evaluative judgments and volitions. As 
Aquinas puts it, ‘will cannot be intensely moved to anything without some passion’s being aroused in the 
sensory appetite.’ On this view, then, passions seem to be integral aspects of the person, the natural 
expressions of what is most clearly herself: her judgments and volitions. But there is a different view of the 
passions, one prevalent in both Greek and Christian thought, according to which they are the importation into 
the rational person of her material or animal nature, with its own source of evaluation and motivation, 
independent – and sometimes even antithetical to – reason…Aquinas himself symbolizes the tension between 
these two views[.]” Murphy, “Aquinas on Our Responsibility for Our Emotions,” 165. We add that this 
tension can be demonstrated with the following example: In Question 59 article 5 Aquinas firmly choses the 
Aristotelian interpretation over the Stoic and argues for moderation and not the extirpation of the passions. 
He claims: “If, as the Stoics posited, what we are calling ‘passions’ are disordered affections, then it is clear 
that a perfect virtue exists without any passions. On the other hand, if what are calling ‘passions’ are all the 
movements of the sentient appetite, then it is plain that those moral virtues that have to do with the passions 
as their proper matter cannot exist without the passions. The reason for this is that, given the Stoic view, it 
would follow that moral virtue renders the sentient appetite altogether superfluous. But it does not pertain to 
virtue that the powers that are subject to reason should be deprived of their own acts; rather, what pertains to 
virtue the powers that are subject to reason should be deprived of their own acts; rather, what pertains to 
virtue is that those powers should execute reason’s command by engaging in their proper acts. Hence, just as 
a virtue orders the members of the body toward the appropriate exterior acts, so it orders the sentient appetite 
toward its own well-ordered movements.” ST I-II 59.5. On the other hand, while discussing the beatitudes in 
the Question 69, Aquinas seems to lean more toward the Stoic interpretation of extirpations of the passions. 
We can find him claiming the following in discussion about the blessing for the meek: “Second, the 
pleasurable life consists in following one’s passions, whether the passions of the irascible part of the soul or 
the passions of the concupiscible part. Virtue draws a man away from following the passions of the irascible 
part by keeping them from abounding in him, in accord with the rule of reason; the gifts, on the other hand, 
do this in a more excellent way, viz., in such a way that the man is rendered wholly undisturbed by them, in 
accord with God’s will. Hence, we have the second beatitude, ‘Blessed are the meek.’” ST I-II 69.3. And 
while we argue that the Treatise on the Passions and Aquinas’s subsequent discussion of virtue clearly 
manifest the Aristotelian line of interpreting the passions, one should be aware of the tensions inherent in the 
Summa as a whole. 
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certain kind of logic. Despite the condition of the fallen human nature our passions, 
according to Aquinas, are still fundamentally oriented toward the good.  
The passions, moreover, have a delicate relationship with our intellective capacities 
in Aquinas’s thought. They are subject to reason, but they stand as free subjects of a 
democratic ruler. There is a certain discrepancy in the interpretations which argue that 
Aquinas thought that reason (through the act of the cogitative power) participates in 
activation of every passion, and those that held it was just some passions (we have argued 
that the latter seems to be the case). But reason comes to aid and manages all of the 
passions independently of their formation process (note, this manageability is real, but 
limited). Aquinas construes the passions as embodied states of awareness that depend on 
our sense apprehension (understood broadly) and bear significance for our well-being. In 
this regard Cates further notes that Thomistic ethics “provides us with a way of 
highlighting certain dimensions of our experience so that these dimensions can become 
objects for reflection and conversation.”383 And thus Cates solidifies the argument that 
emotions are intelligible elements of ethics by claiming that: “Given the fact that most of 
our emotions are, to some extent, intellectually penetrable and thus amenable to deliberate 
formation and re-formation, in light of our understanding of (or our wondering about) the 
final end of human life, emotions are fitting subjects for ethical reflection.”384  
Aquinas’s account on the passions can be an aid to ethics, even today, because of its 
suggestion to look at the patterns of our emotional lives, to think of their roots, the way we 
have acquired them and assess whether we, in fact, benefit from them. Aquinas views 
passions as intentional phenomena and various emotional experiences may indicate the 
way we relate with various objects. By consequence, discovering the objects of our 
emotions and thinking of the deep patterns in which we are immersed in our daily lives 
may aid the way we feel. 
Because of the aforementioned relationship with our intellective capacities, Aquinas 
opens a space to think of the responsibility we bear for the ways we emote. Cates 
insightfully notes that studying Aquinas’s texts on the passions builds the space of 
reflection and freedom concerning our emotions which is not evident neither in 
contemporary agendas of ethics nor in some particular cultures.385 This inquiry opens the 
possibility for thinking that we can and, indeed, should take responsibility for the way we 
interpret what is happening in our interior lives and in our exterior relations with others 
and our surroundings. We could say that the authors we have discussed endeavored to 
demonstrate that we can find a conviction in Aquinas’s thought that the patterns of our 
emotions reflect the moral quality of our lives. Aquinas, thus, speaks of the moral life for 
which we can take various degrees of responsibility.  
At this point, we should also remember that Aquinas allows the passions, especially, 
the passion of love through its natural ‘fit’ between the object and the subject to enrich the 
way we know our world. Indeed, in Question 60 of the Secunda secundae in the context of 
knowing the goodness of God, Aquinas claims that there are two ways of knowing: the 
																																																								
383 Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions, 255. 
384 Ibid., 253. 
385 Ibid., 255. 
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speculative and affective, and the experience way.386 This means, Maguire interprets, that 
“correct judgment can come about in two ways, says Aquinas: either by a perfect use of 
reason or in another distinct way, through a connaturality with the subject being 
judged.”387 And we know that this kind of connaturality comes through love. In this way 
we can say that the love of an object alters the way we know and adds to our fuller 
understanding of it. This in turn encourages one to cultivate his/her emotional capacities to 
engage in a full relationship with one’s personal and professional environments and finally 
even oneself. In Aquinas’s thought, we can find inspiration to argue that love illuminates 
the mind and, in their own right, our cognitive capacities protect our loves from going 
astray, thus the ideal relationship between our distinct capacities is that of mutuality – both 
nurturing and enriching each other.  
Ryan furthers our argument and adds that precisely because Aquinas holds that our 
affective powers are capable of moral value, he also locates virtue in them.388 Our 
emotions can be gradually transformed to become virtuous habituations. Thus Aquinas’s 
ethics is an ethics of transformation and growth (but note, Aquinas is always building on 
the natural equipment we already posses). Ryan concludes: 
 
The affective capacity of the person can be modified and hence grow in sensitivity, intensity, 
and scope. The affective virtues, then, are not primarily about actions (though they may lead to 
actions). Their primary habitual disposition as virtues (their condition of possibility, their 
attunement to being itself as good) is toward the fitting emotional response, namely one that is 
according to right reason. Hence, to adapt Aristotle, the virtuous person is disposed to respond 
emotionally, to the right things, at the right time, and to the right degree. This is how they 
exercise their rationality and contribute to human well-being and growth both personally and in 
the realm of our relationships.389 
 
We should not forget that Aquinas’s account on the passions is also a theological 
account and so we can encounter elements that are particularly important to theological 
ethics and Christian community. Aquinas is convinced that divine grace comes to aid in 
transforming our affectivity – our emotions are healed and changed not only by our 
deliberate, habituated actions, choices, and thoughts, but also through our life of prayer, 
sacraments and participation in liturgy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
386 “There is a twofold knowledge of God's goodness or will. One is speculative and as to this it is not lawful 
to doubt or to prove whether God's will be good, or whether God is sweet. The other knowledge of God's will 
or goodness is effective or experimental and thereby a man experiences in himself the taste of God's 
sweetness, and complacency in God's will, as Dionysius says of Hierotheos (Div. Nom. ii) that ‘he learnt 
divine things through experience of them.’ It is in this way that we are told to prove God's will, and to taste 
His sweetness.’ ST II-II 97.2 ad 2 Fathers of the English Dominican Province translation available at 
http://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/SS/SS097.html#SSQ97A2THEP1  
387 Maguire, “Ratio Practica,” 27. 
388 Cf. Ryan, “Revisiting Affective Knowledge,” 56. 
389 Ibid., 57. 
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CHAPTER IV. BUILDING BRIDGES: A BRIEF CASE STUDY OF 
ANGER AND INTERSECTIONS OF NUSSBAUM’S AND AQUINAS’S 
THOUGHT ON THE EMOTIONS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
We have already encountered Nussbaum’s and Aquinas’s accounts on the nature of 
emotions/passions and in this chapter we will bring those accounts together. The aim of 
this chapter is not to compose a third account on the ethical nature of emotions that would 
merge the insights of Nussbaum and Aquinas. Rather, our aim is to bring the two accounts 
into conversation and see what they can offer to the discipline of ethics. We will achieve 
this goal through the twofold structure of this chapter – the first part will discuss the 
emotion of anger and the second will highlight the elements which we judge to be the most 
obvious meeting points of the accounts. The discussion on anger will be the first bridge 
where Nussbaum and Aquinas suggest views on the same subject matter. We will discuss 
anger through the lenses of Aquinas’s interpretation, situate it within the contemporary 
debate on the moral character of emotion and conclude with Nussbaum’s critical 
evaluation of anger. We will encounter opposing interpretations of anger given by Aquinas 
and Nussbaum that will nonetheless, be reconciled in the consideration of this emotion as 
transitional in nature. After building this bridge, we will search for further meeting and 
divergence points starting with a discussion on Nussbaum’s and Aquinas’s ethical 
frameworks in general and moving on to the most recognizable aspects of their accounts of 
emotions/passions in particular. This will highlight the distinctiveness of both accounts vis-
à-vis each other. The chapter will culminate in the reflection on the specific achievement 
each account brings to ethical thought with a focus on theological ethics. 
 
2. CONTINUING THE CASE OF ANGER 
 
We have already begun to explore the topic of anger in Chapter II. Martha C. Nussbaum 
on Compassion where we inquired into some aspects of Nussbaum’s thought on this 
emotion and its connection to compassion as an answer to political injustice.1 We now 
want to resume the discussion and press it further to dwell upon the moral character of 
anger especially having Aquinas’s evaluation of this passion in mind. We also want to 
highlight that this discussion is particularly useful in illustrating that in the context of 
ethical thinking it is not enough to talk about ‘the emotions’ in a general manner. Once we 
attempt to think of the ways a particular emotion functions in our moral experiences, we 
are unavoidably confronted with the complexity of the task and the consequences our 
standpoints entail – a defense or encouragement of a particular emotion promotes a certain 
vision of moral character. Anger is a retributive emotion,2 also depicted in contemporary 																																																								
1 See sections 4.1.1.4 The Case of Anger; 4.1.1.5 Concluding Remarks and section 5.4 Is Compassion the 
Only Political Emotion We Owe to Others? with all its subsections of Chapter II. 
2 We should note that in contemporary philosophical/ethical discussions anger is largely discussed by using 
its Aristotelian conceptualization. Anger, Aristotle argues, is “defined as an impulse, accompanied by pain, to 
a conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight directed without justification towards what concerns oneself 
or towards what concerns one's friends.” Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book II, 1378b. Thus anger is understood as a 
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discussions as an emotion that aims at relationship with others, uses self-defense 
mechanisms and motivational power to overcome obstacles, regulates social interactions, 
but crucially needs regulation itself and above all – learning forms of appropriate 
expression.3 Anger of an adult human being4 is thus described as  
 
a highly social emotion. Common elicitors of anger involve actual or perceived insult, 
injustice, betrayal, inequity, unfairness, goal impediments, the incompetent actions of another, 
and being the target of another person's verbal or physical aggression[.] One of the most 
prominent reasons for anger involves direct or indirect actions that threaten an individual's self-
concept, identity, or public image[;] insults, condescension, and reproach represent these 
threatening actions[.]5  
 
Our own task is to look at the moral meaning of anger by continuing the line of 
discussion found in the second chapter of this work – we will divide the discussion into 
two main groups: pro and contra anger.6 The pro-anger group will consist of Aquinas’s 
insights on anger and the views of contemporary thinkers who generally agree with 
Aquinas’s line of thought, though they do not address him directly (with one exception). 
This approach is chosen to illustrate that Aquinas’s views on anger still resonate with 
contemporary debates on the nature and consequences of this emotion. The section 
addressing contemporary pro-anger views will consist of touching upon perspectives of 
Aaron Ben-Ze’ev who argues that anger, indeed, can be considered as a moral emotion, 
and insights of Amia Srinivasan, Victoria L. Henderson, and Krista K. Thomason who 
consider anger to have a positive epistemic role which is significant in both personal and 
political lives. We will then move to Nussbaum’s negative evaluation of anger and 
conclude this section by suggesting that love and compassion present themselves as 
reliable guides to sustainable personal and political relationships. We will however point 
out that the absolute dismissal of anger would mean dismissing an alert signal which might 
direct us to important considerations of an ethical nature concerning situations we find 																																																																																																																																																																							
reaction to undeserved insult or harm inflicted upon oneself or the ones one cares about which includes a 
desire to exact things upon others. 
3 Cf. Elizabeth A. Lemerise and Kenneth A. Dodge, “The Development of Anger and Hostile Interactions,” 
in Handbook of Emotions, 3rd Edition, eds. Michael Lewis, Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones, and Lisa Feldman 
Barrett (New York/London: The Guilford Press, 2008), 730-742 – the article discusses anger from a 
developmental point of view, depicting stages of its development in young infants and children and focusing 
on the processes of socializing anger. See also Scott Schieman, “Anger,” in Handbook of the Sociology of 
Emotions, eds. Jan E. Stets and Jonathan H. Turner (New York: Springer, 2006), 494-510 – the article 
discusses the social causes and social contexts and processes in which anger appears. 
4 We should also note that anger is largely classified among six basic emotions. This is not without dispute, 
however. As a telling instance Schieman indicates Ekman’s research and its reception. See Schieman, 
“Anger,” 494. Lemerise and Dodge make a similar observation about an undefined status of anger and 
indicate that there is no agreement among emotion theorists over whether anger is a primary emotion or 
whether it is differentiated from a generalized distress state. See Lemerise and Dodge, “The Development of 
Anger,” 730. This means that, speaking broadly, we can think of anger as being able to accommodate both 
relatively low cognitive triggers (fast reactions to self-preservation threats), to cognitively complex elicitors, 
such as understanding of the self, concepts of justice and relations to one’s environment. The latter is our 
concern (it is also the concern of Aquinas and the authors we will discuss). 
5 Schieman, “Anger,” 495. 
6 See sections 4.1.1.4 The Case of Anger; 4.1.1.5 Concluding Remarks and section 5.4 Is Compassion the 
Only Political Emotion We Owe to Others? with all its subsections in Chapter II. 
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ourselves in. More importantly, dismissing the political significance of anger may lead to 
insensitivity for the most vulnerable; in some cases anger is the only voice available to 
them. 
 
2.1 AQUINAS ON THE PASSION OF ANGER 
 
2.1.1 Defining Anger and Its Object  
 
Aquinas’s discussion on anger is largely influenced by Aristotle’s views on this passion. 
He takes up the task to present it in the usual threefold structure he utilizes in the 
discussions of particular passions: first of all he addresses anger in itself (Question 46), 
then he moves to inquire into anger’s cause (Question 47), culminating his analysis of 
anger in the discussion of its effects (Question 48). Aquinas, generally speaking, offers a 
positive account on anger and connects it with reason, nature, and justice7 – elements that 
are of interest in contemporary discussions on the discerning role of emotions. 
Aquinas locates anger in the irascible power of the sense appetite and construes it as 
a complex passion which is caused by the occurrence of several other passions. He claims 
that anger “rises up only because some sort of sadness has been inflicted and only insofar 
as the desire for retribution is present, along with the hope of exacting it.”8 Aquinas 
thought anger to be caused by contrary passions – sadness the object of which is evil, and 
hope the object of which is good. Owing to this inner contrariety, anger is not conceived as 
having a contrary passion (normally, all the passions are composed of contrary pairs).9 
Moreover, this threefold constitution of contrary passions is unique only to anger and does 
not appear in the Treatise in any other instance.  
After presenting us with a definition of anger, Aquinas proceeds to the investigation 
of the moral quality of anger’s object. Anger is a passion that follows a complex 
apprehension:  
 
For whoever gets angry seeks to exact retribution from someone (quaerit vindicari de aliquo). 
And so the movement of anger tends toward two things, viz., (a) toward the retribution itself, 
which it desires and hopes for as something good, and hence takes pleasure in, and also (b) 
toward the one against whom it seeks retribution as against someone who is opposed to him 
and harmful, and this involves the character of something bad.10  
 
That means that Aquinas conceived of anger as following upon a twofold object – 
retribution that is perceived as something good and the person who is perceived as 																																																								
7 Cf. Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 268. 
8 ST I-II 46.1. Following Damascene, Aquinas divides anger into three species (anger is accorded a particular 
species according to the particular situation): wrath (fel), bitterness or rancor (mania), and fury or rage 
(furor). Wrath is an eruptive kind of anger, bitterness or rancor is a kind of anger that lingers for a long time 
in the memory, and fury or rage is an anger that is particularly desirous of retribution and does not die until 
the punishment is achieved. 
9 See sections 3. Structure of the Passions: The Concupiscible and the Irascible Division and 3.1 The 
Relationship between the Concupiscible and the Irascible Passions of Chapter III.  
10 ST I-II 46.2. In the original text Aquinas uses the term vindicta which is translated by Fredosso as 
retribution, Miner translates it as vindication (See Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 268-286.), and Lombardo 
translates it as revenge, See Lombardo, The Logics of Desire, 66. 
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something evil. Now the good that anger seeks is arduous good and Aquinas furthers that 
both objects – the retribution and the person, have to register with ‘a certain degree of 
magnitude’ in order for the passion of anger to arise. That means that the perceived hurt 
has to be of importance for the person undergoing the passions of anger. 
 
2.1.2 Anger, Reason, and Human Nature 
 
Article 4 of Question 46 inquires into the relationship anger has with reason. Miner argues 
that we can perceive the middle section of this question as ‘as an apologia pro ira’11 – 
anger is not simply an irrational passion, on the contrary, it requires an act of reason. 
Aquinas argues that in order for anger to occur a mechanism similar to what takes place in 
the act of reasoning happens. Anger desires retribution, but it requires, Aquinas thinks, an 
act of collating whereby the desired retribution would be proportionate to the harm done. 
He states: “But collating and inferring are acts of reason (conferre et syllogizare est 
rationis). And so anger in some sense involves an act of reason.”12 Aquinas reminds us that 
there are two ways in which an appetite can involve an act of reason. In the first instance, 
reason commands and in this way an act of will is called a rational appetite. In the second 
instance, reason makes something known and in this way an act of reason is involved in 
anger. Reason here works as a light-shedding device by “manifesting an injury.”13 In 
Aquinas’s thought on anger, reason does not command it directly but uncovers the hurt. 
Anger, moreover, does not listen to reason perfectly, “since it does not observe the rule of 
reason in measuring out the retribution (in rependendo vindictam).”14 
Aquinas continues to present his views on anger by arguing that this passion is 
rooted in human nature. Aquinas discusses the naturalness of anger vis-à-vis 
concupiscence. Now he thinks that we can attribute something to our nature by looking 
into the causes of an item in mind – thus by discovering its object and its subject. If we 
look at anger and concupiscence from the angle of their objects, then concupiscence 
appears to be more natural, because self-preservation (especially the drives for food and 
sex) is more natural for humans than the desire for just retribution. If we were to look at a 
human being not from the perspective of its genus and insofar as he/she is an animal, but 
from the perspective of the species – that is, our rational nature – then anger appears to be 
more natural than concupiscence, “since anger involves reason more than concupiscence 
does.”15 In addition, Aquinas thinks of anger from the point of view of our temperament, 
he reasons that our natural dispositions make us more prone to certain passions and from 
this perspective anger also appears to be part of human constitution (and this is especially 
the case with someone of a choleric temperament, he thinks). “Reason itself is part of 
human nature[,]” Aquinas emphasizes, “[h]ence, from the very fact that anger involves an 
act of reason it follows that it is in some sense natural to a man.”16 
 																																																								
11 Cf. Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 269. 
12 ST I-II 46.4. 
13 ST I-II 46.4 ad. 1. 
14 ST I-II 46.4 ad. 4. 
15 ST I-II 46.5. 
16 ST I-II 46.5 ad. 2. 
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2.1.3 Anger, Hatred, and Justice 
 
Aquinas furthermore urges us not to confuse anger with hatred, which appears to be a 
common conceptual mistake. A passion gets its species from its object. We can now see 
that anger’s subject is the same thing as hatred’s object. Thus the one who hates desires 
something bad for the one he/she hates, and the one who is angry also desires something 
bad for the person he/she is angry with. Yet, there is a conceptual distinction in this 
seeming similarity – the person who experiences the passion of hatred desires something 
bad for the hated person in itself, while the person who is angry desires something bad for 
the person insofar as it has the character of something good.17 Reason, for the perceived 
good in this case, is an inquiry for justice (as a part of retribution) in the angered person. 
Hence, says Aquinas, “hatred has to do with the application of what is bad to what is bad, 
whereas anger has to do with the application of what is good to what is bad.”18 We can see 
further that for Aquinas anger can participate in a virtue of justice if it works in accordance 
with reason, while the only way it can fall short from this participation is when it does not 
listen to reason and seeks for more than a just retribution. Aquinas considers hatred to be 
graver than anger; moreover, it has less mercy. He argues:  
 
For since hatred desires what is bad in its own right (malum secundum se) for another, there is 
no measure of badness that satisfies it. By contrast, anger desires something bad only under the 
concept just retribution. Thus, when the bad thing that has been inflicted exceeds the measure 
of justice in the judgment of the one who is angry, at that point he has mercy.19 
 
Aquinas also considers hatred to be more stable than anger. Anger, he thinks, is more 
like a mental commotion caused by a perceived injury. Hatred, on the other hand, proceeds 
from a disposition to see the hated thing as harmful/opposed to oneself. And from this 
perspective, hatred is more like a disposition and anger is more like a passion which 
vanishes quicker. 
Aquinas goes on to establish a firmer link between anger and justice and claims: 
“both on the part of its cause, which is an injury inflicted by another, and on the part of the 
retribution that is desired by the one who is angry, it is clear that anger pertains to the very 
same individuals with respect to whom there is justice and injustice (ad eosdem pertinet 
ira ad quos iustitia et iniustitia).”20 An injury that triggers anger is always a perceived 
injustice and its aim is to ‘set things right.’ At this point Aquinas reminds us that passions 
can arise through imagination or through a mediated act of reason.21 If anger arises though 
imagination, then one can get angry at irrational things or non-living things. If anger arises 
through reason making the injury known, then one cannot get angry at non-sentient things, 
Aquinas argues – this kind of anger is directed only at a person. Non-sentient things cannot 
inflict a perceived injustice and thus there is no retribution toward them, thus Aquinas 																																																								
17 Cf. ST I-II 46.6. 
18 ST I-II 46.6. 
19 ST I-II 46.6 ad. 1. 
20 ST I-II 46.7. 
21 This confirms our chosen path of interpretation in Chapter III where Aquinas holds that passions can be 
triggered through these two distinct ways. See especially sections 2.1.2 Apprehensive Powers of the Sensitive 
Soul and 2.1.3 Role of the Cogitative Power. 
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thinks that truly human anger involves reason and a sense of justice. Aquinas furthers that 
in the same vein one cannot get properly angry with oneself; anger directed at oneself is 
metaphorical (one cannot, he thinks, exact a just retribution from oneself). He furthers that 
following the same logic one cannot get angry with a genus of things only with one 
singular person. Aquinas argues that anger is always caused by a particular injury, that is, 
by a particular act of injustice that is directed at us. He claims that when we are angry with 
something which is not a person (Aquinas gives an example of a city), we construe that 
group as a singular person committing an injury against us personally. In other words, an 
object that causes truly human anger has to be perceived as an object acting wilfully.22 
 
2.1.4 Causes of Anger: Personal Injury 
 
Aquinas has already indicated the formal cause of anger – anger is a perceived injury with 
an accompanied desire for retribution. Miner points out that in Question 47, Thomas is 
inquiring into the efficient cause of anger, in other words, he asks – what, in fact, makes us 
angry?23 Aquinas explains that one can get angry only for the things done to oneself:  
 
For just as each thing naturally desires what is good for itself (proprium bonum), so, too, each 
thing naturally repels what is bad for itself (proprium malum). Now an injury done by one 
individual pertains to another individual only if the former has done something that is in some 
sense against the latter. Hence, it follows that the moving cause of someone’s anger is always 
something done to himself.24 
 
Aquinas holds that if we get angry about the injury inflicted to others, they have to 
belong to us in some sense – by kinship, friendship or at least by shared nature. One needs 
to perceive a personal connection with the injury done to the victim.  
Aquinas also holds that all the causes triggering anger can be traced fundamentally to 
disdain. Anger always rises under the concept of injustice and we are moved by this 
passion if we think that someone is violating our image of the self, something that should 
be treated respectfully. Aquinas furthers that the other can inflict injury by choice, out of 
passion or out of ignorance. If we perceive that an individual inflicted the unjust harm on 
purpose – this gives rise to a most intense anger. Aquinas argues that if we think that others 
harmed us out of passion or ignorance – we either will not get angry at all or will get much 
less angry and we will be more prone to mercy. 
Aquinas finishes Question 47 by inquiring into whether excellence is something that 
makes us prone to get angry more easily. He argues that considering anger from one angle 
can surely lead us to conclude that excellence is a disposition at the root of anger – one is 
more prone to get angry about the things one excels in. This is why, Aquinas argues, a 
rhetorician will get more easily angry if he is disdained in matters of rhetoric. Miner aids 
our exposé by pointing out that the excellence that Aquinas has in mind is an excellence 
abstracted from moral virtues: “Thus we may account for the odd (but very real) 
susceptibility to anger displayed by talented artists, musicians, writers, actors, and athletes 
who lack the moral virtues. Insofar as excellentia does not reside in a great soul, it 																																																								
22 Cf. Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 278. 
23 Cf. Ibid., 278. 
24 ST I-II 47.1. 
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increases the likelihood that its possessor will be made angry by those who scorn him in 
precisely the respect in which he excels.”25 Now Aquinas also argues that because anger 
involves sadness and because defectiveness is especially saddening, it also moves one to 
get angry more easily. In this way, Aquinas explains, people who are sick or suffer from 
something get angry more easily because they are saddened more easily. He adds that the 
perceived defect is also a reason why we can get more angry with our offender. 
Inappropriate disdain is the first reason for anger and if we perceive the person who insults 
us as possessing some defect, this will increase the level of the inappropriateness of the 
disdain. This is the reason why “the wise get angry if they are looked down upon by the 
foolish,”26 Aquinas states. 
 
2.1.5 Effects of Anger 
 
In the very last question of the Treatise on the Passions, Aquinas discusses the effects of 
anger. He enumerates, pleasure, fervor, impediment of reason, and silence as the 
phenomena that can follow upon the movement of anger. We shall not discuss the last 
element, silence, at length since Aquinas simply indicates that “the disturbance of anger 
can be so great that the tongue is altogether prevented from exercising speech.”27 
Pleasure, somewhat surprisingly, is an effect of anger and it can follow anger in two 
ways; both however, are connected to anger’s desire for retribution. In the first instance, 
pleasure follows anger when retribution occurs in reality. In this way the movement of 
anger comes to rest and one experiences a complete pleasure. The second instance of 
pleasure appears before the occurrence of retribution in reality. This mechanism, Aquinas 
argues, works in two ways. In the first case, the pleasure can occur through hope as 
anticipation for a possible retribution. The second way is a continuous thought – here the 
lingering thought filled with desired images brings about pleasure. Both ways of this kind 
of pleasure, which occur prior to a real retribution, are not complete pleasures because the 
movement of sadness is still not at rest.28 
Fervor is another effect of anger named by Aquinas. Explanations of it rest on a 
medieval understanding of human physiology and the movements of liquids in the human 
body. But what is interesting is that Aquinas once more affirms the connection between the 
passion and the body. He repeats that “the bodily changes involved in the passions of the 
soul are proportioned to the appetite’s movement.”29 Anger is a forceful passion because it 
implies desire, the movement for retribution. Aquinas continues, “And since anger’s 
movement does not have the mode of a withdrawal (non est per retractionis), which is 
what cold is proportioned to, but instead has the mode of an incursion (est per modum 
insecutionis), which is what heat is proportioned to, the result is that anger’s movement is a 
cause of a certain fervor in the blood and spirits that surround the heart, which is itself an 
instrument of the passions of the soul. And from this it follows that because of the great 
disturbance of the heart that occurs in the case of anger, certain indications become 																																																								
25 Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 281-282. 
26 ST I-II 47.4. 
27 ST I-II 48.4. 
28 Cf. ST I-II 48.1. 
29 ST I-II 48.2. 
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especially apparent in the exterior members of those who get angry.”30 Aquinas also adds 
that anger seems not to be a very stable passion – because of the intensity of the fervor it is 
quickly consumed and dies out rapidly. Metaphorically, then, we can tell that in Aquinas’s 
thought anger sets our heart on fire, yet it is also important to pinpoint that the movement 
of the passion, for Aquinas, resonates with our bodies.  
A particularly important effect of anger is the impediment to reason. Is it possible to 
say that one of anger’s effects is an impediment to reason, even in light  
of Aquinas’s thought that anger is triggered by reason revealing the injury made? Aquinas 
answers this question positively. His answer, however, is remarkably related to material 
effects of anger. Anger is a particularly strong movement of an  
appetite that involves strong bodily change. This causes the body-soul composite to focus 
on those material effects of anger and so the usage of reason is  
impeded.31 Aquinas, however, has to explain how an act of reason can be part of anger’s 
cause and at the same time how anger can impede reason. To justify this Aquinas brings in 
a formal-material distinction. We are told that “the source of anger (principium irae) lies in 
reason as regards the appetitive movement, which is what is formal in anger.”32 The 
movement of anger, nonetheless, can prevent reason from adequate judgments “because of 
the commotion caused by the rapidly moving heat, which is what is material in anger. And 
on this score, anger impedes reason.”33 It seems that Aquinas finds an act of reason in the 
immaterial sense to inform the passion of anger, while anger as manifested in the material 
change of the body is an impediment to reason as it captures the whole attention of the 
body-soul composite.  
We should also note that we should not confuse the passion of anger with the sin of 
the same name. In the discussion on the virtues of fortitude and temperance in the Secunda 
secundae – Aquinas solidifies the view that anger is not evil in its species. He discusses 
anger vis-à-vis the passion of envy which, he confirms once more, is an evil passion in its 
species because it is directed at displeasure at someone’s good. But when it comes to 
anger, Aquinas argues that “if one is angry in accordance with right reason, one's anger is 
deserving of praise.”34 He furthers that if a passion is not evil by its genus, then we can 
measure its moral quality by its quantity – “that is in respect of its excess or deficiency; 
and thus evil may be found in anger, when, to wit, one is angry, more or less than right 
reason demands.”35 That means that Aquinas explicitly indicates that there is something 
morally wrong in getting excessively angry, but he also claims that it is also wrong not to 
get angry in situations where our reason requires it. Furthermore, Aquinas urges us to 
distinguish between zealous anger and sinful anger – the desire of anger for just retribution 
is praiseworthy, he repeats. “On the other hand,” Aquinas explains, “if one desires the 
taking of vengeance in any way whatever contrary to the order of reason, for instance if he 
desires the punishment of one who has not deserved it, or beyond his deserts, or again 																																																								
30 ST I-II 48.2. 
31 Cf. ST I-II 48.3. 
32 ST I-II 48.3. ad. 1. 
33 ST I-II 48.3. ad. 1. 
34 ST II-II 158.1. Translations of the Secunda secundae in this chapter come from the Fathers of the English 
Dominican Province translation available at 
http://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/SS/SS158.html#SSQ158OUTP1.  
35 ST II-II 158.1. 
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contrary to the order prescribed by law, or not for the due end, namely the maintaining of 
justice and the correction of defaults, then the desire of anger will be sinful, and this is 
called sinful anger.”36  
Aquinas further nuances that even in the case of anger where the just retribution is 
desired – the movement of the passion should not be too fierce internally and externally; if 
this is disregarded then the passion will be sinful. At this point, Aquinas also points out our 
responsibility for our emotional reactions. He writes that we cannot foresee all the arising 
passions, yet we have the power to revise them using our cognitive capacities and from this 
perspective – “since this movement is somewhat in his power, it is not entirely sinless if it 
be inordinate.”37 Passions are manageable to some extent and we are not free from 
responsibility from the disorderly passional reactions.  
Aquinas is well aware that non-regulated anger can turn into sin with grave 
consequences. He thus warns against the sin of anger: “It does not follow from the passage 
quoted that all anger is a mortal sin, but that the foolish are killed spiritually by anger, 
because, through not checking the movement of anger by their reason, they fall into mortal 
sins, for instance by blaspheming God or by doing injury to their neighbor.”38 Sin of anger 
is grave, but Aquinas firmly finishes Question 158 by indicating that it is also vicious to be 
without a passion of anger. He claims: 
 
Anger may be understood in two ways. In one way, as a simple movement of the will, whereby 
one inflicts punishment, not through passion, but in virtue of a judgment of the reason: and thus 
without doubt lack of anger is a sin. This is the sense in which anger is taken in the saying of 
Chrysostom, for he says (Hom. xi in Matth., in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. 
John Chrysostom): ‘Anger, when it has a cause, is not anger but judgment. For anger, properly 
speaking, denotes a movement of passion:’ and when a man is angry with reason, his anger is 
no longer from passion: wherefore he is said to judge, not to be angry. In another way anger is 
taken for a movement of the sensitive appetite, which is with passion resulting from a bodily 
transmutation. This movement is a necessary sequel, in man, to the movement of his will, since 
the lower appetite necessarily follows the movement of the higher appetite, unless there be an 
obstacle. Hence the movement of anger in the sensitive appetite cannot be lacking altogether, 
unless the movement of the will be altogether lacking or weak. Consequently lack of the 
passion of anger is also a vice, even as the lack of movement in the will directed to punishment 
by the judgment of reason.39 
 
The above claim results from Aquinas’s conviction that there can be no mistakes 
inherent in our nature which is fundamentally good. Sensitive appetite has its own purpose 
and in the case of anger, it is to execute the dictate of reason in a prompt way. Thus 
Aquinas concludes: “Wherefore just as the removal of the effect is a sign that the cause is 
removed, so the lack of anger is a sign that the judgment of reason is lacking.”40 
Aquinas presented us with a remarkably positive evaluation of the passion of anger – 
he connected it with the good, reason, and the concept of justice. This passion has a strong 
personal character and resonates deeply in our bodies. Aquinas makes a very clear 																																																								
36 ST II-II 158.2. 
37 ST II-II 158.2. ad. 3. 
38 ST II-II 158.3. ad. 1. 
39 ST II-II 158.8. 
40 ST II-II 158.8. ad. 3. 
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distinction between anger as a passion and anger as a sin. The latter is considered from the 
perspective of an undue object or from an inordinate quantity of the passion. Sinful anger 
affects our minds, words, and deeds (ST II-II 158.7) gravely, but the danger sinful anger 
holds does not prompt Aquinas to disregard anger as a passion. He considers the passion of 
anger to be a worthy part of what it means to be truly human; moreover, it is indicative of a 
proper judgment of reason in the situations of injustice. We should also remember that 
anger, as an irascible passion, is never an absolute terminus of the sense appetite; it always 
has to lead to something beyond itself since the irascible passions necessarily culminate in 
the passions of the concupiscible power.41  
Aquinas’s thoughts on anger as a passion and a sin still have intuitive and 
experiential appeal for consultation in our daily situations. It is also interesting to consider 
ethically – since anger appears to be a passion indicating that we might be in a particular 
kind of situation, a situation where a personal kind of injury is done by the unjust act of an 
other. Thinking of the ethical relevance and meaning of anger is not a conceptually easy 
task because of anger’s ambiguity; a fact also noted by Aquinas. But reflection on the 
nature and the appropriate boundaries of anger seems to be the labor of an ethics that 
attempts to shape our characters and our rational and emotional judgments and reactions.  
 
2.2 CONTEMPORARY THINKERS ON ANGER: ANGER AS A MORAL RESPONSE TO AN 
IMPERFECT WORLD 
 
“Be angry, but sin not.” Ephesians 4:26  
 
The above quotation is an epigraph of Amia Srinivasan’s paper questioning the aptness of 
the emotion of anger.42 The basic intuition behind this biblical line points to the spirit of 
the ideas of the authors whose work we will further discuss. Moderate anger, in this case, 
is described as an appropriate and, in fact, ethical response in certain situations. Our 
chosen thinkers, who we have opted to use because of the common link of accepting basic 
lines of an Aristotelian definition of anger, advance some of the claims we have seen 
Aquinas defending in contemporary discussions on the moral status of anger. The 
following discussion will locate anger as having an explicitly moral concern (an argument 
defended by philosopher Aaron Ben-Ze’ev) and will point to the areas of ethical concern 
where reasonable anger can be a first indication that something is amiss. Researchers in 
philosophy and human geography, Amia Srinivasan and Victoria L. Henderson 
respectively, consider anger from a political perspective and suggest that anger can serve 
as an insightful voice in situations of injustice. Furthermore, both thinkers advance an 
argument that silencing anger experienced by victims may signal a certain ethical 
insensitivity. Srinivasan asserts one’s capacity to be sensitive to injustices and get angry 
about them as a morally upright quality, while also recognizing that anger, in often cases, 
can worsen the situation of the victim. Henderson, on the other hand, proposes anger as 																																																								
41 See sections 3. Structure of the Passions: The Concupiscible and the Irascible Division and 3.1 The 
Relationship Between the Concupiscible and the Irascible Passions of Chapter III.  
42 Cf. Amia Srinivasan, “The Aptness of Anger (2014),” 1.  
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~corp1468/Research_&_Writing_files/Aptness%20of%20Anger_current.pdf [accessed 
March 15, 2015]. 
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being able to form and empower our moral identities, moreover, prompting us to an actual 
political action seeking change. Lastly, Krista K. Thomason, a professor of philosophy, 
considers anger vis-à-vis forgiveness and suggests that we do not have to consider 
retributive emotions and emotions traditionally favored as morally positive as necessarily 
being mutually exclusive. Concretely, anger does not need to exclude a general sense of 
respect and benevolence toward our offender. 
Aaron Ben-Ze’ev considers the nature of the emotion of anger in general terms. He 
affirms Aquinas’s claims that anger can, indeed, qualify as a moral emotion (as opposed to 
immoral or morally neutral emotions). Ben-Ze’ev acknowledges that the criteria for 
determining the moral character of emotion is a matter of debate, but in his view there are 
two measurements against which we can attempt to assess emotions – the morality of its 
core evaluative concern and the positive moral consequences it yields.43 Ben-Ze’ev utilizes 
the same Aristotelian working definition of anger as an emotion which rises from a 
subjective perception of something that one considers to be an unjustified harm inflicted 
upon oneself or someone one cares about which, in often cases, is perceived as a personal 
insult that yields a desire for retaliation. Precisely because anger registers the possible 
undeserved harm its content is explicitly moral, Ben-Ze’ev argues. Anger refers to the 
feeling of down-grading, placing one in an inferior position. This down-grading however, 
is caused by the perceived unjust activity of the other and does not involve a comparative 
stand as envy44 does – rather, it signals how our relationships with others should be. When 
it comes to the possible consequences of the emotion of anger, Ben-Ze’ev argues that this 
issue is more difficult to answer because it is an empirical question requiring observational 
studies. His assessment, however is “that a moderate intensity of anger and resentment 
may typically have positive consequences.”45 
The meaning, normativity, and the practical consequences of anger are also the ideas 
Amia Srinivasan wrestles with. This area of Srinivasan’s thought focuses on the political 
dimension of anger. Her argument starts with the presupposition that when we think of 
anger in that context, contemporary philosophical discussions tend to focus on the possible 
negative consequences of anger and so dismiss it as dangerously counterproductive. In 
fact, as we have already mentioned in the second chapter, Nussbaum is one of the main 
thinkers arguing that from a pragmatic point of view, anger is destructive. Furthermore, 
she argues that some of anger’s normative claims are simply irrational.46  Anger is 
considered to be a weapon of self-harm and its counter-productivity is a reason not to get 
																																																								
43 Cf. Aaron Ben-Ze’ev, “Are Envy, Anger, and Resentment Moral Emotions?,” Philosophical Explorations: 
An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action Vol. 5, No. 2 (2002): 148. 
44 Ben-Ze’ev claims that relative unfavorable comparison is a cause of envy and the subject’s perceived 
inferiority is its main evaluative concern. Envy also sees the inferiority as undeserved thus it argues about the 
situations of fortune, but this, according to Ben-Ze’ev, is not a moral claim because it does not address how 
we should treat other people. See Ben-Ze’ev, “Are Envy, Anger, and Resentment Moral Emotions?,” 149-
152. 
45 Ibid., 153. 
46 See sections 4.1.1.4 The Case of Anger and 4.1.1.5 Concluding Remarks where we begin to introduce 
Nussbaum’s views on anger; also see section 5.4 Is Compassion the Only Political Emotion We Owe to 
Others? with all its subsections where we present Srinivasan’s discussion on the nature of anger vis-à-vis 
Nussbaum’s concept of compassion, all found in Chapter II. We will go on to present Nussbaum’s evolved 
views on anger in the upcoming section, 2.3 Nussbaum Against Anger. 
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angry regardless of the circumstances.47 But Srinivasan wants to shift the focus to argue 
that anger cannot be normatively evaluable solely on the basis of its effects; we also have 
to look at its intrinsic reasons. Thus, her suggestion is to look into the cognitive content of 
anger which in itself contains justification of it, a claim similar to that of Ben-Ze’ev.  
Anger, for Srinivasan, is also responsive to the harm done. She argues that when we 
communicate what we are angry about, we at the same time communicate the reasons for 
our anger. Srinivasan furthers that “[w]hat makes anger intelligible as anger, and distinct 
from mere disappointment, is that anger implies that its object involves a normative 
violation: not just a violation of how one wishes things were, but a violation of how things 
ought to be.”48 Anger has its reasons and we can consider our anger apt when it is a 
response to a genuine moral violation. However, even apt anger can make an angry person 
worse off; thus Srinivasan considers that apt counterproductive anger is a reality of our 
political times.49 Due to this possibility we have to think about the meaning of anger with a 
great amount of responsibility. Because anger seems to be genuinely epistemically 
productive, it reveals the world to us and Srinivasan considers this pursuit to be legitimate. 
We cannot obligate someone to feel anger about witnessed injustice, but to merely permit 
this emotion also seems to miss the target. For Srinivasan, we lose something of the 
intrinsic worth when we can no longer get angry about the injustices plaguing our 
societies. Thus she suggests “that our capacity for apt anger is a good thing in itself, like a 
virtue or a capacity to be compelled by the beautiful or the sublime. It is not something we 
are obligated to possess, nor are merely permitted to possess; it is simply a good thing if 
we are such that we are disposed to respond to injustice with apt anger.”50  
Arguing for aptness of anger for Srinivasan does not only entail defending our 
capacity to appreciate the way the world is, it is also venerating the reality of the victim. 
There is something morally insensitive in quieting the victim, even in an attempt not to 
worsen the situation. Srinivasan opines that arguing against anger shifts the focus from the 
atrocity and the responsibility of the perpetrator and leaves it in the hands of the victim. 
The pragmatic perspective, that is, advice to focus on something one has control over (in 
other words, pacifying the situation, looking into one’s own responsibility, even as victims 
of the behavior of others), can in itself be oppressive. It indicates the lack of care for the 
suffering victim. 
Wrestling with the normativity of anger is a delicate task because of the practical 
implications it entails. Nonetheless, anger in itself seems to suggest positive epistemic 
effects and this seems to be of intrinsic value, a genuine good – “it is an intrinsically 
worthwhile thing not only to know but also to feel the ugly facts that structure our political 																																																								
47 Cf. Srinivasan, “The Aptness of Anger,” 4.  
48 Ibid., 8. 
49 Srinivasan grants that anger at injustice can be largely counterproductive to its victims. She considers that 
there are cases where the eloquent anger of a leader or even angry solidarity that erupts in political protests 
can have persuasive power. Yet she highlights that “[i]t is naïve to think that anger is always productive in 
this way, that getting angry at injustice does not often result in great personal cost, that it does not often result 
in a worsening of one’s life chances, that it does not often invite more violence against already beaten bodies. 
Indeed, I think we do not arrive at a full understanding of injustice and oppression if we do not acknowledge 
that our political arrangements provide ample occasions for anger that is at once apt and counterproductive: 
anger that is the justified response to the political facts, but nonetheless makes the angry person worse off.” 
Srinivasan, “The Aptness of Anger,” 7. 
50 Ibid., 15. 
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reality.”51 Thus in Srinivasan’s thought anger is a source of a real moral and political 
knowledge and reflecting upon it can disclose the structure of our surroundings. Anger is a 
real response to that structure; furthermore, it can be a response to what can sometimes be 
a very immoral reality. Not dismissing anger means focusing on the reality of the victim, 
acknowledging the truth of his/her suffering, Srinivasan argues. Additionally, not 
dismissing the anger of the victim is a way to recognize that one’s injury and pain is real 
and that one is justified in being angry. This seems a way to encounter the other in the 
situation he/she is and to respect its gravity. Does Srinivasan suggest encouraging the 
anger of the victim or fostering our own? No, this is not the aim of her reasoning. Her 
purpose rather, is to encourage our moral sensitivity to the atrocities happening in the 
contemporary political world and to be reactive to it, be moved by it. She also does not 
suggest stimulating the anger of the suffering, but attending to it sympathetically, not 
focusing on the anger exclusively but on the reasons behind it. Thus, Srinivasan 
insightfully concludes her reflection on anger by stating:  
 
A recognition of anger’s aptness might seem to threaten a return to the petulant and vengeful 
Achilles, a backwards slide into a form of life in which justice is not the business of the state, 
but the personal lot of each man. With the spectre of the raging Achilles in mind, we counsel 
against anger. But in so doing we forget, as we have always forgotten, those who were never 
allowed to be angry, the slaves and women who have the power of neither the state nor the 
sword.52 
 
Victoria L. Henderson unpacks anger in a similarly positive fashion looking to the 
voice it brings in situations of social/political injustices. She discusses anger vis-à-vis the 
emotion of hope which is often contrasted with anger (as we will see shortly, hopeful 
compassion is an emotion that Nussbaum pleads for as an alternative to the politics of 
anger). In a nutshell, Henderson pleads for bringing to the fore of our academic reflections 
the realization that human ethics is out there, on the field. This is the reason adequate 
ethical projects should take into account the emotions that resonate with the experience of 
a large part of our societies. “Hope may nourish contemporary academic theory,” 
Henderson argues, “but as the May 2008 issue of NGO World makes clear, people in the 
throws of precarity are, practically speaking, hungry and angry.”53 She, similarly to all the 
aforementioned thinkers, construes anger in an Aristotelian fashion, as a dominant 
emotional response to a perception of injustice “that tends more than other emotions, to 
impel punitive and/or preventative demands”54 and “can fortify resolve to endure in the 
struggle for accountability.”55 Henderson also argues (as Ben-Ze’ev and Srinivasan) that 
these descriptions of the nature of anger, in turn, represent the three intrinsic reasons why 
we should offer a guarded defense of anger. First of all, if anger is indeed a response to 
perceived injustice – it is not only its excess that should worry us, but also its deficiency 
(Henderson, in fact, quotes Aquinas while suggesting this argument). Secondly, anger’s 																																																								
51 Ibid., 18. 
52 Ibid., 19. 
53 Victoria L. Henderson, “Is There Hope for Anger?,” Emotion, Space and Society 1 (2008): 29. NGO World 
is a development research magazine published in Lahore, Pakistan.  
54 Henderson, “Is There Hope for Anger?,” 28. 
55 Ibid., 28. 
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objective is correction of the perceived injustice (it has punitive and/or preventative 
demands), that means it will also focus on the perpetrator. Henderson considers it to be a 
positive motivational power which more than sympathy tends to result in an active political 
action against the source of injustice.56 “The third and final reason to defend anger,” 
Henderson writes, “is that it ‘puts fire in the belly and iron in the soul’ (Gamson, 1992: 
32), discharging ‘emotional in-process benefits’ (Wood, 2001: 272) that can fortify resolve 
to endure in the struggle for justice and accountability.”57 Providing an example of the 
fieldwork in ethnographic literature conducted on the topic of the post-civil war in El 
Salvador, Henderson suggests that anger instilled a sense of agency that was truly 
transformative for the El Salvadorian peasant communities.58 
Henderson furthers that our affective responses are not fully autonomous processes 
as they are deeply embedded in the socio-political contexts that we find ourselves in. Our 
societies have feeling rules and there is an ongoing debate about the legitimacy of certain 
emotions. Here Henderson makes a similar observation to Srinivasan’s concern that the 
sanctioning of anger is usually directed at particular groups and individuals (women, ethnic 
minorities, working class, the disabled, etc.) and by blaming someone for being angry we 
shift the 
 
attention away from blameworthy behavior to the mode of expressing blame, and by shifting 
the responsibility from the people who could do something about the blameworthy behavior to 
the expresser herself, who is now meant to account for her behavior. The expresser cannot 
account for or defend her intended anger, however, because her interpreters are no longer 
listening. ‘You’re so bitter’ is meant to be not challenging but silencing.59  
 
One could add that often we want to listen to eloquent rhetoric of hope and a 
common future, but at times we forget that those victims who express their anger at great 
social injustices come from vulnerable social circumstances and their emotional resources 
are also limited because of the injuries they have suffered. Henderson’s main argument is 																																																								
56 Henderson’s point is that anger motivates us to remove the obstacle ‘to the way things ought to be.’ She 
refers us to the study arguing that anger tends to motivate one to more explicitly political activities such as 
signing a petition or participating in a protest. See Leo Montada and Angela Schneider, “Justice and 
Emotional Reactions to the Disadvantaged,” Social Justice Research Vol. 3, No. 4. (1989): 313–344. 
Henderson also compares anger’s motivational power vis-à-vis compassion’s and quotes the study arguing 
that “[a]lthough sympathy for the unfortunate may provide the motivation for personal helping when a 
person is in a direct relationship, sympathy for the unfortunate (or an emotional connection with them) does 
not appear to provide the motivation necessary for people to take a political action that requires effort. Such 
righteous behavior – behavior to secure justice in indirect relationships – is motivated by anger at injustice, 
by moral outrage, rather than sympathy[.]” Henderson, “Is There Hope for Anger?,” 30 quoting Joseph De 
Rivera et al., “The Emotional Motivation of Righteous Behavior,” Social Justice Research Vol. 7, No. 1 
(1994): 91–106. 
57 Henderson, “Is There Hope for Anger?,” 30 quoting William A. Gamson, Talking Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 32 and Elisabeth Jean Wood, “The Emotional Benefits of Insurgency in 
El Salvador,” in Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements, eds. Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, 
and Francesca Polletta (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 272.  
58 Henderson quotes: “The interviews generally suggest that moral outrage provided initial motivation early 
in the war […] and that pride and pleasure of agency later supplemented or replaced outrage for those 
participating as well as motivating participation for others (Wood, 2001: 273).” Henderson, “Is There Hope 
for Anger?,” 30 quoting Wood, “The Emotional Benefits of Insurgency in El Salvador,” 273. 
59 Henderson, “Is There Hope for Anger?,” 31 quoting Sue Campbell, “Being Dismissed: The Politics of 
Emotional Expression,” Hypatia Vol. 9, No. 3 (1994): 51. 
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that there are some things about which we should get angry; furthermore “that the task of 
the social scientist, and especially one committed to building a participatory academy, is to 
ensure that not only voices but also emotions transition from the field to the academic 
forum, then it is not unreasonable to expect anger to have a place in social science 
research. Moreover, I would argue, it is both reasonable and necessary to question whether 
the absence of anger is symptomatic of failed contagion, and whether this, in turn, may be 
read as a breach of emotional – and political – solidarity with (angry) others.”60 We should 
also note that Henderson does not argue that hope and anger are oppositional or mutually 
exclusive. There cannot be any politics or ethics without hope, after all, since these are 
endeavors directed at a common and, indeed, better future. Yet we should be suspicious of 
the reasons why anger is silenced. Furthermore, we should inquire whether the absence of 
anger in the face of someone facing an injustice does not in fact signal an absence of 
actual, moving care in us and our communities.  
Krista K. Thomason also offers a positive evaluation of anger. While dwelling on the 
nature and relationship between retributive emotions and emotions which are traditionally 
attributed a positive moral character, specifically forgiveness, she suggests they do not 
have to necessarily exclude each other. Generally speaking, anger is often discussed vis-à-
vis emotions that have a positive moral evaluation such as compassion, hope, and 
forgiveness. The latter are conceived as emotions which are aimed at building and 
sustaining relationships and anger alerts us that something is going wrong within that 
relationship. We have seen Henderson making similar claims in the case of anger and 
hope. We would now like to further look into the dynamics of the relationship between 
positive emotions, concretely, forgiveness and the dimensions of compassion and humility 
it entails and retributive emotions.  
Thomason argues that a forgiving person is praised because he/she shows some good 
character traits, namely, compassion and humility.61 She broadly defines compassion as a 
recognition of humanity in others (thus, when we forgive the offender that entails us still 
seeing him/her as a fellow human being and not reducing him/her to a one dimensional 
trait – the offense). She defines humility as the recognition of our own moral imperfection 
which includes the fact that we can ourselves be in the position of the offender. Thus 
Thomason argues that forgiveness ultimately offers facilitation and expression of our 
compassion and humility. Retributive emotions are considered to be hostile feelings that 
make one more prone to see himself/herself as superior to others. Yet, philosophical 
tradition also recognizes retributive emotions (Thomason is interested in anger and 
resentment in particular) to be responses to the unjust harms done to oneself and as such 
they express the self-respect of an agent. From this perspective, both our ability to forgive 
and our ability to get angry present themselves as integral parts of our moral agency. 																																																								
60 Henderson, “Is There Hope for Anger?,” 32. Elsewhere in the text Henderson insightfully comments that 
in some particular situations our experience, our lives cannot be thought of apart from the emotions we carry. 
Thus there are moments of particular injury where anger defines the sufferer and this is important to 
acknowledge: “[A]t particular times and in particular places, there are moments where lives are so explicitly 
lived through pain, bereavement, elation, anger, love and so on that the power of emotional relations cannot 
be ignored.”  Henderson, “Is There Hope for Anger?,” 30 quoting Kay Anderson and Susan Smith, 
“Editorial: Emotional Geographies,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers Vol. 26, No.1 
(2001): 7. 
61 Cf. Krista K. Thomason, “Forgiveness or Fairness?,” Philosophical Papers Vol. 44, No. 2 (2015): 237. 
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Thomason points out that retributive emotions do not express compassion and 
humility and thus they are thought to be alienating (casting a gap between me and the 
offender) and judgmental (it is ‘downward-looking’ because we presume that we actually 
can judge the other).62 Thomason tackles the first argument that anger is alienating and 
prevents us from seeing the common humanity we share with our offender. Anger fails to 
demonstrate to the offender the care and concern that we would otherwise show for our 
fellow human beings. “Given that we can be angry with friends, family members, and 
spouses, this conclusion seems not to follow[,]”63 Thomason argues. She points out that 
we, indeed, can get most angry with people whose well-being we care about the most 
(precisely because of this emotion invested), and at times forgiveness becomes rather 
difficult in such situations. We might not be able to feel love while being angry, but this 
does not entail the fact that anger precludes love. Thomason’s aim is to demonstrate that 
anger does not preclude basic moral consideration – that is, seeing someone as a moral 
agent in the first place. After all, “[i]t is the special moral dignity of the wrongdoer that 
makes the injury we sustained at her hand not simply an unfortunate harm, like a natural 
accident, but an offense against us[.]”64 Thomason furthers that if we want to think of basic 
moral consideration not only in terms of moral agency, but also in terms of benevolence, 
anger still does not preclude it. She points to the same argument as in the case of love and 
anger – being angry with someone and not feeling benevolent toward the wrongdoer does 
not mean that we gave up being benevolent and gave up all the moral considerations we 
owe him/her. 
Furthermore, Thomason also rejects the consideration that anger is judgmental (in 
the sense of ranking oneself above the offender). “But to see someone as an offender does 
not entail that we see him as an inferior[,]” Thomason writes, “‘[i]n resentment, the victim 
protests the trespass, affirming both its wrongfulness and the moral significance of both 
herself and the offender[.]’”65 Thus she argues that the perception, that is, the registration 
of an offense entails a confirmation of a moral standing of the offender; it acknowledges 
that “the offender is a moral agent like herself who speaks the same moral language.”66 If 
one understands herself and the offender as moral agents then anger is not a real threat to a 
proper humility because humility requires understanding that one can also make the same 
missteps as the offender, but it does not demarcate what kind of attitude we should take 
against the offense, including that of our own. “If an agent believed that undeserved 
injuries deserve anger,” Thomason writes, “she would still be properly humble as long as 
she accepted that her moral mistakes also deserved anger.”67 Thomason furthers that anger 
can imply the notion of superiority, but it does not have to – if we judge someone to be 
significantly beneath us, in often case, the injury will not register (precisely because of the 
lack of care). The mechanisms of trying to cool someone’s anger by proclaiming ‘it is not 
worth it,’ point precisely to the fact that getting angry with someone attaches a significant 																																																								
62 Cf. Ibid., 244. 
63 Ibid., 245. 
64 Ibid., 246 quoting Pamela Hieronymi, “Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, Vol. 62, No. 3 (2001): 553.  
65  Thomason, “Forgiveness or Fairness?,” 246 quoting Hieronymi, “Articulating an Uncompromising 
Forgiveness,” 530. 
66 Thomason, “Forgiveness or Fairness?,” 247. 
67 Ibid., 247. 
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amount of importance to the person.68 
Retributive emotions such as anger and resentment while not necessarily constituting 
positive feelings toward others, do not exclude our compassion and humility – which 
forms a general framework of regard for the other. This is rather evident in our personal 
relationships and there is no reason to think that the same mechanisms cannot apply to 
distant others. 
 
2.3 NUSSBAUM AGAINST ANGER 
 
“Even God prays. What is His prayer? May it be My will that My love of compassion 
overwhelm my demand for strict justice.”69  
 
Though we maintain a general interpretation of Nussbaum’s philosophy as aiming at the 
betterment of society in the here and now while contributing to the formation of more just 
and compassionate imaginations of individuals, 70  we could say that the preceding 
quotation captures the spirit of her evolving view on anger. We have already presented the 
contours of Nussbaum’s argument in the second chapter of this work where she moved 
from a limited appreciation of ‘justified anger’ as a force in a fight for social justice to 
becoming very critical of the emotion and admitting only something she calls ‘transitional 
anger.’71 In her recent article Nussbaum declares: “I am hereby renouncing a range of 
things I said in earlier work about the constructive role of anger, and I am now saying 
something very radical: that in a sane and not excessively anxious and status-focused 
person, anger’s idea of retribution or payback is a brief dream or cloud, soon dispelled by 
saner thoughts of personal and social welfare.”72 Nussbaum’s views on anger developed 
into a very critical stance, but we should also note that in the works on emotions previously 
examined, she did not comment extensively on anger. Her comments involved identifying 
anger as an ambivalent emotion and even though she admitted to a possible ethical 
advantage of a ‘justified anger,’ she nonetheless, advocated for compassion as a 
constructive and reliable guide to approach questions of justice.73  
This section will unpack her further developed views on anger and her suggested 
alternative – compassionate hope.74 Nussbaum now takes up the task of defining anger 
explicitly and does so within an Aristotelian framework, in similar vein to the discussion 
on anger above. Anger, Nussbaum claims, is “a desire accompanied by pain for an 
imagined retribution on account of an imagined slighting inflicted by people who have no 																																																								
68 Cf. Ibid., 247. 
69 Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jean Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), 4 quoting Mahzhor for Yom Kippur. The Rabbinical Assembly of New York, 439 from Berakhot 7a; 
the emphasis is ours. 
70 See section 1.  Introduction to Martha C. Nussbaum’s Ethical Project with all its subsections in Chapter I.  
71 See sections 4.1.1.4 The Case of Anger and 4.1.1.5 Concluding Remarks in Chapter II. 
72 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Transitional Anger,” Journal of the American Philosophical Association Vol. 1, 
No. 1 (2015): 51. 
73 Again, see our analysis in section 4.1.1.4 The Case of Anger in Chapter II. 
74 We should note that Nussbaum’s views on anger developed during the production of this work, thus it was 
an interesting process following up and adjusting our own interpretation. Her extended work on the emotion 
of anger – Anger and Forgiveness – is not yet published, but we can look into her recent article on the matter 
for some core ideas and arguments. 
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legitimate reason to slight oneself or one’s own.”75 Nussbaum notes that the target of anger 
is the person who inflicted the perceived damage and the focus of it is an act done by the 
person perceived as wrongful damage. We should be attentive at this moment as 
Nussbaum is starting to design her main argument concerning the nature of anger – unlike 
the previous thinkers (Aquinas included), she points out that it is not the unjust harm that is 
the focus of anger, but rather the act through which it is inflicted, that is, slighting or 
down-ranking. Furthermore, Nussbaum interprets that slighting or down-ranking is not an 
omnipotent element of anger, and opines that Aristotle might have made a small mistake 
with this understanding. Nonetheless, the concept is very characteristic to how anger 
‘reasons.’ Even though, Aristotle makes the reference to down-ranking in connection to his 
own honor culture, Nussbaum argues that it is naïve to think that in contemporary Western 
culture, people are not concerned with their standing. She wants to construe the perceived 
down-ranking of anger as a status injury and suggests that while it is not always the case, 
very often anger is about it. “And status-injury has a narcissistic flavor[,] Nussbaum 
writes, “rather than focusing on the wrongfulness of the act as such, a focus that might lead 
to concern for wrongful acts of the same type more generally, the status-angry person 
focuses obsessively on her own standing vis-à-vis others.”76 
Now the other element of anger’s judgment that Nussbaum distrusts is its retributive 
desire which she conceives as a desire seeking to compensate for the damage which was 
inflicted to the perceiver. Nussbaum suggests that the idea that a payback can in some way 
lessen or undo our own damage is irrational and grounded in a kind of magical thinking – 
“The fantasy that payback restores is magical thinking, abetted by ideas of cosmic balance 
that are deeply engrained in many cultures, but not the less irrational for that.”77 Yet, if we 
think of payback not in a sense of undoing damage, but as a retaliation of an injured status, 
then it is not based on magical thinking (in this case, retaliation can be achieved through a 
juridical system or some other way). Nussbaum furthers: “Notice that things make sense 
only if the focus is purely on relative status, rather than on some intrinsic attribute (health, 
safety, bodily integrity, friendship, love, wealth, good academic work) that has been 
jeopardized by the wrongful act. Retaliation does not confer or restore those things.”78 
Nussbaum’s aim is to demonstrate that things connected to human dignity are not that 
easily damaged and if our injury concerns matters that are not of a purely relative status 
there is no justification for the thought that payback will restore it. Her core argument is 
that anger focuses on the act of slighting (if such down-ranking is perceived) at which 
point our anger is about status injury – which is essentially narcissist – we can retaliate our 
status. In this way Nussbaum unhooks anger from the concept of human dignity since in 
most cases our anger is about relative matters. If we get angry about the matters of intrinsic 
importance – anger’s desire for payback is illusionary because inflicting damage on the 
wrongdoer does not restore our own damage. Framing anger’s desire in that way 
Nussbaum detaches anger from the concept of fighting for justice. 
Throughout her text Nussbaum illustrates her views on anger by tackling an example 
of possible reactions of a young woman when she learns that her close friend was raped. 																																																								
75 Nussbaum, “Transitional Anger,” 42 quoting Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book II, 1378b. 
76 Nussbaum, “Transitional Anger,” 45. 
77 Ibid., 48. 
78 Ibid., 49. 
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Nussbaum thinks that there are several ways this woman can deal with the situation: 
 
Three paths lie before her. Either she goes down the path of status-focus, seeing the event as all 
about her and her rank, or she focuses on payback and imagines that the offender’s suffering 
would actually make things better, a thought that doesn’t make sense. Or, if she is rational, 
after exploring and rejecting these two roads, she will notice that a third path is open to her, 
which is the best of all: she can focus on doing what would make sense in the situation and be 
really helpful. This may include the punishment of O, but in a spirit that is ameliorative rather 
than retaliatory.79 
 
The first path involves a narcissistic error or status error for Nussbaum. Here the idea 
of payback is intelligible, but it seems morally flawed. This path perceives all the injuries 
as issues of relative personal rank making the world revolve around our desires of control. 
The second path focuses on the damage done to the genuine good (in the case of the rape, 
the bodily integrity), but considers that the suffering of the offender somehow atones that 
loss. This is not a moral error, Nussbaum opines, but an error of rational thinking.80 If we 
truly want to improve society and offenders we have to turn to the third path – a path of 
compassionate hope. 
Nussbaum considers anger to be a bad adviser and she wants to focus on thoughts 
that are genuinely concerned with advancing personal and social wellbeing, even in the 
face of great injury. She calls those forward-looking thoughts, the movement from anger to 
compassionate hope, the Transition. We have already encountered Nussbaum’s recent 
views on advancement of questions of social justice where she takes such political leaders 
as Martin Luther King and Gandhi, among others, as exemplary figures. The Transition, 
even in the face of great injustice, maintains a future-looking, not a retributive perspective. 
Justice can be achieved only through intelligent and imaginative movement and this 
constitutes the core of Nussbaum’s concept of the Transition. The Transition wants 
reconciliation and shared effort; even forgiveness, understood in classical terms, is not its 
aim: 
 
We notice something else: once the Transition gets underway, there is no room for forgiveness 
as classically conceived in transactional terms, namely, as a waiving of resentment because of 
an expression of contrition. The payback mentality wants groveling. The Transition mentality 
wants justice and brotherhood.81 
 
One could wonder what the justice and brotherhood the Transition seeks is based on 
if the initial relationship is broken and not yet mended. But Nussbaum moves on with her 
exposé and attempts to indicate a peculiar species of anger she finds legitimate in the 
process of the Transition. The only kind of emotion that recognizes injury and urges that 
something needs to be done to change it is Transition-Anger. And this is entirely the 
cognitive content of this emotion – recognizing how outrageous the situation is and feeling 																																																								
79 Ibid., 50. 
80 Nussbaum’s argument in a nutshell is as follows: “To put my radical claim succinctly: when anger makes 
sense, it is normatively problematic (focused on status); when it is normatively reasonable (focused on the 
injury), it doesn’t make good sense, and is normatively problematic in that different way. In a rational 
person, anger, realizing that, soon laughs at itself and goes away.” Nussbaum, “Transitional Anger,” 51-52. 
81 Ibid., 53. 
		 284	
the urge to do something about it without a retributive desire: 
 
Transition-Anger does not focus on status; nor does it want, even briefly, the suffering of the 
offender as a type of payback for the injury. It never gets involved in that type of magical 
thinking. It focuses on future welfare from the start. Saying ‘Something should be done about 
this’, Transition-Anger commits itself to a search for strategies, but it remains an open question 
whether the suffering of the offender will be a strong candidate.82 
  
How can we define Transition-Anger conceptually? Is it a species of anger as we 
commonly understand it? Nussbaum leaves this question open, because of the conviction 
that such borderline cases as the Transition-Anger are seldom treated well while 
attempting to conceptualize them. Nussbaum thinks this is clearly an emotion and it is 
delicately separate from compassionate hope because it is focused on outrage and the 
offender is its target; but instead of seeking retribution it looks forward. This is a rare 
emotional reaction to have from the start regarding human injustices, Nussbaum declares, 
as it is more common in the beginning to get angry and gradually to move toward the 
thoughts of social welfare. The Transition-Anger also typically requires self-discipline 
over a long period. Nussbaum further suggests that we manage our anger and move toward 
Transition-Anger by a sympathetic understanding of the other person’s positions and 
motives – “if you see the other person’s point of view, by that very act you are no longer 
exclusively focused on your own status, and therefore you are less prone to make the status 
error. You are also less prone to make the payback error, for you will see the future as one 
involving other people, and your tendency to think of welfare in general social terms will 
be assisted.”83 
Nussbaum finishes her analysis of anger by acknowledging that despite the ethical 
problems inherent in anger’s outlook this is a deeply human reaction which has its roots in 
evolutionary mechanisms of ‘fight or flight.’ When it comes to her own theory of 
emotions, Nussbaum is still willing to recognize anger as a signal that something is amiss 
and “[w]hile one could have that idea of significant injury without anger – with, and 
through, grief and compassion – those two emotions do not contain the idea of 
wrongfulness, which is anger’s specific focus.”84 From that point of view anger is a useful 
wake-up call, but we should always be aware of the signal it sends because of its 
conceptual connection with the idea of payback which is misleading. Because of this 
danger, a person is always advised to move beyond anger into the process of the 
Transition. Nussbaum also agrees that anger is motivational because it encourages people 
to act in the face of perceived injury, but once we are energized to act for a change – we 
should not fall back on anger’s retributive fantasies. Thus Nussbaum claims that we can 
affirm this very limited role of anger – as a signal and a motivational power, but we should 
insist that the payback element is misleading and emotion in general is very likely to lead 
us astray. Anger is also a deterring emotion, Nussbaum points out, and a common future of 
stability and peace is not very likely to be built on the spirit of fear it seeds. Thus 
Nussbaum concludes: “As Aeschylus notes, however, forward-looking systems of justice 																																																								
82 Ibid., 54. 
83 Ibid., 54. 
84 Ibid., 54. 
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have to a great extent made this emotion unnecessary, whether in personal or in public life. 
Like Athena’s citizens, we are now free to attend to its irrationality and destructiveness, 
and we should do so, focusing first on intimate personal relations, and then on the political 
realm.”85 
 
2.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Nussbaum seems to choose the Stoic interpretation of the emotion of anger.86 Anger, like 
all the emotions, has epistemic value, but we should be attentive to the presence of the 
emotion, to its alert signals indicating that there might be something wrong with a situation 
we are in. The cognitive content of the emotion is too problematic to be trusted as a good 
adviser in any moral situation. Anger can also motivate one to act for a change, but once 
we are set to do something about the situation – we should not be lured into the payback 
fantasy. The aim of Nussbaum’s article is to argue, as we have seen her arguing in the 
Political Emotions, that in “this day of torment, of craziness, of foolishness – only love can 
make it end in happiness and joy.”87 Anger is at best a useful wake-up call, but the 
perspective it suggests is flawed either ethically or rationally – it either suggests that our 
own ranking is what matters in situations of injustice or that if we get angry about genuine 
goods, it is irrational to think that a payback will somehow vindicate the situation when in 
reality it does not restore the lost good. Nussbaum thinks that anger does not provide a 
sustainable perspective for building personal and political relationships. We are 
sympathetic to her perspective – anger alarms, it does not build. Nussbaum has built a 
robust account on how emotions such as love and compassion aid toward one’s own moral 
growth and growth of our political communities and this account promises itself to be a 
wise guide.88  
Yet even when we acknowledge the need for a loving and compassionate outlook in 
our societies, Aquinas working out of an Aristotelian concept of anger and the 
contemporary voices arguing for the legitimacy of this emotion leave one wrestling. 
Aquinas’s distinction between anger as a passion and anger as a sin is insightful as he 
makes us attentive to anger’s epistemic worth when it is a reaction to an unjustly inflicted 
injury, but he is very particular about anger’s grave consequences when one is excessively 
angry. Aquinas, nonetheless, also considers that a lack of anger where the passion is 
appropriate is morally flawed. Contemporary thinkers Srinivasan, Henderson, and 
Thomason also argue for aptness of anger with a special attention to the context of social 
justice. They suggest that by proclaiming anger as ethically useless we take away an 
important voice, an insightful perspective from our ethical thought. The slight, the injury 																																																								
85 Ibid., 56. 
86 Seneca, for instance, argued for a total elimination of anger because the emotion inevitably leads to evil. 
See Seneca, “On Anger,” in Moral Essays, Vol. 1. Translated by John W. Basore, Loeb Classical Library 
(London: W. Heinemann, 1928). 
87 Nussbaum, Political Emotions, 176. 
88 See section 2.4 Roots of Emotional Experience in Infancy with all its subsections in Chapter I. Chapter II is 
generally devoted to presenting that position. 
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perceived by anger is understood here as a perception of the self as valuable and has to do 
with self-respect instead of having a strong link with holding onto one’s ego and one’s 
social standing as we have encountered in Nussbaum’s arguments. Additionally, anger is a 
perception of how one relates with his/her surroundings. Furthermore, there is something 
particularly ethically moving in the argument that anger usually provides the voice for the 
most vulnerable, most deprived, most injured. To dismiss their moral emotion without 
looking into its background reasons does not seem ethically correct. Do Aquinas, 
Srinivasan, Henderson or Thomason encourage anger? Our interpretation is that they do 
not – they suggest complementing our own anger with discernment. The contemporary 
thinkers, additionally, encourage us to look into the anger of others sympathetically. 
Dismissing the anger of someone who has suffered a serious injustice or harm seems to be 
a breach of the relationship of solidarity and does not take someone’s pain seriously. 
Nussbaum’s suggestion that her treatment of anger is pragmatic and serves as a vision for 
sustainable political communities might be true, but the authors arguing pro-anger want to 
remind us that our political communities are constituted of particular individuals. From 
that point of view, if we are confronted with a particular emotionally injured and angry 
individual, the dismissal of his/her anger as either narcissistic or irrational does not seem to 
lead to any practical consequences. Nussbaum only accepts something she calls Transition-
Anger which is left conceptually undefined in her exposé; it may be a species of anger 
traditionally understood, but it is also close to compassionate hope. It is anger without 
actually getting angry, one could conclude. It recognizes that the situation is outrageous; it 
wants to move to change it, yet without the ambivalence of the retributive emotions and it 
does not desire payback. This philosophically constructed emotion is the reaction of a well 
self-disciplined person, a leader like King and Gandhi to whom Nussbaum often refers. Is 
it then reasonable to argue that it is not possible for just any and everyone to achieve a 
compassionate state of mind? That is not the case; it is quite the contrary. We do think that 
the goal of any adequate ethical project is to encourage one to change for better in practical 
terms, in our daily lives. What we want to highlight however, is the view that reacting to 
injustice with an outrage that strives for change, yet with a loving mind requires prior 
emotional resources often unavailable for people who come from the most vulnerable 
social contexts. This is precisely why such people are owed recognition of the aptness of 
their anger. Anger, oftentimes, is an indication of real suffering which needs to be 
recognized in all its profoundness in order to build a relationship of trust and solidarity. 
This enables us to steer beyond our anger to a path of healing in subsequent courses of 
action.  
Finally, we could say that emotions like hope, love, and compassion suggest a 
perspective that can be used to build the world we want to live in. Anger, we can claim, is 
a response to the world we live in, the world of imperfect politics and social relationships. 
We want to argue that anger offers a useful alert to reflect about the reasons behind it and, 
in so doing, disclose situations that were not obvious to us. When it comes to the anger of 
others, especially those coming from fragile life circumstances, recognizing their anger as 
apt shows solidarity with their experience which is sometimes defined as and entangled 
with anger in very intimate ways. While ethical projects should not encourage anger, they 
should not shy away from reflections on this emotion and should instead suggest ways to 
access its possible meanings. That being said, we do believe that the emotions of love and 
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compassion are reliable aids in building sustainable relationships with the self, others close 
to us, and our larger communities. This is evident from the structural arrangement of our 
own work which is devoted in large part to contemplating the nature and possible ethical 
benefits of compassion. It is also important to note that for both Nussbaum and Aquinas 
ethically acceptable anger signifies transition, an emotion that is not a final answer 
(remember, for Aquinas anger is an irascible passion which never signifies a last 
movement of the sense appetite) but always has to move beyond itself. While we argue 
that a sustainable perspective which aims toward the flourishing of personal and political 
relationships focuses on what is beyond anger, it is also particularly important to create 
space in ethics to reflect on what anger signals and discloses, especially in the lives of 
those who suffer injustices.  
 
3. NUSSBAUM’S AND AQUINAS’S THOUGHT: SEARCHING FOR THE COMMON GROUND 
AND THE POINTS OF DIVERGENCE 
 
In the upcoming sections we will present the main points of convergence and divergence in 
Nussbaum’s and Aquinas’s accounts. We will start by highlighting the similarity of their 
general universalist ethical framework which is attentive to human desires. We will then 
demarcate the delicate line separating Nussbaum’s ethics of well-being and Aquinas’s 
ethics of happiness. Thereupon, we will identify the main elements of Nussbaum’s and 
Aquinas’s accounts of the emotions/passions. Additionally, at this juncture, we will search 
for points of similarity and departure. Firstly, we will identify both accounts as presenting 
the emotions/passions as intentional phenomena that locate us in a relationship with our 
environment. We will continue by differentiating Nussbaum’s and Aquinas’s suggestions 
for describing the kind of responses emotions/passions are to our environment – Nussbaum 
advocates the view that the emotions are forms of thought and Aquinas considers the 
passions to be the movements of the sense appetite. After this discussion we will present 
how both thinkers treat the bodily element in the emotions/passions and we will further 
illustrate how they treat some troublesome tendencies inherent in human affective 
experience. After laying this basis we will present what we consider to be a culmination of 
Nussbaum’s and Aquinas’s accounts – their proposals for training and cultivating our 
human affective dimension.  
 
3.1 UNIVERSALIST ETHICS GROUNDED ON INNER EQUIPMENT  
 
When thinking of the general ethical frameworks within which Aquinas and Nussbaum 
conceive the passions/emotions, we cannot ignore a certain similarity between the two 
which can be partially attributed to a common source they both greatly value – Aristotle. 
The emotional dimension constitutes a significant portion of their thought precisely 
because they consider ethics to be based on human cares. In the previous chapter we 
broadly situated Aquinas’s ethical thought highlighting that 
 
for Aquinas, normative principles are always conditional upon certain facts about what we 
desire. There is nothing about these principles that makes them true in the abstract, 
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independently of facts about human nature. Instead, those acts are morally right that best allow 
us to achieve the various ends that human beings all desire.89 
 
We have seen that Aquinas’s metaphysical principles allow him to trust human 
desire as a source of ethics – his theistic vision of a created good human nature is a 
guarantor and the basis of his thought. Nussbaum does not presuppose a theistic or, in fact, 
as she argues, any metaphysical background to her ethical approach. At the outset of her 
argumentation for the capabilities approach, she states that her suggested principles are 
‘free-standing’ and “not provided with any particular set of metaphysical or 
epistemological foundations.”90 Yet, in a manner uncommon to a liberal thinker, she also 
defends a universalist ethical account of human good which is anchored in certain 
observable human capacities.  
Nussbaum argues that she builds her claims on the premise that there are some 
universally recognizable human capabilities which ought to be protected and promoted – 
and a partial justification of this is grounded in the fact that people typically desire those 
things.91 Nussbaum is attentive to human desire in the political conception of the good for 
two reasons. First, it plays an epistemic role by being indicative of the fact that the chosen 
conception can prove itself a likely guarantor of political stability and it also “plays a 
limited and ancillary role in justifying the political conception.”92 What is more, for 
Nussbaum, desire in itself is valuable. “I have argued,” Nussbaum writes, “that desire is an 
intelligent part of the human being that deserves respect in itself in any procedure of 
justification we would design. Thus it seems to me that it is not only on account of stability 
that we refer to desire, but also because we respect that aspect of the human personality.”93 
“Similarly,” Nussbaum furthers, “I would argue that the emotions, desires, and even 
appetites of a human being are all humanly significant parts of her personality, deserving 
of respect as such. The personality is a unity, and practical reason suffuses all of its parts, 
making them all human rather than animal.”94 This is also essentially an argument we 
found in Aquinas.95 
It is, therefore, not surprising that ethical frameworks attentive to human cares also 
offer substantive discussions on human emotions – as we witness from both Nussbaum’s 
and Aquinas’s accounts.  
 																																																								
89 Pasnau and Shields, The Philosophy of Aquinas, 222. 
90 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Political Objectivity,” New Literary History Vol. 32, No. 4 (2001): 887. 
91 Cf. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, 112. 
92 Ibid., 152. 
93 Ibid., 154. 
94 Ibid., 155. 
95 This is also Aquinas’s reasoning when he defends the view that virtues directed at the passions also reside 
in the passions themselves. Nothing is superfluous in human nature and by our capacity of defining ourselves 
by practical reason we render our distinct faculties the dignity they deserve: “On the other hand, if what we 
are calling ‘passions’ are all the movements of the sentient appetite, then it is plain that those moral virtues 
that have to do with the passions as their proper matter cannot exist without the passions. The reason for this 
is that, given the Stoic view, it would follow that moral virtue renders the sentient appetite altogether 
superfluous. But it does not pertain to virtue that the powers that are subject to reason should be deprived of 
their own acts; rather, what pertains to virtue is that those powers should execute reason’s command by 
engaging in their proper acts. Hence, just as a virtue orders the members of the body toward the appropriate 
exterior acts, so it orders the sentient appetite toward its own well-ordered movements.” ST I-II 59.5. 
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3.1.1 Human Flourishing: Between Well-Being and Happiness  
 
Both Aquinas and Nussbaum also frame their ethics around the concept of desirable end of 
human life – to put it in contemporary terms – human flourishing. Neither account, 
however, equates it with a subjective state of being content. Both thinkers declare, as we 
have seen, that human beings share basic forms of functioning and that fulfilling those are 
essential to living a truly human life.  
We want to state, together with moral theologian Lisa Sowle Cahill, that the method 
utilized in this kind of ethics represents an inductive approach to universal human values 
and ethical principles. In constructing Nussbaum’s universalism, an argument of the 
inductive nature, Cahill follows Hilary Charlesworth, a feminist international law scholar, 
and suggests that Nussbaum’s argument can also be labeled as ‘transversalism’ – “The 
term suggests a method of inquiry in which agreement does not come from pre-existing 
premises, but is built up by empathetic and mutually critical dialogue. Partners cross back 
and forth into one another’s territories, expressing their own values and claims, listening to 
others, modifying their own perspectives, discovering together the moral nonnegotiables, 
and adopting an appreciative yet critical approach to their different realizations in different 
cultures.” 96  We should, however, note that Aquinas’s ethics is grounded in fixed 
metaphysical principles; the ethical method he suggests is, indeed, inductive observation. 
Lombardo suggests looking at it as an investigation of the structural features of human 
psychology and action – Aquinas identifies the constitutive elements of a given nature and 
then observes what brings that nature to fulfillment.97 Lombardo argues: 
 
[B]ecause our inclinations are oriented toward the perfection of the human person, they are 
fundamentally trustworthy. We can discover something about human flourishing by reflecting 
on our subjective experience of desire. Our experience of desire cannot be taken entirely at face 
value, due to the possibility of disordered desire and self-deception, but it does provide a 
legitimate, if incomplete, basis for determining how we should live.98 
 
While both Aquinas and Nussbaum are Aristotelian in considering that human 
flourishing consists of good activity – Nussbaum, unlike Aquinas, does not provide one 
with a ‘thick,’ comprehensive account of it, and for the reasons of political applicability 
chooses to define the human good in the language of capabilities. We have already 
indicated that Nussbaum, in her account of well-being, consults human desires, emotions, 
appetites to demarcate the boundaries of human capabilities; moreover, since she construes 
emotions as value appraisals – our educated emotions are perceived as normative to such a 
pursuit. Looking at the epistemic knowledge that the emotion of compassion offers, 
Nussbaum concludes that a truly flourishing human life is impossible without it – “the 
																																																								
96  Lisa Sowle Cahill, “Justice for Women. Martha Nussbaum and Catholic Social Teaching,” in 
Transforming Unjust Structures. The Capability Approach, eds. Séverine Deneulin, Mathias Nebel, and 
Nicholas Sagovsky (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), 87. 
97 Cf. Lombardo, The Logics of Desire, 232. 
98 Ibid., 233. 
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teaching of painful compassion is the beginning of social change and of the possibility of 
real happiness.”99 It is, indeed, from our weakness that our fragile happiness is born.100 
Jean Porter highlights the delicate line that separates Nussbaum’s ethics of well-
being and Aquinas’s ethics of happiness. Porter argues that even though the concepts are 
commonly understood as ‘human flourishing’ and though they have some relationship to 
each other, they, nonetheless, should not be entirely equated.101 In the ethics of well-being, 
the human needs, desires and regularities are seen as ‘raw,’ ‘neutral’ materials out of 
which we can construct various ethical systems. Porter, however, is wary of such an 
approach and she is thus critical of Nussbaum’s attempt to construct a universally 
persuasive account which would derive its conclusions from a morally neutral account of 
well-being. As we have seen, Nussbaum claims that capabilities should be regarded as a 
result of cross-cultural observation and experience and their ethical evaluation rests on a 
‘freestanding moral idea.’ Porter objects to such an argument and asserts that an attempt to 
ground capabilities on a ‘freestanding moral idea’ is “reminiscent of the claims of Grisez 
and Finnis to derive moral conclusions on the basis of self-evident intuitions of value 
without any need to appeal to empirical or metaphysical claims.”102 Furthermore, Porter 
suggests, an attempt to base ethical accounts on a neutral conception of human well-being 
may not do the work Nussbaum hopes it to do:  
 
Capabilities are not developed and exercised in isolation; rather, they are exercised in an 
orderly and reciprocally conditioned way, in and through the pursuit of a way of life which will 
always necessarily be to some extent culturally specific. Our moral intuitions about the claims 
attached to these capabilities will always be conditioned, to a greater or lesser degree, by our 
moral judgments regarding an overall way of life.103  
 
Thus Porter points out that life is never ‘neutral;’ people conceive their ideas 
contextually and they are always guided by particular philosophical (be it explicitly 
understood or intuitively felt) premises. Nussbaum is explicit that her approach is liberal – 
this means, Porter asserts, that it is already shaped by specific, not neutral moral values. 
One may debate the content of capabilities, but what Nussbaum essentially argues for is 
the moral significance of indication and creation of spaces and possibilities for 
functioning; the functioning itself being a choice. This move in itself, Porter claims, 
“reflects a moral judgment about the overriding value of autonomy that is itself, at least 
arguably, culturally specific.”104 Defining capabilities is already a moral task, Porter 
argues, and in choosing some over the other we already suggest a normative 
anthropological picture. She thus concludes: “In the process of moving from an account of 
well-being to moral theory, it seems that we will inevitably find ourselves making the 
kinds of value judgments about the proper form of human life that we were hoping to 
avoid.”105  																																																								
99 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Who Is the Happy Warrior? Philosophy Poses Questions to Psychology,” Journal 
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100 Cf. Ibid., 598. Here Nussbaum alludes to Rousseau’s argument found in Emile. 
101 Cf. Porter, Nature as Reason, 146. 
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104 Ibid., 151. 
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We should point out once again that Nussbaum is rather explicit in centering her 
account of capabilities on liberal democratic values. She wants to present the ethical 
evaluations as detached from any specific metaphysics in order to suggest that these 
evaluations rest, rather, on cross-cultural intuitions that the life of a human being, indeed, 
matters. Nussbaum indicates that her aim is not a comprehensive, but a political account 
with a pragmatic goal – that people defending particular comprehensive ethical accounts 
could have a common ground and in the broad lines of capabilities would find some 
overlapping points of agreement. This, Nussbaum thinks, may be a practical solution for 
plural contemporary societies that acknowledge that human beings across the world do not 
often have a chance to live a dignified life and desire more justice. Cahill, on her behalf, 
credits Nussbaum for such an attempt and her thought-provoking account. Furthermore, 
Cahill indicates that there are a number of instances where Catholic social teaching and 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach can meet, most notably in the stride against moral 
relativism, as well as the insistence upon the method Cahill labels as moral realism which 
focuses on the inductive approach. Here, Cahill further credits Nussbaum for her 
incorporation of emotions into the process of gaining moral knowledge and evaluation. 
Indeed, “[u]nlike many liberal philosophers, Nussbaum believes it is not only possible but 
also necessary to talk about ‘universal obligations,’ living a life that is ‘truly human,’ and 
about specific types of social organization that are or are not compatible with ‘human 
dignity.’”106 Yet, like Porter, Cahill indicates that the largest point of divergence between 
Catholic social thought and Nussbaum is Nussbaum’s insistence on autonomy and liberty 
as overarching criteria. Nussbaum persistently defines justice in terms of liberal criteria 
and Cahill insightfully comments that there are areas where Nussbaum’s thought could 
benefit from Catholic social teaching: 
 
There is something missing in the liberal scheme that can be provided by Catholic social 
teaching, and whose recognition is necessary for social change toward genuine equality. This 
missing factor is the intrinsically social nature of the person. The autonomy focus neglects 
precisely those social conditions of belonging, recognition, and access to material and political 
goods that Nussbaum wants to secure[.]107 
 
Catholic social teaching points to the social nature of human freedom and 
individuality. Furthermore, and very essentially, it highlights “the necessary role of 
participatory community in changing both individuals and social structures so that they are 
more just.”108 Those are the areas that ethics based on Aquinas’s insights can provide. 
While Aquinas’s ethics of happiness bases itself on the same ‘data’ as the ethics of well-
being, it is construed around the life of virtue – that is, it is based on a particular 
understanding of perfection. Thus Aquinas presents us with a substantive, ‘thicker’ account 
of happiness stemming from the Christian narrative. For Aquinas, the notion of happiness 
is central to his “theory of the natural law because it provides a framework within which to 
integrate two dimensions of human existence, namely, human nature comprehensively 
understood and the distinctive human character of natural existence, that is to say, human 																																																								
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reason.”109 Thus, happiness holds together two concepts – natural law and virtue – which 
sometimes can be perceived as standing in opposition to each other. Now the virtues 
themselves are dispositions perfecting our capacities for knowing and loving and they are 
exercised through a range of activities necessary for sustaining human life. In this sense, 
virtues considered as normative ideals “stem from and are ineliminably shaped by the 
natural inclinations and needs of the human organism. Hence, our paradigms for virtuous 
behavior, together with the reflective ideals grounded in those paradigms, represent the 
point of connection between well-being and the norms of the natural law – between nature 
as nature, in Albert’s words, and nature as reason.”110 Theological ethics is frequently 
appealing to the discussions on virtue (and, indeed, the discussions on how specific virtues 
bring human beings to full flourishing) – our task was to highlight the moral psychology 
from which Aquinas’s view on virtue stems and to show that the discussion on the passions 
is essential to ethics.111 
Aquinas and Nussbaum share similar baselines in the construction of their ethical 
projects. Nussbaum is a liberal thinker whose thought on human well-being aims to be part 
of contemporary political discussions; thus she does not offer ethics defined in terms of 
strict human functioning since she considers this to be a matter of choice in our pluralistic 
societies. Aquinas, on the other hand, was a thirteenth-century theologian who understood 
true human happiness to be the result of fulfilling one’s Christian way of living. Yet the 
approach of the two thinkers defines the human good in practical terms of universal desires 
and their ethics follow from it – be it fleshed out in a form of capabilities or broadly-
construed inclinations. If we think of ethics from this perspective it suggests a platform for 
various ethical conceptions to meet and debate the possible meaning of those inclinations 
and capabilities and the moral claims they evoke. Lombardo suggests that accounts 
inspired by natural human equipment and desire that genuinely see human good as their 
goal seem to be able to join an open discussion. He furthers: 
 
Anchoring ethics in questions of desire opens up many possibilities for fruitful conversation 
between ethical systems. The universal experience of desire, when deployed as a common 
point of reference, can bridge vastly different perspectives. Regardless of their ethical system 
or vocabulary, all participants in ethical discourse have personal experience of desire and direct 
observations about human tendencies and the structure of the human person. In consequence, 
they can all appeal to the same points of reference and have intelligible discussions…When our 
arguments are rooted in desire, there is always something concrete that we can reference: our 
experience and our observations (scientific or otherwise). Furthermore, arguing about what we 
truly desire and the nature of happiness is much more interesting than reciting reasons why we 
																																																								
109 Porter, Nature as Reason, 143. 
110 Ibid., 163. 
111 Lombardo adds: “In the Prima secundae, Aquinas presents an overview of human psychology and its 
development through virtue and its deformation by sin. In the Secunda secundae, he builds on this 
foundation, and offers a detailed description of how specific virtues bring the human person to full 
flourishing…There is no need to strain to see how Aquinas’s discussion of virtue and vice relates to human 
affectivity. Quite the opposite: affectivity is a central concern of the Secunda secundae. Throughout Aquinas 
seems intent to show how the passions and affections are brought to perfection through virtue and grace and 
how they are put into disarray by vice. By contrast, he hardly ever discusses the role of precept or 
commandment in shaping human affectivity (or indeed in ethics more generally).” Lombardo, The Logics of 
Desire, 148. 
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are, or are not, morally obliged to perform or avoid a certain action.112 
 
Finally, we should conclude that despite the differences between Nussbaum’s 
account of human well-being, an account meant for political purposes with a ‘thinner’ 
definition of the good, and Aquinas’s comprehensive account of ethics suggesting concrete 
ways of functioning, culminating in the ultimate happiness of beatific vision, we judge that 
both ethical proposals contain strong aspects. These aspects constitute the universal scope 
of their ethics, the inductive approach to ethical methodology, and attentiveness to human 
cares, desires and emotions. Particularly attractive in both accounts is the potential of such 
ethical projects for dialogue in the search for common ground in discussions on the content 
of the good.  
 
3.2 NUSSBAUM’S AND AQUINAS’S ACCOUNTS ON THE PASSIONS: INTENTIONAL PHENOMENA 
SITUATING US IN THE WORLD 
 
If we understand the intimate link between Aquinas’s and Nussbaum’s moral psychology 
and their accounts of ethics, we should not be surprised with the positive evaluation of the 
passions/emotions they suggest. The previous chapters endeavored to present the positive 
vision of those accounts. Once again we encountered some common elements in the way 
Aquinas and Nussbaum described the nature of passions/emotions. Both describe them as 
intentional phenomena which indicate how we are relating to the world surrounding us. 
Aquinas’s passions and Nussbaum’s emotions are always about something, they are 
triggered by an object. Both accounts also suggest that often when we are experiencing 
different emotions, they, in fact, indicate the different ways we are relating with the same 
object. For Nussbaum, this process represents a judgment about the object we have. For 
Aquinas, the passions are movements of the sense appetite that depend on the sense 
apprehension which in turn can be influenced by cognitive evaluation on various levels (or, 
indeed, rise only by stimuli of sensation). This is also one of the attractive elements of 
Aquinas’s account in light of what we know about emotion from a contemporary state of 
research.113 
 
3.2.1 Reason and Emotion: Intelligent Responses and Apprehension-Appetite 
Distinction 
 
Neither Nussbaum nor Aquinas renders emotions/passions to be irrational phenomena; in 
fact, they both consider them to be connected to our cognitive capacities. Nussbaum, as we 
have seen in Chapter I and Chapter II of this work, considers emotions to be intelligent, 
discriminating responses of the world around us.114 She suggests that the cognitive aspect 
is part of the emotion’s constitution and thus we can think of them as forms of thoughts 
about the value of external goods.  																																																								
112 Ibid., 246. 
113 See Chapter I, section 3. Thinking of Nussbaum’s Account of Emotions: Some Critical Reflections, 
especially subsections 3.1 A Distinction Between Basic and Complex Emotions and 3.2 Emotions, the Body, 
and the Brain. 
114 See especially Chapter I, section 2.2 The Neo-Stoic Theory of Emotions with all its subsections. 
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Aquinas does not locate the passions in the intellective appetite, but this does not 
mean that he considers them to be brute and non-discriminating. The particular line of 
interpretation we used suggested that the Thomistic passions could be distinguished as 
reason-independent and reason dependent – the latter is a response to reasoned judgment 
and the connection with reason here is rather straightforward. While the passions of the 
first group arise spontaneously by being triggered by sense and imagination, they still 
naturally obey reason, Aquinas asserts. Indeed, “[o]ne of the most crucial elements of 
Aquinas’s account of emotion is the premise that the passions naturally obey reason and 
naturally tend toward conformity with reason.”115 We have seen that this guidance does not 
mean complete subjection because reason has political rule over the passions; secondly, the 
reality of sin and its consequences make this inclination imperfect. 116  Nonetheless, 
Aquinas’s account suggests that the intimate relationship between the passions and reason 
is real. This relationship is manifest by persuasion and formation of the intentional object 
of the passions. Aquinas thinks that a passion presents itself to our consciousness 
motivating us to act, but it waits for our decision to agree or disagree with it; thus we can 
guide our passions to a certain extent. Reason also shapes the intentional objects that 
passions respond to – if we change the evaluation of the situation about which we emote, 
the intensity of the passion will change or it will be replaced by another passion or cease 
altogether. In this instance, Lombardo adds that the natural obedience of the passions to 
reason grounds Aquinas’s thought on the virtuous and graced affectivity: 
 
Since the passions naturally incline toward reason’s guidance, virtue does not imply any 
internal violence. Furthermore, grace does not transform affectivity by the imposition of 
something foreign to human nature, nor is grace a deus ex machina that magically solves the 
problem of internal disorder. Virtue and grace bring natural inclinations to fruition; they do not 
beat them into submission or eradicate them and replace them with something else. This 
account of virtuous and graced affectivity is nonviolent and humane, especially in contrast to 
those accounts that see virtue and grace in constant tension with our natural inclinations.117 
 
Though both authors highlight that emotions/passions cannot be thought of 
completely independently of intellective cognition, it is here that their accounts diverge. 
Nussbaum considers emotion to be a vivid form of intellective cognition and Aquinas 
considers the passions to be movements of the sense appetite. A passion always depends 
on the sense apprehension, but apprehension is not part of a passion for Aquinas. We have 
argued that the sense apprehension in Aquinas’s thought should be understood broadly – in 
some cases a passion is a response to sense impression, in others, a response to cognitive 
judgment of various complexity levels mediated to the sensory power by the particular 
reason.118 Yet Aquinas is always very clear about the apprehension-appetite distinction. 
The distinction also enables him to account for the urgent-felt, often heated character of the 
passions – they are ultimately the movements of the sense appetite. Furthermore, the 																																																								
115 Lombardo, The Logics of Desire, 238. 
116 The reason-passions dynamics is discussed in Chapter III, section 4. The Passions, Reason, and Will and 
reoccurs in all its subsections. 
117 Lombardo, The Logics of Desire, 239. 
118 See Chapter III, section 2.1 Activation of a Passion: Sense and Intellectual Apprehension, especially, 
subsections 2.1.2 Apprehensive Powers of the Sensitive Soul and 2.1.3 Role of the Cogitative Power. 
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distinction between apprehension and appetite is an important conceptual tool to illustrate 
that the sense apprehension grasps a thing as suitable or unsuitable in its particularity, but 
it is only through the power of the appetite the move toward or away from that object takes 
place. “It is the act of being moved by an object of apprehension (which is thus also an 
object of appetite) that constitutes an emotion[,]”119 Cates writes. She furthers that in 
Aquinas’s account we do not only hold the object of the passions in our minds, the object 
gets a hold of us – “[t]he power of appetite makes it possible for a person to be gripped by 
an object in a way that apprehension alone does not. Aquinas says that “the operation of 
the apprehensive power is completed in the very fact that the thing apprehended is in the 
one that apprehends: while the operation of the appetitive power is completed in the fact 
that he who desires is borne toward the thing desirable.”120 It is the object that draws “us 
out of ourselves; it compels us to attend to it, to resonate with it, perhaps to approach it 
inwardly, to dwell within it, and to enjoy the pleasure of being with it.”121 Interestingly, in 
Aquinas’s account, as in Nussbaum’s, the object of the passion depends on one’s 
subjective perception of it; Aquinas also thinks that inasmuch as the object or certain of its 
features exist in reality, the object relates us to something outside ourselves.122 Cates 
suggests that we should think of apprehension in Aquinas’s thought as caused, at least 
partially, by the object being out there and having the qualities it has. Though a passion 
hangs on our apprehension, its dynamic character owns its source to the fact that a passion 
is a movement of our appetitive part. Aquinas’s account on the passions is flexible as it 
allows one to think of various dimensions of our emotional experience:  
 
It allows us to attend to the cognitive dimension of emotion, if we choose. It allows us to attend 
also to the appetitive and, by extension, the motive dimensions. It allows us to isolate different 
apprehensions (from intellectual and general to sensory and particular), and it allows us to 
conceive their relationships to different kinds of appetitive motion (from those whose objects 
are intelligible and general to those whose objects are sensible and particular).123 
 
We have to highlight, once more, that for Aquinas, powers of apprehension and 
appetite in the reality of human experience always function in tandem with each other; that 
means, that if we judge an object to be good and attractive, we will also be attracted to it 
on some level (we also know that in the case of some most basic emotions, some 
perceptions trigger the emotion immediately). 124  Yet Cates points out that “strictly 
speaking, being attracted to an object is something more than apprehending it and judging 
it to have good or attractive properties. If we are actually attracted to an object that we 
judge to be good, it must be because the powers of both apprehension and appetite are 
engaged.”125 Thus we can also say that thinking something to be good will not necessary 
lead us to be attracted to it or judging something to be bad will not necessary amount to 
our being repelled by it. 																																																								
119 Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions, 67. 
120 Ibid., 68. Here Cates quotes ST I 81.1. 
121 Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions, 67. 
122 Cf. Ibid., 67. 
123 Ibid., 74. 
124 Cf. Ibid., 68-69. 
125 Ibid., 69. 
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It is precisely the apprehension-appetite distinction that enables the flexibility of 
Aquinas’s account. Nussbaum, as we have seen, considers all emotions to be forms of 
intellective apprehension. The emotion-thought still represents a kind of movement for 
Nussbaum, but she associates it with the movement of the thought embracing an 
appearance of a particular importance. Thus Nussbaum does not consider knowing to be a 
static process and she accepts the Stoic conception of reason as a dynamic faculty.126 When 
we feel the tension between the ways we think about a particular matter and how we emote 
about it, Nussbaum explains it as an intense, heated conversation between the thoughts of 
different sorts about what we truly value in our lives.127 If the conflict appears to happen 
between the emotions, between the ways we find ourselves emoting about a certain object, 
Nussbaum also suggests seeing it as a clash of judgments emotions entail. 
Though we want to credit Nussbaum for the tremendous work she does to make one 
aware of the intentionality of the emotions, their connection to cognition, and their ethical 
worth, we should also note that Aquinas’s account of the passions gives one more wide-
ranging tools to think of the emotional experiences. For instance, it allows one to assess the 
situations of emotional turmoil from various angles. In certain cases, an emotional conflict 
can be seen as a conflict of apprehension – our cognitive and sense impressions suggest 
different evaluations of an object, sometimes it can be caused by different desires 
competing with each other. 128  Because of the distinction Aquinas makes between 
apprehension and the appetite and consequently, due to the flexibility such a view creates, 
Aquinas’s account seems to be more faithful to the ordinary experience of the emotions 
and the contemporary psychology/neuroscience findings by incorporating cognitive and 
affective elements in his views on the passions.129 
 
3.2.2 Nussbaum and Aquinas on the Bodily Element of Emotions/Passions 
 
Another important and related point of divergence between Nussbaum’s and Aquinas’s 
thought on the emotions/passions is in their treatment of the bodily element. Nussbaum 
opines that for a sentient being having an emotion always feels like something and in many 
cases concrete emotions will have characteristic bodily expressions. Yet she also believes 
that these may vary and that what constitutes the essence of a concrete emotional 
experience is the judgment of a situation – we recall her example of grief – it is not the 
physical expression that forms the core of the emotion, not the trembling of the hands or 
whatever other physiological change constitutes grief; grief is a thought of irrevocable loss. 
We believe that one has to credit Nussbaum for her exegesis of emotional experiences, 
their connection with our cognitive capacities and their meaning dimension that she so 
forcefully brought to the academic discussions. Her insights are powerful explanatory tools 
to help us to think about and cope with our emotions meaningfully. Nonetheless, to 
separate the emotions from the body also seems not entirely faithful to their nature. An 																																																								
126 See Chapter I, sections 2.1 The Stoic Roots; 2.2.6 Feeling and Kinetic Properties of the Emotion. 
127 See Chapter I, section 2.2.10 Emotional Conflict. 
128 Cf. Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions, 73-74. 
129 See again Chapter I, section 3. Thinking of Nussbaum’s Account of Emotions: Some Critical Reflections, 
especially, subsections 3.1 A Distinction Between Basic and Complex Emotions and 3.2 Emotions, the Body, 
and the Brain. 
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emotion is also a bodily experience; the more complex ones can be responses to our 
cognitive appraisals of certain situations, but the bodily change cannot be seen as 
accidental to what emotion is.  
In this respect the flexibility of Aquinas’s account of emotions seems to do adequate 
work in highlighting the intentionality of emotion, its connection to sense and intellective 
apprehension and its bodily element. A passion is a motion of the body-soul composite and 
it occurs “through the exercise of one’s sensory appetite. As such it has a material element. 
It is composed, in part, of patterned bodily changes that can be subtle, but are often 
noticeable in the form of felt bodily sensations.”130 A passion for Aquinas is an embodied 
experience and this includes the fact that our bodies can also serve as a source of 
information indicating how we are faring with our environment – if we attend to the 
condition of our own bodies it can signal the emotion we are experiencing. The way 
Aquinas’s account accommodates the cognitive and the bodily elements is another strong 
aspect of it in comparison to the lack of the embodiment of emotions in Nussbaum’s 
account.131  
 
3.2.3 Troublesome Affectivity: Nussbaum on the Concept of Radical Evil and Aquinas 
on Sin 																																																								
130 Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions, 62. 
131 A recent study in cognitive neuroscience acknowledges that the mechanisms that give rise to the 
conscious experience of emotional feelings are still unresolved, but that in often case we experience emotions 
directly in the body. The study indicated that “[n]umerous studies have established that emotion systems 
prepare us to meet challenges encountered in the environment by adjusting the activation of the 
cardiovascular, skeletomuscular, neuroendocrine, and autonomic nervous system (ANS)[.]” Lauri 
Nummenmaa, Enrico Glereana, Riitta Harib, and Jari K. Hietanend, “Bodily Maps of Emotions,” 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Vol. 111, No. 3 (2014): 646. The link between emotions 
and our bodies is also established in our common language – we speak about ‘heartbreaks,’ ‘cold feed,’ and 
‘shivers going down our spines.’ Emotions are, indeed, associated with a broad range of physiological 
changes, yet “it is still hotly debated whether the bodily changes associated with different emotions are 
specific enough to serve as the basis for discrete emotional feelings, such as anger, fear, or happiness, and the 
topographical distribution of the emotion-related bodily sensations has remained unknown.” Nummenmaa et 
al., “Bodily Maps of Emotions,” 646. The study was conducted using a unique computer based, 
topographical self-report method. The groups of Western Europeans (Finish and Swedish) and East Asians 
(Taiwanese) speaking their own respective languages were shown two silhouettes alongside emotional 
words, stories, movies or facial expressions and were asked to color the body regions in which they felt 
activity increasing and decreasing during each emotional stimulation. The outcomes of the study suggest 
“that consciously felt emotions are associated with culturally universal, topographically distinct bodily 
sensations.” Nummenmaa et al., “Bodily Maps of Emotions,” 646. The researchers further that these discrete 
yet partially overlapping maps of bodily sensations accompanying emotional feelings may indicate that 
embodiment plays a critical role in emotional processing. It is particularly interesting to observe the 
visualizations of these bodily maps of emotions having Aquinas’s discussion on the particular passions in 
mind. While discussing the nature of the particular passions, Aquinas often indicates the particular bodily 
change that comes with it and while it is more interesting today as a kind of archeological knowledge 
because Aquinas’s insights are based on the medieval understanding of human biology, in a certain sense, his 
ideas serve as a witness to the universality of human emotional experiences. For instance, in our discussion 
on anger we have encountered Aquinas describing anger’s movement causing ‘a certain fervor in the blood 
and spirits that surround the heart’ (ST I-II 48.2). The respondents of Nummenmaa’s study also indicated the 
increased sensation in the upper part of the body across the area of the chest, arms, and head during the 
experiences of anger. We have also discussed some findings of neuroscientific research vis-à-vis Nussbaum’s 
philosophy of emotion in Chapter I, section 3. Thinking of Nussbaum’s Account of Emotions: Some Critical 
Reflections. See especially, its subsections 3.1 A Distinction Between Basic and Complex Emotions and 3.2 
Emotions, the Body, and the Brain. 
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One of the main premises of our work is the conviction that the possible danger of 
emotions is overemphasized in discussions on their ethical role132 over and against the 
moral achievement they are capable of offering. One must, however, address the question 
of troublesome propensities of human affectivity in order to embark upon an adequate 
ethical appraisal of it. Both Nussbaum and Aquinas address this issue. Their accounts 
suggest that our emotional reactions depend on and in turn influence our moral characters. 
Likewise, both accounts address the disorders of our affective dimension which are present 
at a deeper level than mere character formation. This approach should not be particularly 
surprising to find in Aquinas’s account, since he is rooted in the Christian tradition, where 
the innate fracture of the human condition is explained by the doctrine of the fall, which 
highlights the realities of original and personal sins. Nussbaum, writing from the liberal 
perspective, constructs an account parallel to that of original sin and addresses the question 
of an innate human disposition to a morally disturbing behavior that occurs prior to any 
socialization.  
We have seen in Chapter II that Nussbaum connects these propensities to disordered 
human behavior to a concept of radical evil she borrows from Kant.133 The concept itself 
refers to an intuition, “a set of presocial tendencies to bad behavior, tendencies that go 
beyond those rooted in our shared animal heritage and which lie beneath cultural 
variation.”134 Nussbaum holds that the bad tendencies are not released by a lack of 
something, a deprivation – we can observe in our environments and from the history of 
human social relations that even at the moments when basic human needs are satisfied, 
humans still behave badly and violate each other’s rights. Nussbaum identifies these bad 
human propensities as a desire to subordinate the other and locates the source of them in 
the dynamics of human developmental process, namely, in the interaction between a young 
infant’s bodily weakness and sophistication of its cognitive abilities. This primitive 
narcissism, as Nussbaum labels it, leads infants (and later adults, if one does not overcome 
it) to desire the subordination of others to one’s own needs. Nussbaum adds two elements 
to expand her account – the human tendency to give in to peer pressure and obeying 
authority even at the cost of ethical concern. These two tendencies, Nussbaum asserts, are 
deeply rooted in human nature and they contain real threats to moral behavior. Lastly, after 
addressing the notion of radical evil, Nussbaum suggests that our common animal heritage 
is also part of the problem of evil because it is the cause of the narrow scope of our 
sympathies (yet, this shared heritage is also a source of good tendencies and some proto-
ethical achievements).135 Chapter I extensively discussed Nussbaum’s suggested vision of 
emotional and moral development136 and Chapter II is devoted to addressing the disordered 
inner tendencies and limits of our concern by way of the emotion of compassion and 																																																								
132 See the discussion on the treatment and the evolution of the concept of the passions in philosophy in 
Michel Meyer, Philosophy and the Passions. Toward a History of Human Nature, translation, preface, 
introduction, and bibliography by Robert F. Barsky (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 
2000), especially, chapter 3 From Sickness to Sin, 59-91. 
133 See section 3.1 Radical Evil in Chapter II.  
134 Nussbaum, Political Emotions, 164-165. 
135 See sections 3.2 Radical Evil: What Lies Behind It?; 3.2.1 Animal Heritage: Problems for Morality; 
3.2.2 Animal Heritage: Positive Contributions to Morality; 3.2.3 Concluding Remarks in Chapter II.  
136 See 2.4 Roots of Emotional Experience in Infancy with all its subsections in Chapter I. 
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humanistic education137– those two concepts basically constitute Nussbaum’s solution to 
the problem of evil. 
In Chapter III we advanced Lombardo’s interpretation of Aquinas’s views where sin 
is viewed as the cause of a traceable disorder in human affectivity.138 Lombardo commends 
Aquinas’s account of the sin-injured human nature for still allowing human affectivity to 
be trusted without suspicion.139 The main argument here appeals to Aquinas’s focus on the 
fundamental goodness of creation and in this respect original sin is viewed as privation of 
grace which is furthered by personal sins – original sin wounds human nature but does not 
destroy its goodness. Lombardo suggests interpreting Aquinas’s views on sin as a lack of 
inner coordination which is introduced – after the fall human capacities lack sound 
communication and subjection to the intellect and God. Even though there is a fracture, an 
injury in the human nature, our capacities remain as God created them – fundamentally 
good and seeking their fruition.140 
We have also already encountered Aquinas’s suggestion that human cognitive and 
affective capacities are renewed through sanctifying grace.141 Here again, Lombardo 
encourages us to think of the work of grace as something that joins ordinary human 
development instead of breaking it. Aquinas’s theology stands on the conviction that 
“[h]uman nature is naturally ordered to God as its end, but is unable by its natural powers 
alone to attain this end in a way that fully actualizes these powers.”142 Furthermore, 																																																								
137 See a large segment of Chapter II starting with section 4. Education of Compassion and going through all 
its subsections. 
138 See section 4.4 The Passions, Sin, and Grace in Chapter III.  
139 Similar intuition can be found in Servais Pinckaers’ thought where he argues that in Christian ethics one 
should focus on the reality of grace rather on the reality of sin (without dismissing its existence and 
consequences): “[W]e have deliberately set out to reestablish in all its fullness the primacy of grace, which is 
more powerful than sin, and the primacy of our spiritual nature, which renders us ‘capable of God’ and at the 
same time is that which sin erodes. For us, in spite of its gravity, sin remains a parasite which attacks and 
opposes the work of God in creation and redemption, without ever being able to destroy it.” Servais 
Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics, 464. 
140 Aquinas claims that the good of human nature is threefold: first, the principles of which human nature is 
constituted (and the properties that have root in it, namely, the powers of the soul); secondly, the natural 
inclination to virtue; thirdly, the gift of original justice. He furthers “[a]ccordingly, the first-mentioned good 
of nature is neither destroyed nor diminished by sin. The third good of nature was entirely destroyed through 
the sin of our first parent. But the second good of nature, viz. the natural inclination to virtue, is diminished 
by sin.” ST I-II 85.1 Because of the lack of inner order, the powers that are naturally directed to virtue, 
namely, the intellect, rational and sense appetites are wounded in the following way: “Again, there are four 
of the soul's powers that can be subject of virtue, as stated above, viz. the reason, where prudence resides, the 
will, where justice is, the irascible, the subject of fortitude, and the concupiscible, the subject of temperance. 
Therefore in so far as the reason is deprived of its order to the true, there is the wound of ignorance; in so far 
as the will is deprived of its order of good, there is the wound of malice; in so far as the irascible is deprived 
of its order to the arduous, there is the wound of weakness; and in so far as the concupiscible is deprived of 
its order to the delectable, moderated by reason, there is the wound of concupiscence.” ST I-II 85.3. Aquinas 
firmly assures us that the wound does not mean destruction “[n]ow sin cannot entirely take away from man 
the fact that he is a rational being, for then he would no longer be capable of sin. Wherefore it is not possible 
for this good of nature to be destroyed entirely…Consequently its diminution may be understood in two 
ways: first, on the part of its root, secondly, on the part of its term. In the first way, it is not diminished by 
sin, because sin does not diminish nature, as stated above. But it is diminished in the second way, in so far as 
an obstacle is placed against its attaining its term…and yet it cannot be destroyed entirely, because the root of 
this inclination always remains.” ST I-II 85.2. 
141 See section 4.4 The Passions, Sin, and Grace in Chapter III.  
142 Micheal S. Sherwin, O.P., By Knowledge and By Love. Charity and Knowledge in the Moral Theology of 
St. Thomas Aquinas (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 124. 
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Aquinas is convinced that humans are not only naturally ordered toward grace but also 
have receptivity to it as “human nature’s openness to more perfect fulfillment is part of 
God’s providential plan.”143 Micheal S. Sherwin, O.P., highlights the fact that Christ has a 
central place in mediating healing and redeeming grace and that He brings about the 
sanctification of human capacities through action of the Holy Spirit.144 We should note that 
Aquinas describes grace as qualitative habitus and he claims that: 
 
Hence it remains that grace, as it is prior to virtue, has a subject prior to the powers of the soul, 
so that it is in the essence of the soul. For as man in his intellective powers participates in the 
Divine knowledge through the virtue of faith, and in his power of will participates in the 
Divine love through the virtue of charity, so also in the nature of the soul does he participate in 
the Divine Nature, after the manner of a likeness, through a certain regeneration or re-
creation.145 
 
This regenerating and re-creating divine presence saturates human inner equipment 
with infused dispositions of three types:  
 
First, there are the three theological virtues that perfect the soul’s spiritual powers in relation to 
God as the ultimate end. There is faith, which perfects the intellect, and there are hope and 
charity, which perfect the will. Second, there are infused moral virtues that perfect the intellect 
and will (and the lower appetites) in relation to those things that are ordered to God as the 
ultimate end…Lastly, there are other infused cognitive and appetitive habitus that perfect the 
intellect and will by rendering them receptive to the guiding action of the Holy Spirit. These 
habitus are the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which the Fathers and the Scholastics find revealed in 
Isaiah 11. 1-2.146 
 
Thus Aquinas’s solution to the question of the dissonance found in human nature is 
the concept of divine aid coming to heal and strengthen human beings in their neediness. 
The elements of Aquinas’s and Nussbaum’s thought on the brokenness of the human 
condition are important to fully understand the implications of their visions of formation 
(or in Aquinas’s case, transformation) of human affectivity and thus moral character. We 
will address this topic in the upcoming section. 
 
3.3 NUSSBAUM AND AQUINAS: MORALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND EDUCATION OF THE 
EMOTIONS/PASSIONS 
 
As we approach the end of our work, we would like to bring to the fore what we consider 
to be the culmination of Nussbaum’s and Aquinas’s accounts of the emotions/passions, 
namely, their visions of educating our affective reactions. In Chapters I and II, we 
encountered Nussbaum’s suggestion of the moral growth and education of our emotions, 
especially, by the medium of the humanities and arts as well as instruction of our emotion 
of compassion.147 Here, we will re-capture that vision in order to present it vis-à-vis the 																																																								
143 Ibid., 125. 
144 Cf. Ibid., 125-126 referring to ST I 43.7, ST I-II 108.1, ST III 8.1 ad. 1. 
145 ST I-II 110.4. 
146 Sherwin, O.P., By Knowledge and By Love, 127-128. 
147 See Chapter I, section 2.4.5 Facilitating Environment and ‘Mature Interdependence:’ From Families to 
Political Institutions and Chapter II. see also section 4. Education of Compassion with all its subsections.  
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vision of educating the passions that can be extrapolated from Aquinas’s account. Our 
main interlocutors in accessing Aquinas’s account on the passions, namely, Lombardo, 
Cates, and Miner focused on presenting their interpretations of the nature of the Thomistic 
passions. They have also demonstrated that the passions rightfully belong in the realm of 
the ethical and argued that, especially through the guidance of reason the passions can be 
managed to become virtuous. We, however, inspired by our reading of Nussbaum’s 
suggestion of educating the emotions want to propose an account of education and 
transformation through prayer which can be constructed from Aquinas’s writings.148 This 
account is partially inspired by and builds on the suggestions of theologians Daniel C. 
Maguire, Charles E. Bouchard, O.P., and Thomas Ryan S.M. already encountered in 
Chapter III – that through more careful reading of Prima secundae we can encounter 
Aquinas’s teaching that the Holy Spirit comes to aid human beings in their weaknesses and 
transforms their affectivity.149 We also suggest that Aquinas’s account on the passions and 
their education can address those who have a distinctively Christian experience whereby 
character formation/transformation can be spoken of through Christian symbols – these 
layers of experience are, however, not addressed and they are even disapproved of by 
Nussbaum’s account. 
 
3.3.1 Nussbaum on Cultivation of Emotions  
 
As we have already indicated above – both Nussbaum and Aquinas consider 
emotions/passions to belong to the sphere of the moral. Nussbaum asserts that emotions 
are an essential part of morality because of their nature and subsequently due to the 
contribution they offer to our moral reasoning. Nussbaum’s thesis about the nature of 
emotions is univocal – they are value judgments directed to the world outside ourselves 
which indicate the value of external goods. Emotions can judge value wrongly; they can be 
distorted. However, Nussbaum’s main argument maintains the fact that they indicate our 
neediness, our non self-sufficiency and our lack of control. Generally they disclose our 
own vulnerability by highlighting something very true of human life itself. This is a great 
achievement for emotional knowledge which offers a unique perspective to ethical 
thought, Nussbaum states. If we want ethics that tackles the question of how we should 
live our life as a whole, an ethics with human significance that empowers people and 
societies to seek positive change – we need ethics where principle and emotion meet, 
ethics with a grounded account of objectivity and an account of a rich, particular 
perception.150 In this way ethics will deal with the whole person – living and loving – and 																																																								
148 To address the question of transformation of affectivity through grace and prayer we will build on 
Aquinas’s insights found in the Summa. One can find similar intuition in G. Simon Harak’s, Virtuous 
Passions. In this work Harak retrieves the Thomistic account of the passions and in the chapter entitled The 
Passion for God: The Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius of Loyola, he wants to demonstrate the importance of 
the passions in the Spiritual Exercises. His main argument is that the Exercises are aimed at education and 
transformation of the passions in a way that they would eventually accord with those of Christ. See Harak, 
Virtuous Passions 99-122. 
149 See Chapter III, section 4.1 The Influence of the Passions on Reason and the Will and a Possibility of 
Affective Knowledge in Aquinas’s Thought. 
150 Nussbaum notes that a substantial account of ethical objectivity is ‘internal’ and human in mind – “[i]t 
does not even attempt to approach the world as it might be in itself, uninterpreted, unhumanized. Its raw 
material is the history of human social experience, which is already an interpretation and a measure. But it is 
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in turn will aid at forming persons who are passionately involved in thinking and 
imagining, people who can show personal investment, an ability critical to the flourishing 
of personal and political lives.  
In Nussbaum’s exposé of moral education we can truly grasp her vision of human 
perfection and the ultimate goal of life – her version of a salvific vision. Nussbaum asserts 
that our emotions are best nurtured and educated by artistic mediums, especially, story-
telling.151 This is the reason why Nussbaum is such an advocate for the need for 
humanities in moral and civic education – through accessing an adequate set of literature 
sources152 we get the opportunity to enhance our moral agency which has a direct link to 
what kind of citizens we are. We have observed that Nussbaum builds much of her views 
on emotional development in children by utilizing the works of Donald Winnicott. 
Nussbaum believes that, generally speaking, we have positive psychological equipment as 
she argues that children are born with a rudimentary capacity for sympathy and concern.153 
We may also recall from the presentation in the previous chapters that Nussbaum, inspired 
by Winnicott, advances the position that those rudimentary capacities for sympathy and 
concern can grow during the activity of play in a created potential space (a space where 
children and at a later point adults can experiment with the idea of otherness without the 
																																																																																																																																																																							
objectivity all the same.” Martha C. Nussbaum, “‘Finely Aware and Richly Responsible:’ Literature and the 
Moral Imagination,” in Love’s Knowledge. Essays on Philosophy and Literature (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1990), 164. By perception Nussbaum means “the ability to discern, acutely and 
responsively, the salient features of one’s particular situation.” Nussbaum, “Introduction: Form and Content, 
Philosophy and Literature,” 37. This is the core of Aristotelian practical wisdom, this is a state of being 
‘finely aware and richly responsible’ – this entails three salient features – being receptive to new and 
unanticipated features of a particular situation, being aware that those features are always embedded in their 
particular and unique context, and seeing that particular persons and relationships are always salient in 
ethical situations. The ethical perception Nussbaum suggests presupposes a rich moral imagination, a state of 
mind where our minds and emotions are ‘fine tuned’ and we possess a discriminating insight toward self and 
toward the other. To put it in Nussbaum’s own words: “This means the ability to think what it might be like 
to be in the shoes of a person different from oneself, to be an intelligent reader of that person’s story, and to 
understand the emotions and wishes and desires that someone so placed might have.” Nussbaum, Not for 
Profit, 95-96. She furthers: “On this view, there will be certain contexts in which the pursuit of intellectual 
reasoning apart from emotion will actually prevent a full rational judgment – for example by preventing an 
access to one’s grief, or one’s love, that is necessary for the full understanding of what has taken place when 
a loved one dies.” Nussbaum, “Introduction: Form and Content, Philosophy and Literature,” 41. 
151 It is interesting to note that the cognitive neuroscience study of Nummenmaa and colleagues also indicates 
that one of the most powerful emotion induction techniques is guided mental imagery by reading stories and 
viewing movies. Cf. Nummenmaa et al., “Bodily Maps of Emotions,” 648. 
152 We should note here once more that Nussbaum is aware that it is relatively easy to manipulate one’s 
emotions, thus cultivation of the imaginative component in democratic education requires a very careful 
selectivity. The set of literature available in high schools, for instance, should be appropriated to children’s 
ages and their development level and at the same time should address the crucial value questions of 
contemporary societies: “[T]hat will bring students in contact with issues of gender, race, ethnicity, and 
cross-cultural experience and understanding. This artistic instruction can and should be linked to the citizen-
of-the-world instruction, since works of art are frequently an invaluable way of beginning to understand the 
achievements and sufferings of a culture different from one’s own. In other words, the role of the arts in 
schools and colleges is two-fold. They cultivate capacities for play and empathy in a general way, and they 
address particular cultural blind spots. The first role can be played by works remote from the student’s own 
time and place, although not just any randomly selected work. The second requires a more pointed focus on 
areas of social unease. The two roles are in some ways continuous, since the general capacity, once 
developed, makes it far easier to address a stubborn blind spot.” Nussbaum, Not for Profit, 108. 
153 Cf. Ibid., 96. 
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fear of a threat because it does not engage a real encounter with it).154 As child’s play 
develops, so does his/her capacity to wonder and children’s songs, fables, stories also 
facilitate it – as it allows one to get to know objects and wonder about their nature, their 
‘inner world.’ This is precisely the aim of healthy development – enabling the same 
wonder but about other people. “Nursery rhymes and stories are thus a crucial preparation 
for concern in life[,]” Nussbaum writes, “[t]he presence of the other, which can be very 
threatening, becomes, in play, a delightful source of curiosity, and this curiosity 
contributes toward the development of healthy attitudes in friendship, love, and, later, 
political life.”155 What Nussbaum, following Winnicott, suggests is that the potential space 
of play does not disappear just because one becomes adult – children’s play reemerges in 
adult life through the medium of arts. Thus, arts for Nussbaum serves not only an aesthetic 
function, it is also didactical. Sharing the nature of children’s play, arts continues to teach 
one how to live with the other without manipulation, it also strengthens our imaginative 
and emotional resources. The core of it is captioned in the following quotation: 
 
We do not automatically see another human being as spacious and deep, having thoughts, 
spiritual longings, and emotions. It is all too easy to see another person as just a body – which 
we might then think we can use for our ends, bad or good. It is an achievement to see a soul in 
that body, and this achievement is supported by poetry and the arts, which ask us to wonder 
about the inner world of that shape we see – and, too, to wonder about ourselves and our own 
depths.156  
 
Literary pieces especially work as optical instruments “through which the reader 
becomes a reader of his or her own heart.”157 Nussbaum thinks that merely observing life 
could never bring us to easily make such conclusions in the way that literary imagination 
offers simply because “we have never lived enough. Our experience is, without fiction, too 
confined and too parochial. Literature extends it, making us reflect and feel about what 
might otherwise be too distant for feeling.”158 Thus Nussbaum concludes that “[l]iterature 
is an extension of life not only horizontally, bringing the reader into contact with events or 
locations or persons or problems he or she has not otherwise met, but also, so to speak, 
vertically giving the reader experience that is deeper, sharper, and more precise than much 
of what takes place in life.”159 And this is the very essence of Nussbaum’s understanding 
of transcendence within human life. In Chapters I and II we have seen that Nussbaum’s 
ethical vision is a demanding one. In that vision the minds and hearts of people have come 
together; they are encouraged to make consciously deep, personal and political 
commitments. Yet this perfection that it seeks is ultimately human and Nussbaum utilizes 
the metaphor of descent as the best way to capture its essence. “Human limits structure the 
human excellences,” Nussbaum writes, “and give excellent action its significance.”160 																																																								
154 See Chapter I, especially, section 2.4.5 Facilitating Environment and ‘Mature Interdependence’: From 
Families to Political Institutions and Chapter II, sections 4.4 The Spirit of Love, 4.4.1 Ethics, Compassion, 
and Play, 4.4.2 Concluding Remarks. 
155 Nussbaum, Not for Profit, 99-100. 
156 Ibid., 102. 
157 Nussbaum, “Introduction: Form and Content, Philosophy and Literature,” 47. 
158 Ibid., 47. 
159 Ibid., 48. 
160 Ibid., 378. 
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Nussbaum reflects on the fact that there is a great space for transcendence in our ordinary 
humanity, but this transcendence is of a human sort and it can be reached by cultivating 
human intellectual and emotive capacities by aid of the humanities: 
 
For I believe it is no accident at all that both James and Proust, apparently independently, 
compare excellent literary works to angels that soar above dullness and obtuseness of the 
everyday, offering their readers a glimpse of a more compassionate, subtler, more responsive, 
more richly human world. That is a view about transcendence. And I believe that it is 
extremely important to make the aspiration to that sort of transcendence central to a picture of 
the complete human good. There is so much to do in this area of human transcending (which I 
imagine also as a transcending by a descent, delving more deeply into oneself and one’s 
humanity, and becoming deeper and more spacious as a result) that if one really pursued that 
aim well and fully I suspect that there would be little time left to look about for any other 
sort.161  
 
Thus Nussbaum reasons that we do not need to add aspiration to a religious 
transcendence, seeking something more than the ‘merely human’ for cultivating humanity. 
There is no such thing as ‘merely human’ because human aspiration to become better, to 
seek distinctively human excellence within a human sphere is already a mystical yearning 
with much potential, depth and space to become the compassionate, loving, mindful human 
beings we have capacities to be. Nussbaum leaves individuals to achieve this on their own 
devices – our political systems and educational institutions should ideally provide a 
facilitating environment, but ultimately it is our own choice and our individual journey. 
Nussbaum thus leaves us with a moral vision of high stakes where “acting virtuously 
requires not only going through the motions of correct action, but doing so with the 
appropriate thoughts, motives and reactive feelings.”162 In this vision our emotions play an 
essential role as disclosing something true about life itself through their dimension of 
neediness and yet at the same time they are remarkable founts of human resourcefulness. 
Furthermore, our emotional reactions are directly linked to our moral character; this thus 
entails that we hold a very high degree of responsibility for them (as far as we are 
ourselves responsible for the people we are). Emotions can themselves be judged and 
educated and their moral education, for Nussbaum, represents an ultimate vision of human 
meaning.163 Nussbaum leaves us with this vision of approximate religious imagery where 
the ‘sacred’ ultimately must reside within ourselves because all there is “is just human life 
																																																								
161 Ibid., 379. 
162 Ibid., 378. 
163 One could understand Nussbaum’s vision on moral education as a delicate exchange between moral 
imagination and philosophy. Nussbaum opines that stories teach us to trust, to love, to be open while 
philosophical endeavor is different in its nature – it requires us to be skeptical. Nussbaum writes: “The 
attitude we have before a philosophical text can look, by contrast, retentive and unloving – asking for 
reasons, questioning and scrutinizing each claim, wrestling clarity from the obscure…Before a literary work 
we are humble, open, active yet porous. Before a philosophical work, in its working through, we are active, 
controlling, aiming to leave no flank undefended and no mystery undispelled. This is too simple and 
schematic, clearly; but it says something.” Martha C. Nussbaum, “Love’s Knowledge,” in Love’s 
Knowledge. Essays on Philosophy and Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 282. In 
thinking and writing ethically, we ultimately need to balance each other to reach conceptual clarity and 
meaningful depth. Thus Nussbaum’s vision of moral education does not make an argument for emotivism. 
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as it is lived.”164  
 
3.3.2 Aquinas and the Transformation of Affectivity 
 
“Moreover, I will give you a new heart and put a new spirit within you; and I will remove 
the heart of stone from your flesh and give you a heart of flesh.” Ezekiel 36:26.  
 
The biblical quotation represents the main intuition guiding us through the interpretation of 
Aquinas’s vision of cultivation of human affectivity, and at the same time it is true to the 
spirit of that vision. The story of Aquinas’s views of the formation and transformation of 
the passions stands on the argument found in Chapter III, namely, that Aquinas considers 
the passions to belong to the moral domain and that we can, indeed, be responsible for 
them.165 We have presented a retrieval of Aquinas’s account of the responsibility for the 
passions by Claudia Eisen Murphy.166 Murphy suggests that another attractive element of 
Aquinas’s views on the passions is the multilayered account of responsibility that can be 
retrieved from his writings. This account argues that while, in most cases, we can be held 
responsible for the way we emote, this responsibility can be external or internal and of 
various degrees depending of the nature of the concrete passion in question. This more 
balanced view makes a difference between someone’s prime and more complex emotional 
expressions (such as, one’s abrupt anger if he/she was suddenly shoved in the back by a 
stranger and the resentment a male colleague has toward his female co-workers because of 
a complex relationship with his mother and the subsequent judgments that he projects onto 
all other females). Even though Aquinas presents a more nuanced account of the 
responsibility for the passions, he still, like Nussbaum, holds that they reflect on our moral 
characters. 
We should also remember that when Aquinas analyses the passions, he considers 
their structure to be relative to the structure of reality as such – and Aquinas’s vision of 
reality is theological. Cates writes: “In interpreting Aquinas, I seek to show that emotions 
can meaningfully be located along a continuum of appetitive motions within the human 
being, and that the appetitive motions of humans can meaningfully be thought of in 
relation to the appetitive motions of other sorts of entities, within the context of a cosmos 
that is governed by Love as the first and final principle of all appetitive motion.”167 The 
passions are the movements of the sense appetite toward the object and at the same time 
they are the movements that contribute to the attainment of our final telos. The fact that 
Aquinas considers the passions ‘to have something of their own,’ Miner suggests, points 
not only to the mere sad fact that the passions do not obey our intellect completely – “[i]t 
also points to the ability of the sensitive appetite to make a contribution of its own in the 
return of the rational creature to the ultimate end. If directed by reason, the energy 
provided by the sensitive appetite can deepen the love by which the rational creature is 																																																								
164 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 
Vol. 13, No. 1 (1988): 49. 
165 See Chapter III, sections 4.2 Morality of the Passions; 4.2.1 Normativity of the Passions and 4.2.2 
Responsibility For The Passions. 
166 See Chapter III, section 4.2.2 Responsibility for the Passions with all its subsections. 
167 Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions, 63. 
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drawn to her end.”168 This is the logic, the formal structure Aquinas considers the passions 
to follow. 
Because of this metaphysical background holding Aquinas’s views on the passions, 
his account allows us to access layers of emotional formation for people of a Christian 
faith and, thus, hope for a life that transcends this one. Charles E. Bouchard describes a 
person of Christian identity as ‘a living-breathing-thinking-feeling-intuiting-hoping-
believing entity’ who has multiple capacities and needs, including the hope for the eternal 
life.169 In the previous chapter we wanted to demonstrate that Aquinas’s discussion on the 
passions indicates that he did not consider them to be an extrinsic part of the formation of 
Christian character – on the contrary, his discussion of affectivity relates directly to his 
subsequent discussion on virtues (and description of vices). More so, the formation of 
character in Christian tradition is one of the main tasks of Church communities, to be more 
precise – Christian community is concerned with its transformation or sanctification.170 
Aquinas’s thought, we suggest, is distinctive because it can accommodate an idea of 
sanctification of character encompassing multiple dimensions of it – our passions, our 
behavior, and our intellective capacities. Aquinas’s account stands on the premise that our 
distinctive powers, in their very structure, are directed toward flourishing “and that grace 
will aid the process”171 of achieving it. Aquinas constructed his ethical vision “in terms of 
the formation of the kind of person who appropriates and develops the gifts required for a 
moral life in view of the promised enjoyment of divine beatitude”172 and the aim of the 
Secunda pars was to present Christian community with “a picture of the kind of people 
God desires.” 173  Thus, the Secunda pars presents the reader with “a systematic 
consideration of the human being as moral agent, with goals, capacities, emotions, 
dispositions, and so on, which have to be integrated, with the help of law and grace[.]”174 
Happiness – beatitude, the face-to-face vision of God, is the ultimate end of such a human 
being, but the notion also accommodates layers of happiness with imperfect perfection 
already starting here and now: 
 
Destined for eternal life with God, Aquinas sees grace as a vital reality in the human being, 
‘not a transitory divine help but a principle for people living in and toward a special destiny’ 
(ST I q.23 a.2 ad 4). Grace influences how we live now, and at the same time it is a ‘kind of 
beginning of glory in us’ (ST II-II, q.24 a.3). For Aquinas there is an eschatological perspective 
to the moral life, without which the Christian moral life has no meaning. This life and the next 
are intimately connected.’175 
 
																																																								
168 Miner, Aquinas on the Passions, 94-95. 
169 Cf. Charles E. Bouchard O.P., “What Is ‘Prudential Personalism?’ Why Does it Matter?,” Health 
Progress Vol. 88, No. 2 (2007): 24. 
170 Robert C. Roberts, “The Idea of a Christian Psychology,” Journal of Psychology and Theology Vol. 40, 
No. 1 (2012): 39. 
171 Lisa Sowle Cahill, “Renegotiating Aquinas: Catholic Feminist Ethics, Postmodernism, Realism, and 
Faith,” Journal of Religious Ethics Vol. 43, No. 2 (2015): 213.  
172 Kerr, After Aquinas, 118. 
173 Ibid., 119. 
174 Ibid., 118. 
175 Fáinche Ryan, “Why Do We Still Need Aquinas?,” New Blackfriars Vol. 95, No. 1056 (2014): 174. 
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Christian tradition is embedded in the belief that God is in a relationship with us,176 
thus, the elements of grace coming about through sacramental life and the practice of 
prayer cannot be overlooked when we think of education and the transformation of 
character Aquinas’s account on the passions implies. God is the source of goodness; 
Aquinas’s account has this in mind when at the same time he asserts, God comes to aid us 
in the attainment of that good. When we think of the discussion on prayer found in 
Secunda secundae – here we do not encounter Aquinas providing us with a guide suffused 
with metaphorical language. In fact, he locates prayer in the cognitive and not the 
appetitive part of the human being and he describes its primary function as a petition.177 																																																								
176 In his article Ryan explores Aquinas’s understanding of the question of God which, he thinks, could be 
captured in the statement: “Deus non est in genere” (ST I 6.2 ad 3). That means that according to Aquinas, 
God cannot be caught in any category of human thought. Ryan quotes Brad Gregory explaining Aquinas’s 
position: “God shares no genus in common with creatures – not even being – so utterly different is God’s 
literally indefinable…reality from that of anything else, God is not a highest, noblest, or most powerful entity 
within the universe, divine by virtue of being comparatively greatest. Rather, God is radically distinct from 
the universe as a whole, which he did not fashion by ordering anything already existent but rather created 
entirely ex nihilo…Although God is radically transcendent and altogether other than his creation, he is 
sovereignly present to and acts in and through it. There is no ‘outside’ to creation, spatially or temporally, 
nor is any part of creation independent of God or capable of existing independently of God.” Ryan, “Why Do 
We Still Need Aquinas?,” 162 quoting Brad S. Gregory, The Unintended Reformation. How a Religious 
Revolution Secularized Society. (Cambridge/London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012), 
30. Ryan furthers that the distinction between existence and essence Aquinas makes in his theological 
thought is crucial in understanding how creatures relate to their Creator; it points to the source of our 
existence that does not belong to us and envisions the very nature of our existence as dependent, thus “God is 
truthfully addressed as Creator because the world, all of creation, has a real relation to God.” Ryan, “Why Do 
We Still Need Aquinas?,” 170. Though Aquinas asserts that God does not have any relation of dependence to 
His creatures, “[p]aradoxically this mysterious, transcendent Otherness listens to us, relates to us, is intimate 
to our very being: ‘God is not far from us, nor outside us, but rather he is in us, as Jeremiah 14 says: You are 
in us, O Lord. Thus the experience of divine goodness is called tasting.’” Ryan, “Why Do We Still Need 
Aquinas?,” 172-173 referring to Paul Murray, O.P., Aquinas at Prayer: The Bible, Mysticism and Poetry 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 258 citing from Aquinas’s commentary on Psalm XXXIII.  
177 Cf. ST II-II 83.1. Brian Davies summarizes Aquinas’s treatment of prayer as a petition in the Summa as 
first of all “an example of practical reasoning. It springs from knowing what we want and recognizing how 
we might obtain it.” Brian Davies, “Prayer,” in The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas, eds. Brian Davies and 
Eleonore Stump (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 470. He points out that Aquinas does not 
situate prayer in the appetitive part and by this he does not define it in affective terms. Davies suggests that 
we should see the dynamics of prayer in the following way: “But he also believes that we can engage in 
practical reasoning – reasoning with respect to how to achieve our goal, how to get what we want. And, 
thinks Aquinas, (a) one reasonable way of getting what we want is to ask for this from one who is able to 
provide it, and (b) prayer is a reasonable practice to engage in given that God is able to provide what we 
might reasonably ask for.” Davies, “Prayer,” 469-470. Paul Murray, O.P., whose research focuses on 
Aquinas’s thought on prayer and Aquinas at prayer himself – retrieving Aquinas as a scholar and a silent 
mystic, suggests some more imaginative interpretations on the meaning of prayer as petition. Murray writes: 
“Prayer – Christian prayer – by its very nature is born out of an acknowledgment of need, out of an honest 
recognition of spiritual poverty.” Paul Murray, O.P., Praying with Confidence. Aquinas on the Lord’s Prayer 
(London/New York: Continuum, 2010), 7. He quotes the reflection of a contemporary Carmelite 
contemplative Ruth Borrows as an illuminating example to deepen our understanding of the petition prayer: 
“Isn’t Christian existence itself petition?…It is the expression of dependency, of the awareness of our 
limitation and helplessness in so many areas. One doesn’t need to have lived long to know this by 
experience…Petition, asking, is the practical admission that we are here to receive, to be ‘done unto’ and the 
deeper our faith the more we know that this is pure blessedness. We are here to receive all that God, divine 
Love, has to give. The Church’s liturgical prayer is almost all an asking. Even the acts of praise reveal that 
we depend on divine aid to enable us to praise: God must praise God within us.” Murray, Praying with 
Confidence, 7 quoting Ruth Burrows, Letters on Prayer (London: Sheed and Ward, 1999), 29. For further 
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Yet, in the discussion inquiring into whether the personal prayer be vocal, Aquinas opines 
that it does not have to be, but there are reasons why this is beneficial: 
 
First, in order to excite interior devotion, whereby the mind of the person praying is raised to 
God, because by means of external signs, whether of words or of deeds, the human mind is 
moved as regards apprehension, and consequently also as regards the affections. Hence 
Augustine says (ad Probam. Ep. cxxx, 9) that by means of words and other signs we arouse 
ourselves more effectively to an increase of holy desires.’…Secondly, the voice is used in 
praying as though to pay a debt, so that man may serve God with all that he has from God, that 
is to say, not only with his mind, but also with his body: and this applies to prayer considered 
especially as satisfactory. Hence it is written (Osee 14:3): ‘Take away all iniquity, and receive 
the good: and we will render the calves of our lips.’ Thirdly, we have recourse to vocal prayer, 
through a certain overflow from the soul into the body, through excess of feeling, according to 
Ps. 15:9, ‘My heart hath been glad, and my tongue hath rejoiced.’178 
 
Thus Aquinas presents prayer as an act where our mind, affectivity, and the bodily 
expression come together in order to fully engage in the act of friendship with God. Those 
are important elements to consider when arriving at Aquinas’s views of graced affectivity. 
At this point, it may be useful to be reminded that Aquinas suggests a broad picture of 
human moral psychology where the passions, virtues (acquired and infused), the categories 
of the gifts, the beatitudes, and the fruits of the Holy Spirit have an integral role – they are 
elements that represent the “‘theory of the divinization of man by grace through the action 
of the Holy Spirit, teaching, guiding and strengthening’ – not, then, merely a decorative 
pious appendix.”179 While it is always difficult to attempt to conceptualize the dimension 
of mystery, by the very definition it escapes, such attempts, leaving us with more of an 
intuitive grasp, we suggest that the dimensions of the gifts, the beatitudes, and the fruits 
can play a role in educating our emotions through the practice of prayer. All three elements 
follow Aquinas’s discussion on the virtue in the Prima secundae and are proclaimed to be 
an intrinsic part of the moral life.180 Aquinas defines the gifts as a certain sensitivity to 
God’s promptings,181 the beatitudes are closely linked to the virtues and the gifts and 																																																																																																																																																																							
analysis of Aquinas’s thoughts on prayer which includes interpretation of Aquinas’s own ‘inner life,’ and his 
compositions of prayers and hymns, see Murray’s, Aquinas at Prayer. 
178 ST II-II 83.12.  
179 Kerr, After Aquinas, 132 referring to Edward O’Connor, in St Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae, vol. 
24: Gifts and Beatitudes (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1974). 
180 Cf. ST I-II questions 68, 69, and 70. Translations of the Prima secundae in this part of the text come from 
the Fathers of the English Dominican Province translation available at 
http://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/SS/SS158.html#SSQ158OUTP1. 
181 “Whether we consider human reason as perfected in its natural perfection, or as perfected by the 
theological virtues, it does not know all things, nor all possible things. Consequently it is unable to avoid 
folly and other like things mentioned in the objection. God, however, to Whose knowledge and power all 
things are subject, by His motion safeguards us from all folly, ignorance, dullness of mind and hardness of 
heart, and the rest. Consequently the gifts of the Holy Ghost, which make us amenable to His promptings, are 
said to be given as remedies to these defects.” ST I-II 68.2. The gifts of the Holy Spirit, Aquinas argues, 
extends to our cognitive and affective capacities: “Now just as it is natural for the appetitive powers to be 
moved by the command of reason, so it is natural for all the forces in man to be moved by the instinct of 
God, as by a superior power. Therefore whatever powers in man can be the principles of human actions, can 
also be the subjects of gifts, even as they are virtues; and such powers are the reason and appetite…Now the 
reason is speculative and practical: and in both we find the apprehension of truth (which pertains to the 
discovery of truth), and judgment concerning the truth. Accordingly, for the apprehension of truth, the 
speculative reason is perfected by ‘understanding;’ the practical reason, by ‘counsel.’ In order to judge aright, 
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because they contain certain items different from them Aquinas considers beatitudes a 
different category; essentially, they refer to the experience of something already 
anticipated.182 Finally, the fruits are ethical attributes that ‘calm the appetite with a certain 
sweetness and delight.’183 The rich images these concepts contain present themselves as 
objects of our emotions by evoking them in personal and communal prayers and in this 
way nurturing our moral imaginations (the same holds for the liturgical and sacramental 
symbols). This does not mean that we can simply take Aquinas’s suggestions on the gifts, 
the beatitudes, and the fruits and appropriate them without contextualizing them in a 
contemporary setting; indeed, some of his thoughts about the meaning of these concepts 
require a careful ethical re-appropriation.184 Yet, the idea that we can suggest some 
elements of pneumatology and references to biblical texts to ethical formation of our 
emotions seems very attractive. Finally, Aquinas’s account can speak of virtuous passions; 
more than that, it can speak of virtuous graced passions where the mysterious Other comes 
to aid us in our vulnerability and neediness. If we want to claim firmly that “[i]n his 
exposition of the good human life, Aquinas describes a long story of patient humanization, 
in which the virtue of charity, of learning to desire rightly, is central”185 – we have to take 
into account that Aquinas’s picture of moral psychology extends beyond a mere discussion 
of virtues – the passions, the gifts, the beatitudes, and the fruits being integral and not 
merely a decorative part of that moral psychology. The idea of graced affectivity and, thus, 
sanctified character represents one of the main divergence points between Aquinas’s and 																																																																																																																																																																							
the speculative reason is perfected by ‘wisdom,’ the practical reason by ‘knowledge.’ The appetitive power, 
in matters touching a man’s relations to another, is perfected by ‘piety;’ in matters touching himself, it is 
perfected by ‘fortitude’ against the fear of dangers; and against inordinate lust for pleasures, by ‘fear,’ 
according to Prov. 15:27: ‘By the fear of the Lord every one declineth from evil,’ and Ps. 118:120: ‘Pierce 
Thou my flesh with Thy fear: for I am afraid of Thy judgments.’ Hence it is clear that these gifts extend to all 
those things to which the virtues, both intellectual and moral, extend.” ST I-II 68.4. 
182 “Accordingly, those things which are set down as merits in the beatitudes, are a kind of preparation for, or 
disposition to happiness, either perfect or inchoate: while those that are assigned as rewards, may be either 
perfect happiness, so as to refer to the future life, or some beginning of happiness, such as is found in those 
who have attained perfection, in which case they refer to the present life. Because when a man begins to 
make progress in the acts of the virtues and gifts, it is to be hoped that he will arrive at perfection, both as a 
wayfarer, and as a citizen of the heavenly kingdom.” ST I-II 69.2. Aquinas in the instance of the beatitudes 
refers us to Jesus’ Sermon on the Mount found in Mathew 5:12 and considers that the beatitudes pertain to 
sensual (being poor in spirit, blessing for the meek and mourning), active (blessing for those who hunger and 
thirst after justice, blessing for the merciful, blessing for the peacemakers) and contemplative (blessing for 
the clean of heart) lives. 
183 “More is required for a beatitude than for a fruit. Because it is sufficient for a fruit to be something 
ultimate and delightful; whereas for a beatitude, it must be something perfect and excellent. Hence all the 
beatitudes may be called fruits, but not vice versa. For the fruits are any virtuous deeds in which one delights: 
whereas the beatitudes are none but perfect works, and which, by reason of their perfection, are assigned to 
the gifts rather than to the virtues, as already stated.” ST I-II 70.2. When discussing the fruits Aquinas refers 
to the origin of the concept in the Letter to the Galatians 5: 22, 23. He states that the fruits pertain to good 
ordering of the mind (charity, joy, peace, patience, long-suffering). They also pertain to our relationship with 
our neighbor (goodness, benignity, meekness, faith), finally, they pertain to the body (modesty, continency, 
chastity). Cf. ST I-II 70.3.  
184 For instance, his exegesis of the meaning of the blessing of the poor in spirit as either moderation of usage 
of external goods or, perfectly despising them altogether seems troubling due to some misunderstandings and 
the ethical consequences this suggestion entails. While this suggestion requires careful, ethical treatment, the 
first suggestion of moderation seems to provide an insightful perspective that can provide an alternative 
voice to contemporary cultures. See ST I-II 69.3. 
185 Ryan, “Why Do We Still Need Aquinas?,” 173. 
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Nussbaum’s accounts. 
GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of our work was to inquire into the role emotions can play in ethics. The work did 
not aim at constructing an account in which we would merge Nussbaum’s and Aquinas’s 
insights, we rather endeavored to present their insights on the ethical worth of the emotions 
and observe what new dimensions it can bring to our understanding of ethical agency. 
Previous chapters presented a detailed discussion on Nussbaum’s and Aquinas’s accounts 
on the emotions/passions in order to highlight the value of the accounts themselves and to 
have a better grasp of the nature of those accounts. Chapter IV in particular has sought to 
bring Nussbaum’s and Aquinas’s accounts together by illuminating what we judge to be 
some of the most important points of intersection which, at the same time, and in delicate 
ways, are also points of divergence. Both accounts converge in the scope of universal 
ethics with a significant interest in human desire; they both locate the emotions/passions in 
the moral sphere, and speak of the responsibility one has for them. We have also sought to 
demonstrate that both accounts lead to an ethical vision of the cultivation of morally 
praiseworthy emotions/passions. 
When it comes to the nature of the emotions/passions themselves, both accounts 
describe them as intentional phenomena. Nussbaum provides us with a rich account of the 
ethical nature and achievement of emotions – emotions are ways of seeing, specifically, 
they are ways of seeing value in fragile things outside one’s own control. Depicting 
emotions in this way, Nussbaum suggests the very specific anthropological picture of a 
human being vulnerable to his/her environment. Nussbaum maintains that it is through 
emotional cognitions that we grasp the deeper layers of our surroundings and their worth 
and importance. This enables an ethical agency sensitive to the protection of external 
goods because it fully grasps their fragility and our incompleteness without them. Any 
ethics which does not incorporate the awareness and knowledge emotions offer is 
incomplete because it does not assess and reflect on human experience in its fullness – 
more than that, by lacking emotional insight, it will lack the powerful human interest 
facilitated by our emotions. 
Aquinas’s account of the nature and morality of the passions is formulated in a less 
univocal way, yet we have argued that a close reading of the Treatise on the Passions 
allows a positive retrieval of it. Aquinas considers the passions to be embodied states of 
awareness that are sensitive to the good or bad qualities of the object. Our main goal was to 
demonstrate that Aquinas’s account of affectivity is intrinsic to his account of ethics and 
plays a substantial role in it. In Chapter III we suggested moving away from the view that 
the passions are morally neutral. We argued that this view diverted attention away from the 
view that the passions are morally normative. We have encountered Aquinas arguing that 
passions are not morally evil, on the contrary – the presence of an orderly passion increases 
the moral quality of an action. Furthermore, if we are considering a concrete passion of a 
particular person, we can speak of its moral character per se, Aquinas claims. He judges 
the moral character of the passions according to their objects and so the passions that tend 
toward genuine good are good (and so are the passions that withdraw from a genuine evil) 
and passions seeking evil and withdrawing from the good are bad. We have also suggested 
viewing the Thomistic passions as directed toward flourishing in their very structure. The 
suggestion that the passions are also movements toward a human final telos and grounding 
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this in the fundamental goodness of creation enables one to have a liberating view of 
human affectivity.1 The passions do not have to be perceived as a sign of brokenness and 
chaos, but rather as a part of the good creation. The passions need proper education and the 
aid of sanctifying grace; yet, ultimately, human affectivity is inclined to aid the pursuit of 
human happiness and not to impair or damage it.  
Even though we can assert that Nussbaum’s and Aquinas’s accounts meet in 
stressing the importance of affectivity, one also immediately notices that they stand in a 
certain tension with each other. Nussbaum’s vision on cultivating human emotions focuses 
on moral growth through artistic mediums and rejects any claims that go beyond here and 
now; in other words, beyond what is strictly human. Despite that, Nussbaum’s account 
presents itself as a demanding description of moral growth where one holds a high degree 
of responsibility for one’s emotional reactions and where emotions themselves are 
conceived as relatively complex phenomena. Aquinas’s account, on the other hand, 
presents a flexible and multilayered exposé on the nature of the passions and it introduces 
balance to thinking ethically about emotions – it is able to accommodate emotions that are 
more basic in their structure as well as emotions that depend on more complex 
operations/insights. Of particular importance for the Christian community, is the capability 
of his account to accommodate the discussion on graced affectivity. Nussbaum’s account 
considers all the claims of the faith traditions appealing to transcending the human life as 
superfluous and even dangerous. She believes such claims encourage apathy, silence to the 
present reality of an individual or community. She furthers that claims that hope in other 
worldly aid and reward do not explore the full potential of the human being. Her caution 
about an ethical perfection that undermines the merely human with no admiration and 
appreciation for the fragile beauty of the human condition highlights some real tensions 
within theological ethics, tensions any ethical account which concerns itself with character 
formation must undertake. Yet by undermining the reality of the faith dimension and its 
importance for particular moral communities, Nussbaum leaves large areas of human 
reality unexplored. Our own work is concerned predominantly with the Christian 
experience and this is where Aquinas’s account can help – it approaches human desires in 
universal terms and suggests concrete ways in which they can come to their fruition 
through a distinctively Christian life. We should also highlight once more that Aquinas’s 
account on virtuous and graced human affectivity presents itself as a non-oppressive 
account where the elements of grace join the regular human psychological development. 
Human beings typically experience their emotions in particular contexts and Aquinas’s 
account facilitates the person who wants to form his/her character in a distinctively 
Christian way. Yet the starting point of this account in the universally observable human 
tendencies, desires, and cares also enables it to be communicable to a larger audience. 
We have also sought to demonstrate the benefits and challenges that advising the 
emotions in moral situations might create. There is a substantial difference between 
presenting a general theory of ethical worth of emotions and engaging in the more delicate 
task of reflecting on how a particular emotion functions in a concrete moral situation. To 
illustrate the latter, we engaged in a presentation of two emotions; one traditionally 
recognized as morally praiseworthy, namely, compassion and the other which has a more 																																																								
1 Observation is also made by Lombardo. See The Logics of Desire, 234. 
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ambiguous moral evaluation, namely, anger. Nussbaum provided us with an extensive 
treatment of compassion which was revealed as an emotion having great ethical potential, 
especially, in the way it recognizes the common humanity between the other and myself. 
Yet we have also encountered that without proper education this emotion can go astray in 
significant ways, mostly, in its naturally limited scope. Nussbaum’s account did not remain 
uncontested and we suggested alternative views by Cates and Srinivasan. Cates’ 
theological critique argued for a more comprehensive view on compassion and proposed 
viewing it as a virtue. Srinivasan, meanwhile, criticized compassion promoted by political 
regimes as potentially dangerous in silencing victims and hindering them from assessing 
their full ethical agency. We approached anger through Aquinas’s interpretation and 
situating it against the contemporary discussions of Srinivasan, Henderson, and Thomason 
showed that the anger that Aquinas portrays is still very much relevant today. We argued 
that anger can be perceived as a first signal that there is something wrong with a particular 
moral situation. Moreover, anger can be seen as a transformative emotion enabling one to 
define himself/herself as a respect-worthy moral agent that engages in action seeking 
justice. This view, we have seen, is sharply criticized by Nussbaum who holds anger to be 
an irrational and false emotion that cripples sustainable interpersonal and political 
relationships.  
To give each emotion its due is a process of engaging in careful ethical discussions. 
The competing views we have encountered have served precisely this purpose – it 
illustrated the process of seeking a more adequate understanding of the ethical nature of 
these emotions. It further highlighted the fact that arriving at a detailed picture of the 
nature of a particular emotion requires discussion of its possible benefits, dangers, and 
consequences and a look at its most salient features, approaching it from different angles 
and disciplines. Furthermore, with these case studies we sought to demonstrate that not 
only were discussions on a particular emotion a delicate matter, but, more importantly, we 
highlighted that emotions offer significant potential for assessing moral situations in their 
fullness.  
We have also sought to show that the emotions that are more complex in their nature 
have an epistemic dimension which does not merely add something to our cognitive 
knowledge, but transforms it.2 Our main argument can be re-captured and supported by 
views of theologian Edward Collins Vacek, S.J. and philosopher Robert C. Roberts. Vacek 
argues that “[a]n experience of ‘love’ for one’s spouse is different from an experience of 
the spouse as a ‘rational animal,’ and an experience of guilt changes the meaning of the 
neutral description ‘uttered a false statement.’”3 This means that emotions bring to the fore 
features of their object, of a situation which is otherwise concealed if we attempt to engage 
only in a ‘rational’ analysis. Roberts supports our argument by pointing out that in many 
cases we can grasp the full meaning of a certain action only by attending to its emotional 
dimension.4 He presents the situation of a father selling a piece of property and asks what it 
reveals about his character? Once we know more about his motivations, the emotional 
background, we are able to have a fuller knowledge of the situation. Whether the father has 																																																								
2 Cf. Vacek, “Orthodoxy Requires Orthopathy,” 224. 
3 Ibid., 224. 
4 Cf. Robert C. Roberts, “Feeling One's Emotions and Knowing Oneself,” Philosophical Studies Vol. 77, No. 
2 (1995): 327. 
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sold the piece of property out of anger or out of deep concern for his family’s well-being 
puts forward two pictures that enable one to think of the same act in rather distinct ways. 
Looking into the emotional background of the situation thus provides significant 
information about the man, his character and how he sees the world. Many actions have the 
identity they have due to the ways they are tied to our personalities via our emotions.5  
It is precisely these, sometimes implicit layers of ethical dimension we wanted to 
bring to the fore. In daily situations when confronted with moral and social consequences 
of emotions, both others and our own, more perceptive persons may attend to the 
emotional dimension in evaluating concrete situations. Nonetheless, ethical literature does 
not widely highlight this dimension of moral conduct nor does it provide the tools to 
enable one to assess it. We wanted to demonstrate that Nussbaum and Aquinas suggest 
ethical frameworks to reflect on our affective dimension, and that those frameworks point 
to the aid emotional knowledge can bring to our moral reasoning. 
Our argument was not geared toward emotivism – the view that we should make 
ethical judgments based on subjective feelings. On the contrary, our aim was to suggest an 
ethical approach which engages in critical reflection on the moral meaning and possible 
ethical character of our emotions. We advocate ethics which provides us with tools to 
reflect on our emotions, their possible epistemic worth, and the models of their education. 
Cates notes that learning any particular account on the nature of the emotions gives one a 
specific grammar to reflect and debate about his/her emotional experiences; more than that, 
it enables one to put that grammar to use.6 Introducing language that assesses the ethical 
worth of emotions has the potential to be not only intellectually informative, but ethically 
transformative as well. Exploring the question of the ethical worth and formation of 
emotions presents the possibility of making certain aspects of our emotional lives explicit, 
salient. This enables one “to uncover and seek to articulate some of the deepest mental 
causes of one’s emotional reactions and habits, including assumptions that one makes 
about what is ultimately real and really important in life.”7 Thus thinking about the nature 
of emotions is already a formative exercise. Cates adds that this may have additional 
benefits to one’s relationships with others: “Learning such a grammar can support the 
practice of virtuous communication regarding the dynamics of one’s own and others’ 
interior lives; it can thus support more discerning and responsible human interactions.”8 
This means that an ethics that encourages going beyond action and is attentive to the 
emotional dimension is likely to form moral agents capable of honest self-discernment, 
capable of assessing his/her own environment and capable of having insight into the 
interior life of the other.  
Thus ethics engaging in the question of emotions can have benefits not only through 
assessing deeper layers of character formation, it is also likely to have practical outcomes 
in forming more aware agents. Ethics that presumes to have human relevance needs to 
resonate with the actual experience of people and emotions are very likely to have 																																																								
5 Cf. Ibid., 327. 
6 Cf. Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions, 254. She makes the argument having Aquinas’s account in mind. We 
consider this argument to be transferable to any ethical account tackling the nature of emotions as long it is 
critically worked out. 
7 Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions, 259. 
8 Ibid., 260. 
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significant social and moral consequences in individuals’ lives. If ethics mirrors the reality 
of people, it is able to suggest competent, persuasive, and personally moving directions on 
ways to live better personal and communal lives. Thus together with Vacek we highlight 
that “[w]ell-reasoned arguments themselves usually are impotent unless they correlate with 
human affectivity.”9 We additionally highlight that despite the possible beneficial practical 
outcomes emotional knowledge can offer, one can argue that being able to perceive our 
ethical realities by engaging our emotional receptivity is a morally commendable quality in 
itself. The idea is brought to the fore by Srinivasan who suggests that it is morally 
praiseworthy to feel our ethical realities, which we can understand as a capacity analogous 
to “a virtue or a capacity to be compelled by the beautiful or the sublime.”10 There is 
something ethically admirable about a person who is disposed to react to moral situations 
with emotional sensitivity and personal investment – there is something of intrinsic value 
in being able to assess moral realities in this way. And we thus argue that ethics should 
form ethical agents capable of such receptivity. 
The above arguments have direct consequences for theological ethics, a discipline 
geared to explaining experiences and behaviors stemming from the context of Christian 
faith. The Christian faith itself stems from a tradition of kinship between people, appeal to 
love and charity directed to each other and God in building a good, truly flourishing human 
life. And yet we can find a great quantity of theological works written on the tradition of 
correct beliefs, of correct praxis of those beliefs, and very little on what it means to 
experience them, to feel their truth – about ‘correct’ sets of emotions. Vacek points out that 
we rarely recognize that communities are largely built through shared emotions.11 He 
argues that: 
 
The history of Christianity is often told in terms of orthodoxy, the truth of doctrines believed; 
and Christians are frequently evaluated in terms of their orthopraxy, the good that they do. But 
the inner history of Christianity is what we might call its orthokardia, the ordered affections 
that unite us with God, ourselves, other people, and the world. These affections give rise to 
both doctrine and practice. Ultimately, our perfection as a person is measured strictly according 
to the degree of development of our loves.12 
 
 Bringing the topic of emotions to theological ethics may serve as a counter-balance 
to the view that Christian life consists solely of the exercise of intellect and will – it also, 
and very fundamentally, consists of the exercise of the heart. 13  Vacek insightfully 
comments that adequate theological anthropology should consult and discuss all these 
dimensions of human being. We hope that Nussbaum’s and Aquinas’s accounts illustrated 
how we can approach the reflection on the matters of the heart. 
We would like to end our work by acknowledging that despite the elements of 
reflection, distance, persuasion, education and cultivation we can introduce to our 
emotions, by their very nature emotions will remain elements that escape our full control. 																																																								
9 Vacek, “Orthodoxy Requires Orthopathy,” 238. 
10 Srinivasan, “The Aptness of Anger,” 15. The argument also occurs in section 2.2 Contemporary Thinkers 
on Anger: Anger as a Moral Response to an Imperfect World in this Chapter IV. 
11 Cf. Vacek, “Orthodoxy Requires Orthopathy,” 226. 
12 Vacek, Love, Human and Divine, 5. 
13 Cf. Vacek, “Orthodoxy Requires Orthopathy,” 241. 
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In other words, there will always be something mysterious about our emotions and the 
ways they reveal us to ourselves. Learning to cultivate emotions, it seems, is ultimately a 
process that consists of both mastering and learning to let go. Nussbaum elegantly captures 
this process in her explanation of attempting to understand the truth of the human heart and 
what love might be. In order to attempt to understand what love is we need more than just 
an intellectual grasp which without a doubt is a necessary and critical element of this 
pursuit. Yet ultimately we also need an element of fundamental openness to the reality of 
the other, reality beyond us. Nussbaum captures the often forgotten element with an image 
of learning to fall with an attitude of trust. She herself is utilizing an intuition found in Ann 
Beattie’s short story Learning to Fall, a story of a woman who learns her own love through 
learning not to fear her own vulnerability. Nussbaum explains that the protagonist of the 
story discovers her inner world through the medium of a boy, Andrew, telling a story about 
his mother, Ruth, learning to fall in her dance class. Her realization is summed up in the 
following insight: 
 
But what this means is that she lets herself not to stop it, she decides to stop stopping it. She 
discovers what will happen by letting it happen. Like Ruth, slowly falling in the class exercise 
that teaches and manifests trust, she learns to fall. As Andrew says, she doesn’t just go plop[;] 
she gently, slowly yields to her own folding, to the folding of his arm around her. She lets that 
touch not startle her. Like Ruth’s bodily fall, and as she sees, like a prayer, it’s something done 
yet, once you do it, fundamentally uncontrolled; no accident, yet a yielding; an aiming, but for 
grace. You can’t aim for grace really. It has so little connection, if any, with our efforts and 
actions. Yet what else can you do? How else are you supposed to pray? You open yourself for 
the possibility.14 
 
This image, we argue, captures well the general dynamics between the intellect and 
the knowledge emotions can offer to our ethical thought. Our critical insight will gather the 
intuitions offered by emotions and conceptualize it. Yet if we decide to take the epistemic 
worth of emotions seriously – we, in certain aspects, will be led by it in unexpected ways. 
Allowing emotions in the sphere of the ethical will ultimately ask one to embrace his/her 
own vulnerability. This is what an ethical judgment that connects an intellectual 
deliberation and a consultation of emotion looks like – it embraces aspects of control and 
aspects of surprise and unpredictability. We consider this intuition to be a strong aspect of 
Nussbaum’s ethics. Our moral lives and moral judgments are about deliberation, 
manageability and control. Ethics is a discipline, after all, that tackles predictable patterns 
of human behaviors and suggests reliable ways to improve them with the goal of achieving 
a human life that is fuller, better, more flourishing. While ethics in its very nature has to 
focus on this, Nussbaum points out that in order for our moral reasoning not to become 
solely procedural endeavor, we need to leave space for openness, for wise moral insight 
where we allow life, circumstances, people, our emotions to surprise and awaken us. This 
insight is especially valuable to theological ethics which is open to the Mystery of 
transcendence which requires the same space of possibility.  
Nussbaum’s metaphor of learning to fall presents a beautiful image and a good 
reminder for ethics, but her trusting fall, representing the depth of human love, does not 
embrace the dimension of the fall which requires the courage to trust what is beyond 																																																								
14 Nussbaum, “Love’s Knowledge,” 278. 
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human. This intuition, rather, is expressed in Aquinas’s hope that God himself comes to 
aid our vulnerability. This is the same intuition expressed in Rainer Maria Rilke’s poem 
Autumn portraying a different kind of fall: 
 
The leaves fall, fall as from far, 
Like distant gardens withered in the heavens; 
They fall with slow and lingering descent. 
 
And in the nights the heavy Earth, too, falls 
From out the stars into the Solitude. 
 
Thus all doth fall. This hand of mine must fall 
And lo! the other one: – it is the law. 
But there is One who holds this falling 
Infinitely softly in His hands.15 
 
Both images of human trusting fall and the fall which has trust and faith that there is 
an ultimate Love to aid us in the process are the intuitions that theories of the ethical role 
and meaning of emotions provide – the intuitions that can nurture the science of critical 
reflection that ethics rightfully is. More than that, the intuitions that can stimulate that 
reflection to be both the work of a critical mind and an insightful heart. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
15  Translation by Jessie Lemont available at the Project Gutenberg website 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/38594/38594-h/38594-h.htm [accessed 26 August, 2015]. 
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